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ABSTRACT 
It is widely assumed that the fortress-like methods typically used for managing protected 
areas will be unsustainable in the face of a growing human population. In order to help justify 
the future of conservation, people-oriented management strategies have been created to 
enable development in under-resourced rural communities living around protected areas. 
Despite the promise of these strategies, issues of ownership, management, and access to 
resources in protected areas remain highly contested by stakeholders. Stakeholder 
engagements over resources are linked to the health of natural and social systems, but this 
relationship is poorly understood. Since the management and use of natural resources in and 
around protected areas is affected by the interactions of stakeholders, understanding how to 
optimise working relationships between stakeholders is critical for the effective management 
of protected area centred ecosystems.  
This study is based on two in-depth studies of ecotourism concessions in Tanzania as well as 
a case investigated outside of Tanzania, a private game reserve in South Africa. It makes use 
of participant observation, semi-structured interviews and qualitative analysis to gather 
contextually sensitive data that yields understanding on the complex human aspects of socio-
ecological problems. The thesis focuses on social factors influencing co-operative natural 
resource management. Findings emphasize the important influence of ad-hoc human 
behaviour on the outcome of co-operative natural resource management. In particular co-
operation, power, and trust were found to be pervasive issues that were not only influential in 
determining stakeholder engagement outcomes, but also had a significant impact on natural 
resources in and around the protected areas in question. Recommendations are given for 
practitioners in each of the three cases and a more generalised set of guidelines for 
stakeholder interactions in natural resource co-management are abstracted from a cross-case 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1. Introduction 
When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in 
the universe. 
– John Muir, My First Summer in the Sierra, 1911, p.110 
Natural resource management in and around protected areas is inherently complex. It 
includes an understanding of the natural components in an ecosystem such as flora, fauna, 
climate, and ecological cycles (Petty et al., 2015). In addition natural resource management 
must also be sensitive to human interactions with those natural components within the 
environment. The development of management systems for protected natural resources 
should consider the complex scope of these interacting and dynamic components – instead, 
they typically focus on development by abstracted design (Cleaver, 2017). Consideration of 
historical interactions from neighbouring communities has typically been a low priority in 
protected area biodiversity management plans (Cleaver, 2017; Leverington et al., 2010). This 
is most likely due to the fact that for the greater part of their existence, protected areas have 
been managed by scientists in order to maintain or improve biodiversity health through 
purely scientific means in relative isolation from humans (Worboys, Lockwood & Kothari, 
2015). In opposition to this practice, some research has suggested that resources in and 
around protected areas are best managed in collaboration with the people living around them 
rather than in an exclusionary manner by experts alone (Berkes, 2004). Hence, in the last 
three decades co-operative resource governance has been utilised with some success in the 
management of natural resources in and around protected areas (Plummer et al., 2012; Igoe, 
2006). 
Collaborative governance1 models have been developed to guide stakeholder interactions 
about co-operative resource management, but models are often vague and can be 
implemented in a myriad of ways (Shackleton et al., 2010). This is why stakeholder 
engagement strategies for resource management have been employed with varying success 
and they are, more often than not, synonymous with conflict (Stein, 2013). In Tanzania, 
                                                 
1 A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a 
collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative (Ansell & Gash, 
2008). 
2 
 
Stellmacher et al. (2012) show that relationships between stakeholders interacting for 
protected area management have been defined more by conflict than by participatory co-
operation. With particular reference to conservation and co-operative resource management 
in protected area-centred ecosystems, scholars have shown that stakeholder discussions are 
often marked by conflict (Halpern et al., 2013; McShane et al., 2011; Ferraro & Hanauer, 
2010). A major problem with co-operative management of natural resources in and around 
protected areas is that it is typically skewed along axes of power imbalances, thus increasing 
the potential for marginalizing some stakeholder groups and reinforcing or creating negative 
perceptions of conservation (Burgoyne & Kelso, 2014; Colfer, 2011; Robards et al., 2011). 
However there is little commentary on the impact that these power relations have on 
stakeholder relations, co-operative governance, and ultimately biodiversity health 
(Shackleton et al., 2010). 
It can be said that social interactions between stakeholders have an important impact on the 
environment and the effectiveness of conservation: conflict between stakeholders of natural 
resources can exacerbate negative perceptions of conservation and in turn increase associated 
risks to the natural environment (McShane et al., 2011; Dahlberg & Burlando, 2009; 
Schmidt-Soltau, 2004). If we are to improve the impacts of co-operative practices in the 
management of protected area centred ecosystems, it will be necessary to have a deeper and 
more contextual understanding of stakeholder interactions over natural resource management 
decision-making (Shackleton et al., 2010; Schmidt-Soltau, 2004). Approaching co-operative 
management with a deeper contextual understanding of stakeholders and their interests could 
help to reduce conflict and make stakeholder co-operation in and around protected areas more 
effective, thus increasing the number of cases where lasting resolutions to sustainable co-
operative resource management can be found (Emerson et al., 2012).  
While there have been some examples of successful co-operative natural resource 
management (Plummer et al., 2012), Shackleton et al. (2010) stated that much of the research 
in this field leading up to their 2010 editorial had focused on either examining the general 
effectiveness of protected areas in preserving biodiversity through co-operative management 
between rural communities and the state, or suggesting guidelines that can improve the 
likelihood of successful co-operation based on large numbers of cases (Stellmacher et al., 
2012). Since then, no studies could be found which directly investigated the underlying social 
reasons of why this approach has been implemented with little success. Attempts have been 
made to demonstrate the institutional conditions that exist in case studies that are considered 
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to be successful (Measham & Lumbasi, 2013; Cox, Arnold & Tomás, 2010), but there is little 
agreement on the definition of success and the way in which key social factors should be 
characterised (Buscher, 2014; Shackleton et al., 2010). This thesis will provide contextually 
rich knowledge about important social factors that have contributed to the outcomes of co-
operative natural resource management arrangements, with particular reference to ecotourism 
concessions in Africa.  
In this thesis, three case studies are presented in an analysis of some of the difficulties and 
successes experienced by stakeholders that are laying claim to contested resources in areas 
where multiple resource uses are spatially overlapping, or happening in close proximity. The 
study visits the two focus cases of Ololosokwan community conservancy in Tanzania and the 
Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area on the coast of Zanzibar, as well as the 
comparative case of Phinda Game Reserve in South Africa which will be visited in less detail 
but will be a useful addition for testing the broader ideas of the former cases. In each case 
there has been conflict over resources but the current state of stakeholder relationships is 
different in each of these protected areas. Each case study will thus make a unique 
contribution to understanding the nature and impact of stakeholder interactions as well as the 
linkages these interactions have with co-operative governance outcomes. The cases have 
many similarities while also having some vast differences. This diversity of data will be 
important in illustrating how stakeholders can best work together in a variety of contexts to 
equitably manage natural systems co-operatively. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Rural communities in Africa depend largely on natural resources for their livelihoods, 
creating an indelible link between sustainable resource management and societal welfare. 
Natural resources are under threat of decline because of various anthropogenic impacts on the 
environment, including but not limited to overuse of resources, pollution, and growing 
populations. Protected areas have been a successful tool in preserving these natural resources, 
such as ecosystems that provide goods and services. However, the fortress-like methods that 
have typically been used for managing protected areas have led to conflict over resource 
access and use. In response, people-oriented management strategies were developed in an 
attempt to reduce conflict by having conservation contribute to the needs of under-resourced 
rural communities. Despite this strategy issues of ownership, management, and access to 
resources in protected areas remain highly contested by stakeholders. Conflict over resources 
4 
 
has been linked to the declining health of natural and social systems (Schmidt-Soltau, 2004), 
but this relationship is poorly understood (Shackleton et al., 2010). Since the management 
and use of natural resources in and around protected areas is affected by the interactions of 
stakeholders, understanding how to optimise working relationships between stakeholders is 
critical for the effective management of protected area centred ecosystems. This study 
focuses on stakeholder interactions over contested natural resources in order to add to the 
knowledge framework about improving working relations in co-operative natural resource 
governance arrangements, with specific reference to ecotourism in southern and east Africa. 
1.3 Background to the problem 
Natural resources are the basis of the modern economy in many nations, particularly 
developing nations in Africa. According to the African Natural Resources Centre, natural 
resources accounted for 42% of African government revenues in 20122. In Tanzania for 
example, not only do rural communities depend on natural resources for subsistence 
livelihoods but so does the economy at large with agriculture, mining and tourism being the 
biggest contributors to the economy2. Speaking at the 2014 International Tourism Fair in 
Tanzania, the Deputy Minister for Natural Resources Lazaro Nyalandu stated that the tourism 
sector contributed USD 1.8 billion to the country's economy in 2013. He said that tourism is 
one of the few economic sectors that is growing strongly, and that it is driving economic 
progress in Tanzania3.  
Effective management of natural resources is in the best interests of ecosystem stakeholders, 
especially rural communities that depend on natural resources. The African Natural 
Resources Centre reports that over 70% of Africa's sub-Saharan population depends on 
forests and woodlands as a fuel supply. In concordance with this dependence on natural 
resources, the World Health Organization (2005) has stated that rural people gain significant 
benefits to their well-being from healthy ecosystems. Díaz et al. (2006) similarly state that in 
communities relying largely on natural resources for sustenance, health standards tend to 
decrease when there is ecosystem decline due to over-utilisation of resources. The impact of 
damaging or degrading natural resources can be negative at both the macro (economy) and 
micro (rural livelihoods) scales. 
                                                 
2
 http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/african-natural-resources-center-anrc/ 
3
 http://www.tanzaniainvest.com/tourism/news/1299-tanzania-tourism-earnings-reach-record-high 
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Natural resources are under threat. Growing populations and decreasing land availability are 
two factors impacting the way in which people use natural resources. Research on poverty 
and environmental degradation abounds: Some would argue that poverty has a direct 
connection to environmental degradation (Barrett et al., 2011; Alam, 2010; Baland et al., 
2010; Mukiibi, 2010) while others show that this is not always the case (Gosling, Shackleton 
and Gambiza, 2017; Kangalawe & Lyimo, 2013; Child, 2013). In either case, it has been 
shown that growing populations can put strain on natural resources (Kangalawe & Lyimo, 
2013; Harte, 2007; Pimentel et al., 2007). Rural populations are growing. For example, the 
national census database shows that the population of the Ngorongoro District in northern 
Tanzania grew by 34% from 129,776 to 174,278 between 2002 and 20124. In the 
Ololosokwan community, a village within the Ngorongoro district of Tanzania, the population 
increased by about 350% between 1982 and 2012 when it reached approximately 5000 
people due to high fertility rates (Bartels, 2014). During that time, the amount of land 
available for rural livelihoods decreased. This was in part due to the economic liberalisation 
of the Tanzanian economy from the late 1980s which led to the lease of wildlife tourism 
concessions to foreign investors. In addition to this the Tanzanian government has also 
increased the amount of legally protected land (Rurai, 2012).  
As populations grow and land space diminishes, the human impact on the environment will 
increase. On Matemwe village land in Zanzibar, over 70% of the land area has been 
transformed over the last 50 years from natural cover to different land-cover conditions 
relating to human use (Käyhkö et al., 2011). As natural land is being altered, ecosystems are 
being damaged or lost. Natural land-cover is vital to the preservation of ecosystems and the 
natural goods and services they provide. As the amount of natural land-cover and associated 
biodiversity dwindles, so does the environment‘s ability to support healthy natural-resource 
based livelihoods (Gosling, Shackleton & Gambiza, 2017; WHO, 2005). 
Protected areas have been used as a tool to preserve ecosystems which are at risk (Dudley et 
al., 2014). Historically, tracts of land became legally protected to preserve dramatic scenery 
and significant or endangered wildlife populations (Gaston et al., 2008). Human interaction 
in protected areas was seen to be interference in natural mechanisms, leading to the forced 
removal of people living within the confines of areas that were deemed worthy of the 
protection afforded by science and the state (Child, 2013; Gush, 2009). This autocratic 
                                                 
4 www.nbs.go.tz 
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management of protected areas by scientists and authorities, and the prevention of access to 
natural resources once depended upon by indigenous people, has been called ‗fortress 
conservation‘ (Brockington, 2002). This history of dispossession is one of the reasons for 
some rural peoples' negative opinion of conservation objectives (Igoe, 2006). A history of 
negative relationships between rural communities and conservation practitioners, and the loss 
of communal land has sparked conflict over natural resources across Africa. Stakeholder 
conflicts over ownership of land and access to resources have hampered the management of 
protected area centred ecosystems (Rurai, 2012).  
In response to the problems generated by this 'fortress'5 type management of protected areas 
that is biodiversity-oriented, various forms of co-operative management have been developed 
to empower dispossessed rural communities (Pomeroy, 1995; Jentoft, 1989). This inclusive, 
people-oriented brand of conservation has broadened the objectives for protecting land and 
resources to include support for social development in communities that affect, and are 
affected by, conservation. Financial and natural resources produced in protected areas are 
being used in some cases as developmental tools for rural communities: they can be a source 
of income through nature-based tourism (Dikgang & Muchapondwa, 2016; Holmes, 2015). 
Thus through people-oriented and co-operative management, rural communities can directly 
benefit from the protection of natural resources (Gardner et al., 2013). However issues about 
ownership of resources, access to resources, and a lack of effective co-operation has led to 
conflict between stakeholders and thus troubled working relationships (Burgoyne & Kelso, 
2014; Cundill et al., 2013; Cinner et al., 2012). While there are examples of successful co-
operation, even in these cases ideals have not been achieved (Dressler et al., 2010; 
Shackleton et al., 2010). Some argue that true win-win situations are not possible (Muradian 
et al., 2013; McShane et al., 2011; Dressler et al., 2010; Ferraro & Hanauer, 2010); others are 
of the mind that such an ideal can be achieved (Sessin-Dilascio et al., 2015; Gardner et al., 
2013; Mukul et al., 2012). As a proposed solution to fortress management, co-operative 
management remains fraught with problems. 
Due to the open nature of ecological systems, co-operation between stakeholders in the 
management of protected areas is a necessary basis for effective management of resources 
and the fair distribution of costs and benefits. Even where protected areas are fenced, natural 
resources are often ranging (e.g. antelope that migrate seasonally) or too widely distributed to 
                                                 
5 Also called the ‗Fences and Fines‘ model of biodiversity management 
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be confined to a single protected area, necessitating a landscape approach to conservation 
(Sayer et al., 2013; Cadman et al., 2010). An example of this would be the many unfenced 
protected areas in Africa, such as the Serengeti National Park, that are not fenced off making 
them open systems with the landscapes around them. In these cases, the limitations to 
conventional ‗fortress‘ type methods of protected area establishment and management 
become clear. It is equally important to sustainably manage resources in the landscape 
beyond the boundary of protected areas (Muller, 2014; Sayer et al., 2013; Sunderland, 2013). 
The boundary and surroundings of protected areas are the parts of the landscape where 
human interactions with natural resources become important to consider. It is for this reason 
that stakeholder co-operation is a vital consideration for effective conservation of 
biodiversity. 
A good working relationship between stakeholders is a pre-requisite for good management of 
wide-ranging resources and landscape-scale ecosystems. However, successful co-operation 
has been an elusive goal and people-oriented conservation continues to be marred by 
stakeholder conflict (Larson et al., 2016). In co-operative approaches, resource management 
conflicts arise relatively frequently in developing nations with a short democratic record 
(Niedziałkowski, Paavola & Jędrzejewska, 2012). Stellmacher et al. (2012) found that in 
Tanzania, which received independence from Britain in the 1960s, there can be up to 17 
stakeholder groups involved in protected area management. They also state that co-operation 
between decision making stakeholders is limited, particularly between government and rural 
communities because of the continued struggles for power over resources in post-colonial 
Tanzania (Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Stellmacher et al., 2012). A basic analysis of 
stakeholders and their interactions is not enough however: a more contextual understanding 
of what is driving these conflicts will be useful in trying to help stakeholders co-operate 
effectively and coalesce their interests in the management of resources in protected area 
centred ecosystems (Crona & Hubacek, 2010; Shackleton et al., 2010). 
Having stakeholders support alternative interests is a key part of conservation initiatives 
(Sayce et al., 2013; Sayer et al., 2013; Young et al., 2013). Andrade and Rhodes (2012) 
performed a review of research investigating the factors that influence community support of 
conservation objectives. They found that community participation in managing a protected 
area was an important variable that was significantly related to higher levels of support for 
conservation strategies. In cases where there is conflict over these strategies, ineffective 
management of protected area centred ecosystems has been more common (Young et al., 
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2013; Andrade & Rhodes, 2012; Horigue et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2012; Niedziałkowski, 
Paavola & Jędrzejewska, 2012; Hirschnitz-Garbers & Stoll-Kleemann, 2011; Suuronen et al., 
2010; Stump & Kriwoken, 2006). It can thus be stated that stakeholder relationships have a 
strong influence on the management and use of resources in and around protected areas. 
Current methods of engaging stakeholders6 over issues of resource management have proven 
problematic, with unresolved conflict among stakeholders being a common symptom seen in 
case study research on protected area and natural resource management (Laws et al., 2014). 
While participation and co-operation have been widely called for in natural resource 
management literature, there is little in the literature that investigates the nature of social 
interactions among stakeholders and their impact on co-operative governance outcomes. 
From the aforementioned it can be presumed that in order for any people-oriented initiative to 
work, stakeholders need to have positive working relationships. Shackleton et al. (2010) 
wrote in their community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) editorial for the 
journal of Environmental Conservation that the bulk of research submitted to their special 
journal edition on people-oriented conservation has focused on highlighting ineffective 
protected area management arrangements, analysing co-operative decision making, or 
quantifying the contribution of conservation initiatives to household livelihoods and 
community development – there has been relatively little work investigating, at a localised 
scale, the inescapable issues of trust between stakeholders, the power landscapes that define 
their interactions, and equity concerns resulting from these engagements (Stellmacher et al., 
2012; Crona & Hubacek, 2010; Shackleton et al., 2010). Shackleton et al. (2010) write that 
such information could help stakeholders to achieve justice in their co-operation and greater 
enactment of community rights to resources. 
1.4 Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to use three case studies to investigate the social factors affecting 
outcomes of stakeholder interactions in co-operative natural resource governance for 
protected area centred ecosystems where there are contested resources, specifically in the 
context of ecotourism. This thesis borrows from the political ecology paradigm of analysing 
the state and history of working relationships where there are multiple significant decision 
                                                 
6 ―Stakeholder engagement, in the natural resource management context, most often refers to the participation of 
stakeholders in planning or decision-making efforts in order to integrate their knowledge and values with a 
particular project‘s more specialized knowledge and purpose‖ (Talley, Schneider & Lindquist, 2016:37) 
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makers (Robbins, 2011). The main research question for this study is:  
With specific reference to ecotourism in Tanzania and South Africa, how do social 
factors influence socio-environmental outcomes of co-operative natural resource 
management arrangements? 
As such the thesis grapples with: 
 Co-operation, power, and conflict in stakeholder interactions 
 Ownership of, access to, and management of natural resources 
 The structure and outcomes of co-operative natural resource management 
arrangements. 
This study has the following objectives to help answer the main research question: 
 Investigate stakeholder sharing of resources and benefits stemming from nature-based 
tourism to find links between stakeholder relations and resource sharing 
 Investigate stakeholder engagement to determine if co-operative governance is 
serving particular interests 
 Use the information gleaned from Objectives 1-4 to compare the three cases and find 
key social factors that affect the outcomes of working relationships in the three cases 
considered, thus providing generalised guidelines for stakeholder behaviour that can 
yield improved outcomes for co-operative natural resource management. 
1.5 Research Design 
The study has a comparative case study design that makes use of multiple methods in 
gathering data. Analysis for each case is to be performed concurrently. A case study protocol 
was used so that data from different cases was obtained using the same process, thus allowing 
for a fair cross-case analysis. Cases have been selected because of their prominent features 
that are of interest to the study. They were also selected because an ecotourism company 
wanted greater understanding of the role that stakeholder relations have had in shaping co-
operative governance outcomes in these cases. The three cases have many similarities, but 
there are important differences in the history of interactions between stakeholders and the 
current state of their relationships: 
 Ololosokwan community conservancy on the border of the Serengeti National Park in 
Tanzania: The Ololosokwan community leases their land to ecotourism operator 
&Beyond. &Beyond is the operator at Klein‘s Camp Lodge. Relations between the 
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company and the community have not been good in the past but this is beginning to 
change (Personal communications with Niall Anderson, August 2014). There is no 
managing body or general management plan for the conservancy but &Beyond 
manages it in an ad-hoc fashion. Additional financial assistance is given to for 
community development projects. Relations between the community and 
governmental bodies, e.g. the Tanzanian National Parks Authority (TANAPA), are 
strained. The location of this case is seen in Figure 1 
 Mnemba Island and the Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area (MIMCA) on the 
north-eastern shore of Unguja Island, Zanzibar, Tanzania:  &Beyond leases the island 
from the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar for the operation of the Mnemba 
Island Lodge. They are involved in the government driven MIMCA management 
body. There is a management authority and plan but it is not being implemented 
effectively. Relationships between government, the MIMCA managing authority and 
the communities are strained. While the government has been autocratic, communities 
appear willing to work with authorities in managing the protected area (Personal 
communications with Mike Makame, August 2014). The location of this case is seen 
in Figure 1 and 
 Phinda Game Reserve in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa: &Beyond and the two 
communities living next to the reserve each own approximately a third of the reserve. 
There is a conservation management body within &Beyond and a well implemented 
management plan in the reserve. Relations between the communities and &Beyond 
are good. There is benefit sharing taking place and the communities at Mnqobokazi 
and Makasa are largely happy with the current situation as they seek to improve the 
state of their self-reliance, though some community members still feel marginalised 
(Burgoyne & Kelso, 2014). The location of this case is seen in Figure 2. 
The legal frameworks relating to conservation and resource ownership in South Africa are 
quite different to Tanzania, and this allows for a contrasting analysis of the two Tanzanian 
cases, including additional information about why the system works at Phinda Game Reserve 
and what has led to the development of good relations. For continuity and control, it is 
important to note that the same tourism company (&Beyond) has the leases to Klein‘s Camp 
and Mnemba Island, and manages conservation and tourism in Phinda Game Reserve. The 
study focuses on the human aspect of resource management and is heavily qualitative, using 
semi-structured and unstructured discussions in order to maintain openness to the unexpected.  
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Figure 1: Map of Tanzania showing the location of Mnemba Island and the Ololosokwan 
Conservancy (inset: Map of Africa showing position of Tanzania in east Africa) 
 
Figure 2: Map showing Phinda Game Reserve (in green) in KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa 
(inset: Map showing location of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa in southern Africa) 
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1.6 Theoretical Framework 
The difficulties faced by protected area management authorities can be termed what Brown et 
al. (2010) call a ‗wicked problem.‘ A wicked problem is a complex social environmental 
issue that cannot be solved using standard modes of inquiry and decision making. ―The task 
is therefore to draw on all our intellectual resources, valuing the contributions of all the 
academic disciplines as well as other ways in which we construct our knowledge‖ (Brown et 
al., 2010, p.4). Dealing with the research problem requires investigation of complex 
contextual issues around stakeholder interactions over natural resource ownership, access, 
and management. The study thus requires contributions from several distinct domains of 
knowledge including the broader concept of qualitative research, co-operative natural 
resource governance, community-based natural resource management, political ecology, 
social capital, and the conservation-development debate. 
This study assumes that a transdisciplinary approach is necessary in threading together 
quantitative knowledge on natural resources and qualitative knowledge of stakeholder 
working relations in specific contexts. In understanding these linkages we can begin 
understanding the complex problems associated with divergent stakeholder interests over 
natural resource management and use. While the study is largely qualitative, focusing on 
social issues affecting co-operative governance, the state of natural resources is also 
investigated at each site. Early research suggested that natural resources can be an important 
indicator of outcomes for natural resource management programs (Wolf, 1972). This work by 
Wolf (1972) led to the development of a political approach to ecology which assumes that 
factors affecting, and affected by, the state of natural resources might not be revealed from a 
quantitative investigation of the state of natural resources.  
In focusing on the complex interactions occurring between the social and biological 
environments this study borrows certain assumptions from the field of political ecology. Wolf 
(1972:202) wrote in one of the early works on political ecology that this complex and well-
established approach assumes there are important linkages ―between the pressures emanating 
from the larger society and the exigencies of the local ecosystem.‖ The political ecology 
approach assumes that politics7 are affected by uneven distribution of costs and benefits 
within a socio-economic system (Görg et al., 2017; Bryant and Bailey, 1997). While 
                                                 
7 In this thesis the word politics is taken to mean ‗the power to exercise organized control‘ 
13 
 
apolitical ecology studies are focused largely on biodiversity, studies inclusive of any politics 
affecting ecology combine ―inquiries into multiple local ecological contexts with a greater 
knowledge of social and political history‖ (Wolf, 1972:204). This study examines the 
political nature of natural systems as it aims to perform holistic inquiry into three unique 
socio-ecological landscapes. 
The research problem is ultimately centred on the working relations that are a basis for co-
operative management of natural resources. The issue this is underpinned by is the 
conservation-development debate. It is a critical sustainability issue for biodiversity and 
human quality of life. The division is often that biologists argue for the preservation of 
biodiversity while humanists would argue for the use of resources rather than their 
conservation for conservation‘s sake (Siurua, 2006). On both sides the debate is about how 
resources should be managed and used. They can either remain unused and managed within a 
fenced fortress, or they can be managed co-operatively and used to varying degrees. This 
study is based on the premise that indigenous people have a right to access resources. This is 
what Harris, Brown and Russel (2010) call a people-centred conservation. In this thesis the 
word centred is exchanged for oriented because it is less exacting. This research focuses on 
understanding problematic aspects of co-operative, people-oriented natural resource 
management in the conservation-development debate. 
Current theory in fields relating to people-oriented natural resource management focuses on 
factors that contribute to successful co-operative working arrangements between stakeholders 
(Cox, Arnold & Tomás, 2010). Design factors and property regimes are important to 
understand but equally as important are certain social factors influencing co-operative natural 
resource management that have been largely overlooked in academia (Cox, Arnold & Tomás, 
2010; Shackleton et al., 2010). This study investigates conflict, relationships of power, and 
trust between stakeholders to understand how these factors impact resource access, 
management, and use. It is logical to suppose that working relationships are in part 
responsible for the outcome of co-operative natural resource management programs, but there 
has been little research on how issues of power and trust shape working relations and 
program outcomes (Crona & Hubacek, 2010; Shackleton et al., 2010). This research focuses 
on that gap with particular reference to ecotourism in east Africa.  
1.7 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 2 provides a review of literature on people-oriented conservation by investigating 
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global trends in this research, placing an emphasis on South Africa and Tanzania. The chapter 
discusses people-oriented conservation, and co-operative governance. Key terms such as 
community, community-based, ownership, participation, communication, power and trust are 
discussed. The chapter points out some of the shortcomings of co-operative governance 
programmes and discusses why these problems are worth solving. 
Chapter 3 details the history of natural resource ownership and management in the three cases 
considered in this research. A contextual discussion takes place to situate the cases within the 
history of conservation and protected areas in Tanzania and South Africa. This is vital in 
providing historical context to the current state of working relations in this study. 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used in this research. The broader ontological aspects of 
research design are first considered. The case study approach is then discussed along with 
sampling strategies, sample sizes, the design of the interview schedule, and analytical 
techniques used in the analysis of data. Limitations for the study are described in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 is the first of the three case studies. This chapter details the investigation on the 
Ololosokwan community game reserve in Tanzania. The history of conservation and the 
concession in the Ololosokwan community is presented. The stakeholders and their interests 
are outlined, along with a review of the factors affecting stakeholder relations and conflict. 
Chapter 6 details the second case study of the Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area in 
Tanzania. A history of the conservation area is provided along with an outline of the 
stakeholders and their interests. A review of relations also takes place with mention of factors 
affecting the particularly poor state of relations in this case. 
Chapter 7 contains the last of the three case studies in this thesis: Phinda Game Reserve in 
South Africa. The history of the reserve is recounted. This case is examined for reasons why 
the relations between stakeholders are so positive. This provides a contrasting set of 
information for an analysis of the two Tanzanian cases where relations and co-operation 
between stakeholders are poor. Stakeholder and their interests are outlined 
Chapter 8 provides an in-depth cross-case analysis of the three cases considered in chapters 5, 
6, and 7. The results of the three cases are compared to make generalised statements about 
co-operative governance in conservation and ecotourism. 
Chapter 9 is a summative chapter that concludes the thesis with a synthesis of findings for 
principles guiding co-operative governance and recommendations for further research. In this 
chapter there is also a discussion of the novel contribution that this thesis makes to the 
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application of community-based natural resource management techniques in ecotourism 
concessions in Africa, with particular focus on the role that ecotourism plays in community-
based conservation initiatives. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces this thesis and briefly outlines the research process including the 
research problem, aim, objectives, research design, theoretical framework, and how the 
resulting contributions will add to the knowledge framework using repeatable qualitative 
research techniques. The use of extensive qualitative datasets gathered during the research 
process not only allows for the conclusions drawn in this study but also provide an important 
baseline snapshot of the state of the socio-environmental systems in each of the three cases 
considered, a useful pool of information for future research. This chapter provided an 
introduction to the research problem and briefly described the processes used to investigate 
this problem. Overall this study makes contributions to our understanding of social factors 
influencing social and environmental outcomes for co-operative natural resource 
management, the influence of benefit sharing in conservation and tourism, and power 
relations within communities that are stakeholders in ecotourism contexts in Africa.  
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CHAPTER 2: PEOPLE-ORIENTED CONSERVATION: A REVIEW OF 
COMMUNITY-BASED AND CO-OPERATIVE BIODIVERSITY 
GOVERNANCE LITERATURE 
2. Introduction 
Conservation science has undergone significant changes over the last few decades. For the 
greater part of the 20th century, it was focused on the preservation of biodiversity even where 
that meant that people living around protected areas would have to bear the costs.  In concert 
with global human rights movements that developed in the 1960s, this focus changed as 
conservation science became increasingly concerned with human welfare. In addition, the 
efficacy of preserving biodiversity despite human poverty was called into question. People-
oriented conservation, where the focus of conservation is expanded to include human welfare, 
has become a popular alternative to the conventional 'protectionist' approach that focuses 
solely on biodiversity. There has been a lack of consistent development however, and 
according to some scholars the field is in disarray (Dressler et al., 2010; Shackleton et al., 
2010). Proponents of people-oriented approaches to conservation argue that while this 
method has been plagued by significant problems, it is merely in its infancy and must 
continue to be developed and improved (Dressler et al., 2010; Stamm, 2019).  
Before one can disentangle the complexities of the field, people-oriented conservation must 
be defined because it is the umbrella term under which all of these approaches are classified. 
The classification of the various approaches must then be decided along with a discussion of 
the assumptions underpinning these strategy designs and the ultimate purpose of the people-
oriented approach to conservation, i.e. improving the quality of life in rural communities 
living near protected areas while also conserving biodiversity. As we do so we will discuss 
these topics in the context of African conservation and identify some of the short-comings 
and knowledge gaps in research fields that are associated with people-oriented conservation. 
2.1 People-Oriented Conservation 
2.1.1 What is it? 
The concept of people-oriented conservation first gained popularity after the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) passed a resolution in 1975 after the General 
Assembly held in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The resolution 
recognized the rights of people to participate in natural resource management when their 
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livelihoods were affected by conservation (Jonas, 2014). The idea that conservation should 
maximize human welfare has become increasingly prominent in conservation (Doak et al., 
2015; Naughton-Treves, Holland, & Brandon, 2005). Proponents of people-oriented 
conservation have pointed out the flaws of the protectionist approach to biodiversity 
conservation in order to make the alternative method seem more attractive (Doak et al., 
2015).  
It has been said by critics of conventional conservation that conservationists have worked to 
protect nature without concern for human welfare (Suckling, 2012), that conventional 
protectionist conservation is an unsustainable approach (Stevens, 2014), and that protected 
areas create more problems than they solve (West, Igoe & Brockington, 2006). These short-
comings have caused some to advocate that the historically prevalent 'fences and fines'8 
approach to conservation has failed, and that conservation efforts should be more inclusive of 
humans (Doak et al., 2015; Zielinski et al., 2018). While advocates of a human-oriented 
approach to conservation do not necessarily lessen the importance of biodiversity 
preservation, they do agree that conservation cannot be sustainably achieved without the 
inclusion of rural stakeholders in natural resource management and utilisation (Kareiva and 
Marvier, 2007; Zielinski et al., 2018). 
Biodiversity conservation practice has undergone major changes in the last few decades. Due 
to the recognition of various problems resulting from the 'fences and fines' or 'fortress' 
approach to conservation, conservation practice came under significant scrutiny during the 
late 20th century. This biodiversity-oriented paradigm remains pervasive, but people-oriented 
approaches have become widely accepted by conservation practitioners as a more sustainable 
solution (Harris, Brown & Russel, 2010). People-oriented conservation has not been well 
defined in the literature, but it has been described to some extent (Dawkins, 2018). Hulme 
and Murphree (1999) described people-oriented conservation using the three major shifts in 
thinking that this approach entailed. These include 1) a focus on community, 2) a re-
conceptualisation of conservation based on ideas about sustainable utilisation, and 3) the 
utilisation of market forces to make conservation pay for itself (Hulme & Murphree, 1999). 
People-oriented conservation can thus be used to label approaches that include a focus on 
either community engagement in conservation strategy, or community benefit from 
conservation and related tourism.  
                                                 
8 Also known as a ‗fortress‘ approach to conservation, a phrase used elsewhere in this thesis 
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More recently Ruiz-Mallen et al. (2015:1) have described people-oriented conservation as a 
means to reconcile ―the goals of conservation and development by establishing partnerships 
between local communities and external organizations. These partnerships intend to increase 
the economic and other benefits that local people get from becoming involved in resource 
protection.‖ This definition by Ruiz-Mallen et al. states more specifically that obtaining 
economic, social, and infrastructural benefits is the purpose of a community and participatory 
focus (Dawkins, 2018; Hulme & Murphree, 1999). Thus the term people-oriented 
conservation can be used to describe a number of approaches that are used to engage local 
stakeholders in conservation strategies in order to benefit people whose livelihoods are 
affected, with the concurrent aim of maintaining or improving biodiversity conservation 
outcomes. 
People-oriented conservation seeks to engage with people living around protected areas in 
increasing economic and other benefits. This is because of two important connections that 
scholars have identified between people and conservation. Firstly, it has been identified that 
effective engagement with local communities in joint management of natural resources can 
improve resource management outcomes (Johannes, 1981; see also Andam et al., 2010; 
Nelson & Chomitz, 2011; Nguyen, Tyler & Tong, 2018; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012). 
Secondly, researchers have come to understand that the communities that benefit from 
conservation are more likely to participate in, and respond positively to, conservation 
activities on and around their land (Herriman, 2017; Jones & Murphree, 2004; Nelson & 
Agrawal, 2008; Ruiz-Mallen et al., 2015).  
The understanding that these two constructive relationships underpin positive outcomes for 
conservation led conservation practitioners to develop what Hulme and Murphree (1999) 
called a new form of biodiversity conservation. More recently the people-oriented approach 
has been called the new conservation science by Doak et al. (2015). It is an approach that is 
inclusive of people living around protected areas (Dawkins, 2018). Inclusiveness is a defining 
characteristic of people-oriented conservation and has been a major departure from the 
historically dominant protectionist conservation that largely excluded local people since its 
development in the 19th century. The rise to popularity of the people-oriented approach in the 
late 20th century was global, and as such many different methods of engaging people in 
conservation have been developed. Let us review some of these methods. 
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2.1.2 Approaches to People-Oriented Conservation 
After the conceptualisation of people-oriented forms of conservation in the 1970s, initiatives 
that attempted to integrate conservation and development were developed in the 1980s as a 
means to practically implement the 'new conservation science'. These initiatives were 
originally limited in their scope and size, but have since become much larger and broader. 
Many of these initiatives were not entirely successful leading to much criticism and many 
different styles of implementation in the search for success (Hannah, 1992; Wells et al., 
1998). Today, the many forms of people-oriented conservation have been branded in a variety 
of ways and there are proponents for these various brands who describe the vices of 
conventional conservation while expounding upon the benefits of their approach. 
In describing the various 'new' conservation approaches, practitioners and scholars have used 
terms that included integrated conservation-development projects (ICDP), community-based 
conservation (CBC), community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), community 
wildlife management, collaborative or co-operative management, and protected area outreach 
programs to name only a few. These approaches have all sought to break the trend of 
excluding local people whose livelihoods were affected by conservation, a trend that was 
synonymous with 19th and 20th century conservation (Ramutsindela, 2006). All of these 
various methods that are being used to govern resource use necessitate co-operation between 
stakeholders, whether it is simply supporting conservation initiatives around protected areas 
or being actively involved in protected area management. Co-operative governance of natural 
resources has become a significant field of implementation and study, yet it remains plagued 
by problems due to a lack of operational consistency. This study is situated within co-
operative natural resource governance literature, specifically focusing on ecotourism 
operations in African protected areas. 
2.1.2.1 Co-operative Natural Resource Management 
For the greater part of the 20th century natural resource management was the domain of 
scientists and experts (Anaya & Espirito-Santo, 2018; Dressler et al., 2010). As researchers 
exposed the latent knowledge that citizens held, co-operation between scientists and citizens, 
or state and non-state, was recognised as a viable option for the management of public and 
common-pool natural resources. Some of the first co-operative agreements on natural 
resource use became operational in the 1970s when indigenous Americans were afforded 
collective choice rights (Plummer & Armitage, 2007). Early studies on these co-operative 
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management arrangements were based in organisational and public management studies 
(Gray, 1989, in Fresque, 2008) as well as property studies and common pool resource 
research (Plummer & Armitage, 2007). Early work by Gray (1989) suggested that 
collaboration occurs in response to turbulent environmental conditions resulting in 
interdependence in organisations. One of the foundational concepts coming from Gray's work 
was that co-operative management assumes joint ownership in decision making and 
collective responsibility. This is because co-operative approaches bring multiple stakeholders 
together to engage in consensus-oriented decision making (Ansell & Gash, 2012:543), 
particularly in cases with contested claims on certain property or resources (Plummer & 
Armitage, 2007).  
Much of the work in this field during the early 1990s was focused on developing strategies, 
frameworks of analysis, and examining the success or failure of various cases (Grimble, 
1998; Notzke, 1995). While these kinds of research continue today, there is a significantly 
larger theoretical base for the co-operative approach and there is thus a wider application and 
integration of this approach. Researchers in the 2000s began to integrate the co-operative 
approach with theory on complex systems, adaptive management, and governance (Foucat, 
2002; Plummer & Armitage, 2007; Rammel, Stagl & Wilfring, 2007).  
Co-operative natural resource management is distinct among people-oriented approaches to 
conservation. An important aim for co-operative initiatives is for the community to be an 
active part of natural resource management, while approaches like ICDPs more typically 
incorporate a form of benefit sharing but not active co-management (Dressler et al., 2010; 
Newmark & Hough, 2000; Sandbrook, Cavanagh and Tumusiime, 2018).  Almost all people-
oriented conservation projects will have a human development component, i.e. benefit 
sharing (Baral, & and Heinen, 2007; Hughes & Flintan, 2001; Matseketsa et al., 2018), but 
co-operative approaches should go beyond merely incorporating human concerns to actively 
involving local rural stakeholders in natural resource management and conservation 
(Bodonirina et al., 2018; Dhungel, 2008). Hence the title that is now so commonly used to 
describe conservation initiatives that actively involve community participation: community-
based. 
2.1.2.2 Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
This form of co-operative natural resource management is one of the most well-known. It 
was devised in the second half of the 20th century, a time period which saw international 
21 
 
donors intensify funding of centralised conservation efforts in developing nations (Dressler et 
al., 2010). At the height of African nationalism during the 1960s, developing states received 
support for strong conservation measures which benefited tourism and elites while causing 
cost for marginalised people (Moswete & Thapa, 2018; Neumann, 2001). The CBNRM 
approach gained popularity in the 1980s and 1990s when a growing number of more 
inclusive conservation initiatives were labelled with the CBNRM brand (Dzingirai, Manhamo 
& Mangwanya, 2018). In the early 1990s, CBNRM initiatives and research were focused on 
implementation as opposed to understanding the political landscape in which these initiatives 
were implemented (Murphree, 1995). Since then research on CBNRM has had an increasing 
focus on the social, political, and economic landscape in which it is situated, following the 
political ecology approach. 
Community-based natural resource management came about due to a growing realisation that 
in some cases coercive conservation had harmed the social and material welfare of people 
whose livelihoods depended on natural resources (Brandon and Wells, 1992). The CBNRM 
ideal is to address human welfare concerns while simultaneously ensuring the conservation of 
biodiversity. This approach places an emphasis on local people's knowledge and abilities in 
the management and conservation of biodiversity. It was hoped that an emphasis on local 
partnerships that utilised indigenous knowledge would produce locally relevant and equitable 
conservation (Berkes, 2004). The CBNRM approach has been implemented in resource 
management and conservation programs globally. In Zimbabwe, the Communal Areas 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) became well known 
globally because of the success with which it was able to financially enrich the communities 
who participated (Kamphorst et al., 1997). In Nigeria, a CBNRM programme was able to 
improve living conditions for 64 communities in the Niger Delta by funding the operations of 
small-scale agricultural entrepreneurs (Coker et al., 2014). These are examples of CBNRM 
initiatives across the world that have successfully improved quality of live while 
simultaneously improving local natural resource governance. 
Despite the more effectively implemented cases other examples have not indicated such 
success and there has been much debate since the late 1990s about the viability of the 
CBNRM approach. By contrast to Berkes (2004), Dressler et al. (2010) argue that 
conservationist motives which underpin CBNRM initiatives have often contradicted rural 
ideals, resulting in the failure of these initiatives. Since the year 2000, a significant number of 
scholars have argued that CBNRM has been an unsuccessful approach to conservation, citing 
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the many failed initiatives that exist globally (Blaikie, 2006; Downie, Dearden & King, 2018; 
Nelson, 2006). Child and Dalal-Clayton (2004) contend that this evidence does not prove that 
CBNRM is a failed approach, but rather that it merely shows a failure in the implementation 
of CBNRM. Either way, the development and implementation of CBNRM has been plagued 
by various problems from the beginning and in the 2000s it was a field of research and 
practice that lacked consistency, requiring constant innovation in order to be justified 
(Blaikie, 2006; Child, 2003; Dressler et al., 2010; Torquebiau & Taylor, 2009). Blaikie 
(2006:1952) describes the CBNRM concept as ―a pile of assorted ideas... where it is the 
discursive appeal rather than coherence and applicability which is more important.‖ 
There has been a lack of agreement on the definition of CBNRM. Practitioners have used the 
label in a variety of ways since its first use. Western and Wright (1994:7) defined this 
approach as being ―by, for, and with the community.‖ Less than ten years later, some were 
calling it a form of co-management where the phrasing ―by the community‖ was less 
important. Castro and Nielson (2001, in Dhungel, 2008) describe CBNRM as 'a co-
management process of bringing in diverse stakeholders to manage common-pool resources.' 
Yandle (2003:180) defines it as ―an instrumental arrangement where management 
responsibilities are shared between the community and the government.‖ Dhungel (2008:11-
12) calls CBNRM a form a co-management, where ―different stakeholders work together to 
address a particular problem pertaining to natural resources by sharing their diverse 
knowledge, skills and resources.‖ More recently, scholars have consistently begun to use the 
term more broadly to describe any 'approach to conservation that is culturally empowering, 
emphasises local peoples' environmental knowledge, is driven at the community level and 
creates locally relevant and equitable conservation measures' [paraphrased] (Dressler et a., 
2010:3). As has been demonstrated, the definition for CBNRM is inconsistent. Armitage 
(2005:1) similarly states that ―there is no single [accepted] definition of CBNRM, [and that] 
the approach seeks to encourage better resource management outcomes with the full 
participation of communities and resource users....‖  
In conservation literature, CBNRM has become a catch-phrase for a number of different 
types of natural resource management projects (Redmore et al., 2018; Shackleton et al., 
2010). This broadening of the accepted use of the phrase has happened over time: whereas in 
the early 1990s, CBNRM was considered an approach that involved direct management input 
from a community. Today the use of this title is less strict. This thesis considers CBNRM to 
be a co-operative form of people-oriented natural resource management that involves either 
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direct control over resources or, at the very least, direct management input from a community. 
Despite the accepted definition and operationalization of the phrase CBNRM having changed 
over time, this thesis makes use of the earlier, more restricted definition that it is any natural 
resource management initiative that is both with and for the community. This definition is the 
most relevant to this study because it is the one that best describes what has occurred in the 
three cases presented in this thesis: they involve initiatives that were intended to be with and 
for the community. Whether or not this has been achieved (and why) is the focus of this 
thesis. 
2.1.2.3 Community-Based Conservation 
Community-based conservation (CBC) can be considered a type of CBNRM that deals 
specifically with biodiversity conservation. This is the form of co-operative natural resource 
management that is of most relevance to this study. While this study is nested within CBC, it 
focuses on co-operation that enables CBC of resources that are contested due to multiple 
users. It is also nested within CBNRM. In order to demonstrate how CBC is unique, two 
cases can be referenced. In Zanzibar, Tanzania a coastal mangrove forest was placed under 
community-based management in the late 1990s for the purpose of ensuring long-term 
sustainable use of mangrove resources. This was an example of CBNRM. A second case, an 
example of CBC, involves the establishment of a Marine Conservation Area (MCA) on 
Pemba Island, Tanzania (Brooks, 2013). The MCA was established to preserve local marine 
ecosystems for the purposes of ecotourism and protecting breeding grounds of reef fish in the 
region. Conservation area management exchanged consumptive resource use within the MCA 
for other benefits like tourism income or improved fishing in waters nearby. Community-
based conservation deals exclusively with biodiversity conservation initiatives at a 
community level, exchanging consumptive use for non-consumptive use and other benefits. 
Berkes (2004) has described how the CBC approach came from fundamental shifts in the 
study of ecology and applied ecology in the 1980s. These shifts were the acceptance of 
systems thinking, the inclusion of humans into natural ecology, and importantly the inclusion 
of participation in managing what was previously a domain dominated exclusively by 
scientific experts (Berkes, 2004). In conjunction wiath the development of Integrated 
Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs) and CBNRM were these important shifts that 
Berkes (2004) described. They have been instrumental in making CBC a prominent approach 
since the 1990s (Ayer et al., 2018; Igoe, 2006). 
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Community-based conservation is well established in published literature and the title 'CBC' 
is used extensively. Berkes (2007) defines CBC as ―a wide range of natural resource 
management practices improving conditions for the co-existence between humans and 
nature.‖ This broad definition has been used to describe a number of different types of 
conservation projects that attempt to focus on both biodiversity conservation and rural 
development, but have little else in common (Brosius, Tsing & Zerner, 1998; Gibson and 
Marks, 1995; Goldman, 2003; Jones, 1999; Mehta & Heinin, 2001; Mwajake et al., 2013; 
Nilsson et al., 2016; Robinson & Makupa, 2015; Symington, 2015). The problem with such a 
definition is that ICDPs and CBNRM programmes also seek to improve conditions for the co-
existence of humans and nature; as such some ICDP and CBRNM initiatives could be defined 
as a form of CBC. There is thus confusion about how to distinguish these various fields of 
work and this confusion of terminology can be seen in the literature (Shackleton et al., 2010). 
This is a problem that will likely not be solved because of the increasing utilisation of broad 
definitions for CBC (Fabricius, 2007). Berkes‘ (2007) definition of CBC is better suited as a 
definition of the co-operative, people-oriented natural resource management approach. In this 
thesis however, a stricter definition of CBC, one which is more aligned with the definition of 
CBNRM, is applied: It is a biodiversity conservation initiative that is both with and for the 
community. 
Berkes (2004) wrote that CBC has been a controversial approach because conservation goals 
are usually not aligned with community development objectives. There is thus debate about 
the efficacy of the CBC approach, and more generally the people-oriented approach. 
Hamilton-Smith (2000) boldly asserts that assuming consumption and preservation can be 
performed hand-in-hand is both naïve and stupid. Others that subscribe to this school of 
thought would argue that saving nature should be a higher priority (Rolston, 1996; Siurua, 
2006). In response Turner (2004) argues that exclusion of affected people because of the 
absolute rights of nature is an unrealistic and impractical concept which has already proven 
unsustainable in many cases. Critics of CBC continue this debate using fuel provided by 
examples of failed CBC projects (Horwich & Lyon, 2007; Kumar, 2005). Proponents of CBC 
continue in the hope that they can successfully integrate conservation and development. As an 
approach to conservation, and an alternative to the ‗fences and fines‘ method of protected 
area management, CBC continues to be criticised due to its inability to provide consistent 
results (Adams, 2004; Berkes, 2007; Elliot and Sumba, 2012). 
Similarly to CBNRM, CBC has also been criticised because of the nomenclature used in 
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naming these approaches. Some scholars have questioned the feasibility of calling a 
government devised programme 'community-based' just because it is supposed to benefit, or 
engage with, a community (Cooper et al., 2007; Igoe, 2006; Kareiva & Marvier, 2007; Roe & 
Elliot, 2006). The inconsistent use of the phrase 'community-based' is one of the main issues 
of contention that is causing the previously discussed entangling of conservation approaches. 
Let us investigate the significance of this phrase in conservation science and examine debate 
about its use. 
2.1.3 Key Concepts in People-Oriented Conservation 
2.1.3.1 Defining 'Community-Based' 
The meaning of the term 'community-based' has broadened considerably in a decade, and 
today can be used to describe almost any initiative that a community is able to derive some 
benefit from. This could include a project that simply provides benefits from a restricted 
protected area (Magome & Murombedzi, 2003), a conservation project that is managed by 
community members with no outside help (Porter-Bolland et al., 2012), or a customary 
resource management plan that has resulted in a stable ecosystem (Bartels, 2014; McNeely & 
Scherr, 2003). Due to the variety of conservation project strategies that the phrase 
'community-based' has been used to describe, there has been debate over the correct meaning 
and usage of the phrase.  
The phrase 'community-based' has been used as a title for a myriad of approaches. Many of 
these approaches have different objectives, governance styles, degrees of devolution to 
communities and incentives for communities to participate in or support conservation 
initiatives (Ruiz-Mallen & Corbera, 2013). Western and Wright (1994) were among the first 
to attempt to define the community-based approach to conservation. They described it as 
natural resource management that is ―by, for, and with the local community‖ (Western & 
Wright, 1994:7). The key departure that community-based approaches made from 
conventional conservation science was the idea that people and nature are able to coexist, 
whereas protectionist conservation was based on the segregation of these two supposedly 
disparate entities (Ruiz-Mallen et al., 2015). Over a decade after Western and Wright (1994) 
published their definition, Berkes (2007) defined CBC as a broad range of natural resource 
management strategies that improve conditions for the co-existence of humans and nature. 
Western and Wright's definition is now a subset of Berkes' definition. Much of the current 
published work on community-based initiatives uses Berkes‘ broader definition. 
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Due to the variety of operationalizations and definitions that are applied to the phrase, there is 
no apparent consensus in the literature on its correct usage. On one hand, it has been stated 
that a possible strategy for a community-based approach could be co-management which 
incorporates indigenous knowledge into scientific management plans for the environment 
(Jones, Mulolani & Child, 2006). This implies that trained scientists are managing the 
environment. The idea to co-manage or include indigenous knowledge did not originate in a 
community. On the other hand, some scholars have questioned how this conservation strategy 
could be labelled as community based if it is neither developed in, nor owned by, the 
community members (Western & Wright, 1994). Others have argued that an approach to 
conservation is community-based if it is based, even only in part, on the welfare of the local 
community (Wainwright & Wehrmeyer, 1998). This latter description stretches the definition 
of community-based conservation because it would then include benefit sharing and 
community participation or consultation in conservation decision making. Is community 
consultation a community-based approach? According to some practitioners it is, but critics 
of the broader definition have argued that this cannot be called community-based (Holt, 2005; 
Kareiva & Marvier, 2007).  
Scholars can debate the correct definition endlessly, but the common application of the phrase 
'community-based' is central to our understanding of the current state of people-oriented 
approaches to conservation. This thesis makes use of the most common application of the 
phrase which is based on the broader Cambridge English Dictionary definition for the term 
community-based: focused on or relating to a community.  
2.1.3.2 Community 
The word community has been a key concept in the study and practice of people-oriented 
conservation. Not only has it been useful for characterising local actors when investigating 
natural resource management, it has also been useful in gaining support for CBC initiatives 
(Blaikie, 2006; Child, 2003; Mascia & Mills, 2018). Despite the importance of this concept, it 
has been difficult for practitioners and scientists to appropriately define the term 'community' 
(Berkes, 2004; Kumar, 2005). It is one of the most frequently used concepts in natural 
resource management literature and yet a satisfactory definition remains elusive (Creamer, 
2015). The purpose of this section is to provide a grounded theoretical understanding of one 
of the central terms in co-operative and community-based natural resource management: 
community. 
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word community as ―a group of people living in 
the same place or having a particular characteristic in common.‖ The same dictionary also 
states a community to be people considered collectively, especially in the context of common 
ownership, social values, and responsibilities. It is, in other words, a unit of society. However, 
this simple series of phrases is vague enough to include a wide variety of dissimilar societal 
structures. A lack of consensus about the definition for the word community has resulted in 
mixed outcomes for natural resource management projects because stakeholders are not 
adequately defined within a project (Kumar, 2005). Providing an appropriate definition for 
the term could be a critical part of normalising the study of co-operative natural resource 
management and achieving consistent, predictable results. 
In the commonly cited common-pool resource management design principles devised by 
Ostrom (1990), principle 1A stipulates that a community should have well-defined boundaries 
and jointly manages a delimited common resource. In this context, Turner (2004) writes that 
communities are expected to be immutable groups that are able to devise clearly defined rules 
of access to common-pool resources. This paradigm is a part of the generalised narrative in 
natural resource management literature that a community is what Brosius et al. (1998: 165) 
describe as ―coherent, long-standing, localised sources of authority tied to what are assumed 
to be intrinsically sustainable resource management regimes.‖ Agrawal and Gibson (1999) 
have countered that this idealised view ignores the fact that sources of authority can change 
and that they are not always coherent. Despite this counter argument, commonly utilised 
ideas about communities are based on an ideal type and over-simplification of the whole 
(Kumar, 2005). These assumptions have come under scrutiny in recent years because of the 
difficulties inherent in their use as a basis for the examination of rural social structures 
(Newing, 2009; Tenzing, Millar & Black, 2018). 
In co-operative and community-based resource management projects, the term community 
has been used as a gloss for a complex social phenomenon that is difficult for practitioners to 
cohesively identify and delimit when working in the field (Berkes, 2004; Cox, Arnold & 
Tomas, 2010). Others argue that rather than a gloss term, the term community should be taken 
to denote a multi-scale social system that hides much complexity and is dynamic through 
time (Berkes, 2004; Carlsson, 2000). Due to these inescapable complexities, Cox, Arnold, 
and Tomas (2010) argue that rather than having strict boundaries, the definition of community 
needs to be fuzzy enough that flexible, ad-hoc arrangements can be successfully facilitated 
between communities and other stakeholder groups. Similar to this more fuzzy ideal, Agrawal 
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and Gibson (1999) proposed a shift away from the conceptualisation of community as a 
small, territorially fixed and homogeneous group that has shared norms and thus lives in 
harmony. They argued for community to be conceived as a group of resource users with 
divergent interests that interact in the context of community norms and institutions. Despite 
this recognition of intra-community dynamics by a small group of scholars, the most common 
conceptualisation of community has remained a simplified and idealised one (Creamer, 2015; 
Waylen et al., 2013; Kumar, 2005). 
Instead of viewing community as a group of people inhabiting a small territory with a 
homogeneous social structure and shared norms, some scholars have suggested viewing 
communities using an institutions-based approach that focuses on the interests and norms of 
influential and vulnerable stakeholders (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Berkes, 2004; Cox, Arnold 
& Tomas, 2010; Waylen et al., 2013). Saunders‘ (2014) recent study of natural resource 
management at a community level revealed that there is in fact little internal harmony and 
that there are many sub-groups with divergent interests and varying preferences. According to 
Agrawal and Gibson (1999), researchers that recognise this are doing far more than merely 
advocating for decentralisation of natural resource management: they are beginning to 
undertake the more challenging task of understanding the social structures that exist between 
multiple community actors and ensuring fairness in empowering those actors in order to 
establish the sustainability of natural resource management. This thesis accepts that 
investigation of a community must include knowledge about the locally complex social 
landscapes within a community (Creamer, 2015; Kumar, 2005; Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). 
Inter-case variations in socio-political community dynamics could yield critical 
understanding about the way that communities engage with other stakeholder groups, a vital 
part of studies on co-operative natural resource management strategies within the CBC 
approach. 
2.1.3.3 Ownership and Participation 
The words ownership and participation have proven to be significant in people-oriented and 
community-based approaches to conservation. As is to be expected, the applications of these 
words have shared characteristics (Castro & Nielson, 2001). It is those shared characteristics 
that account for the inter-related use of these words in recent literature (Castro & Nielson, 
2001; Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2004; Seid-Green, 2014). For example, in some cases merely 
talking to a community has been equated with community-based management (Shackleton et 
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al., 2010). Shackleton et al. (2010) stated in their editorial how it was clear to them that there 
is a lack of distinction between the terms ownership, participation, and communication. 
Nearly a decade earlier Castro and Nielson (2001) had emphasized the need to use careful 
judgement in selecting words to describe collaborative conservation activity.  
The word participation has been used to describe a number of different methods that 
conservation authorities have used with consumptive-use stakeholders. Scales (2014) points 
out that Madagascan conservation ―consultation leaders have conflated consultation with 
sensibilisation precisely because their mandate from Antananarivo was to persuade, not 
consult.‖ In Finland, Poland, Greece and the United Kingdom, participation has been taken to 
mean any educational activity, citizen science monitoring and landowner compliance with 
conservation strategies (Paloniemi et al., 2015). Thus participation is something that does not 
have a widely used operationalization but applies to a range of different methods. It is a vital 
concept to grapple with because participation increases acceptance of conservation (Nelson & 
Agrawal, 2008; Prins, Castillo & Almendares, 2003). This research uses the word 
participation to indicate active contribution that is incorporated into governance, whether it is 
solicited or proactively given. 
Shackleton et al. (2010) identified that indistinct usage of terminology that should be 
distinctive has caused a lack of debate on the impact of different collaborative people-
oriented conservation methodologies on conservation outcomes. This would surely be an 
important debate in determining how to more sustainably solve human-related conservation 
problems. In order to debate this, terminology needs to be used distinctly and the 
successfulness of collaborative approaches need to be evaluated in a contextually rich manner 
(Crona & Hubacek, 2010). However, terminology is used without consistency and evaluation 
is weakened by this inconsistent usage of terminology (Shackleton et al., 2010).  
In this thesis, ownership of a resource is defined by legislative frameworks. For example, 
land and wildlife can be owned by private individuals, a community, or the government. 
Ownership of a program, such as a conservation or resource management program, is defined 
by those ordained with the power to run that program. Ownership of programmes or 
initiatives is an important concept because perceptions of resource ownership can impact 
stakeholders‘ willingness to participate in conservation (Goodwin, 1998). The concept of 
ownership is critical to our understanding of social relations between stakeholders contending 
over natural resources. Wolf (1972:202) states that capitalism uses ―jural rules of ownership 
to strip the labourer of his means of production and deny him access to the product of his 
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labour.‖ The owner of the resources is the one that profits, a concept that defines the 
interactions of stakeholders involved in resource conflict. Research in CBNRM and CBC has 
largely demonstrated this to be correct (Nelson et al., 2009).  
Ownership is considered distinct from participation in that those who participate in 
conservation or resource management might not be owners of it by any legal measure. 
Participants are typically stakeholders who participate in the management of resources. This 
can include a wide variety of activities relating to resource management as well as varying 
levels of participation, but participants are not necessarily resource owners. Participation can 
create feelings of ownership over resources and this can be an important tool in improving 
perceptions of conservation (Niedziałkowski, Paavola & Jędrzejewska, 2012; Nelson et al., 
2009; Goodwin, 1998).  
Participation is a particularly important word in co-operative governance of natural resources. 
It has been a heated topic of discussion since the mid-20th century with some saying that 
citizen participation has been used as a form of citizen control (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein‘s 
(1969) typology of citizen participation has been a seminal work in categorizing citizen 
participation in governance. This typology was expanded on by Connor (1988) who 
introduced a systematic approach to resolving public conflict over specific issues. Yet even 
this new ladder of citizen participation (Connor, 1988) did not pay attention to the questions 
posed by Cornwall (2008:269): who is participating, in what, and for whose benefit? 
Cornwall stated that the rhetoric of public participation has helped the idea gain purchase but 
vagueness about the answers to these questions has also prevented the democratization of 
thorough participation. Tosun (1999) developed a typology for community participation 
specific to tourism development, suggesting that participation be categorised in a way that 
prevents this vagueness and forces the use of clear terms among scientists and practitioners. 
By contrast to the introduction of theories and typologies, Ramukumba (2018) argues that 
such participatory mechanisms and typologies originated in the developed world creating 
context-specific limitations and imbalances of power in developing countries. This study 
investigated the type of participation taking place in three cases of co-operative natural 
resource governance, with specific reference to ecotourism. While not making use of Tosun‘s 
(1999) typology, this research did seek to answer Cornwall‘s (2008) questions during the 
primary investigation in order to be clear about the nature of citizen participation in African 
resource governance. 
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2.1.3.4 Partnership, Collaboration, and Co-Management 
Just as with the above terminology, the terms partnership, collaboration and co-management 
are used both inconsistently and synonymously in the literature. Each of these terms is used 
in a significant body of literature and so they can only be briefly dealt with here, but this 
discussion focuses on indistinct usage of terminology rather than the terms themselves. While 
the notion of partnership has been widely embraced, there has been little agreement on what 
it actually means (Brinkerhoff, 2002). In lieu of the lack of recent definitions for the term in 
relation to co-operative natural resource governance, this thesis uses Brinkerhoff‘s (2002) 
definition which states that a partnership is a shared undertaking by more than one party; 
where resources are combined for mutual benefit and power is shared in decision making. 
Collaboration has similarly been stated to mean the pooling of resources to solve problems, 
but this word emphasises the process of interaction among partners (Hall, 1999, in Plummer 
& FitzGibbon, 2004). Co-management has been defined as the sharing of rights and 
responsibilities among partners in a partnership (Berkes et al., 1991, in Plummer & 
FitzGibbon, 2004). While the three terms partnership, collaboration and co-management are 
distinct in certain ways, their shared characteristics account for their inter-related use in the 
literature (Plummer & FitzGibon, 2004). As argued by Plummer and FitzGibbon (2004), co-
operative management is a more generic term that can be used to describe an array of cases 
which might be more accurately defined by a multi-dimensional definition of co-operative 
management arrangements. This thesis distinguishes the following words: 
 Partnership refers to an agreement or shared undertaking in which resources and 
power are shared 
 Collaboration is a similar word that will be used to refer to the actual work done by 
partners in a partnership, i.e. partners can collaborate with each other and 
 Co-management is more specifically a type of collaboration that refers to the sharing 
of management responsibilities for resources mutually owned by partners 
collaborating in a partnership. 
All of these terms are related under the umbrella term of co-operative natural resource 
management where co-operation occurs, or does not occur, between multiple stakeholders. 
2.1.3.5 Benefits 
The terms benefits and benefit sharing are recurring themes in people-oriented conservation 
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science. Benefit sharing is a process in which fair trade-offs are made between costs and 
benefits across multiple stakeholder groups (Swemmer et al., 2015). Numerous authors write 
of benefit sharing and how communities should be able to partake in the benefits of 
conservation (Worboys et al., 2015; Bennet & Dearden, 2014; Strickland-Munro and Moore, 
2012). Many protected areas include benefit sharing as an important management tool 
(Strickland-Munro & Moore, 2012). The accrual and sharing of benefits has become an 
important issue in modern conservation. This has only become possible because of the 
commercialisation of conservation along with the creation of a tourism market that values 
wilderness and wildlife (Holmes, 2015). In the past conservation was limited to being a 
government responsibility. In the 20th century, ecotourism to protected areas became a global 
trend. Due to this, civil society has become involved with conservation because of the 
potential business aspect stemming from ecotourism. Conservation is no longer only a 
government undertaking to protect nature because of its intrinsic value. It is now an activity 
that has commercial value because of tourism (Holmes, 2015; Shabangu, 2014).  
The financial income resulting from commercialised conservation, also referred to as 
neoliberal conservation, has been lauded by some as a way to solve conservation problems 
(Holmes, 2015). It is not a panacea, however. This form of conservation, which makes use of 
the global tourism market to secure financial income, has been criticised because of its 
negative effects on nature and people. Not only have a number of market-based conservation 
projects failed to achieve social or environmental objectives but some have exacerbated 
existing problems (Igoe & Brockington, 2007). Holmes (2015) points out that market forces 
and financial income can be used as a tool for powerful actors to gain control over land and 
resources unjustly. By contrast, Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012) have shown that in cases 
where local people have been given ownership of land and resources, neoliberal conservation 
has been beneficial to communities. 
Ecotourism based on nature conservation, and ultimately protected areas, has provided an 
enduring global market (Beeton, 2006). Wilderness and wildlife in its perceived natural state 
is the product and tourists are willing to pay money to enjoy wide-open spaces that are devoid 
of people. It is through this tourism that financial income occurs. There are numerous support 
industries relating to tourism: hospitality including accommodation and catering, local 
products as curios, transport, and guiding among others. These industries provide direct 
employment in tourism businesses and they also provide entrepreneurial opportunities for 
local people living in places where tourists are travelling. Tourism related industries provide 
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stimulation for local and national economies and provide impetus for infrastructural 
development by governments and private investors. Governments can also benefit from 
tourism by generating income from fees and tariffs relating to protected areas and 
conservation sites. Conservation has become synonymous with non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and local people can benefit from these organisations where they 
operate to secure funding for development programs. In this thesis, all of these potential 
inputs can be termed benefits. They can be direct financial benefits from employment in a 
tourism related industry, social benefits in the form of improved education or healthcare, and 
they can be infrastructural benefits like roads, running water or electricity (Dressler et al., 
2010). Benefit sharing occurs when the perceived benefits of a protected area such as income 
from tourism, income from tourist activities or environmental resources are shared between 
different stakeholders in a way that benefits all parties.  Ideally, this should take place in a 
way that has the potential to be sustainable over the long term.  
Nkhata et al. (2012) wrote that benefit sharing forms the basis of debates about resource 
governance that regulates access to, and use of, ecosystem services. The concept of benefit 
sharing incorporates responsibility to replace consumptive natural resource use with other 
benefits that can substitute for dependence of the contested resources, be they monetary or 
non-monetary. These benefits should be distributed according to designated stakeholders 
according to co-operatively designed arrangements (Nkhata et al., 2012). For this process to 
be effective, co-operation is required and little work has been done to examine the finer 
contextual details relating to social factors impacting co-operative governance (Crona & 
Hubacek, 2010). 
The relationship between benefit sharing and stakeholder relations has not been well 
described in the literature. Richerzhagen (2011) described several factors influencing the 
effectiveness of benefit sharing as a conservation approach, factors relating to property rights, 
governance, transaction costs, and market structure. Among the critical factors impacting 
benefit sharing effectiveness that were suggested by Richerzhagen (2011), the impact of 
competing stakeholder interests was not mentioned. In addition relations between 
stakeholders were not considered. In a study by Nkhata and Breen (2010) stakeholder 
relations were merely described as social relations with no further thought given to the 
complexities of these relations. This research will investigate such social complexities. 
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2.1.3.6 Power 
Understanding power relations between groups in the context of co-operative conservation 
and natural resource management is of vital importance (Shackleton et al., 2010). It has a 
direct impact on the structure and effectiveness of co-operative arrangements. In this thesis 
―power can be thought of as the capacity to have a meaningful (effective) input into making 
and implementing decisions about how forests are used and managed‖ (Fisher, 2003:20). 
Giving meaningful input should not be understood as having the power to make all decisions 
but rather that the interests of a certain party are given significance by others. Power is also 
dependent on implementation because if a strategy or plan cannot be implemented, then the 
decision-making process does not award effective power to the stakeholders.  
The study of power is viewed with increasing interest because of the recognition that the 
power landscape in which stakeholders interact has a direct but intangible impact on the 
outcome of people-oriented conservation strategies (Castro & Nielson, 2003). In this thesis, 
power is examined using the classification of stakeholder interactions devised by Castro and 
Nielson (2003). These are: 
 Social differences between actors in a co-operative arrangement 
 Equity of access to resources 
 Responsiveness of government administration and 
 Equity in legal systems. 
This thesis seeks to highlight the importance of a historical understanding of the social 
contexts, micro and macro, that impact environmental change. As such the notion of power 
forms a critical part of this understanding. Studies examining contextual power landscapes of 
people-oriented conservation provide a historical understanding of the social processes 
affecting environmental degradation (Castro and Nielson, 2003; Forsyth, 2018). With the 
inclusion of highly contextual social data, the more abstract principles for designing and 
implementing people-oriented conservation programs become more useful and the likelihood 
of sustainable program implementation increases (Crona & Hubacek, 2010; Cox, Arnold & 
Tomás, 2010; Mermet, 2018; Shackleton et al., 2010). 
2.1.3.7 Trust and Social Capital 
The two concepts of trust and social capital are intertwined in natural resource governance 
literature. There is not much literature examining trust between stakeholders taking part in 
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conservation, how trust is developed, and how it impacts co-operative governance in different 
contexts. The social capital concept however has been well studied in comparison. This study 
makes use of the word trust but wherever trust is mentioned it is synonymous with social 
capital. The phrase social capital has two main definitions in published literature. The first is 
wherein social capital is associated with norms in stakeholder behaviour and networks 
between stakeholders. The term networks refers to social structures that emerge from human 
interactions and norms are the resulting standards that constrain human behaviour (Coleman, 
1988). The second definition for social capital involves trust and commitment as two main 
socio-psychological attributes that affect the outcome of stakeholder relations (Nkhata, Breen 
& Abacar, 2009). Commitment in this sense refers to the energy and resources that partners 
are willing to invest into a partnership, based on the perception of worth of that partnership 
(Groce et al., 2018; Luo, 2002). Stated more concisely, social capital refers to willingness to 
engage with others (Pretty, 2003; Pretty & Smith, 2004). In this thesis, the terms trust and 
commitment are used distinctly in order to provide a snapshot of the cohesive state of a 
network. While social capital is taken to mean the level of trust that stakeholders have for 
each other as well as their level of willingness to invest energy and resources into a 
partnership (Groce et al., 2018; Pretty, 2003), this term is not used in this thesis where issues 
of trust and commitment need to be dealt with separately. Trust, commitment, and social 
capital are key concepts in this thesis because without them, partnerships between 
stakeholders invested in co-operative resource management are more likely to disintegrate. 
The concept of social capital can thus be used as a tool to improve the effectiveness and 
sustainability of co-operative arrangements (Dennis & James, 2018). 
Trust has been defined by Luo (2002) as a psychological state in which a member of a 
partnership believes that the other partner will not act in a way that would harm their 
interests. Trust between individuals, and between groups, is often the result of trustworthy 
behaviour (Westlund & Kobayashi, 2013). It develops over time based on past experiences 
and current interactions with other stakeholders (Luo, 2002). As such, trust is an important 
indicator of historical stakeholder interactions and the likely outcome of future scenarios 
(Cvitanovic et al., 2018; MacKeracher et al., 2018). Despite the importance of trust for social 
cohesion in partnerships, as well as its potential use as an indicator, the concept of trust is 
infrequently featured in natural resource management and conservation literature (Shackleton 
et al., 2010; Stern, 2008). 
Few published papers overtly examine trust and factors in co-operative natural resource 
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management that affect levels of trust between stakeholders (Cvitanovic et al., 2018). Most of 
this research is framed in the study of social capital. Hahn et al. (2006) investigated how a 
small municipal organisation in southern Sweden used its social network of local stewards to 
work on issues in wetland management in an ad hoc fashion. One of the key social outcomes 
of this approach was trust building. Cramb (2005) presents a study from the Philippines in 
which a government soil conservation program built trust with local farmers. This trust 
proved to be a critical basis for the increasing rate of adopting soil conservation techniques in 
local farming. Similarly, Pretty and Smith (2004) describe how in Bangladesh, local farmers 
were brought together by a foreign NGO to deliberate on how to make foster new social 
solutions that will build trust and sustain changes in rice farming practices.  
The importance of trust in partnerships and working relationships, and the concurrent dearth 
of research on trust in community-based natural resource management, indicates a weakness 
in the study of co-operative natural resource management (Shackleton et al., 2010). There is a 
lack of knowledge on how trust is developed in co-operative governance contexts, how it 
impacts stakeholder relations, and how it can be used as a tool. This study incorporates the 
concept of trust in examining the impact that stakeholder interactions, past and present, have 
on the development of trust and ultimately social capital. 
Pretty (2003) has aptly described the concept of social capital and its usefulness in 
biodiversity conservation: that social capital captures the idea of social norms and bonds 
being a necessity for sustainable conservation. Pretty and Smith (2004) demonstrate that 
conservation initiatives which build social capital improve other stakeholders‘ understanding 
of the importance of biodiversity while also helping them develop new social norms and 
institutions. This latter impact of social capital can be an important part of ensuring the 
sustainability of an initiative (Dennis & James, 2018). Bicchieri and Mercier (2014) argue 
that norms foster behaviour, so in order to change behaviours relating to conservation, 
perceptions and norms must first be altered. Where social capital is high, people are willing 
to invest in collective activities, shifting their norms and thus changing their behaviour 
(Dennis & James, 2018; Groce et al., 2018; Pretty, 2003; Pretty & Smith, 2004) Trust, 
commitment, and ultimately social capital are thus critical factors contributing to the 
successful implementation of people-oriented conservation initiatives. 
2.1.4 Repackaging Conventional Conservation? 
Due to the increasing variety of conservation initiatives that are labelled as 'people-oriented', 
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'people-centred', and 'community-based' there has been debate about the definition of what 
can be classified as truly people-oriented conservation. Cooper et al. (2007) have argued that 
―real‖ people-oriented conservation makes participation of local people inclusive and 
deliberative as opposed to passive or coercive. According to Harris, Brown and Russel 
(2010), inclusive and deliberative relationships between conservation authorities and local 
stakeholders can transform conservation science into a democracy where scientists co-create 
socially responsible solutions to conservation problems with local people. Conservation has 
traditionally relied on ecological science which ignores socio-political factors (Cooper et al., 
2007). Human factors have been argued to result in bias, but according to Mathevet and 
Mauchamp (2005) and others like Sutherland et al., (2005), including socio-political factors 
is the only truly evidence-based approach to conservation science because humans are a key 
part of many protected area-centred ecosystems. In this sense, people-oriented conservation 
entails active and effective participation and engagement with local communities. 
Some people-oriented conservation initiatives have enabled communities to participate at a 
basic level without effectively engaging the community as described above. The label of 
people-oriented conservation has been applied to a wide range of initiatives from 
'participation of civil society to culturally embedded customary tenure in traditional societies' 
(McConney & Charles, 2008). Due to the rising number of programs that label community 
participation as a people-oriented approach, there has been an increasing number of scholars 
who resist the idea that participatory initiatives developed and implemented by conservation 
authorities can be called people-oriented (Igoe, 2006; Kareiva & Marvier, 2007; Roe & 
Elliot, 2006). In academia some argue that the true meaning of 'people-oriented' should not 
include benefit sharing and participatory social engagement approaches – it is said that these 
initiatives serve those who created them, not the affected stakeholders they pay lip-service to 
(Kareiva & Marvier, 2007; Redford, Padoch & Sunderland, 2013). In practice however, the 
phrase 'people-oriented conservation' is more often used to label projects with participatory 
aspects rather than those projects where local stakeholder communities are actually owners of 
the resources and management process (Shackleton et al., 2010). 
Participatory conservation strategies have been used in protectionist conservation programs to 
win allies (McKie, 2018). Holt (2005:212) has stated that conservation needs to win ―as many 
allies as possible, rather than alienating or discounting entire constituencies with strong 
vested interests in intact ecosystems.‖ Protectionist conservation is clearly biased towards 
biodiversity and typically does not call for local support, but in cases where protected areas 
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are not fenced local support is important to conservation efforts (Cadman et al., 2010). 
People-oriented conservation initiatives recognise ownership of natural resources on 
indigenous, cultural, and historical terms (Ramustindela, 2006). Ideally a people-oriented 
approach should be unbiased in the effort to establish a dynamic equilibrium between 
ecosystems and human use, but in practice many programs show bias towards either 
biodiversity preservation or human development (Doak et al., 2015).  
Shackleton et al. (2010) found that bias existed in many of the conservation programs they 
reviewed. Where people-oriented conservation is biased towards human development, 
conservation outcomes are poor and the project is labelled unsuccessful. Where people-
oriented conservation has demonstrated bias towards biodiversity, critics have labelled the 
approach as a 'repackaging of traditional conservation ideas' (Redford, Padoch & Sunderland, 
2013; Kareiva & Marvier, 2007:4; Igoe, 2006:1). In cases where people-oriented 
conservation has been labelled a repackaged protectionist program, poor conservation 
outcomes have been more likely to occur as local people come to recognise they are not a 
priority to that program. To avoid being the same approach merely dressed in new clothing, 
so to speak, conservation initiatives need to go beyond simply garnering vague participation 
or trying to satisfy the financial demands of affected local people (Kareiva & Marvier, 2007; 
Redford, Padoch & Sunderland, 2013). Conservation authorities need to work jointly with 
other stakeholders towards the long-term goal of providing alternative livelihoods and 
improving quality of life so that communities will continue to actively support and participate 
in conservation in the future (Hackel, 1999). 
2.2 Principles Governing the Design of People-Oriented Conservation Approaches 
2.2.1 Common-Pool Resource Management Design Principles 
During the first few decades that people-oriented conservation programmes were 
implemented, they were studied by scientists trained in organizational studies, common-pool 
resources, and natural resource management. People-oriented conservation is typically a form 
of common-pool resource management because in community-based programmes, self-
organising groups of resource users (rural communities) participate in establishing rules of 
resource access and use that are a form of management for natural resources (Ostrom, 1990). 
Research on common-pool resources was influential in the formation of CBNRM theory 
(Agrawal, 2003, Cox, Arnold & Tomas, 2010).  
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During the 1980s, researchers investigating cases of rural common-pool resource 
management recognised that there were many ways in which common-pool resource 
management was occurring globally (Agrawal, 2003). There was no generally accepted 
process for CBNRM implementation that was recognised to maintain or improve ecological 
and developmental conditions simultaneously. This diversity of concept application in the 
field led scholars to study factors that impacted the successfulness of CBNRM programmes. 
The purpose of this was to create a generally accepted process for the design of CBNRM 
programmes so that people-oriented conservation practitioners could improve the likelihood 
of successful programme implementation. Design principles were devised for common-pool 
resource management projects from reviews of hundreds of cases (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 
1994; Wells & Bradon, 1992). These common-pool resource management design principles 
were highly influential in the development of people-oriented conservation initiatives in the 
1990s and beyond (Agrawal, 2003, Cox, Arnold & Tomas, 2010). 
In Ostrom's (1990) seminal work on the design principles for common-pool resource 
management, she draws upon many cases to abstract a set of principles that has an impact on 
the outcomes of co-operative management strategies. Wells and Brandon (1992) also 
abstracted principles that contribute to the more successful implementation of ICDPs. They 
identified various factors that had significant impact on the roll-out of ICDPs. Ostrom's 
(1990) set of principles grew in popularity and her work has guided the design of many 
conservation projects. A review by Cox, Arnold and Tomas (2010) demonstrates that 
Ostrom's (1990) design principles have gained significant traction. Cox, Arnold and Tomas' 
(2010) review is a useful evaluation of success in common-pool resource management. They 
were able to demonstrate which of Ostrom's principles were most influential on resource 
management by comparing multiple cases. Design principles can thus be seen as a useful tool 
for comparing the reasons for success in resource management cases which have differing 
contexts and characteristics.  
Individual reviews that compare many cases (more than 30) can yield interesting results, but 
collating reviews is an almost impossible task because reviewers tend to emphasize different 
design principles (Gruber, 2010). Collating the results of multiple reviews could result in bias 
because there has been little consensus about which principles are most influential (Agrawal, 
2003; Gruber, 2010). The usefulness of the design principles in assessing the effectiveness of 
people-oriented conservation approaches is thus limited. They also do not include the 
significant contextual and social factors that influence the outcome of co-operative 
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governance, so their ability to characterise or evaluate the social nature of governance 
arrangements is limited. As such, while these design elements might be associated with 
effective governance solutions are likely to come from a study of the historical and social 
elements affecting co-operation between stakeholders. 
2.2.2 Research-Implementation Gap 
The disagreement over which principles are most influential is not only at the theoretical 
level of abstracting principles, but also exists at the level of practical reporting. In a review of 
45 CBNRM case studies, Gruber (2010) characterises cases reported on by practitioners and 
scholars according to 12 design principles that were collated from reviews of design 
principles in common-pool resource management and CBNRM. Gruber stated that these 
design principles should not be thought of as predictors of success but rather precursors to 
successful program implementation. What Gruber found was that there was a gap between 
what scholars and practitioners thought of as best practice. In Gruber's study there were two 
significant differences between what scholars rated as most influential on success, and what 
practitioners rated as most influential. Scholars and practitioners showed agreement on most 
principles, such as the importance of public participation and mobilisation or the 
effectiveness of participatory decision making. When it came to the equitable distribution of 
resources and benefits however, 63% of practitioners rated this as an important precursor to 
success, but only 35% of the reviewed scholars agreed. By contrast, 74% of scholars rated 
adaptive leadership and co-management as an important factor while only 38% of 
practitioners agreed (Gruber, 2010:19).  
Interestingly, adaptive leadership and co-management was the highest rated principle by 
scholars while equitable distribution of resources and benefits was the highest rated principle 
by practitioners, though it was closely followed by social capital and collaboration (Gruber, 
2010). The key question then arises: who is correct, practitioners or scholars? This question 
would be difficult to answer. What can be said is that the use of management design 
principles is a useful but incomplete method for characterising and evaluating people-
oriented approaches to conservation. 
Toomey, Knight and Barlow (2016) have re-conceptualised the research-implementation gap. 
They show that conservation scientists have conceived the relationship between research and 
implementation as being linear and unidirectional. In this model, scientists need to provide 
detailed empirical information in order to solve complex problems faced by practitioners. But 
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this model is refuted by well-established examples in other fields which show that human 
decision-making is guided by more than the single factor of empirical data (Jones, 2017; 
Robinson et al., 2017). While it is thought that empirical information will shift the values and 
beliefs of stakeholders due to their rationality, by contrast it has been observed that this 
information may reinforce power relations and competing interests (Pielke, 2007). This is 
because actors participating in governance are not rational decision makers (Cox, Arnold & 
Tomás, 2010). As such there should be a greater contribution from researchers toward 
understanding the historical, social and economic factors that shift norms, values, and 
behaviours relating to natural resource use. 
2.3 Ecotourism 
Tourism is the practice of touring to places of interest outside of one‘s usual environment. 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines tourism as the practice of traveling for recreation. 
Subsequently, ecotourism is a form of tourism which is unique from general tourism in that it 
does not involve commercial mass tourism, the practice of touring in large groups in order to 
reduce costs for tourists. Ecotourism specifically avoids mass tourism; rather it is a form of 
tourism that accommodates small numbers of tourists in order to be environmentally 
sensitive. It differs from nature-based tourism in that it accounts for sustainability (Eagles, 
1992). Nature-based tourism is tourism to areas of natural interest for the purpose of enjoying 
undeveloped natural areas. It may involve large numbers of tourists and might neglect issues 
of conservation or local development (Nyaupane, 2007). On the other hand, ecotourism is a 
form of sustainable and responsible tourism that considers local environments and peoples. 
Ecotourism typically occurs as an environmentally sensitive form of nature-based tourism. 
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature defines ecotourism as 
―environmentally responsible travel to natural areas in order to enjoy and appreciate nature 
(and accompanying cultural features, both past and present) that promote conservation, have 
a low visitor impact and provide for beneficially active socio-economic involvement of local 
peoples‖ (Azara et al., 2018:12).  
Ecotourism in Africa has provided a considerable array of opportunities for income earning 
practices relating to biodiversity conservation and natural resource management (Kline & 
Slocum, 2015; Snyman, 2015). Snyman (2015) pointed out that there have been few studies 
looking at the role that stakeholders play in local development and resource management. In 
a case like Zanzibar, Tanzania where tourism plays a significant role in the economy, these 
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stakeholders can include government, NGOs, communities, and private tourism enterprises. 
Kline and Slocum (2015) argued that multi-national NGOs play a pivotal role in controlling 
prevailing approaches to conservation and tourism development in developing nations like 
those of Africa. While there has been an array of in-depth research on ecotourism governance 
in Tanzania (Pasape, Anderson & Lindi, 2015), there has been little or no research into the 
specific role that ecotourism operators play in the same context – how these private 
businesses can impact the outcomes of co-operative governance and development in and 
around tourism concessions. It is argued in this thesis that there is a need to understand the 
interactions and roles of the various stakeholders interacting in ecotourism development 
scenarios in Africa.  
While ecotourism does solve various problems relating to environmental sensitivity, it is not a 
panacea due to issues of governance. Pasape, Anderson & Lindi (2015) found in their study 
on ecotourism in Tanzania that the sustainability of co-operative governance and 
development is threatened by inadequate transparency, poor accountability practices and 
weak integration of ecotourism into national development plans. Their study was useful in 
pointing out some of the main issues facing co-operative governance in ecotourism and 
natural resource management; what their study does not do however, is investigate the role of 
stakeholder behaviour in the outcomes of co-operative governance and ecotourism. In an 
investigation of the impacts that stakeholders have on these outcomes, this study sought to 
provide a wealth of contextual data that recognised a diversity of voices and opinions. 
The notion that ecotourism contributes to conservation and development is based on the idea 
that as a form of tourism, ecotourism can provide income to marginalised communities while 
simultaneously being sensitive to the demands of biodiversity conservation (Fennel, 2014). 
The poor performance of ecotourism and co-operative governance cases over the last ten 
years has caused some to call the efficacy of market-based conservation-development 
instruments into question (Buscher, Dressler & Fletcher, 2014; Buscher et al., 2017; Fletcher 
et al., 2017). Buscher and Davidov (2015) have shown that ecotourism can be paired with 
resource extraction in cases where these two seemingly incongruous activities are supported 
by the same organisations. The idea that ecotourism and consumptive resource use can occur 
simultaneously and sustainably in an area is one that this study investigates in the African 
context, paying close attention to the use of market-based mechanisms to support 
conservation and local development.  
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It should be recognised that ecotourism can yield negative results for local people, especially 
when there is no attempt at co-operation by tourism enterprises or government. This was the 
case with Thakazulu private game reserve, an area where farm tenants were relocated to make 
way for an ambitious ecotourism project by private investors (Brooks & Kjelstrup, 2014). 
What Brooks and Kjelstrup (2014) found was that the state and local people bore all the costs 
of relocation to make way for ecotourism. What was missing here was co-operation and an 
interest on the part of the private investors to help local people. This study pays attention to 
the idea that co-operation is an important factor in determining the successful integration of 
ecotourism, conservation, and development. 
2.4 The Definition of Success 
Most academics and practitioners use the word 'success' when discussing people-oriented 
conservation, but they do not define what success actually is (Brehony et al., 2018; Buscher, 
2014; Lee & Bond, 2018). According to Gruber (2010) there is a lack of consensus on how to 
define long-term success in people-oriented conservation. He attributes this to the fact that 
success appears to be contextual due to its link to stakeholder priorities and interests. Success 
is therefore difficult to define because it varies according to local conditions (Gruber, 2010). 
In its most basic sense, a people-oriented or community-based conservation project could be 
considered successful if stakeholders are satisfied and natural resources are managed in a way 
that has the potential to be sustainable over the long term (Lee & Bond, 2018). The issue is 
more complex than this however, because there is often no timeline describing when these 
aims should be achieved by in order to claim success or admit failure (Buscher, 2014; 
Dressler et al., 2010). It is also complicated by the fact that stakeholders will understand and 
experience success differently to one another. Success is not easily defined when there are 
stakeholders with varied interests. 
Goodwin and Santilli (2009) have discussed this concept of success in community-based 
tourism initiatives. They investigated the criteria for success that are used by funders, 
conservationists and other practitioners working on community-based tourism initiatives. 
Their investigation revealed that improvements in social capital and empowerment was the 
most commonly used criterion for success. Next was improved livelihoods, followed by local 
economic development. The sharing of collective benefits was the least frequently cited 
criterion relating to successful initiative outcomes. Simply sharing benefits was deemed to be 
insufficient – those benefits need to make a positive difference. Goodwin and Santilli (2009) 
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further state that there is an important distinction between improved livelihoods and local 
economic development. The former refers to individuals and households. The latter refers to a 
broader community effect. Interestingly, the two criteria relating to individual empowerment 
were rated to be more influential on program outcomes than the criterion relating to 
community development, the third most influential criterion (Goodwin & Santilli, 2009). 
Again, there was no mention of how long it should take to achieve objectives in order for the 
initiative to be called successful. 
There are various ways to measure the success of people-oriented conservation initiatives. In 
Mugisha‘s (2002) study of threats to protected areas in Uganda, the threat reduction index is 
used to measure the degree to which a management strategy has reduced the threat to 
protected biodiversity. The less threatened biodiversity is because of management 
interventions, the more successful those management strategies are deemed to be (Lee & 
Bond, 2018). Prins, Castillo and Almendares (2003) use conflict resolution as an indicator of 
success. In the case of the Blue Forest in Honduras, the future existence of the forest was 
under threat. In 1995, the forest covered 1200 ha. while in 2000, only 804 ha. remained. 
Illegal logging and land-use conversion for agriculture were the main reasons for forest 
decline. Conflict centred on the management of funds arising from communal timber 
harvesting and the timber quota allotted to each community. The conflict was resolved after a 
series of meetings between community members, the local municipality and a human rights 
NGO. A process of mutual trust building and communication was established which paved 
the way for positive change to occur. Stakeholder willingness and capacity to participate in a 
just manner (in essence due to social capital) led the communities to find a mutually 
beneficial outcome. This case was said to be a success because of the change of 
circumstances from conflict to co-operation. Dyer et al. (2014) use an outcomes based 
evaluation process to define success. They write that community ownership of project 
outcomes as well as empowerment in design and implementation can be used to indicate the 
successfulness of an initiative (Dyer et al., 2014). 
There is a large variety of operationalisations for the word success in people-oriented 
conservation literature. In general, the most common use implies that the goals of the 
initiative have been achieved (Brehony et al., 2018). This is what Dyer et al. (2014) call an 
outcomes based approach. For example, a conservancy was established in 2006 on communal 
land in the Ishaqbini Hirola community in north-eastern Kenya to protect the critically 
endangered Hirola Antelope. The project was deemed to be a success because the antelope 
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population increased over the next 6 years (Measham & Lumbasi, 2013). A Joint Forest 
Management initiative in Katanino, Zambia was deemed to be a failure due to a lack of 
community ownership and empowerment. Participants in the initiative said that they had not 
received support from the government since 2008 and that they could not act without 
government support. The Joint Forestry Management initiative was no longer active in 2013 
(Dyer et al., 2014). In an example at Lake Victoria in Tanzania, Beach Management Units 
were established in 1999 among local communities to monitor fish catch and enforce 
Tanzanian fisheries legislation. These management units were deemed to be an unsuccessful 
community resource management initiative because the management units ended up serving 
community livelihood objectives and deviated from the original fisheries management 
objectives (Medard & Gehab, 2000). This thesis will also make use of an outcomes based 
understanding of success: the successfulness of an initiative will be measured by comparing 
the goals and resultant outcomes. However, it is recognised that success can be transient 
because of the changing nature of stakeholder co-operation; thus the word effective will be 
used synonymously with success in most contexts because the word effective allows for 
viewing co-operation on a sliding scale leading to a form of long-term success in which goals 
are achieved sustainably and consistently over years, decades, or more. 
2.5 People-Oriented Conservation in the 21st Century 
When the people-oriented conservation approach was at an early stage of development in the 
1990s, practice began to diverge from theory (Dressler et al., 2010; Turner, 2004). For 
example, much of the theory defines CBNRM more strictly in terms of self-organising user 
communities that own and manage natural resources, while practitioners on the other hand 
have applied the CBNRM label to a variety of people-oriented approaches to natural resource 
management that are neither community owned nor managed (Shackleton et al., 2010; 
Turner, 2004). This divide between theory and practice continues today with many natural 
resource management case studies being presented as examples of community-based 
initiatives, but the community that uses the resources neither owns them nor plays the greater 
role in management (Shackleton et al., 2010). Terminology has been used indistinctly in 
published research on people-oriented approaches, creating confusion about the manner of 
implementation, and successfulness, of people-oriented approaches in conservation practice 
(Dressler et al., 2010; Shackleton et al., 2010; Turner, 2004). 
The various people-oriented approaches to conservation began to mature as distinct fields of 
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study in the early 21st century. While some of the first conceptual works published on people-
oriented conservation practice were the design principles devised in the 1990s, the first 
conceptual publications that examined approaches like CBNRM and CBC as independent 
fields of research appeared in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Adams & Hulme, 2001; 
Fabricius, 2004; Hulme & Murphree, 1999, 2001; Kellert et al., 2000; Shackleton et al., 
2002). Some of the early conceptual works on CBNRM and ICDPs challenged the efficacy of 
the approach in being able to successfully conserve biodiversity and create development 
opportunities for rural communities because many of these programmes had not delivered the 
promised results (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Berkes, 2004; Campbell et al., 2001; Kellert et 
al., 2000). The problems experienced in early implementation, and the divergence between 
research and implementation (or theory and practice) caused these scholars to begin 
conceptually examining the problems that the people-oriented approach was undergoing as a 
method of conservation practice.  
The thesis of Turner's (2004) paper ―A Crisis in CBNRM?‖ effectively sums up the state of 
the people-oriented conservation approach over a decade ago: practice had diverged from 
theory and the myriad of people-oriented approaches labelled as ICDPs and CBNRM projects 
were largely failing to produce the desired results for conservation and development. More 
recently, Dressler et al. (2010) agreed with Turner (2004) that in the 21st century, people-
oriented conservation remains in a state of disarray. There is a lot of contention and debate in 
this field, particularly around the following issues: 
 People-oriented conservation seeks to improve quality of life while maintaining 
environmental health, yet few studies on these initiatives successfully tie together 
social variables and outcomes with environmental health (Nolte, 2013; Crona and 
Hubacek, 2010; Shackleton et al., 2010; Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006). If successful 
achievement of both conservation and development goals is possible, this should 
surely be a priority 
 Quality of life can be improved where a person has the rights to do so (ownership of 
and access to resources, social justice), the power to do so (making decisions about 
resource use, management and monitoring), and a context of justice to be able to 
retain the result (benefits). Despite this, people-oriented conservation projects 
continue to be initiated where one or more of these three socio-political factors are not 
present and the resulting project failures are misunderstood (Larson & Ribot, 2007)  
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 Trust is an important indicator of historical stakeholder interactions and the likely 
outcome of future scenarios. Trust between individuals, and between groups, is often 
the result of trustworthy behaviour (Westlund & Kobayashi, 2013). When people trust 
each other they are more willing to engage with one another (Pretty, 2003; Pretty and 
Smith, 2004). Without this social cohesion the probability of positive outcomes 
emerging is low, yet the concept of trust features little in natural resource management 
literature and even less in conservation literature (Shackleton et al., 2010; Stern, 
2008).  
Neither trust nor social capital features in Ostrom's (1990) oft cited design principles for 
managing common property natural resources. This has underpinned some major weaknesses 
in the design of people-oriented conservation programs by overlooking key local social 
variables which influence natural resource management outcomes (Sowman & Wynberg, 
2014; Stern, 2008). Blaikie (2006:1953) calls this lack of inspection into local social 
variables ―the containerisation of the local‖, a tool used to make locally complex scenarios 
manageable. However, trust is a key variable that can foster positive working relationships 
between stakeholders of conservation programs – while it needs more attention in the 
literature, there is a general lack of investigation into this subject (Pretty, 2003; Stern, 2008). 
 The field of people-oriented conservation is relatively immature, not necessarily due 
to age but due to a lack of defined operationalizations of key terms. There is a lack of 
agreement on the correct interpretation of the terms community, community-based, 
ownership, and participation (Shackleton et al., 2010) 
 There is no typology or model being widely used that categorises people-oriented 
conservation projects into the spectrum of approaches (Shackleton et al., 2010; 
Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2004). Such a model could negate some of the problems 
stemming from the inconsistent operationalization of key labels and terms. Without 
consistent categorisation of people-oriented projects, comparisons for the sake of 
generalisation are inherently weak due to inconsistency (Blaikie, 2006) 
 Success is a debatable label (Buscher, 2014). It is often arbitrarily assigned and it is 
not often analysed (Goodwin & Santilli, 2009). Comparison of supposedly successful 
people-oriented conservation initiatives is thus weakened due to a lack of consistency 
in the definition of 'success'. While the fields of CBNRM and CBC have been labelled 
by some as largely failing techniques in conservation (Redford, Padoch & 
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Sunderland, 2013), success and failure is attributed inconsistently due to different 
measures of success across cases. These measures can include, but are not limited to, 
biodiversity preservation, financial growth, natural resource preservation, growth in 
community wealth, or increased diversity of community livelihoods 
 Many people-oriented conservation initiatives are built on at least one of a number of 
erroneous assumptions that have served to reproduce and market these initiatives over 
the years (Blaikie, 2006). When these assumptions are incorrect they inherently 
weaken the ability of said initiatives to yield positive outcomes for both conservation 
and development and 
 There is little macro-work in the field, not only in terms of synthesising case studies 
in the form of Agrawal's (2006) study but more importantly in the form of meta-
research: thinking critically about the development of the field (Dressler et al., 2010; 
Shackleton et al., 2010;  Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004). 
With such a complex and confounded field of study comprising a vast array of competing 
ideas, one might question if continuing with the approach is worthwhile. However, such 
questioning is irrelevant because as Adams and Hulme (2001:198) wrote: community 
conservation is here to stay. Similarly, Blaikie (2006:1944) wrote that ―(Almost) all roads 
lead to CBNRM.‖ The popularity of the people-oriented approach will grow as conservation 
practitioners seek out ways in which to preserve a representative portion of biodiversity in an 
increasingly populated world (Blaikie, 2006). Environmental pressures from a growing 
population paired with the social imperative of poverty reduction will ensure that there will 
continue to be people-oriented conservation projects in the future. The continued use of this 
approach necessitates an improved understanding of what makes these projects work well. 
Moreover, there are a number of positive things that people-oriented conservation does 
achieve, making it a useful tool for improving the sustainability of conservation: There are 
numerous examples of initiatives that successfully deliver on either rural development goals 
or conservation objectives, but rarely are both achieved concurrently (Buscher & Davidov, 
2016; Mbaiwa, 2004; Measham & Lumbasi, 2013; Mohammed & Inoue, 2012; Wood, 2008). 
By improving our understanding of people-oriented conservation, practitioners might be able 
to more often successfully deliver on both development and conservation goals. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The people-oriented conservation approach is a radical change from the conventional 
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methods used since the idea and practice of modern conservation was developed. 
Conservation has typically been associated with protected areas: national parks and nature 
reserves. These protected areas have been established and maintained in ways that were often 
detrimental to people living in close proximity (West, Igoe & Brockington, 2006). Global 
societal shifts towards recognition of human rights in the 1960s paved the way for changes in 
conservation (Dowie, 1996). Western conservationists saw it as their duty to improve the 
quality of life in communities that had historically been marginalised by conservation 
(Adams & Hulme, 2001). The development of people-oriented approaches to conservation 
was supposed to be an answer to this problem, but the uncontrolled growth of these 
approaches has caused a unique set of problems that, if left unsolved, could entrench negative 
histories into the future of conservation (Dressler et al., 2010; Shackleton et al., 2010). 
Despite the current problems that have come about in people-oriented conservation, these 
approaches grow in popularity due to their theoretical contributions towards the idea that 
conservation can relieve poverty in rural communities (Child, 2003). It is this growing 
popularity despite many failures, and the need to satisfy basic human rights while conserving 
nature, that makes the problems relating to people-oriented conservation worth solving. 
The development of scientific knowledge that is inclusive of indigenous knowledge and local 
contexts has resulted in a major shift in conservation. Whereas the fortress-like management 
of protected areas typically excluded people, integrated community-based management has 
created opportunities for local people living around protected areas to participate in, and 
benefit from, conservation. The study of people-oriented conservation, which focuses on the 
impacts and benefits of conservation affecting local indigenous people, has been fraught with 
difficulty. The research processes used to investigate complex socio-ecological problems 
have become increasingly adept at generating information that captured the nuances of the 
social and political networks relating to conservation and natural resource governance. This 
has allowed an improved understanding of the deeper impacts had by beneficiation, resource 
ownership, and resource management. Increasing levels of differentiation between aspects of 
the people-oriented approach has allowed researchers to dissect the various methods used to 
manage natural resources, improving our understanding of what works and what does not.  
Using a qualitative approach that can capture the nuance of complex social processes in 
specific contexts, this study will add to our understanding of the people-oriented approach to 
conservation, specifically in the context of private ecotourism in Southern and East Africa. 
Specific attention will be paid to understanding the complexities of communities because 
50 
 
they are such complex, non-homogeneous groups. This will include examination of resource 
ownership, participation in resource governance, partnerships, benefit sharing, power, and the 
inescapable factor of trust. The examination of these varied factors does increase the 
complexity of the research process, but it is required when attempting to understand the 
complexities of ‗wicked‘ socio-ecological problems.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONTEXTUAL HISTORIES OF CONSERVATION IN 
TANZANIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
3. Introduction 
In order to deal with how control over limited resources and their uneven distribution affects 
resource governance outcomes, this study must examine the historical context to the alliances 
and negotiations that have been observed occurring between stakeholders during this 
research. As a framework for understanding the complex social processes that impact natural 
environmental systems, political ecology includes a historical perspective in the examination 
of the natural resource management. This chapter provides important historical context to the 
case study chapters that are to follow. In studying politics, the power that stakeholders wield 
in their interactions, a historical perspective is inevitably required. Bryant (1998:85) wrote 
that ―the colonial legacy is alive and well because political and economic elites accumulate 
wealth and power based on tenure arrangements and management practices bequeathed to 
them by the departing colonial authorities.‖ Colonial interventions in legal dynamics of third 
world nations are thus especially relevant in "understanding contemporary patterns of human-
environmental interaction and associated power relations" (Bryant 1998:85). As such, this 
chapter outlines the history of biodiversity conservation as a historical context for 
conservation approaches in Tanzania and South Africa, the two countries in which this study 
is based. It then continues with a brief history of biodiversity conservation in the two nations 
when they were still colonial territories, and then an outline of current day conservation and 
the legal frameworks supporting current conservation concepts. Other important ideas about 
indigenous people‘s resource use rights, the fortress model for protected area management, 
and the ethical basis for developing a people-oriented approach to conservation are discussed 
as context for changing patterns of resource ownership and access in the cases considered in 
this study. 
3.1 The Origins of Biodiversity Conservation 
The first statutory protected areas came to exist in the 19th century, but biodiversity protection 
has a history that is much older than that. Ancient societies thrived by protecting their 
resources – by contrast, societies that over-utilised natural resources were prone to weakening 
or collapse (Diamond, 2013). The protection of biodiversity is an ancient ideal that first 
originated from spiritual practices (Willis, 2014). Holdgate (2014) claims that the first 
protected areas came to exist as sacred forests, 2000 years ago in India. The idea of making 
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wilderness sacred has been found to be a universal concept: it has been historically evident in 
Ghana (Dudley, Higgins-Zogib, & Mansourian, 2009); Kenya, Benin and Cote d'Ivoire 
(Sheridan & Nyamweru, 2004); India (Gadgril & Chandran, 1992); Japan (Manabe et al., 
2000); Europe (MacKenzie, 1997); and the Pacific Islands (Colding & Folke, 2001). In these 
societies the practice of protecting land was not strictly a spiritual one, but it also held social 
and economic significance. A thousand years ago in Europe, wealthy people set aside hunting 
grounds for use by social elites (Eagles, McCool & Haynes, 2002). Similarly in Africa, 
protectionism was being practised in the Zulu Kingdom in the 19th century (Briggs, 2008). 
Hunting preserves were set aside for Zulu royalty consisting of land that the people were 
forbidden from entering. It is thought that this was done by the Zulu elites in order to control 
the utilisation of desirable species and their products (Child, 2013).  
Over time these protected lands became available to the public. The reason for protecting 
these lands changed from being hunting preserves for the elite of society to being an amenity 
for use by the public (Eagles, McCool & Haynes, 2002). An example of this is Richmond 
Park in England. Established as a deer park in the 17th century, it was reserved for royal 
hunting. The British parliament gave the public full right of access in 1872 and the park's 
ecosystem has since been developed as a public amenity9. 
In William Wordsworth's book A Guide through the District of the Lakes (1810), the English 
poet made one of the earliest written cases for preserving wildlife and wilderness for the sake 
of their beauty and intrinsic value. The Lake District of the United Kingdom had historically 
been wild moorlands, frequented only by a few travellers interested in seeing the wild 
landscapes. Wordsworth called the area a sort of 'national property', and of the area he penned 
these words in 1810: 
If the Lake District is worth having as a national recreation ground, it is worth preserving as 
such.... The well-being of its inhabitants depends on its popularity as a tourist district, while its 
importance to the country at large... is sufficiently attested by the immense number of visitors who 
flock to it annually.... (Yoshikawa, 2016:7) 
Similarly in the United States of America, the prominent naturalist John Muir (1901:1) 
furthered the idea that biodiversity should be protected when he wrote ―that wilderness is a 
necessity; and that mountain parks and reservations are useful not only as fountains of timber 
                                                 
9 https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/Richmond_Park.html 
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and irrigating rivers, but as fountains of life.‖  
Thirty one years before Muir published those words, in 1872, the world‘s first national park 
came into existence when the United States of America dedicated the Yellowstone National 
Park as an area for public use and enjoyment. The concept of preserving natural areas grew in 
popularity in Europe and North America during the 19th century as urban areas expanded and 
population density increased. The establishment of small urban parks set a precedent during 
the time period, and the idea of preserving great natural landscapes became increasingly 
popular in the United States due to the romanticising of the frontier experience (Eagles, 
McCool & Haynes, 2002). 
Soon after the Yellowstone wilderness was named a protected park, more prominent sites 
gained protection including the Grand Canyon and Mount Rainier. Other countries soon 
followed suit by creating their own national parks, examples being Australia's Royal National 
Park in 1879 and Canada's Banff National Park in 1887 (Eagles, McCool & Haynes, 2002). 
During this time period, European authorities in African colonies were similarly setting lands 
and biodiversity aside from local consumptive use and excluding indigenous peoples. In 
certain instances this was used as a tool to preserve African wildlife for European sport 
hunting. Whatever the overall purpose, the international conservation trend had a significant 
impact on current day conservation in Africa because colonial authorities used their power to 
control resources. This use of autocratic control set an important historical precedent for rural 
peoples‘ perceptions of, and interactions with, conservation. 
3.1.1 Development of an Authoritarian Approach: The Fortress Model 
The concept of protecting pristine landscapes was influenced by 19th century Anglo-European 
science which propagated the idea that nature was pristine until humans interrupted its 
balance – in order to protect nature it would be necessary to exclude humans from it (Descola 
& Palsson, 1996). Not only did this idea lead to the development of national parks, but it also 
guided the way in which these parks were managed because any non-scientific human 
interaction would come to be seen as unnecessary interference (Dressler et al., 2010). A 
useful example in this regard is the Yellowstone National Park. When Yellowstone National 
Park was created in 1872 there was no legal protection for wildlife. Being a wilderness area, 
wildlife populations were high. Park managers and tourists alike were allowed to hunt any 
animal they came across. Due to the high rate of hunting, regulations were passed by the 
federal government in 1883 that prohibited killing wild animals in the park, excepting 
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predators such as the bear, wolf, mountain lion and coyote (Haines, 1996). In 1886 the United 
States Army took over administration of the park in an attempt to control the high rate of 
poaching. They autocratically banned hunting of any animals by the public leaving predator 
control to the army as park managers10.  
Due to the desire to preserve pristine landscapes, control human interactions with nature in 
these landscapes, and protect biodiversity from poaching, administrators became increasingly 
authoritarian in their style of managing protected areas and the natural resources contained 
therein (Cock & Fig, 2000). An early example of this authoritarianism was the use of military 
personnel in protecting Yellowstone National Park. Government administrators of 
Yellowstone felt that they did not wield enough social power to frighten poachers, so they 
asked the army to take over management of the park (Schullery, 1996). However even the use 
of military might was not enough to scare poachers as Edgar Howell proved when he was 
caught by the Army shooting several individuals of the critically endangered Bison 
population (Haines, 1996). Perhaps this was an early warning that an autocratic method of 
governance would not be successful in the long term as shall be discussed hereafter.  
The example of Yellowstone National Park is important to be familiar with because it quickly 
became the most commonly followed model for protected area formulation and management 
and continues to be a popular approach today (Dressler et al., 2010; Wuerthner, 2015). The 
use of this authoritarian model was popular not only in the United States of America, but also 
in the colonial management of natural resources in Africa where Europeans had power over 
indigenous people and saw themselves as the protectors of nature (Dressler et al., 2010; 
Neumann, 1998).  
3.1.2 The Fortress Model in African Conservation 
Due to the philosophical alienation of humans from nature, the methods of conserving 
biodiversity became fortress-like: Human entry into, and activity in protected areas was 
strictly controlled (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997). In many modern reserves and parks resource 
use has been strictly forbidden, and engaging in resource use has become vilified as poaching 
(Adams & Hulme, 2001; Carruthers, 2009). In many cases the establishment of a protected 
area meant that governments wrested ownership of land and control of the associated natural 
resources from rural communities (Lasgorceix & Kothari, 2009). The fortress model became 
                                                 
10 
http://yellowstone.net/history/timeline/the-early-years-1872-1915 
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a popular approach with colonial authorities because of its usefulness in excluding 
competition from indigenous people in resource use, and because of views on nature held by 
many early 20th century scientists and philosophers (Anderson & Grove, 1987; Carey, 1926; 
Descola & Palsson, 1996; Ereshefsky, 2007; Hingston, 1931; Pearson, 1922). Initially, local 
rural people were excluded from reserves because they were seen as competition for natural 
resources (Maddox, Giblin & Kimambo, 1996). Later they became seen by some as the cause 
of environmental degradation (Lambert & Colomeda, 1999). For both reasons indigenous 
African people were commonly excluded from protected areas. The top-down approach to 
protected area management that has dominated management practice since parks and reserves 
were conceived has been criticised for its negative impact on rural livelihoods (Dahlberg & 
Burlando, 2009). Despite some of its obvious failings (McShane, 2003), the fortress model 
has its proponents and continues to be a dominant method of operation in many protected 
areas around the world today, particularly privately owned nature reserves (Siurua, 2006).  
Administrators of the 'fortress' method of protected area management in the 20
th
 century in 
Africa cast rural people as degraders of the natural environment, a natural opposition of 
conservation (Lasgorceix & Kothari, 2009; Brockington, 2002). As a consequence, local 
people have been excluded from conservation, preventing them experiencing the potential 
benefits of biodiversity conservation and tourism (Maddox, Giblin & Kimambo, 1996; West, 
Igoe & Brockington, 2006). Not only have rural people been prevented from utilising natural 
resources in protected areas, but the financial benefits accrued from conservation, usually 
benefits relating to tourism, have typically been used to support further conservation efforts 
as opposed to being shared in local development (West, Igoe & Brockington, 2006). In some 
protected areas the financial income resulting from tourism is not enough to support current 
conservation efforts let alone extend them. Corruption and maladministration of public funds 
can be a drain on tourism income from protected areas (Personal communications with 
management staff at Mkuze Game Reserve, 7 December 2012; Personal communications 
with resident of Ololosokwan community, 10 March 2015). 
Exclusionary methods of managing protected areas have induced social and financial costs on 
neighbouring rural communities, and these costs have hampered the potential development of 
rural people (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Campbell et al., 2001; West, Igoe & Brockington, 
2006). Conservation practices that cause costs to local people can induce these people to have 
negative attitudes towards conservation (Burgoyne & Kelso, 2014; West, Igoe & 
Brockington, 2006). Rural people with negative attitudes towards conservation are more 
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likely to resist conservation efforts, making them less successful (Campbell et al., 2001; 
Rurai, 2012). People-centred programs such as CBNRM were designed to increase the 
likelihood of conservation success by ensuring that conservation produces benefits for local 
people living around protected areas instead of inducing costs (Hulme and Murphree, 2001; 
Kellert et al., 2000). Using force to create and manage protected areas can put communities at 
odds with conservationists, making rural people less likely to participate in conservation 
efforts thus decreasing the effectiveness of conservation (Andrade & Rhodes, 2012).  
A fortress approach to protected area management can have a negative impact on the 
surrounding landscape. Much of the rural population in Africa practices subsistence 
agriculture (Hulme & Murphree, 2001; Kangalawe & Lyimo, 2010; Rurai, 2012). Increasing 
intensity of subsistence agriculture due to growing populations also increases the likelihood 
of environmental degradation due to over-utilisation of natural resources (Brink & Eva, 2009; 
Brockington, Sachedina & Scholfield, 2008). Environmental degradation resulting from 
increasing agricultural intensity around protected areas has compelled conservation 
administrators and scientists to acknowledge that the conventional 'fortress' method of 
protected area management can have negative impacts on neighbouring rural communities 
and the environment (Igoe, 2004; West, Igoe & Brockington, 2006). 
In addition to the negative social and environmental impacts that 'fortress' management can 
have, this approach has been nonsensical in much of Africa where many protected areas are 
not fenced and governing authorities are stretched to administer vast tracts of wilderness. 
This makes neighbouring communities a highly influential factor in the success of 
conservation initiatives in African protected areas (Brockington, 2004; Hulme & Murphree, 
1999; Nelson & Agrawal, 2008). Conservationists have recognised that working with rural 
communities is necessary to construct a viable long-term solution in much of Africa (Adams 
& Hulme, 2001; Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Berkes, 2004). Faced with a growing amount of 
scientific evidence about the social and environmental costs of fortress conservation, as well 
as the influence that rural communities have on biodiversity conservation, a growing number 
of conservationists in the 20
th
 century began to promote people-oriented conservation (Hayes, 
2006; Turner, 2004). 
3.2 Africa's Protected Landscapes 
The arrival of the first European settlers in southern Africa coincided with the first recorded 
over-utilisation of natural resources in the region. In 1658 regulations were issued by the 
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Dutch East India trading company regarding the clearance of forests for firewood, penguins 
for food, seals for pelts, and elephants for ivory. These regulations were soon to fall into 
obsolescence as settlers dispersed and used wood, hides and ivory as important resources for 
home industries and income (McCormick, 1991). As Europeans began to settle further into 
the interior of southern Africa, conflicts over land use began to occur as the foreign settlers 
sought to find un-utilised wildlife stocks and arable farming land that had not yet been 
ploughed by European hands (Carruthers, 1997). The 19th century prominence of firearms 
allowed these settlers to hunt wildlife with impunity, building their wealth with skins and 
ivory; clearing the land of grazing wildlife that competed with their livestock and ate their 
crops (McCormick, 1991). 
This aggressive expansion of hunting and agriculture caused the decimation of wildlife 
populations across parts of southern Africa in the 19th century (MCracken, 2009). By the 
1830s elephants were almost extinct in what is now the Eastern Cape Province of South 
Africa. The Quagga and Blaubok were hunted to extinction (McCormick, 1991). Such 
reckless destruction of wildlife led to the establishment of hunting restrictions (Carruthers, 
2010; Page & Ateljevic, 2017). Similarly forest reserves were established as logging began to 
grow to the point where over-utilisation and top-soil loss were points of concern (Hutchins, 
1903; King, 1941). These restrictions and reserves were initiatives that sought to preserve 
natural resources for economic and political reasons, but excluded indigenous Africans from 
the resources upon which their livelihoods depended (Beinart, 200; Child, 2013; Hutchins, 
1903). Indigenous people were removed from their land to make way for the establishment of 
parks and reserves, and they were excluded from using protected biodiversity and land 
despite the importance of these resources to their livelihoods (Child, 2013; Gush, 2000). This 
historical practice of exclusion in Africa was based in part on the iconic Yellowstone model 
and has had lasting consequences on communities‘ perceptions of conservation (Rurai, 2012).  
Attempts to legally protect nature in the 19th century colonies of southern and east Africa 
were the beginnings of major developments in nature conservation in Africa. The 
development of biodiversity conservation and protected areas in southern and east Africa is 
hereafter closely examined because this served as the basis for the development of legal 
frameworks for nature conservation in Africa during the 20th century. These histories detail 
aspects of resource ownership, access, and control and they have had a significant impact on 
the current perceptions that rural people have of conservation. They thus provide an 
important understanding of current day working relations between rural people and 
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conservation authorities. 
3.2.1 The 19th Century 
3.2.1.1 German East Africa 
The 19th century in East Africa was a time of extraordinary exploitation. In the 1880s 100,000 
firearms were imported to East Africa each year. British colonial authorities estimated that 
during this period 65,000 elephants were shot in Africa annually (Gißibl, 2006). In 1885 a 
colonial presence in East Africa began officially when the German government announced 
their intention to establish a protectorate in the region (Peters, 2001). With the increasing 
German presence toward the end of the 19th century the number of hunters increased 
significantly. The German colonies' foremost export at the time was ivory. Large numbers of 
foreign hunters visited the region, decimating wildlife populations (Gißibl, 2006). In the 
1890s a scourge of deadly pestilences broke out among both people and livestock. Rinderpest 
caused the loss of approximately 90% of the region's cattle and severely reduced wildlife 
populations (Gißibl, 2006). The scourge was so heavy that Buffalo were recognised by 
colonial administrators as being endangered. Their ability to multiply quickly allowed 
Buffalo herds to return in such numbers that a decade later they were no longer considered 
endangered but rather a nuisance to the people. This fluctuation in wildlife made colonial 
administrators realise that biodiversity needed protection (Cioc, 2009).  
In 1895 Hermann von Wissman was appointed the Imperial Governor of German East Africa 
(Peters, 2001). Wissman was the subject of an essay written in 1906 in which he was praised 
for his foresight in preserving African wildlife from extinction. Wissman was himself a 
hunter and he described the conduct of many Europeans as reckless, their shooting 
unsportsmanlike. As the Imperial Governor, he was responsible for a ban in trading ivory 
under a certain weight (i.e. coming from immature animals) and for the establishment of 
game reserves in 1896. The Colonial Department authorised Wissman to declare that in two 
large districts game would be absolutely protected (Gißibl, 2006). Wissman proposed that the 
animals in these game reserves be referred to as ―imperial game‖, rendering the reserves 
more like the royal hunting estates of medieval Europe where local people were excluded. 
Power and control over natural resources at the turn of the 20th century lay in the hands of the 
colonial rulers. They used this control to limit indigenous peoples‘ access to the natural 
resources that they had once entirely depended on. In 1896 Wissman published a legal 
ordinance in which hunting was regulated (Gißibl, 2006). This was heavily criticised as 
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visiting hunters and indigenous people were not deemed knowledgeable enough about local 
fauna to be able to obey the ordinance. The ordinance was mostly repealed in 1898 (Gißibl, 
2006). After the repeal, reserves were established as a formal means to manage wildlife and 
by 1913 there were 14 game reserves in the protectorate which could be open or closed 
depending on the stability and size of the wildlife population. The ability of indigenous tribes 
to hunt in these reserves was largely reduced, however they were allowed to continue living 
in them where they had customary heritage (Nelson, Nshala & Rodgers, 2007).  
3.2.1.2 The British Colonies of Southern Africa 
Regulations on biodiversity protection in southern Africa first appeared in the Cape colony in 
an 1846 ordinance that regulated the clearance of forests to prevent soil erosion and maintain 
an aesthetically pleasing environment (King, 1941). Legislation came about in 1859 with the 
Forest and Herbage Preservation Act, and again in 1888 with the Cape Forest Act that 
established the Knysna and Tsitsikamma forest reserves (Hutchins, 1903; Cape of Good 
Hope, 1871). In the Cape colony there appears to be no legislation on wildlife in the 19th 
century, as much of the wildlife populations had been decimated in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
The same was not true of the Natal colony where significant populations of large mammals 
thrived (McCracken, 2008:2). 
British occupation of Zululand in the late 19th century saw the first beginnings of change in 
the management of wildlife resources in the Natal colony. Travellers gained easier access to 
the wilder parts of Natal as transport infrastructure improved. Travel through the region was 
made easier. Writers at the time attracted hunters to the region with their reports of ―paradise, 
a land of forests, streams, and plains, of verdant meads, and gentle rains‖; of ―elephant seen 
in great plenty all over the [St. Lucia] district‖ (McCracken, 2008:2). Ivory and hides were 
Natal's chief exports to Britain and Europe until 1862. Wildlife was seen as an unlimited 
resource and was severely depleted by the 1880s (Perisinotto, Stretch and Taylor, 2013). The 
destruction of wildlife became great enough for government officials to suggest that hunting 
would need to be regulated before wildlife resources were exhausted (McCracken, 2008).  
The first wildlife law to be promulgated in Zululand was in 1890 - large mammals were 
protected and the governor‘s permission was required before anything could be destroyed 
(Gush, 2000; McCracken, 2008). However this law did not last long because of the spread of 
a wildlife disease known as Nagana (Trypanosomiasis), propagated by the Tsetse Fly. Before 
large numbers of cattle died, the protected status of wildlife was repealed because they were 
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known to be a host for the Tsetse fly and large numbers of wildlife were destroyed (Player, 
1998). This problem of Nagana was to become manifest repeatedly over the next few 
decades, with mass shooting of wildlife being used as an unsuccessful tool for the control of 
the disease (Perisinotto, Stretch & Taylor, 2013).  
The decimation of wildlife for the purposes of hunting and improving agriculture brought to 
the colonial administrators' attention the need for protected areas in which wildlife could be 
allowed to replenish their populations without harassment by hunters or spreading disease to 
cattle. In 1895 five game reserves were established in the Natal Colony (Zululand 
Government Notice 12 of April 1895). In 1897 four of these reserves were reaffirmed and 
hunting in the reserves was introduced as a regulated activity (Perisinotto, Stretch and Taylor, 
2013). Local people were being infrequently removed from game reserves and while they 
were allowed to graze their cattle in reserves, they were not allowed to settle there. This led to 
a number of individuals being imprisoned or fined because they did not agree with British 
regulations on their use of natural resources, and they thus contravened these regulations 
frequently. The Yellowstone model of conservation by authoritarian control was causing 
significant conflict with local people by the early 20th century (Gush, 2000). British 
regulations on the development of protected areas followed the authoritarian Yellowstone 
model. Not only was resource access limited but land was taken from local people to increase 
the size of these protected areas. These historical aspects of power, control, and access have 
impacted the views that local people have of conservation in South Africa. 
3.2.3 The 20th century and Today 
As a result of the authoritarian style of governance that colonial governments employed, 
newly developing conservation authorities had a significant amount of control over national 
parks and game reserves during the 20th century (Carruthers, 2009). Whereas during the 19th 
century protected areas had been in the hands of colonial administrators, in the 20th century 
they moved into the realm of more specifically placed political administrators and scientific 
experts (Carruthers, 2010; Siurua, 2006). The establishment and management of protected 
areas largely remained out of reach for the ordinary citizen, and in the first half of the 20th 
century was not thought to be the concern of the indigenous African public (Siurua, 2006). 
This attitude became particularly evident during the establishment of protected areas where 
rural communities were removed from their land (Colchester, 1997; Dressler et al., 2010; 
Gush, 2000; Robins and Waal, 2008). People that had previously engaged in livelihoods like 
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hunting and pastoralism were now labelled as squatters and poachers. They became enemies 
of nature conservation (Siurua, 2006). Thus began an era what has been called ―fortress,‖ 
―fences and fines‖ or ―coercive‖ conservation, an era that laid a foundation for current day 
relations between conservationists and rural people (Adams & Hulme, 2001:10).  
3.2.3.1 Tanzania 
The first game reserves established in Tanzania were proclaimed by the Germans in 1905 
around the present day Selous Game Reserve (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 
1998). At the time, game reserves were established to conserve the colonial heritage of 
wildlife and the imperial right to hunt big game where it was found in the empire (Gißibl, 
2006). In this vein reserves established by the Germans were done so for the high 
concentration of wildlife in an area, particularly big game worthy of being hunted by German 
aristocracy (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 1998). The rule of colonial authority 
changed in 1919 when Germany and her allies lost the First World War, and the German 
colonial protectorate in East Africa was annexed by the British. In 1921 the British colonial 
administration established the Game Department and set about re-establishing the reserves 
that the Germans had created. The Game Department had the roles of managing these game 
reserves, enforcing hunting regulations and protecting people and their crops from wildlife 
(Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 1998).  
In 1922 the British gazetted the first game reserve in the newly formed British territory of 
Tanganyika: Selous Game Reserve. In 1928 the Ngorongoro Crater Game Reserve was 
established, shortly followed in 1929 by the Serengeti Game Reserve. British attempts to 
control the Tsetse fly and sleeping sickness in the 1920s and 1930s consisted of gathering 
rural people together in more concentrated living areas and this enhanced their ability to 
establish reserves. By 1940 game reserves with varying degrees of control over wildlife 
protection and resource use existed in the regions of Serengeti, Ngorongoro crater, Mount 
Kilimanjaro, Mount Meru and Selous. These policies reflected the broader colonial processes 
at the time of transferring control of valuable natural resources from indigenous people to 
Europeans (Nelson, Nshala & Rodgers, 2007). 
The Tanganyikan reserves that were established in the 1920s were areas of significant 
hunting value. Thus in the mid-20
th
 century hunting areas were established adjacent to game 
reserves, allowing foreign hunting tourism to continue. Land where hunting was controlled 
was divided into hunting blocks that were established by game ordinances set out by the 
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British colonial administration in 1921, 1940 and 1951 (Nelson, Nshala & Rodgers, 2007). In 
1974 some of these blocks were amalgamated into Game Controlled Areas (GCAs), a term 
created in the Wildlife Conservation Act, Act No. 12 of 1974. Hunting continues to be a 
contentious but important part of wildlife conservation and the tourism economy in Tanzania 
today (Songorwa, 2013). 
At the time of independence in 1961 there were three national parks and nine game reserves 
in the territory of Tanganyika. Centralised state control over wildlife and protected areas 
became well established in Tanzania by the mid-20
th
 century. The government retained direct 
control over the country's parks and reserves at a centralised national level (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism, 1998). In anticipation of wildlife slaughter similar to what 
was seen in Uganda after colonial independence (Wasswa, 1991), western conservationists 
mobilised foreign resources to support and fund wildlife conservation in Tanzania (Nelson, 
Nshala and Rodgers, 2007). The slaughter did not happen however and the government made 
it clear that they intended to conserve wildlife resources in Tanzania because they saw the 
financial value that wildlife could contribute to the Tanzanian people. In a document about 
wildlife conservation called 'The Arusha Manifesto' the President of then Tanganyika, Julius 
Nyerere wrote: 
The survival of our wildlife is a matter of grave concern to all of us in Africa. These wild creatures 
amid the wild places they inhabit are not only important as a source of wonder and inspiration but 
are an integral part of our natural resources and of our future livelihoods and well-being. In 
accepting the trusteeship of our wildlife we solemnly declare that we will do everything in our 
power to make sure that our children's grand-children will be able to enjoy this rich and precious 
inheritance (Arusha Manifesto, 1961 cited in Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 1998). 
Wildlife and wilderness resources are governed by the Wildlife Conservation Act of 2013 
and the National Parks Act of 2002. In 2015 the Tanzanian Wildlife Authority was formed by 
the government to work with TANAPA in taking care of game reserves, wildlife management 
areas, hunting blocks and anti-poaching operations. This authority replaced the Wildlife 
Division but is still called by that name colloquially by many people in Tanzania. Ownership 
of wilderness and wildlife resources in Tanzania is a highly contested issue. The government 
has claimed an increasing number of land portions for the declaration of protected areas. One 
of these is the iconic Serengeti National Park. The National Parks Act provides for the 
establishment and management of national parks in Tanzania. The act was originally devised 
in 1959 with several revisions being published in the 1960s and 1970s. The most recent form 
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was published in 2002. These laws originally set out to decentralise the management of 
natural resources, and the various amendments reinforced this ideal. In recent years however, 
revisions to legislation have served to recentralise the control of wildlife and wilderness 
resources. According to Benjaminsen et al. (2013), communities have recognised this and 
they are resisting the government‘s latest ‗community-based approach‘ that has been set out 
in the aforementioned legislation.  
Tanzania has established a comprehensive scheme for differentiating protected areas by type 
and their establishment of protected areas has been prolific (Kiwango et al., 2015). There are 
national parks, game reserves, conservation areas, marine reserves, marine conservation 
areas, and wildlife management areas
11
. All information on these was obtained from a 
Tanzanian government website (www.tanzaniatourism.go.tz). The national parks are 
excluded from consumptive use. Conservation areas are places where multiple land uses are 
promoted including conservation, tourism and subsistence consumptive use by local 
communities. The Ngorongoro conservation area is a unique protected area in this respect – 
conservation and tourism are managed alongside local subsistence farming that takes place 
within the conservation area. Marine conservation areas are similar though not terrestrial. 
Game controlled areas similarly allow for consumptive use within their boundaries, and 
hunting is permitted under license. Game reserves are managed exclusively by the 
Department of Wildlife and are typically managed for tourism and hunting – no local use is 
permitted inside their boundaries
11
.  
Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) are altogether different in that they are established on 
village land by rural communities – the community manages their land and the resources on 
it. They retain 100% of hunting fees from that land and 25% of hunting fees from adjacent 
reserves. Wildlife management areas are the legal framework that Tanzania has adopted to 
involve rural communities in conservation and natural resource management (Caro & 
Davenport, 2015; Lee, 2018). The newly formed Tanzanian Wildlife Authority (TAWA), the 
management body that has replaced the Wildlife Division in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, is responsible for the operation of WMAs. The successfulness of 
WMAs has been debated. Their conservation effectiveness has reportedly been valuable to 
cases where local ungulate numbers have increased (Lee, 2018) but the national problem with 
poaching, in particular that of elephants, highlights some of the issues facing the community-
                                                 
11 http://www.tanzaniatourism.go.tz /places-to-go/category/national-parks 
64 
 
based conservation approach in Tanzania (Caro & Davenport, 2015). 
3.2.3.2 South Africa 
In the early years of the 20th century, South Africans grew increasingly concerned with the 
future of game reserves and wildlife in their country. Prominent figures such as Jan Smuts, a 
former Prime Minister of South Africa, called for the establishment of wilderness reserves as 
areas for the protection of wildlife and the advancement of natural science (Adams, 2004). In 
1912 Stevenson-Hamilton, appointed the first warden of Sabi Nature Reserve in 1902, 
proposed that the reserves around Sabi be amalgamated and turned into a national park. The 
idea was accepted and a bill on national parks was drafted for parliament in 1923. In 1926 the 
bill was promulgated as the National Parks Act, Act No. 56 of 1926. It was in this year that 
the first board of South African National Parks (SANParks) was appointed and the land 
between the Sabie and Olifants Rivers was declared as the Kruger National Park12. 
The creation of national parks was not only based on ideas of preserving wilderness and 
wildlife. The establishment of national parks in South Africa was seen at the time as a means 
to advance the status of the country and to align the country with what were seen as 
progressive, civilised societies in Europe and North America (Carruthers, 1995; Conlon, 
2005). It was an important part of a national identity that drew the country together, allowing 
for the formation of nationalist pride among citizens, trust in the government and the nation's 
eventual declaration as an independent republic (Carruthers, 1997). 
By the mid-20th century, South Africa's national parks and reserves had become tourist 
attractions. This was in part due to changing values and economies. Many people no longer 
thought it morally defensible to kill wild animals for sport. Hunting was no longer a major 
part of the economy because of the development of industries (Carruthers, 2010). Part of the 
original rationale for establishing protected areas in South Africa was in response to 
encroachment on pristine landscapes by growing rural populations and the spread of 
agriculture driven by a surge in national development, however the idea of preserving a 
romantic African wilderness abundant in wildlife was a powerful ideal that played an 
important part in the development of tourism and the South African national park system well 
into the 20th century (Carruthers, 1997).  
From the year 1994, with the shift from the apartheid government in South Africa to a 
                                                 
12 https://www.sanparks.org/about/history.php 
65 
 
democratically elected government, new legislation was developed in a number of sectors.  
Environmental legislation was completely overhauled with the introduction of the National 
Environmental Management Act (Act no. 107 of 1998). This act was designed to serve as a 
framework for future environmental legislation and environmental governance activities in 
South Africa. Devolved environmental governance requiring public participation is part of 
this national policy (Carruthers, 2009; National Environmental Management: Protected Areas 
Act, 2003). With the promulgation of the National Environmental Management: Protected 
Areas Act the governance of protected areas in South Africa has become closely linked to 
social and political narratives, particularly as government seeks to improve the quality of life 
for under-resourced and historically marginalised rural communities living adjacent to 
protected areas (Adams, 2004; Anthony & Szabo, 2011; Child, 2013). This ideal has been 
especially prevalent since the 1990s when South Africa became an increasingly popular 
tourism destination with the demise of apartheid. For example, the South African government 
has estimated that tourisms contribution to gross domestic product grew by over 70% 
between 2004 and 2008
13
. Such growth in tourism has great potential to help rural people 
improve their quality of life. Due to the increase in tourism, the South African government 
has focused on co-operative and community-based engagements in tourism and conservation 
to help improve the quality of life among rural people (Dressler & Buscher, 2008).  
Along with huge growth in tourism, ownership of resources became an issue that the post-
1994 government set about addressing. With the land restitution process, catered for by the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act (Act no.22 of 1994), people who had lost their land due to 
discriminatory processes in the past could have their land restored to them through a court of 
law, or be financially compensated for the loss of that land. This is a process that has allowed 
multiple communities neighbouring protected areas in South Africa to claim their land back, 
and get access to resources, through legal means. Prominent examples of this include the 
Makuleke community outside the Kruger National Park, the on-going saga of Sabi Sands in 
the Kruger Park, and the Mnqobokazi and Makasa communities outside Phinda Game 
Reserve. 
The National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (Act no.57 of 2003) 
categorizes protected areas according to their function and level of statutory protection. Main 
categories are nature reserves, forest reserves and areas, mountain catchment areas, and world 
                                                 
13 https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/15yearreview_tourism.pdf 
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heritage sites. As of 2006, these formal statutory protected areas represented 6% (or 
approximately 7Mha) of all land in South Africa
14
. The Protected Areas Act defines a major 
departure from South Africa‘s previous protected areas legislation and management. It 
addresses a crucial topic in the nation‘s natural resource use policy: access to resources 
(Child, 2004). This act is imbued with the notion that natural resources are the property of the 
South African people and that those appointed to co-manage these resources should have the 
freedom to work within the framework established by the state (Cadman et al., 2010).  Where 
previously conservation management was considered the realm of scientists and experts, 
public involvement have become not only encouraged but more recently also required 
(Carruthers, 2009). 
3.3 Conclusion 
Biodiversity conservation is an ancient practice that has been modernised by science and 
enhanced with legal systems that enforce its importance. In the 19
th
 century, public 
wilderness began to be protected by law when it became apparent that their resources were 
vulnerable and they were worth being preserved for the public. An authoritarian approach 
was taken to enforce control over these resources and a dominant protected area management 
model emerged. This model was applied in Africa where colonising European nations sought 
to preserve biodiversity where it was supposed to be pristine or served an economic purpose. 
The 20
th
 century has seen certain developments that improved the plight of historically 
marginalised indigenous people. Conservation has been a tool to be utilised for economic and 
social development, justifying the continued protection of wilderness and wildlife resources. 
In Tanzania and South Africa there is a history of colonial oppression of indigenous people 
that continues to affect the way in which people perceive and interact with conservation 
concepts. Their perceptions are often negative and in cases where they are, rural people are 
likely to resist conservation efforts that restrict their access to resources (Bragagnolo et al., 
2016; Hackel, 1999). These histories are the basis for current day working relations and as 
such are vital to be familiar with if one is to attempt to understand the complex working 
relations that underpin modern conservation efforts in Africa.  
                                                 
14 http://soer.deat.gov.za/593.html 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND 
PRACTICE 
4. Introduction 
Social interactions between stakeholders competing for control over natural resources can 
impact the state of the natural environment and the outcomes of co-operative natural resource 
governance (McShane et al., 2011; Dahlberg & Burlando, 2009; Schmidt-Soltau, 2004). Thus 
it is of vital importance to understand the nature of stakeholder relations and the historical 
context that is responsible for their state. This study primarily makes use of qualitative data 
gathering methods to understand stakeholder relations and the state of the natural 
environment that is causing conflict between stakeholders. The analysis of the qualitative 
data requires specific tools that can reveal the complexities of socially rich textual data. This 
analysis can reveal links between stakeholder behaviours that would be overlooked if using 
quantitative techniques in isolation. It was important to engage multiple stakeholders in order 
to avoid bias and attain a holistic snapshot of the current state of stakeholder relations in each 
case under consideration. It is important to know not only how stakeholders interact with one 
another, but how members of stakeholder groups engage with other members of their own 
group. This requires detailed and rigorous qualitative inquiry with multiple representatives of 
each stakeholder group. With the volume of data that can be obtained from such a method, 
the analysis must similarly be rigorous in order to focus the research onto the most important 
topics. 
The methods used in this study were developed from related literature and books detailing the 
use of social science in conservation science (Richie et al., 2013; Saldaña, 2015; Yin, 2014). 
Another important guide in the development of research tools used in this study was the 
researchers own experience gained in qualitative data gathering during research that the 
researcher had performed previously in this field. Primary data was taken in the form of in-
depth interviews, focus groups, or informal discussions with 127 participants at 3 sites in 2 
countries. This data was then organised through a coding process prior to qualitative analysis. 
This chapter details how the cases were selected; how the research process was designed; 
epistemological considerations of the design; how the design was implemented for data 
gathering; and how the data was analysed. It has been written in two parts, the first being 
about research design and data gathering procedures, the second being about data analysis.  
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4.1 Part 1: Data Gathering 
4.1.1 Selection of Case Studies 
In July 2014, the researcher had a meeting with the sustainability and environmental directors 
of the &Beyond hospitality group. They described the nature of their business and discussed 
two particular lodges that the business owned in Tanzania where the future was under threat 
due to the degradation of natural resources. One lodge is on Mnemba Island off the coast of 
Zanzibar, Tanzania. There are various communities living on the nearby shore of Zanzibar 
that have historically fished around Mnemba Island. Another lodge called ―Klein‘s Camp‖ 
was on Maasai community land on the boundary of the Serengeti National Park in Tanzania. 
This community, called Ololosokwan, had been nomads in the area for centuries. The 
directors spoke about the natural resource-based livelihoods in these communities situated 
near to the two lodges and how the existence of the lodges, the future of rural livelihoods, and 
the health of ecosystems were under threat due to stakeholder conflict over natural resources.  
The directors said that, to their view, there was no current solution to the problems of natural 
resource degradation. They sought research that could guide stakeholders toward improved 
relations and fair benefit sharing. In order to address the perceived problem, research topics 
were decided on in consultation with &Beyond and community members in each of the cases 
that were to be included. It became apparent from these interactions with stakeholders that 
useful research would perform the following functions: 
 Investigate social drivers of natural resource degradation around these lodges 
 Engage with stakeholders about natural resource conflict and 
 Suggest potential solutions which could sustainably provide livelihood opportunities 
for local communities as well as security to the future of their business at these 
lodges. 
After this meeting, a search for information on these two lodges, the protected areas they 
were in, and the neighbouring communities yielded little. None of the communities in the two 
Tanzanian cases have been researched in much detail, though there has been some research 
on the use of natural resources in and around Ololosokwan community (Bartels, 2014) and 
the communities living near Mnemba Island (Kennedy and Johansen, 2014; LaPlante, 2014). 
In the Ololosokwan community neighbouring Klein‘s Camp, a local Maasai man had written 
a Master‘s thesis at a European university about the conflict over land ownership in the 
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greater Loliondo district surrounding Klein‘s Camp and the neighbouring community (Rurai, 
2012). This relates to the broader district conflict over land, but pays little attention to the 
details of conflict in the Ololosokwan community. There is other literature discussing such 
conflict in the greater Loliondo district, but this literature most often does not pay much 
attention to the individual communities (Galaty, 2011; Gardner, 2007; McCabe, Leslie & 
DeLuca, 2010; Nelson, 2010; Ojalammi, 2006). Similarly, there is one paper published on 
resource governance which focuses on the Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area 
(Gustavsson et al., 2014), but most research on natural resources in this region focuses on the 
greater scope of Zanzibar or Tanzania as opposed to Mnemba Island and the surrounding 
marine conservation area (De la Torre-Castro, 2012; Gossling, 2006; Jiddawi & Ohman, 
2002; Jiddawi & Pandu, 1987; Levine, 2007; Lindhjem, 2003; Masalu, 2000; McLean et al., 
2012). 
An initial visit was made to Tanzania in August 2014 to visit the two lodges and speak with 
lodge managers, community leaders, and some community members. After travelling around 
the communities surrounding the two lodges, some of the factors contributing to the 
overutilization of natural resources began to emerge. It became apparent that stakeholder 
relations and the management of protected areas heavily influenced patterns of natural 
resource use in and around protected areas. A search was made for research that investigated 
stakeholder relations and/or natural resource use in these two areas in Tanzania. No 
publications were found on this topic for the two cases being considered. In particular, there 
is a clear gap in knowledge about the links between stakeholder relationships and the 
utilisation/management of natural resources.  
Having decided that it would be important to investigate these topics in order to address the 
problems presented by stakeholders during the pilot visit to the Tanzanian study area, the 
researcher reflected on his experience doing fieldwork for a Master‘s dissertation in the rural 
communities around Mkuze Game Reserve in South Africa. This state-run reserve is a 
neighbour to the privately owned Munyawana Game Reserve – these two reserves share a 
fence-line. It is more commonly known among the local communities as Phinda Game 
Reserve, but this is only one part of the Munyawana complex, which consists of various 
private properties that have been amalgamated by their owners to form a larger private 
reserve. Hereafter it will be referred to as Phinda Game Reserve, or simply Phinda. Phinda is 
the portion of Munyawana that is owned by &Beyond. By contrast to the other two cases, the 
rural people living around Phinda have spoken highly of &Beyond and &Beyond has 
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simultaneously claimed to have developed good working relations with the rural communities 
living around the reserve (Burgoyne & Kelso, 2014). It was decided to include Phinda Game 
Reserve as a minor third case study as it could serve as an example of some social and 
environmental outcomes for the community-based co-operative natural resource governance 
and conservation approach. As a comparative case that was visited in less detail, Phinda 
would provide contrasting data to the varying degrees of complexity in the two Tanzanian 
cases which were the focus of this study: Klein‘s Camp and Mnemba Island. 
The protected areas that were included in this study studied are all leased to, or owned by a 
single ecotourism business called &Beyond. There were various reasons for choosing these 
cases. Firstly, this was what was available to the researcher. Then there was the issue of full 
and comprehensive access to operations: &Beyond would provide access to business 
operations (excepting financial detail of course), employees and a well-established network 
among local communities in each of the cases to be studied. Employees helped the researcher 
to find key informants and get introductions into the community, improving the odds that the 
community members would trust the researcher. Using one business throughout the research 
means control of the tourism stakeholder variable. In all three case studies, there is a 
consistent management style for the ecotourism operations in dealing with local communities, 
natural resources and other stakeholders. A cross-case analysis is thus made more worthwhile 
by the fact that the same business operates in all three case studies. In order to avoid bias, it 
was made clear in a memorandum of understanding between &Beyond and the researcher 
that the business would not influence the research process with any private agenda. 
Within each case, the communities to be involved in the study were clearly defined from the 
start. At Klein‘s Camp, the only community that is directly involved is Ololosokwan because 
the Klein‘s Camp concession is entirely on the Ololosokwan village land. At Mnemba Island, 
the 5 communities to be involved were named by virtue of their historical use of the reefs on 
the Mnemba Atoll: Matemwe, Kigomani, Mbuutunde, Pwani Mchangani, and Kiwengwa. At 
Phinda Game Reserve, there are five communities that the Africa Foundation has 
involvement with but only 2 are of significance to the ownership of resources in the reserve. 
The communities of Mnqobokazi and Makasa each own about one third of the land inside 
Phinda Game Reserve. Thus these two communities were given priority for participation in 
the study, however any people wanting to participate in the study that was from the other 
three communities around Phinda were also included, namely Nibela, KwaNgwenya, and 
KwaJobe. More detail about relevant stakeholder agreements is provided in Chapters 5 to 7. 
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4.1.2 Research Design 
Social research will always involve an element of the unknown if it is not simply to 
duplicate what is already established (Pole and Lampard, 2002), and a key strength 
of qualitative research in particular is that it can explore unanticipated issues as they 
emerge. Design in qualitative research is not therefore a discrete stage which is 
concluded early in the life of a study: it is a continuing process which calls for 
constant review of decisions and approaches (Richie et al., 2013:48). 
4.1.2.1 Qualitative Research using Multiple Data Sources 
Due to the social nature of the problem being investigated, the research was best performed 
using qualitative tools of data gathering and analysis. Richie et al. (2013) have written that an 
important feature of qualitative methods is that they are able to display and describe social 
phenomena according to the experiences and perceptions of the study population, not only in 
detail but also in the participants‘ own terms. Most of the data in this study was a verbatim 
record of the participants‘ perceptions recorded through the transcription of conversations 
held with participants. These conversations obviously yielded subjective data because most of 
the discussions focused on participants‘ observations, opinions and perceptions. These 
personal thoughts and paradigms were an important part of this study. It is the opinions of 
people that can form the basis of stakeholder relationships, and it is thus in the opinions and 
ideas of stakeholders that solutions to stakeholder conflict can be found. By recording 
participants‘ observations, opinions, and perceptions verbatim, the qualitative method chosen 
for this study allows the issues to be described in detail from many viewpoints, aiding the 
researcher in identifying the issues that are important to the different stakeholders and how 
they are understood by those that are affected by them (Richie et al., 2013:27). 
The study aimed to be exploratory in nature, attempting to uncover issues surrounding natural 
resource conflict and causal relationships that contribute to these issues. As such, a flexible, 
open-ended data gathering technique was necessary. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews are 
an appropriate qualitative research tool for investigating personal observations, perceptions, 
opinions, and ideas. The main method of data gathering used in this study was in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with individuals and focus group discussions with small groups of 
people representing the relevant stakeholder groups in each case. An interview schedule 
would thus need to be designed that is flexible and adaptable so that the researcher could 
focus on what was important to each participant in a way that they would understand. 
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4.1.2.2 Design of the Interview Schedule 
This study adopts the post-positivist view that structure is necessary for interviews with 
participants (Richie & Lewis, 2012). A strict regimen of questions can be too controlling in a 
situation where data takes the form of opinions and ideas that are to be unobtrusively 
obtained, but without some form of pre-planning and structure, interviews and focus-groups 
can wander off topic and end up being a waste of time for both participants and researchers 
(Hatch, 2002:101).  
The themes developed following the pilot trip to the study area were based on preliminary 
information gathered during discussions with &Beyond employees and key informants from 
various communities. These themes were used for structuring the process of data gathering. 
In order to find out more about these themes, and ultimately investigate the research problem, 
a series of questions was developed that would provide data on each theme. An initial list of 
questions was formulated with the intention of using them as a guide for discussion. The 
questions in the interview schedule were then altered during the course of the study according 
to emphasis placed on certain topics by participants. This was done to improve both the way 
in which the questions were asked and the quality of the information gathered. Some 
questions that became superfluous were removed or amalgamated (see Table 1), such as 
questions relating to saturated datasets. Moreover in many cases, the questions could not be 
asked verbatim. Due to the English language not being a first language for most of the 
participants in this study, in certain instances the questions had to be asked and phrased in 
more than one way to make sure that they were understood. The initial guide is found in 
Appendix A (p.272). Table 1 demonstrates how the discussion guide changed over time and 
in this table an example is made of the discussion guide for community members. 
Table 1: Questions from two different iterations of the same discussion guide 
18 March 2015 5 May 2015 
Are there any benefits that the community receives 
from living near to MIMCA? 
What are the benefits of the Marine 
Conservation Area (MCA)? 
If there are benefits, what are they and who gets them? Do you receive benefits from the MCA? 
Do some people get more benefits than others? Does anyone receive benefits? 
 What are the benefits that you want? 
 
The University of Johannesburg requires that all people participating in research give 
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informed consent. This can take the form of signing a document where participants state their 
name and that they give informed consent to participating in the study. It can also take the 
form of giving verbal consent as long as this is recorded. When participants gave consent to 
have their participation recorded, the discussions they participated in were recorded along 
with their consent given. In cases, where participants did not give their consent to having the 
discussion recorded, participants signed informed consent forms and the interview schedule 
was used as a note-taking page on which the researcher could write important points. 
The research was introduced to participants as a process that was independent of any 
stakeholders in the study; it was made clear in each engagement that the researcher was 
independent of &Beyond and not biased towards particular stakeholders. Each participant 
was made to understand that they could speak freely without fear of reprisal from other 
participants or stakeholders because their participation would be anonymous and they would 
be able to stop participating at any time. They were also told that they did not have to answer 
particular questions or speak about any particular topics if they did not want to. 
The University of Johannesburg also requires that studies involving primary research 
programs involving humans undergo an ethics clearance process. This includes submitting a 
brief research proposal with intended dates of primary data gathering, as well as a complete 
copy of any interview schedule to be used in the primary research phase of the study. This 
process was undertaken in November 2014 so that the researcher could begin the primary 
research process in 2015. The study was subsequently given clearance to proceed by the 
Science Faculty Ethics Committee. 
4.1.2.3 Triangulation 
Triangulation is a method used to cross-check data gathered by using multiple collection 
procedures on the same set of phenomena. It is a basic form of methodological pluralism that 
is primarily used to increase trust in the validity of a dataset (Olsen, 2004). Richie et al. 
(2013:38) have argued that it can be beneficial to use qualitative and quantitative enquiry 
―provided that the two methods, and the data they generate, can be clearly delineated… Each 
of the two research approaches provides a distinctive kind of evidence and used together they 
can offer a powerful resource to inform and illuminate policy or practice.‖ As a research tool, 
triangulation draws from tenets of both constructivism and empiricism. While this study 
emphasises constructivist methods that move beyond the scope of traditional inductive or 
deductive research, it has used these latter approaches to provide a baseline of data that will 
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verify the accuracy of, and add detail to, participant observations on the state of natural 
resources. This baseline data took the form of undergraduate and graduate studies on the state 
of natural resource health and use that were performed prior to the primary research phase of 
this study.  
4.1.2.4 Case Protocol 
A basic research protocol was developed for the three cases used in this study. This protocol 
was developed following a well-established idea in medical research (Yin, 2014). The 
protocol was followed for each of the three cases with little variance. This was done in order 
to improve the reliability of both the data gathering process and the data. Reliability in the 
data, within and between cases, improves the validity of this thesis. The protocol followed 
this basic sequence of events:  
 Describe the case historically and through published literature as much as possible 
before visiting the study area 
o Understand the significance of the case and how the research questions apply 
 Establish contact with the relevant &Beyond official before arrival at the study area, 
inform them of the objectives and timeline of the research that is to take place, and 
have them try make contact with the following people for the research process that 
was to take place: 
o a representative of the Africa Foundation 
o key community members that work at the &Beyond lodge 
o at least one community leader and perhaps additional community members 
representative of the community structure from each relevant community 
 At Mnmeba, these communities included: 
 Matemwe 
 Pwani Mchangani 
 Kiwengwa 
 Mbuutende 
 Kigomani 
 At Klein's Camp that included Ololosokwan Village 
 At Phinda Game Reserve that included the Mnqobokazi and Makasa 
communities as the two main land ownership communities, with three 
other communities participating in community development programs 
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spearheaded by the Africa Foundation namely Nibela, KwaNgwenya 
and KwaJobe 
o at least one non-governmental organisation other than the Africa Foundation 
o at least one local government official from each department that is involved in 
resource governance in the area, as possible 
 Travel to the study area and discuss the objectives, methods, and timeline of the 
research process with the lodge manager and if possible a representative of the Africa 
Foundation, and a key community member that works at the &Beyond lodge. As per 
these discussions, tailor the research process to suit local requirements 
 Begin data collection and management: 
o Collect photographs, field notes, and informal discussions15 
o Have semi-structured interviews with key participants using relevant 
selections from a discussion guide 
o Use chain and flow sampling to engage with more participants. Adapt the 
question guide using experience gained in previous interviews and 
o Record interviews where possible. Transcribe recorded interviews, focus 
groups and informal discussions. Write notes on non-recorded discussions as 
they happen, or immediately after. 
4.1.3 Sampling 
For the purpose of conducting primary research, the study areas were visited in August 2014, 
December 2014, and March till May in 2015. Each of these cases represents a population 
from which participants were to be sampled. The population was defined by the physical 
boundaries of community land, employees of &Beyond and any other relevant tourism 
operations, NGOs, and any government officials who are involved with natural resource 
management in the protected area or on community land. Non-probability sampling of study 
populations is well suited to small-scale, in-depth analyses. In this study, probability 
sampling would have done nothing to improve the robustness of the data (Richie et al., 2013). 
The samples selected were not intended to be statistically representative, so purposive, non-
probability sampling was used to allow for the deliberate selection of certain key elements in 
the population of each case. 
                                                 
15 These are discussions which were not initiated formally as an interview; as such they were not recorded for 
coding, however notes were made so that information shared could be used in the research. 
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The Ololosokwan community at Klein's Camp was visited for a week during the pilot field 
trip in August 2014. The primary data gathering in the Ololoskwan community took place for 
4 weeks in April 2015. For the primary research in this study area an interpreter was used 
who also acted as a guide in the community. The language spoken in the community is Maa 
and where the participant did not speak English well enough to understand or respond to the 
questions asked, discussions took place in Maa through an interpreter. Two different 
interpreters were used during alternating days in order to avoid bias. Both were employees of 
&Beyond at the Klein's Camp lodge who wore plain clothes for most of the time spent 
interpreting in order to encourage participants to speak freely, however it is noted that they 
could have introduced bias into participant responses. This strategy of avoiding bias was 
useful because there were obvious differences between the primary data gathered using the 
two interpreters and these differences could be duly accounted for. During the discussions it 
was apparent that some of the people of the Ololosokwan community were mindful that they 
were speaking to an outsider because they were very reserved and gave conservative 
responses. On the other hand there were other participants who were passionate and 
outspoken in their responses, speaking freely about issues they had with other stakeholders. 
Overall, being an outsider posed some difficulties in data gathering and interpretation that 
were not straightforward to resolve. Each engagement required that the nature and 
independence of the research be explained. During the primary data gathering phase of this 
research, a minimum of four consecutive weeks were spent in the various Tanzanian 
communities in an attempt to become an insider, become known to community members, and 
to develop relationships of trust so different stakeholders would open up in a way that they 
would not have done otherwise. In the South African case at Phinda Game Reserve, only a 
week could be spent in the communities. 
The communities of Matemwe and Mbuutende (in the MIMCA) were visited in the August 
2014 pilot field trip. These communities were visited again in March 2015 for 4 weeks and 
May 2015 for 1 week, along with the other three communities in the MIMCA study area 
namely Kigomani, Pwani Mchangani, and Kiwengwa. The language spoken in Zanzibar is 
Swahili. Most people are not proficient in English so an interpreter was almost always used 
who also acted as a guide in the communities. Multiple interpreters were used in these 
communities and only one was an employee of &Beyond at the Mnemba Island lodge. The 
data gathered in this case was largely similar across the range of participants and so bias in 
the interpretation process did not appear to be a problem. The people in these communities 
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were largely open to the researcher as an outsider. Most of the participants spoke without 
reservation about their perceptions of other stakeholders.  
The communities of Mnqobokazi and Makasa (next to Phinda Game Reserve) were visited 
for a week in December 2014 for the first phase of primary data gathering. The language 
spoken in these communities is Zulu but in South Africa, English is taught in most schools 
and so the participants were all able to speak English proficiently enough to participate 
without an interpreter. In some cases, the level of proficiency was such that questions that 
were not understood well by the participants were excluded from the discussion at hand as 
there was no interpreter available. In this case, the initial guide was an employee of the Africa 
Foundation and he was able to connect the researcher with a few key informants thereafter. 
As in all three cases, the researcher ensured that each participant understood that the 
researcher was an independent party and that no stakeholder was being represented. This was 
to help participants feel that they could speak openly. Although there are obviously 
limitations caused by being an outsider, repeated lengthy visits seemed to allow deeper and 
more complex narratives to emerge. 
4.1.3.1 Sampling Strategies 
Stratified purposive sampling is a mixed approach in which the researcher aims to select 
relatively homogenous groups that display patterns of variation for certain study variables 
(Richie et al., 2013). This was the main sampling approach used in this study. Both chain and 
opportunistic sampling techniques were employed in finding willing participants that would 
reveal both variation and concordance where applicable. The first participant in each case 
was found with the help of a local key informant who was willing to introduce the researcher 
to participants that were available and willing to contribute to the study. 
Chain sampling (or snowballing) is an approach where people already interviewed are asked 
to identify other people who fit certain selection criteria (Richie et al., 2013). It is useful 
when specifically studying a low-density population or one which is hard to find but when 
used as a generative sampling technique across larger populations it can introduce bias 
(Polgar & Thomas, 2013).  It is also useful in populations where trust is an issue. In the cases 
selected for this study, both government officials and community members were known to be 
untrusting of outsiders, particularly outsiders who approached them as researchers. Chain 
sampling was used to initiate trust into these stakeholder groups so that participants would be 
more likely to speak freely as well as more open to discussing sensitive topics. Initially 
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&Beyond employees helped with introducing the researcher to other stakeholders in the area 
in which they worked. Participants were recruited by attending local government meetings, 
speaking with well-connected members of local communities (some also used as key 
informants in the study), talking to village leadership, and thereafter using chain sampling to 
find new participants. Opportunistic sampling was also used in stopping people at random in 
busy areas of the village communities included in this study. 
In this study, flow populations were sampled in order to target random members of significant 
sub-groups in the population, and thus avoid potential bias that can occur when only chain 
sampling is used. A flow population is one that is found in a particular setting, such as at 
clinic, a school, or a recruitment centre (Richie et al., 2013). In the Mnemba Island case, this 
included fishermen found around the fisherman‘s market at Matemwe beach or the launch 
point for many subsistence fishing vessels at Muyuni beach. In the Klein‘s Camp case, this 
included people attending the Sunday market in Ololosokwan village, those attending a 
community meeting in the Ololosokwan village centre as well as those people visiting village 
leadership at the community hall. Some participants were recruited by driving the only roads 
between the village centre and certain outlying parts of the village, and then asking local 
people walking these roads if they would like to be driven in the direction they were going. 
During the drive they would be invited to participate in the study. 
4.1.3.2 Sample Sizes 
Richie et al. (2013:pp.84-85) say about the acceptable number of participants for this type of 
qualitative study:  
As a very general rule of thumb, qualitative samples for a single study involving 
individual interviews only often lie under 50. If they become much larger than 50 
they start to become difficult to manage in terms of the quality of data collection and 
analysis that can be achieved.  
In this study, samples for each case fell within the range that is considered generally 
acceptable for in-depth qualitative research (Mason, 2010; Richie et al., 2013). Within cases 
the populations in each case were relatively homogenous across the social variables of 
education, financial wealth, health, religion and culture. Thus the study did not need a large 
number of participants for each case. 
In this study sampling was continued until there was little new information gathered from 
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each new participant, at which point the effort taken to add data outweighed the potential for 
gathering new data. At this point, primary data gathering would end. Using this as a guide, 
the sample sizes remained within the expected range. In the case of Mnemba Island, the 
number of participants was 62. In the case of Klein‘s Camp, the number of participants was 
56. In the case of Phinda Game Reserve the number of participants was 9. A breakdown of 
how data was gathered from these participants is found in Table 2. The total number of 
participants was 127. This included people from local government, NGOs, local tourism 
operators, and communities living around the lodges and protected areas that were selected as 
cases. The relatively low participant count for Phinda Game Reserve is that it was not meant 
to be a focus case for this study like the other two Tanzanian cases – as such not as much 
breadth was required in data gathering. It was rather meant to be a case which could be 
compared with the former two at a greater scale, not in fine detail. For a count of participants 
representing each stakeholder group, see Table 3.  
Table 2: A count of the different interactions with participants in the three case studies 
 
Number of 
participants 
Focus 
group 
In-depth 
interview 
Informal 
discussion 
Total 127 70 45 12 
Mnemba  62 41 20 1 
Kleins 56 29 17 10 
Phinda 9 0 8 1 
 
Table 3: A count of the stakeholder groups participants represented during the study. Pale text 
indicates subgroup of group in the column to the left. 
 Tourism operators Senior staff Community Leader Government NGO 
Total 28 9 89 10 7 3 
Mnemba  10 1 45 5 6 1 
Kleins 13 6 41 4 1 1 
Phinda 5 2 3 1 0 1 
 
4.1.4 Transcription of Recorded Data 
When permitted by participants, any focus groups, interviews, and discussions were recorded 
using the standard recording facility on a Samsung smartphone running an Android operating 
system. These recordings were then saved onto a computer for transcription at a later date. In 
the months following my travel for primary data gathering, over 40 hours of recorded 
interviews were transcribed. Each audio file was saved using a distinct code which would 
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allow it to be identified later. The code was created using the variables Case; Stakeholder 
group; Village; Gender; Age group; Number of people participating; and Date. 
The audio files were then replayed using free audio playback software called Winamp. 
Transcribing was a tedious process that took several months because it required listening, and 
in many instances re-listening, to a particular segment of audio in order to ensure that the 
correct words were heard. Microsoft Word was used to write the transcripts from the recorded 
interviews. Over 140 pages were transcribed making a single document unwieldy. Thus in 
preparation for analysis, each interview was saved into a separate document using the above 
code sequence for titling. 
4.2 Part 2: Data Analysis 
This study followed an adapted form of the method for data sorting and analysis described by 
Richie et al. (2013). It is listed hereunder: 
1. Identifying initial themes or concepts; 
2. Constructing an index; 
3. Labelling or tagging data; 
4. Sorting the data by theme or concept; 
5. Summarising or synthesising the data; 
6. Defining elements and dimensions, refining categories and classifying data; 
7. Detecting patterns of association or clustering; 
8. Developing explanations; 
9. Seeking wider applications. 
This process begins with sorting and summarising (steps 1-5) followed by analysis both 
within and across cases (steps 6-9). The final step involves some level of generalisation and is 
where any worthwhile research will prove itself by being situated well in the body of 
literature that it contributes to. This process is discussed below. 
4.2.1 Software used for Qualitative Analysis 
The software packages used in analysis of the transcripts retrieved from primary data 
collection work were ATLAS.ti and the Microsoft Office suite. ATLAS.ti is one of the latest 
and most advanced pieces of text analysis software that exists today. It was used for coding 
the transcripts and some basic analytical work on the coded data. While undertaking the work 
of transcript analysis, analytic memos and notes were recorded in Microsoft Word and saved 
for later use in the typing of this thesis. Microsoft Excel was also used for organising the 
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transcripts and the coded data. Coding was useful to this study not for quantitative means but 
rather to organise the large qualitative dataset and enhance the analytical process. It came to 
be a useful tool for organising and analysing the data within the qualitative method. 
4.2.2 The Coding Process 
The coding process used here fits within the first 4 steps of the Richie et al. (2013) approach 
to data sorting and analysis. Coding is used in this thesis for qualitative data analysis – it has 
been used as a process whereby a large textual dataset can be sorted and ordered for the 
qualitative analysis set out below. In order to begin the coding process, initial concepts were 
identified and an index was created using provisional coding. Various coding techniques 
followed that tagged and sorted the data by theme. These themes have been discussed in 
section 4.1.2.2. During the initial stage of coding, or the first cycle, the primary documents 
were approached using a combination of provisional coding and descriptive/simultaneous 
coding techniques. Coding is not without weakness: it introduces the risk that a datum will 
lose context, altering its meaning (Richie & Lewis, 2013). It is worthwhile noting here that 
the researcher gave care not to isolate quotes from context during data analysis by adding 
comments to quotes and using ATLAS.ti during analysis to retrieve quotes within primary 
documents. 
Provisional coding provides a platform for the start of coding. Saldaña (2015) states that 
provisional coding helps the researcher to establish a pre-determined set of codes that arise 
from the responses which a researcher anticipates arising during the research process. This 
list should be revised during the coding various cycles applied to a dataset. Due to the defined 
process of research design in this study, both the study objectives and the list of questions in 
the interview guide were deemed to be the best way to start with creating a provisional list of 
useful codes wherewith to examine the data. Initially, 108 codes were created based on the 
interview questions and the objectives of the study. The primary documents were then 
searched for quotes that gave information on these codes. The primary documents were 
broken down into discrete quotes. These quotes were assigned codes so that they could be 
more easily accessed later. The process was adaptive and 16 codes were added during the 
initial coding stage. For example, a number of times certain participants described ideas they 
had which they believed could be used to solve certain problems. There was no code for these 
ideas and so a code titled Solutions was created during the initial coding process. As another 
example, the Maasai cattle were mentioned so frequently that the single code title Cattle was 
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becoming unwieldy with the number of quotes it was assigned to. It was thus decided that the 
code Cattle should be subdivided with sub-codes like Cattle, Management in order to make it 
more descriptive. After initial coding, the total was 124 codes.  
Descriptive coding is a technique used early on in data analysis to begin breaking the data 
into more manageable amounts of information (Richards & Morse, 2012). Single responses 
from participants might refer to multiple topics because of the complexity of social events. 
Large swathes of text could thus be assigned multiple codes that describe topics which the 
participant refers to in a single response to a question. Many of the quotes related to multiple 
topics so more than one code was at first assigned to larger quotes. This form of coding is 
what Saldaña (2015:62) calls simultaneous coding: the application of two or more different 
codes to a single qualitative datum. Saldaña suggests that this method is appropriate where 
the data content is descriptive of multiple meanings, a common event because social 
phenomena do not occur neatly in discrete events unrelated to others. Richie et al. (2013:229) 
state that there are two cases in which simultaneous coding should be used: ―First it may be 
that a single passage will have relevance to two conceptually different subjects and carving it 
up would destroy both its meaning and its coherence. Second, the juxtaposition of two 
apparently unrelated matters may give the very first clues to some later insight or 
explanation.‖ In this study, simultaneous coding was used for descriptive labelling of the data 
at the start of data analysis so that it could be more easily accessed later for analytical coding. 
In subsequent coding cycles, much of this simultaneous coding was removed and only the 
applicable codes remained. One example was a quote from a participant living in 
Ololosokwan community near Klein‘s Camp in Tanzania. He spoke about the way that 
community-level government managed community income from &Beyond at Klein‘s Camp: 
Before, we know how they spend the money. But at the moment we don't know… but still the 
education is down, and also the health is also down. The way they control education is not higher 
like before, and also the health is not higher than before. The other ones who are aged with me, 
they used the money to go to school but now things change. 
During initial coding, this quote was assigned four different codes simultaneously: Benefits, 
Fairness in Allocation; Community; Quality of Life; and Understanding of Arrangements. 
This quote was subsequently split into three different quotes relating to the three most 
relevant codes: 
1. Before, we know how they spend the money. But at the moment we don't know 
(Understanding of Arrangements). 
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2. The education is down, and also the health is also down. The way they control education 
is not higher like before, and also the health is not higher than before (Quality of Life). 
3. The other ones who are aged with me, they used the money to go to school but now 
things change (Benefits, Fairness in Allocation). 
Saldaña (2015:62) advises: Be aware that some may attribute indecisiveness on the 
researcher’s part if Simultaneous Coding is used excessively. Thus in the second cycle of 
coding, quotes were examined to determine if either of the conditions given by Richie et al. 
(2013) for simultaneous coding applied. If they did not and the quote was more aptly labelled 
with a single code, the quote was given a single code that would be most applicable. In some 
cases longer quotes were split into multiple shorter ones that were more aptly described by a 
single code.  
Even after this process of attempting to determine a singular defining code for a quote, or 
splitting longer quotes into shorter quotes, there remained many quotes where codes were 
assigned simultaneously out of necessity. It was decided that it would be appropriate to assign 
codes simultaneously in cases where the segment was both ―descriptively and inferentially 
meaningful‖ to different codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994:66, in Saldaña, 2015:62). Breaking 
data for the sake of analysis can be a hindrance for qualitative study. An example of this is the 
quote: 
We have a map of the village. TANAPA they want to take our land… They put some beacons in the 
village area and people from the village came and took off those beacons. They put them for the 
border of the Serengeti. Now they know really where is the limit [sic]. 
In this quote, the participant speaks about conflict over land between the Tanzanian National 
Parks Authority (TANAPA) and the community. This quote refers to the decision making 
process for boundary allocation of national parks as well as the power that the community has 
to over-ride those decisions. Thus the codes Decision Making and Community, Power were 
both assigned to this quote simultaneously.  
The second cycle of coding required better organisation of the data. Codes which were 
similar and had few quotes attributed to them were consolidated together. Most codes with 
fewer than 5 quotes linked to them could be deleted because they revealed little of 
importance or lacked any defining features within and between the three cases. Additionally, 
some of these codes got deleted because the quotes linked to them were adequately described 
by other codes and a code with only two or three quotes linked to it was going to be 
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superfluous in the larger scheme of the study. An example of codes that were merged was the 
two codes Can norms be enforced? and Enforcing rules. Each only had one quote linked to 
them but would be appropriately recoded under a new code entitled Use of force. Later, when 
the code Government was split into a code family with more detailed sub-codes, the codes 
Government, force and Use of force were also merged because there were related topics. 
During this stage of coding and data handling, a total of 27 codes were shed from the 
provisional code list, leaving a total of 97 codes in the list.  
The second cycle of coding employed a technique that Saldaña (2015) calls ‗focused coding‘. 
Richie et al. (2013) refer to this as a form of data management which allows the researcher to 
better provide a descriptive account of the data gathered. It employs a search for the most 
frequent or significant codes which develop into salient categories in the data corpus 
(Saldaña, 2015:155). The codes which make the most analytic sense are organised, or 
streamlined, by the creation of code families in preparation for the development of study 
themes. Codes were split into 12 code families and many of what had previously been called 
codes were then organised as sub-codes within these new code-families. New codes were also 
added into these code families. During the second coding cycle, more descriptive codes were 
added after the rearranging, splitting, and organising of codes. An example of this was the 
code Cattle, in the Livelihoods code family, which was split into 6 sub-codes that provided 
more descriptiveness on the 114 quotes labelled with the code Cattle. The sub-codes for 
Cattle provided a finer level of detail that would not be possible by using only a single label. 
After this process of descriptive coding, the number of codes and sub-codes was 117, 
comprising a total of 1586 quotes. These quotes were mostly unique, with some quotes 
overlapping (by smaller or larger amounts) in order to emphasize certain parts of the text 
which were more relevant to different codes. 
Some of the most commonly occurring codes across all three cases were benefits, fairness in 
allocation of (38); community, change (54); community, understanding of arrangements (68); 
cattle (163); natural resources, education/awareness on (82); relations, conflict (61); 
relations, transparency (44). Some codes were more important in each case than in other 
cases. For example coded data about cattle in Ololosokwan (sections 5.3.2 to 5.3.4) was not 
directly relevant to coded data about fishing and fish stocks around Mnemba Island (sections 
6.3.2 to 6.3.4), but it was the analytical process that developed within the coded dataset that 
linked these together as resource management concerns (sections 8.1.3 and 9.1). These codes, 
and the others that were developed with them, began to form a detailed and contextual 
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description of the case as it occurred during the research process. For example, seven codes 
relating to benefits emerged during the coding of statements relating to benefits. These codes 
were beneficiaries, fairness in allocation, impact on behaviour, impact on perceptions, lack 
of, list, and management of. Sub-codes such as these emerged during the coding process as a 
result of reviewing the data multiple times. The codes and sub-codes (all referred to as codes 
from now on) were then analysed in terms of each piece of novel information that contributed 
to the existence of the code. Elements and dimensions of the code that were contained within 
the data were examined to classify abstracted principles from the data – this is discussed in 
section 4.2.3.1 below. When separating the codes into sub-codes, it became clear that 
between the groups of people represented in the interviews and focus groups there were a 
number of different opinions and voices that needed to be represented in this thesis. 
Abstracted principles developed from the coding and classification of a diverse array of 
participant responses was what formed the basis of the results chapters 5-7 and the discussion 
chapters 8 and 9. An example of how data within a code was summarised across the range of 
responses, then categorised and further classified for within and cross-case examination can 
be found in the table below. 
Table 4: Sample from the analytical workbook showing an example of how data relating to a single 
code (Benefits, impact on behaviour) was examined within the three cases, as well as across the three 
cases 
Benefits, impact on 
behaviour Summary of Responses 
Mnemba Island We continue fishing on the reef because we have no alternative 
  If the system works we will protect the reef 
Ololosokwan 
Conservancy Not honouring the agreement due to lack of benefits 
Phinda Game 
Reserve People want the benefits 
  Feelings of ownership 
Cross-Case  
Classifications Impact on behaviour 
 
People do what they must for benefits 
 
Continued 'poaching' due to due to lack of benefits/alternatives 
  People are willing to protect resources 
Cross-Case 
Differences Feelings of ownership at Phinda 
 
Benefits draw people into communities, causing multiple impacts 
 
Coding data using specialised software is not in itself an analytical technique. Coding is 
useful mostly in the summary and retrieval of data, both important parts of an intellectual 
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analysis (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). As Coffey and Atkinson state, the computer program 
does not do the analysis but it is able to present data for the researcher to analyse. In the third 
cycle of coding, the work of analysis began: axial coding was used to detect patterns in the 
data that were fractured by the initial coding process. Axial coding is what Richards and 
Morse (2012) have called a type of analytic coding. It is a process used for identifying or 
investigating already found themes and developing explanations for observed events 
classified according to these themes. In this study, axial coding was used to search quotations 
and find conditions, causes and consequences of processes observed in the cases examined. 
This included case specific processes as well as more general processes that existed in all 
cases. At this stage of data examination, patterns of association were sought and explanations 
developed. It was during this cycle that data organisation and mining began. 
4.2.3 Analytical Techniques 
This study made use of the inductive qualitative data analysis technique outlined by Richie et 
al. (2013). The initial objective was to gather pieces of evidence for various themes and 
concepts that were identified as being important early on in the study and primary research 
phase. Observed phenomena could then be pulled together so that more general statements 
could be made about patterns within and across cases. In this research, ―theory [was] derived 
inductively from the careful study of a contextualised phenomenon‖ (Hatch, 2002:162). The 
first few steps to qualitative analysis that Richie et al. (2013) outline are much the same as 
what has been described above in the preceding section. They are as follows: 
1. Identifying initial themes or concepts 
2. Constructing an index 
3. Labelling or tagging data 
4. Sorting the data by theme or concept 
Sorting the data allows the researcher to analyse each theme in-depth so that important data 
and connections within the data can be better understood. The initial sorting of data is not 
final and can be altered during the research process allowing openness to the unexpected, but 
the initial result allows the researcher to perform a detailed review of the analytical process in 
the later stages of the research process (Richie & Lewis, 2012:228-229). 
5. Summarising or Synthesising the Data (p.229) 
The summarisation and synthesis of data was completed using what Richie et al. (2013:229) 
call a thematic matrix chart. The chart containing results of the coding process is presented in 
Appendix B at the end of this thesis. Each of the codes was allocated a column in the matrix 
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and each participant was assigned a row on the chart. The ordering of participants remained 
the same across all the theme charts. The coded data was then retrieved from Atlas.TI and 
typed into the matrix in a summarised form. This technique began the process of digesting the 
large amounts of text data that were in the transcripts. Each theme and its associated codes 
were included in separate thematic charts. Thus the number of thematic charts was dictated 
by the number of themes in the study. The size of these charts was dictated by the number of 
participants and codes, and what these participants had to say about each of the coded sub-
topics in the study.   
4.2.3.1 Descriptive Accounts 
When working on single cases, the analysis is mostly descriptive, with the possibility of some 
explanation finding for within-case patterns. Most of the explanatory analysis occurs when a 
cross-case analysis is performed. 
6. Defining elements and dimensions, refining categories and classifying data  
Detection 
The detection of different responses involved investigating each code across all cases 
in the study and making note of the range of responses to the questions posed to 
participants. This included their perceptions, views, experiences or behaviours which 
were coded during the initial stages of analysis. The researcher was then able to list 
the unique responses of participants by rewriting them in a simpler form and noting 
the key dimensions within the differing responses. This summary was used to 
discriminate between different responses by participants, allowing for categorisation. 
Categorisation 
At this stage of analysis, the data is starting to be dealt with in a more conceptual way. 
The summarised range of responses from participants allows for the categorisation of 
data in a way that moves beyond the labels associated with the coding of the original 
text. The unique responses were grouped into categories according to their similarity. 
In each thematic chart these categories were at times remarkably similar. While the 
wording used for labelling the categories of data initially remained close to the 
original wording used by participants, as analysis progressed new categories and 
classes became increasingly abstract in preparation for classification. 
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Classification 
Categories are sorted into classes at a higher level of abstraction. 
4.2.3.2 Explanatory accounts 
7. Detecting patterns of association or clustering 
a. Matched set linkages 
Associative analysis involves finding links or connections between two or more events within 
and across themes that emerged from the coding process. Linkages occur between events of 
the same kind, different kind, and multiple kinds. Richie et al. (2013:248) have stated that 
―sometimes there is a clear explanatory connection between the two sets of phenomena. 
Often, however, it is not clear that one phenomenon explains the other but only that they tend 
to co-exist.‖ 
b. Verifying associations 
Verification is an important step in determining the level at which patterns and events are 
matched across the coded data set. A tool for verification of associations is the use of 
anomalous events. In qualitative analysis 'outliers' are important indicators for strengthening 
the validity of findings. While events that fit the pattern are important in exposing 
weaknesses in the analysis or reinforcing the validity of it, events that do not fit the pattern 
are important in refining understanding of a pattern of association. 
The next analytical step is to interrogate the patterns of association that have been found in 
order to develop explanations. In qualitative research, patterns of association are used to 
guide the researcher to the next stage of analysis. 
8. Developing explanations 
In order to develop explanations for the events that have been observed in the data, the 
researcher needs to carefully interrogate the data in determining the most plausible causes for 
the observed events. Explanations for the causes of observed events can be developed in 
different ways. They can be broadly grouped in explicit reasons that are given by the study 
participants themselves. Alternatively implicit reasons can be inferred using patterns in the 
data, or the juxtaposition of themes that appear to be unconnected in the data yet appear in 
close proximity. Furthermore, Richie et al. (2013:253) state that these explanations can be 
dispositional, i.e. derived from the behaviour or attitudes of participants, or they may be 
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situational, i.e. factors that are through to contribute to the observed event in a specific 
context. 
Explicit explanations will be overtly stated by the participants themselves. For implicit 
explanations, use was made of Richie et al. (2013:253) suggestion to ―deliberately put 
together different pieces of evidence in order to develop or construct an explanation.‖ Other 
techniques of finding implicit logic for patterns and causes among events involved searching 
for underlying logic to what people have stated in discussions with the researcher; using 
common sense to suggest plausible explanations; applying broader the analytical framework; 
comparing findings to other studies with similar methods or contexts; or relating the findings 
to a theoretical framework (Richie & Lewis, 2012) 
9. Seeking wider applications 
Considering the wider application of research findings is an essential part of any piece of 
research. Contributions to theory or recommendations for practice were found that are to be 
described in the final chapter. The theoretical contributions are written in the context of 
published literature to provide context for the importance of the findings, while 
recommendations are made based on the pattern explanations derived from data analysis. 
4.2.3.3 Within-Case Analysis 
Other than the understanding that within-case analysis should be a detailed pre-cursor to a 
cross-case analysis, there is no consensus on how this analysis should be performed. The 
number of analytical techniques employed is almost as vast as the number of publications 
using them. For this study, the analysis of single cases was performed by integrating two 
approaches. The first was the three step process of detecting, categorising and classifying 
participant responses as suggested by Richie et al. (2013) and cited above. This was 
performed using axial coding to search quotes and detect patterns in the data. The second was 
the use of pattern-finding analytical strategies.  
The aforementioned coding techniques and analytical tools were particularly useful for a 
qualitative within-case analysis. They provided intimate familiarity with each case that 
quantitative techniques might not have achieved. It was from this familiarity that patterns 
emerged, and cross-case analysis then occurred. Within-case analysis was important because 
of the amount of data that each case study generated using qualitative data gathering 
methods. The analysis of a single case involved a detailed write-up for a case study‘s 
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description and context. The write-up helped the researcher to deal with the large qualitative 
dataset. The within-case analysis also entailed mostly descriptive accounts of observed social 
phenomena. Detailed descriptive accounts were what allowed the emergence of general 
patterns. 
4.2.3.4 Cross-Case Analysis 
Qualitative research typically involves few cases with many variables (Creswell & Creswell, 
2017; Yin, 2014). While single case studies are useful when they are used to test theory or are 
extreme examples (Yin, 2014), the use of multiple cases in a study allow for better 
description of phenomena as well as the extension of theory (Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead, 
1987; Miles & Huberman, 1994). A cross-case study method can explain causal links 
between complex arrays of variables (Yin, 2014). Using multiple cases in sampling also 
―adds to the validity and generalizability of the findings through replication logic‖ 
(McGuiggan & Lee, 2008:2).  
This study makes use of Eisenhardt‘s (1989) inductive approach to theory building by using 
qualitative data analysis across multiple cases. Eisenhardt‘s discussion on theory building has 
been described as one of the best because of the clarity with which concepts are discussed 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Eisenhardt‘s approach continues to be influential with over 
40,000 citations since it was published in 1989. Cross-case analyses draw upon descriptions 
of individual cases and are typically explanatory in nature (Richie et al., 2013). Much of the 
cross-case analysis in this thesis developed explanatory accounts by matching sets of events 
between the three cases and establishing their validity by searching for anomalies or 
differences.  
The three cases chosen for this study have some commonalities that improved the validity of 
cross-case analysis (Yin, 2014). In all three cases, a major stakeholder segment is the rural 
communities that are largely dependent on natural resource-based livelihoods. These 
communities are typically under-resourced and have been historically disenfranchised from 
portions of their land and resources. In all three cases, government and tourism play a major 
role in the management of conservation related wildlife resources. In all three cases, benefits 
arising from the use of these resources have been contested. These conflicts have been 
addressed with varying degrees of success. Differences between these cases were used to 
highlight factors of stakeholder relations that either contribute to, or detract from, the 
sustainability of co-operative governance. While broad generalisation might be limited, it was 
91 
 
perceived that there would be important implications for stakeholder relations and 
conservation outcomes based on the simple comparison of applicable variables in these cases.  
4.3 Limitations 
While there are definitely positive elements associated with the case selection, these cases 
and the methods used in their study also present some limitations for this research: 
 Focus on context: The use of qualitative methods in a small sample case study 
approach results in low generalizability of findings 
 Sample size: Using only three cases limits the generalizability of the results. There 
were fewer participants from the Phinda Game Reserve case – this could severely 
limit the completeness of the findings, however this was simply what was possible at 
the time and the inclusion of the case was useful for the study overall. Additionally, 
the two Tanzanian cases were meant to be the focus from the start of the project 
 Using one company: Using one company limits generalizability, but it does provide a 
level of control in understanding the interactions that tourism enterprises have with 
other stakeholders. It is also what was available to the researcher – the research 
opportunity was with one only business, &Beyond. Moreover, it is useful in 
controlling the scale of the study as a study aiming to cover such a breadth of 
information could quickly become unwieldy. It is an advantage though, to have full 
and intimate access to the operations of one business, rather than incomplete or 
superficial access to the operations of multiple businesses. This study could be 
expanded simply by using the same design and case protocol in cases where there is a 
different ecotourism company 
 Use of qualitative methods: The qualitative analysis of textual data is influenced by 
the researcher. Personal experience, personal paradigms and the researcher‘s own 
thoughts on the significance assigned to material introduce bias into the study. This 
was considered during primary data gathering and participants were allowed the 
freedom to indicate important concepts. During data analysis, this created a 
framework of important concepts for the researcher to work within 
 Local politics: It could not be determined if participants were always being truthful 
or totally open. Local politics and the nature of stakeholder relations may have 
influenced the responses people gave when participating 
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 Being an outsider: People living in local communities sometimes associated the 
researcher with &Beyond, despite them being told clearly that the research was not 
controlled by &Beyond. This could have biased participants answers to questions. 
Despite this, some participants did speak negatively of &Beyond proving that they 
were comfortable expressing honest opinions and 
 Language barrier: Almost all of the participants did not speak English as a first 
language, and many of the participants did not speak English. Using a translator 
meant that some of the meaning in discussions could have been lost in translation. 
While the study may be limited in certain ways, this does not change the fact that the results 
can be viewed as a useful addition to the knowledge framework as this study focuses on the 
pervasive social issues affecting co-operative natural resource management, with specific 
reference to ecotourism in the African context. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This study makes use of a qualitative approach to gather and analyse contextually rich data. 
The qualitative approach was most effective as all three cases required an understanding of 
human behaviour: both how and why stakeholders acted in certain ways. The research used 
semi-structured in-depth interviews, focus groups, casual discussions, observations, and 
secondary data to learn more about stakeholder interactions and natural resource management 
in three community-based conservation and tourism cases. The analytical process applied was 
also qualitative, following a well-established routine for textual data (Richie et al., 2013). A 
cross-case analysis allowed for a deeper understanding of patterns in stakeholder behaviour 
and a more abstracted set of principles could be extracted for guiding stakeholder behaviour 
in co-operative natural resource management. This approach has allowed the researcher to be 
open to adaptation in the research process. The participatory and adaptive nature of this 
research created a process that yielded knowledge which is not only applicable in each of the 
three cases but also adds to the field of community-based conservation research.  
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CHAPTER 5: KLEIN’S CAMP CONSERVANCY AND THE 
OLOLOSOKWAN COMMUNITY, TANZANIA  
5. Introduction 
The Ololosokwan community (Ololosokwan meaning ―Place of the Buffalo‖) is a Maasai 
community living adjacent to the Serengeti National Park in the Loliondo division of 
northern Tanzania. It has been a prime tourism interest area for foreigners during the last few 
decades because of the migrating herds of wildlife. As an eco-cultural tourist attraction it is 
unique in the Loliondo area. It is on the eastern boundary of the Serengeti National Park and 
so large numbers of wildlife frequent the community land. Since local tourism developments 
in the 1990s, the iconic wildlife migration it plays host to attracts tourists from many parts of 
the world (Rurai, 2012).  
Control over natural resources in Ololosokwan has been contested between stakeholders 
since the early 1990s. Tourism and government stakeholders have sought to gain power over 
others in claiming ownership of land. The complexities of conflict over this land, and the 
resources attached to it, will be addressed in this chapter. The chapter discusses natural 
resources and stakeholder relations – code families that were most influential in this case 
include benefits, community, power, rules, livelihoods, natural resources, and relations. A 
total of 86 codes across these code families were influential in the discussion of themes in 
this case chapter.  
Interviews and focus groups were conducted while driving or walking around the 
Ololosokwan community. Some of the data was obtained by searching the internet for 
archival information on stakeholder interactions, observing the environment, and collecting 
research performed on the state of natural resources. Relating the details of stakeholder 
conflict is an important undertaking for conservation in Africa because it demonstrates the 
subtle influence of human behaviour on co-operative natural resource management 
arrangements. A brief history is outlined and relevant stakeholders are discussed. The natural 
resources of Ololosokwan are discussed with focus on issues of ownership, access, 
management, and the state of relevant natural resources. Stakeholder relations relating to 
these resources are discussed, including co-operative relations, the nature of benefit sharing, 
and the landscape of power that exists between stakeholders. 
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5.1 A History of the Ololosokwan Community Game Reserve 
In order to understand stakeholder interactions past and present, it is crucial to be familiar 
with the history of land ownership, wildlife management, and tourism in the Ololosokwan 
community. It is with this in mind that the history of conservation and wildlife tourism is 
examined in the Ololosokwan community. 
In 1973 hunting was banned in Tanzania due to rampant over-hunting and poaching (Nelson, 
2012). Prior to this the Tanzanian Wildlife Division had managed hunting operations but due 
to the inefficiency with which this occurred, a new organisation was created to deal with 
hunting and poaching in Tanzania: The Tanzanian Wildlife Corporation (TAWICO). Now a 
defunct Tanzanian parastatal organisation, TAWICO was formed to manage hunting blocks 
like the Loliondo Game Control Area (GCA) adjacent to the Serengeti National Park. 
Management by TAWICO began in 1978 when tourist hunting was reopened after a five year 
ban while the government nationalised the hunting industry (Gardner, 2016). During the 
1980s corruption and incompetent management led to management being reassigned to the 
Tanzanian Wildlife Division in 1988 (Gardner, 2016; Baldus & Cauldwell, 2004). With the 
economic liberalisation of natural resource management in Tanzania beginning in the 1980s, 
TAWICO was eventually dissolved and foreign investors were allowed to lease land in the 
Loliondo hunting block (Gardner, 2016; Rurai, 2012). 
A company known as Tanzania Cattle Products Ltd. was operating in Tanzania during the 
1980s and acquired the lease rights or title deed for various properties across the country 
(&Beyond-director-20140818). One of these was the grazing concession that they were 
granted a 25,000 acre concession in March 1993 (Ojalammi, 2006). The concession was 
supposed to be used mainly for cattle ranching but it turned out to be a private hunting ranch. 
According to Gardner (2007), the company had acquired the land under the guise of opening 
a cattle ranch because there was less red tape to this process than opening a hunting ranch and 
they felt they would more easily get the support of the village. In 1993 the company was 
granted the title deed for 66 years (Rurai, 2012). The land allocation was conditional upon the 
agreement negotiated with the village council in 1991. Gardner (2007) noted that the 
agreement was signed into contract between the company and the village in March 1993.  
In the second half of 1993 the village leadership decided to take this land allocation to the 
Tanzanian High Court with financial support from Oxfam (Ndaskoi, 2002). The village 
leadership claimed that this allocation was illegal due to the nature of the company‘s 
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activities and they argued that it should be overturned (Gardner, 2007). Gardner (2007) said 
that when he spoke to Ololosokwan community leaders, their feeling at the time was that the 
company had not fulfilled its obligations to build infrastructure in the community and it was 
not planning on using the land for cattle ranching but rather had only worked on the 
development of a tourism lodge. A lodge and a campsite had indeed been established, and a 
few roads had begun to be developed. The land title was revoked by the court, though tourism 
and hunting continued (Gardner, 2007). 
Despite the outcome of the court case on land-title, Tanzania Cattle Products continued to 
operate the lodge commercially by attracting tourists from Europe and North America 
between 1994 and 1998 (Ndaskoi, 2002). It was known as Klein‘s Camp. Gardner (2007) 
reports that the company was able to avoid dealing with the court case under the pretence that 
the land was being leased for a cattle farming operation so it was difficult for the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism to intervene as they did not have jurisdiction over farming 
operations. The village resisted this lodge operating and the company had a hard time 
developing their business (Ndaskoi, 2002). In 1997 Tanzania Cattle Products began 
negotiating for the sale of the land parcel and its infrastructure to Conservation Corporation 
Africa (CCA), the predecessor to &Beyond. The Ololosokwan community had not been 
informed that the property and infrastructure was to be sold. When they found out, they 
contacted CCA and advised them not to pay for the supposed title that Tanzanian Cattle 
Products held for the property. Despite this CCA officials explained that the sale had already 
begun and they would continue with it (Gardner, 2007). It was completed in 1998 and CCA 
took ownership of the infrastructure along with the supposed land title that the court revoked.  
The new owners of Klein‘s Camp lodge, CCA, later discovered that their land title deed had 
been revoked and was post-dated to a former deed which was issued to the community. A 
current member of upper-level management in &Beyond claimed that CCA company 
management at the time did not know about the court case and the revocation of the land title 
(&Beyond-director-20140818). Having been under the impression that they were buying the 
title deed to the land, CCA appealed the land title issue to the Tanzanian High Court and 
ownership of the title deed was reinstated to CCA (USAID Tanzania, 2000). According to 
Mbilinyi (2000, in Ndaskoi, 2002), this happened because the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Tourism was allied with CCA. 
It was after this that community leaders contacted the Member of Parliament (MP) 
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representing the Loliondo constituency. The community leaders and the MP spoke with then 
Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa in 1999 (Rurai, 2012). It is said that he ordered CCA to 
return the land to the community and revoke their claim to land title (Gardner, 2007). Since 
CCA was marketed as a high-end ecotourism operation that was supportive of local peoples, 
CCA management saw it as being in their best interest to work with the Maasai rather than 
fight for the land title they had bought from Tanzania Cattle Products (&Beyond-director-
20140818). A senior level employee of &Beyond said that in 1999 CCA revoked their claim 
to the land title deed on the condition that the community would enter an agreement with 
them to lease the land to CCA for 15 years (&Beyond-director-20140818). 
Negotiations for the agreement in 1999 were not straightforward due to conflicting interests. 
The African Wildlife Foundation was approached by the community leaders to help them 
negotiate a deal with CCA (USAID Tanzania, 2000). While CCA asked for title deed of 3000 
acres around their infrastructure, the community would not compromise that the land would 
only be rented. In a comprehensive history of Klein‘s Camp Garnder (2007) writes that it was 
finally agreed that CCA agreed to pay US$1/acre annual rental for 25,000 acres for safari 
operations, increasing at 5% per annum, US$3.15 per tourist per night, and 1.3 acres for 
CCAs exclusive use at the lodge. Observations indicate that the community was empowered 
by this negotiated agreement (Gardner, 2007). This lodge continues today as Klein‘s Camp. It 
is operated by the rebranded CCA, now called &Beyond. While the primary research for this 
study was being undertaken, the lease had not yet been re-signed as negotiations were still 
underway. 
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Figure 3: Map of northern Tanzania showing location of Ololosokwan village land (approximate 
boundaries marked with orange), Loliondo division, the Tanzania-Kenya national border, and nearby 
points of interest 
 
Figure 4: Satellite image of Ololosokwan village land with map overlaid showing boundary of the 
Serengeti National Park (green), boundary of the concession (yellow), the Grumeti River (blue), and 
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three important stakeholder locations (green dot) (Satellite image courtesy Airbus Defence and 
Space) 
5.2 Relevant Stakeholders and their Interests 
5.2.1 The Maasai 
The Maasai are a semi-nomadic tribe whose land straddles the northern Tanzanian – southern 
Kenyan border in Loliondo. Their main interest is in cattle because it is their most important 
livelihood (&Beyond-employee2-20150429:31). This interest is increasingly at odds with 
wildlife conservation objectives due to the increasing human and cattle populations (Olo-
leader6-20150422:3). There are no fences on the boundaries of national parks in Tanzania and 
with Klein‘s Camp concession sharing a boundary with the Serengeti National Park, wild 
animals are able to migrate across the village land for grazing at certain times of the year.  
During the research process in Ololosokwan, wildlife and cattle were seen grazing near to 
one another on numerous occasions. 
The Maasai depend almost entirely on animal products for their sustenance. Regular 
harvesting of milk and blood from live animals sustains them along with occasional 
harvesting for meat (Observations by researcher in April 2015). They are pastoralists that 
historically migrated seasonally, living in easily constructed, non-permanent dwellings (Olo-
community5-20150418:1). One community member stated the main interest of the Maasai 
succinctly when he said that ―one thing that we are so keen on is the land‖ (Olo-leader6-
20150422:8). The reason for this is that the land supports their cattle. The success of the 
Maasai livelihood depends on their ability to access wet and dry season grazing areas over 
the greater ecosystem (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum, 2011).  
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Figure 5: Maize cultivation by Maasai in the Ololosokwan community (Source: Author) 
Over the last few decades, the Maasai have been increasingly adopting agriculture as a means 
to diversify livelihoods and reduce their exposure to drought risk (O‘Malley, 2000). Some 
choose to cultivate crops out of necessity, and for others it is a choice that reflects changing 
social norms (McCabe, Leslie, & DeLuca, 2010). In addition to crop agriculture such as was 
observed in the figure above, it was observed that some of the people living in Ololosokwan 
undertake small-scale local trade in Ololosokwan and other neighbouring markets. There is 
also a small amount of urban migration where young adult and middle-aged men relocate to 
urban centres for employment, or young adults relocate for tertiary education.  
Another interest the Maasai have is improving quality of life through social and economic 
development (Olo-leader6-20150422:15). The Ololosokwan community is faced with 
challenges associated with a growing population. Development of services and infrastructure 
is not keeping up with population growth. The ward has 3 primary schools and one secondary 
school. There are two clinics, one at Seronera and one at Ololosokwan. There are a number of 
water projects that are being developed, namely at Mairowa, Njoroi and Seronera. More of 
this type of basic service infrastructure is sorely needed in Ololosokwan. 
The population in Ololosokwan village was reportedly about 5000 people in 2012 and at that 
time there was an estimated 107 780 head of livestock (Bartels, 2014). The National Bureau 
of Statistics (www.nbs.go.tz) in Tanzania reported that the Ngorongoro district, adjacent to 
the Serengeti National Park where Ololosokwan is located, had a population density of 4.5 
people/km2 in 1988 and 11.2 people/km2 in 2012. The population increased by 78% between 
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1992 and 2002 (from about 1800 to 3200) and by 56% between 2002 and 2012 (from about 
3200 to 5000)16.  
 
Figure 6: A sign at the Serengeti National Park gate indicating the boundary of the Ololosokwan kijiji 
(village); with a welcome greeting: ―Karibu tena‖ (Source: Author) 
5.2.2 &Beyond 
&Beyond is a luxury responsible tourism company that operates a series of high-end lodges 
throughout southern and east Africa, south America, and the Indian subcontinent17. The 
Klein‘s Camp lodge is operated by &Beyond and sees guests visiting from around the world. 
It was observed that there are 10 cottages in the camp with a swimming pool, restaurant, 
shop, lounge, and extensive infrastructure for the running of the lodge including a kitchen and 
food store, separate staff canteen, management offices, a vehicle workshop, staff quarters and 
a guide training facility nearby. A director of &Beyond told me in an informal discussion that 
the primary interest &Beyond has is providing the best wildlife viewing for their guests. 
Ensuring positive safari experiences for their guests is one way in which &Beyond secures 
future business. That means that they have a significant interest in the local and migratory 
wildlife populations that live on or cross the land they rent. They also thus have an interest in 
the condition of the land as this has an impact on the numbers of wildlife that their guests will 
be able to encounter (a soil scientist was visiting the lodge concurrently with me in August 
2014). Their other main interest, as told to me by the sustainability general manager of 
&Beyond, is related to the human aspect of securing the future of their business: firstly 
ensuring that they have a positive impact on the neighbouring community, and secondly 
ensuring that their relationship with the local community is positive so that they can work 
                                                 
16 www.nbs.go.tz 
17 www.andbeyond.com 
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with local people to protect wildlife. This narrative was repeated by an employee at the Africa 
Foundation (AfricaFoundation-employee1-20150411:12). 
 
Figure 7: A view of the Klein's Valley from a Klein’s Camp chalet. The tree on the right had been 
broken by elephants at dawn, only an hour before this photograph was taken (Source: Author) 
5.2.3 Otterlo Business Corporation 
The founder of the Otterlo Business Corporation (OBC) is a member of the royal family of 
the United Arab Emirates and a high ranking official in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
defence force, Major General Mohammed Abdulrahim al Ali (Nelson & Makko, 2003; 
Nelson, Sulle, & Lekaita, 2012). The OBC has been involved in Loliondo since 1992 when 
the corporation secured the lease for hunting rights on the greater Loliondo hunting block, 
also called the Loliondo Game Controlled Area (GCA). Their greatest interest is the 
management of wildlife resources for hunting. The OBC obtained ten year hunting rights for 
the Loliondo GCA in 199218. These rights have been consistently renewed every five years 
since 2002. They are the only business licensed to hunt in the Loliondo GCA (Rurai, 2012). 
The GCA covers an area of approximately 4000 km2. While the OBC does not own title to 
any land, for the last two decades they have secured the lease to sole hunting rights in the 
Loliondo GCA which they make use of on an annual basis. This controversial lease of 
hunting rights in the Loliondo GCA was ended in late 2017 when the executive director of 
OBC in Tanzania reportedly tried to bribe the newly appointed Minister of Natural Resources 
                                                 
18 http://m.ippmedia.com/en/news/kigwangalla-sends-controversial-obc-packing-loliondo-game-area 
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and Tourism, Dr. Hamisi Kingwangalla19. A recent investigation has revealed that the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism has received bribes in the form of donations in 
excess of US$2m over the last twenty years19.  
 
Figure 8: A Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft with UAE markings at the OBC landing strip in 
Loliondo (Inset: a tyre cover for an OBC vehicle in Tanzania) (Source: 
termitemoundview.blogspot.co.za) 
5.2.4 Buffalo Luxury Camp 
The Buffalo Luxury Camp has been operating on Ololosokwan land since 2010. It is owned 
by a company known as Intimate Places Tanzania (www.intimate-places.com). The camp is 
about 5 kilometres east of the Klein‘s Gate to the Serengeti National Park and features 15 
semi-permanent tents of 60 square meters each21. The 60 acres of land on which the camp is 
built was acquired from the Ololosokwan village by Intimate Places Tanzania in 199320, but 
due to conflict over the size of the land parcel, the camp did not being operating until 2010 
(Rurai, 2012). Like Klein‘s Camp, Buffalo Camp is built in a unique place as it is not within 
the boundaries of the Serengeti National Park. This means that they can offer walks and night 
drives to their guests. Close proximity to a Maasai community (Ololosokwan) also provides 
guests with an opportunity to experience the local culture, something that is not possible with 
safari camps in the Serengeti National Park (Rurai, 2012). The main interest that Buffalo 
Camp has is to provide their guests with a high quality wildlife viewing experience. Rurai 
(2012) noted in his discussions with residents of Ololosokwan that there is some conflict with 
                                                 
19 http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Tanzania-ends-hunting-deal-with-Dubai-royal-family/2558-4182470-
dv6hysz/index.html 
20
 Information sourced from the Land Office, Ngorongoro District Council 
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the Maasai about cattle, as well as conflict with &Beyond about the use of the 25,000 acres 
that &Beyond rents from Ololosokwan. Despite this conflict, the camp has been given several 
Safari Awards21 for the level of hospitality service provided and Intimate Places Tanzania 
recently invested US$250,000 in renovations to the camp in a bid to increase its appeal to the 
higher end safari tourism market22. 
 
Figure 9: An entrance to Buffalo Luxury Camp in the Kuka Hills (Source: www.sunsafaris.com) 
5.2.5 Government 
There are a few distinct stakeholder groups that are all labelled as ‗government‘. There is the 
central government, local government at district and community levels, and conservation 
agencies which exist at a national level but operate locally in the Loliondo division. The 
central government is responsible for the development of legislation that controls land 
ownership, resource ownership, resource management and use, and business enterprises or 
partnerships involving tourism and natural resources. Conservation agencies are an important 
stakeholder in the greater Serengeti ecosystem which the Loliondo GCA is a part of. They are 
a part of the central government. The two main agencies involved in resource management in 
this region are the Tanzanian National Parks Authority (TANAPA) and the Wildlife Division 
under Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. These agencies are responsible for the 
management of the hunting block in the Loliondo division and protected areas around the 
division. Wildlife tourism is a major financial contributor to the government and economy in 
this part of Tanzania (Homewood, Trench & Brockington, 2012). The main interest that 
TANAPA has is the maintenance of wildlife and ecosystems so that tourism will continue in 
                                                 
21 http://www.intimate-places.com/portfolio-item/buffalo-luxury-camp/ 
22 http://www.intimate-places.com/buffalo-luxury-camp-to-undergo-a-us-250000-renovation-in-readiness-for-
the-2016-season/ 
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the region, thus allowing for social, economic and infrastructural development. Similarly the 
Wildlife Division benefits from tourism and hunting in GCAs and thus conservation of 
wildlife is one of their primary interests.  
Local government, which consists of the community and district level, is able to license tour 
operators in combination with Wildlife Division. The Ngorongoro district council receives a 
portion of the tourism fees occurring in Loliondo (Homewood and Rodgers, 2004). 
Community leaders have the opportunity to sign agreements with foreign investors which can 
yield infrastructural, economic and social benefits to their communities (Rurai, 2012). 
Several of the communities in the Loliondo division have entered agreements with foreign 
photographic tourism businesses. Examples of this include the Klein‘s and Buffalo Camps in 
the Ololosokwan community, Thomson Safari‘s Enashiva Refuge in the Soitsambu 
community, and a few mobile camps such as Dorobo Tours that operate in villages across 
Loliondo (Kileli, 2013). The main interest of community level government is to earn income 
from foreign photographic tourism operators that conduct business on village lands, and 
furthermore to preserve their right to do this despite conflict with district government, central 
government, and the OBC. 
5.2.6 Non-Governmental Organizations 
There are various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) run by the local Maasai people 
(AfricaFoundation-employee1-20150411:27). Some are run by foreigners. Most of the local 
NGOs operate under the umbrella organisation Ngorongoro District NGO Network 
(Odhiambo, 2008). Examples include the Ramat foundation which supports community 
income generating projects in Loliondo and the Pastoral Women‘s Council which attracts 
funding for various projects like the Emanyata Secondary School in Ololosokwan23. There 
are also foreign NGOs that employ people locally to run development projects, like Maasai 
Honey which supports honey farming by women in Ololosokwan24. There is also Oxfam: 
Based in the United Kingdom they fund initiatives relating to female economic 
empowerment, education for children, and livestock development. Oxfam is apparently 
largely responsible for the current trend of Maasai people seeking out what is locally called 
the ‗high breeding cow‘, a larger cattle breed that was sourced in Kenya (Olo-leader5-
20150421:9).  
                                                 
23
 www.pastoralwomenscouncil.org 
24
 www.maasaihoney.org 
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One of the key NGOs operating in Ololosokwan is the Africa Foundation. This foundation is 
the humanitarian arm of &Beyond operating at Klein‘s Camp. They have been responsible for 
funding significant infrastructural and social development in the community 
(AfricaFoundation-employee1-20150411). Their interests are to improve relations between 
the community and &Beyond and to improve local peoples‘ perceptions of conservation 
(AfricaFoundation-employee1-20150411:17). Overall, the main interest of all these NGOs 
appears to be the improvement of local quality of life across various indicators, especially 
among women and children in the Maasai communities. This interest originates for different 
reasons and is manifested in different ways but can be said to have been a universal basis for 
many NGO-funded local developments observed in Loliondo. 
5.3 Natural Resources 
Two natural resources of the Loliondo division in Ngorongoro district are of major 
importance to tourism and hunting: land and wildlife. The vast herds of the Serengeti 
ecosystem provide major economic stimulation for the region (Homewood and Rodgers, 
2004). As such, the ownership, management, and use of these resources are highly contested. 
In the following sections, important factors relating to natural resources are discussed: 
ownership of the land; access to resources; rules relating to their use; actual resource use 
practices; and the state of natural resources are considered. As a constant thread through this 
the different sources of conflict are detailed. 
5.3.1 Ownership of Resources in Ololosokwan 
Ololosokwan village was created in 1975 after certain Maasai communities had been evicted 
from the Serengeti National Park after its formation in 1959 (Olo-leader5-20150421:13). The 
Maasai people that settled in Ololosokwan village received a title deed to about 40,700 
hectares in 1975. The village land was mapped and registered in 1990 under The Local 
Government (District Authorities) Act of 1987 (Bartels, 2014). According to the Land Act of 
1999 and the Village Land Act of 1999, the responsibility for managing this land is vested in 
the village council on behalf of the community. According to the people of Ololosokwan, 
they own the land on which they live (Olo-community1-20150415:8). 
A conflicting claim emerges from the government however. They argue that all land in 
Tanzania is owned by the President. The idea that land in Tanzania is owned by the 
government by virtue of the Land Ordinance of 1923 gazetted by the colonial government. 
This idea was entrenched in 1999 with the promulgation of the Land Act which repealed the 
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Land Ordinance: ―All land in Tanzania shall continue to be public land and remain vested in 
the president as trustee for and on behalf of all the citizens of Tanzania‖ (Land Act of 1999, 
sec.4). The same idea applies to wildlife in that the Wildlife Conservation Act of 2009 vests 
control over wildlife in the government. In the Arusha Manifesto, President Julius Nyerere‘s 
famous 1961 speech on natural resources, it was stated that the government accepts 
trusteeship of wildlife on behalf of the people of Tanzania (Nshala, 2000). This point about 
wildlife has not been challenged by the Maasai, but their right to use wildlife in gaining 
income has been contested by government through land ownership conflict (Olo-
community24-20150420:16). This disagreement over the rightful ownership of land in 
Ololosokwan, and Loliondo in general, has led to a significant struggle for control of the 
land. A more detailed discussion follows on conflicts that have emerged between stakeholders 
over resource ownership. 
5.3.1.1 The Loliondo Game-Controlled Area 
There has been significant conflict around issues of ownership between Maasai communities 
living in the Loliondo GCA and the Wildlife Division of the central Tanzanian government. 
The reason for this is the two-fold classification of land in this area. The question of who 
owns the land in Ololosokwan has a mixed answer according to the law. The land in the 
Ololosokwan community can be classified as village land as it satisfies the definition of 
'village land' under Tanzania's Village Land Act (Act no. 5 of 1999). By contrast, the 
Ololosokwan community land is also a protected area. A large portion of the Loliondo 
division was gazetted as a Game Reserve in 1959 by the British colonial government 
(Bartels, 2014). In 1974 the Tanzanian government passed the Wildlife Act which defined 
GCAs as protected areas outside of core wildlife protected areas in which hunting was 
allowed under permit. The Loliondo GCA which was the whole of the Loliondo division, 
about 4000 km2, was established in 1974 (Gazette Notice no.269, Government of Tanzania). 
The Wildlife Act did not restrict common rural livelihoods in GCAs, so life continued as 
usual until the GCA was leased to the OBC in 1992. The legal status of livelihoods in the 
Loliondo GCA changed with the promulgation of the Wildlife Conservation Act (2009) which 
prohibits consumptive subsistence resource use in GCAs. There is now confusion about 
appropriate land use practices in Loliondo because of the dual status of land as a GCA and 
village land. 
In the early 1990s rural communities co-existed in relative peace with the OBC, but in the 
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late 1990s the OBC began to forcefully disturb Maasai communities in Loliondo in order to 
clear critical areas in the hunting block (Smith, 2012; FEMACT, 2009). Despite reports of 
unlawful harassment of local people, the district commissioner of the Ngorongoro district 
said that the OBC has followed all applicable rules and has invested more money in the 
region than any other hunting operation (Tomlinson, 2002). In 2009, Tanzanian police and 
OBC employees were reportedly responsible for the eviction of two to three hundred 
households from their land in order to remove livestock from the Loliondo hunting block 
(FEMACT, 2009; Renton, 2009). This deepened the divide between communities in Loliondo 
and the OBC, and increased feelings of animosity towards government (AfricaFoundation-
employee1-20150411:48).  
Contention was reignited when the Tanzanian government began evicting people from their 
homes in Oloosek subward, Ololosokwan village on 13 August 2017. By the end of the day 
on 14 August some 70 bomas had reportedly been burned in Ololosokwan and neighbouring 
villages25. However a major change occurred when this controversial lease of hunting rights 
in the Loliondo GCA was cancelled in late 2017 because the executive director of OBC in 
Tanzania reportedly tried to bribe, Dr. Hamisi Kingwangalla, the newly appointed Minister of 
Natural Resources and Tourism19. This represents a significant change in the power dynamics 
in the Loliondo land conflict. Exactly what the impact will be is yet to be seen in 2018 and 
beyond as a new hunting company applies for the lease of hunting rights in the Loliondo 
GCA. 
5.3.1.2 Ecotourism Concessions 
According to some of the community members participating in this research, the land on 
which the Buffalo Luxury Camp has been built was a highly contested issue for the people of 
Ololosokwan (Olo-leader5-20150421:16). Ololosokwan community leadership said that the 
agreed size of the land parcel was originally 60 acres when an agreement for lease was 
reached in 1993 (Olo-leader14-20150417:7). However when the new owners sent surveyors 
to demarcate the boundaries, the parcel was increased by surveyors from 60 acres to almost 
700 acres (Rurai, 2012). In 2005 the community filed a case in court to break off their 
contract with Intimate Places Tanzania. Rurai (2012) noted that the issue was settled out of 
court in 2007 with the company agreeing to use only 60 acres and the community 
withdrawing their case. This negative start has been remembered by the people of 
                                                 
25 http://termitemoundview.blogspot.co.za/2017/08/illegal-arson-attack-in-loliondo.html 
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Ololosokwan; several participants said that ―we don't really have a good relationship with 
Buffalo‖ (Olo-leader14-20150417:7). Due to the fact that Buffalo does not pay money to the 
community (Olo-community2-20150416:29), various community members said that the 
village council has a plan to talk with the owners of Buffalo Camp to secure regular rental 
payments for the land (Olo-community2-20150416:30; Olo-leader8-20150417:18).  
Ownership of the infrastructure at Klein‘s Camp could be another potential source of conflict. 
There seems to be some misunderstanding about who the buildings belong to: &Beyond or 
the community. In an offhand discussion with a management employee it was clearly stated 
that &Beyond is the owner of the buildings at Klein‘s Camp because of the purchase from 
Tanzania Cattle Products and they have made significant investments since then. By contrast 
the Ololosokwan community leaders have stated that they felt they were the owners of that 
infrastructure: ―When they were building the rooms, they belonged to the village‖ (Olo-
leader13-20150421). Despite this community leaders said that they recognise &Beyond‘s 
claims to infrastructure ownership (Olo-leader13-20150421). One community leader asked 
that &Beyond sell the infrastructure to the community if they ever were to sell Klein‘s Camp 
(Olo-leader13-20150421). The sale of the camp infrastructure could become a point of 
conflict. Issues relating to the ownership of land, resources, and infrastructure contribute 
significantly to conflict in the Ololosokwan community. 
5.3.2 Access to Natural Resources in Ololosokwan 
Natural resources are the primary source of sustenance for the Maasai people living in 
Ololosokwan (Odhiambo, 2008). While most residents engage in cattle-based livelihoods, a 
few have begun to diversify into minor subsistence crop farming and local businesses such as 
transport or building services. Access to natural resources is critical to survival in 
Ololosokwan. Similarly, a healthy ecosystem is essential if natural resource based livelihoods 
are to thrive (WHO, 2005). Resources are not bounded by fences, not even in the case of 
neighbouring Serengeti National Park. The Maasai people, and other stakeholder groups, are 
free to wander across the landscape as they please. Rules that form part of negotiated 
agreements between stakeholders are a useful tool to manage resource access so that natural 
resource use practices can be managed at sustainable levels (Kideghesho, 2006). There are 
different sources for the rules that relate to natural resource access: national legislation, 
community government, and partnerships with other stakeholders are all involved in making 
rules about natural resources. These rules and their impact are discussed.  
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5.3.2.1 Rules about Natural Resource Use 
Similar to work done by Kideghesho (2006), it was noted that the Ololosokwan community 
has developed its own set of rules regarding natural resource use. Traditionally, people were 
not allowed to build structures or residences anywhere without consulting the community 
leaders and the people living in that specific area; people are not to build on public land 
without consulting community leaders; and they should not use dry season grazing till it has 
been declared open for grazing by community leaders (Olo-community1-20150415:33). 
Rules such as this have always existed in Maasai society and some of them have already been 
mentioned, or are yet to be. It is postulated in this thesis that stakeholder's perceptions of 
rules, and their willingness to work within those rules, can have a great impact on relations 
between stakeholder groups and thus also on the state of natural resources. 
There are various levels at which rules have been developed relating to natural resources in 
Tanzania. At a national level, laws about natural resource use have been developed in the 
form of the Land Act of 1999, the Village Land Act of 1999, the National Parks Act of 2003, 
and the Wildlife Conservation Act of 2009. These laws relate to who owns and manages land, 
who owns and manages wildlife, and what people can do in protected areas (the Loliondo 
GCA is of relevance). As detailed above, the Wildlife Division is responsible for the 
management of wildlife and the administration of GCAs; TANAPA manages protected areas 
across Tanzania; and village councils are responsible for administering village land.  
One of the tools that has been utilised to enforce resource access rules is known locally as 
‗the patrol‘. The men who are employed in the patrol come from the community (Olo-
community14-20150423:30). They are paid salaries from money held by the community trust 
fund (Olo-community14-20150423:30). Their vehicles, and the vehicle maintenance, are 
financed by &Beyond. These men patrol the boundaries of the concession and chase cattle off 
the land that &Beyond rents from the community. Despite their work, the patrol has been a 
largely unsuccessful deterrent. As a result mixed responses were observed regarding the 
patrol: some people from the community supported the use of the patrol (Olo-community24-
20150420:32; Olo-leader8-20150417:27) while others opposed it (&Beyond-employee1-
20150427:21; Olo-leader5-20150421:27). The main consensus was that the current system 
should be revised as it was not working (Olo-leader5-20150421:28; Olo-leader13-
20150421:18). One resident of Ololosokwan said of the patrol: 
It is a problem because few people in the village know what the patrol is doing. The patrol is 
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political because they are chosen by leaders. They are chasing some cows and not chasing others. 
They catch some people, they don't catch other people. That is a big issue (Olo-leader5-
20150421:28) 
While 5 of the 8 of the participants who spoke about the patrol thought that the patrol has 
been a good idea in controlling the community‘s access to grazing on the concession, three 
did not agree26. Three of the 4 community members agreed except a community member 
employed at Klein‘s Camp. The other two who stated that it was not a good strategy were 
village councillors in the Ololosokwan community. One of these councillors pointed out that 
the patrol was restricting the community‘s access to the financial resources accruing from 
&Beyond‘s rental of the community‘s natural resources (Olo-leader14-20150417:13). The 
consistent argument was for the number of patrollers to be reduced so that more money could 
be spent on education for youth in the community (Olo-community6-20150419:19; Olo-
leader14-20150417:14). 
Another set of rules is those which have been agreed on with &Beyond due to their leasing of 
the concession. One of the more obvious examples of these rules relates to grazing in the 
concession. While the Maasai may take their cattle up to the Grumeti River, one of the main 
boundaries for the concession, it has been agreed that they will not take their cattle across the 
river (Gardner, 2007). While the primary research phase was taking place many 
infringements of this rule were observed. Some of the residents of Ololosokwan reported that 
the only cows to enter the concession were those that belonged to travelling Kenyans or 
Tanzanian Maasai from other villages nearby (Olo-community3-20150416:21).  
The community leadership has devised their own rule to help residents keep the previously 
discussed rule about grazing in the concession: that nobody will make a permanent boma in 
the same valley as the concession (&Beyond-employee2-20150429:11). Temporary bomas 
were allowed but had to be removed after a span of less than 6 months. Several herders from 
Ololosokwan pointed out that this rule has not been followed (&Beyond-employee1-
20150427:35; &Beyond-employee2-20150429:11; Olo-community3-20150416:2; Olo-
community14-20150423:11; Olo-community24-20150420:48). Interestingly at least one of 
those who had constructed one of these ‗temporary‘ bomas was an employee of &Beyond 
who had been there for over a year (&Beyond-employee1-20150427).  
                                                 
26 This quantitative breakdown of the data was made possible by the coding process 
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In this research it was found that rules at the village government level have been difficult to 
enforce effectively. This has similarly been the case with rules devised at the national 
government level. Due to difficulties in enacting government plans, and the rules devised to 
support these plans, the government has typically used force to impose rules. In one case a 
herder from Ololosokwan was shot by Serengeti National Park rangers when grazing cattle in 
the park27. The government has made use of TANAPA rangers and the police force to evict 
Maasai from areas that were said to be interfering with wildlife that had significance for 
conservation in the Serengeti National Park and hunting occurring in the Loliondo GCA25. 
 
Figure 10: The Ololosokwan community centre. Some of the interviews with Ololosowakn residents 
took place in the room on the right (Source: Author) 
5.3.3 Management of Natural Resources in Ololosokwan 
The Ololosokwan community has two forms of land-use management: traditional and written. 
This distinction was reported by those participating in the study. Their responses relating to 
the management of natural resources were coded in terms of natural resources, management, 
land-use plan, use/harvesting, overuse, and ownership. In terms of the former management 
style, which is traditional, rules are discussed in the general assembly and agreed upon 
verbally by all. The general assembly is an open community meeting which all community 
members are encouraged to attend and participate in. In a general assembly meeting the 
researcher attended, the village council discussed important issues, inviting input and polling 
opinions of the community members. In these meetings, those who do not agree are allowed 
to voice their dissent but there is no guarantee that their opinion will be incorporated into the 
                                                 
27
 http://www.conservation-watch.org/2017/08/16/violent-evictions-of-maasai-underway-in-loliondo-tanzania-
to-make-way-for-otterlo-business-corporations-hunting-concession/ 
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consensus-led decision. In the meeting attended it was noted that there were a handful of 
community members who disagreed with the mainstream opinion and spoke openly in the 
meeting. When asked what plan is being implemented in the community, 4 of the 7 
community members who spoke about land-use planning said roughly this: 
They are somehow sticking to the traditional plan… the traditional one you just say from here to 
these places no grazing. But not written (Olo-community2-20150416). 
 
Figure 11: A general assembly meeting in Ololosokwan community (Source: Author) 
These four were herders from Ololosokwan. By contrast, the three who said that there is no 
land-use plan at all were community leaders, i.e. members of the village council. The 
traditional land-use plan that is being used has its short-comings as this resident of 
Ololosokwan pointed out. Speaking about land-use planning, he said that: 
We had it before. But now the big issue is the number of cattle. We are trying to face it but it is 
difficult. We need governments support (Olo-community1-20150415:36). 
Growing social and developmental complexities have made it difficult to enforce traditional 
rules about land-use (Olo-leader6-20150422:67). From first-hand observation it was deduced 
that this is where the traditional land-use plan has begun to fail. Traditional Maasai society is 
changing and this has affected the efficacy of traditional land-use planning. Some residents 
were of the opinion that a formal land-use plan should be devised by the government: 
The best way is only the government to come up with terms and conditions and the restrictions on 
implementing [a land-use plan]; and then the society must accept it and be the person to 
implement it. I think that is the best way, otherwise we cannot (Olo-community1-20150415:16). 
A land-use plan was devised in the late 1990s by the Ololosokwan village council (Bartels, 
2014). One participant in the study surmised that this was a power strategy used by the 
village council to ensure that they retained the land along the boundary of the Serengeti 
National Park: 
113 
 
They are trying to convince the government that they have a land-use plan so that they can 
convince the government to accept what is going on in the village (&Beyond-employee2-
20150429:25). 
This location of dry season grazing has also created conflict between &Beyond and the 
Maasai because some of the residents in Ololosokwan claim that the concession is part of 
their dry seasons grazing (Olo-community24-20150420:22).  
Despite the talk about traditional and formal land-use plans, a general lack of agreement on 
land-use plans was observed in the Ololosokwan community. While some stated that a land-
use plan had been created (Olo-community1-20150415:2; Olo-community24-20150420:48), 
others did not acknowledge such a development (Olo-community2-20150416:12; Olo-
leader13-20150421:23). Four of the 7 people who spoke about land-use planning agreed with 
this herder who said that the plan currently being used ―is a traditional one. People… are 
using that traditional ways‖ (Olo-community2-20150416:35). At least five of the study 
participants from Ololosokwan expressed the sentiment that in order to ensure that &Beyond 
remained as the tenant at Klein‘s Camp, a formal land-use plan should be developed and 
implemented (Olo-leader6-20150422:18). 
5.3.4 The State of Natural Resources on Ololosokwan Village Land 
In order to better understand why stakeholder interactions happen in the manner that they do, 
one must consider the state of the resources that they are interacting over. This study theorises 
that stakeholder interactions impact the state of natural resources and that those resources in 
turn have an impact upon the interactions that stakeholder have with one another. One of the 
major parts of investigating such an idea is an understanding of 1) the state of natural 
resources and 2) how humans have been responsible for that observed state. The most 
important resources in this case are considered below: natural land-cover (i.e. grazing and 
wood resources) and wildlife. 
5.3.4.1 Natural Land-Cover 
Natural resources are under pressure in Ololosokwan. All of the 41 residents of Ololosokwan 
who discussed grazing said that there were too many cattle on village land: they were of the 
opinion that grasslands were being overgrazed. When driving between the community centre 
and Klein‘s Camp where the researcher was staying for the duration of research, herders 
would often be found walking on the roadside. In order to have discussions with random 
community members, these herders would be offered a lift along the road in the vehicle. 
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During the drive discussions would ensue. On one of these drives a resident herder said in 
effect what many others had said: 
There is not enough [grazing] to satisfy all the community (Olo-community8-20150427:13). 
This was a consistent response given by residents when asked if there is enough grazing for 
all the cattle in Ololosokwan. All of the residents in Ololosokwan who attributed a reason to 
overgrazing said simply that the cattle population has been too high for the amount of grazing 
available. Speaking of the observed decrease in available grazing, one resident of 
Ololosokwan who is not Maasai said: 
Previous days, there were long grasses, big bushes that were dark so you can't even go by foot; 
but nowadays someone can just come from the village by foot up to here (&Beyond-employee2-
20150429:18). 
All of the Ololosokwan herders attributed the diminishing grazing to a high cattle population. 
Five of them also noticed other environmental changes such as soil erosion. It was noted that 
soil erosion was not attributed to vehicles or climate change, but rather the cattle population: 
The big number of cattle means there are no grasses. So it is very easy for the winds to keep out 
the upper soils so that there is soil erosion (Olo-community2-20150416:34). 
Frequent use of the same paths and fields by herds of cattle was also given as a reason for 
erosion: 
There is a big number of cattle nowadays and they are passing one way causing soil erosion (Olo-
community2-20150416:34). 
There were also comments on the effect of the increasing human population on bush and 
forest land-cover: 
In this community we have some areas where people have never lived. But right now people have 
shifted from these places and made new settlements there. It forces them to make new farms, clear 
forest and make new settlements (Olo-community3-20150416:4). 
Many years ago there were some bushes, some big trees that can make the rain to come close. 
Nobody goes there, very forest. Some places there are very nice grass, and tall. Nowadays gone 
(Olo-leader8-20150417:16). 
According to at least one community member, the expanding human population is impacting 
on forest and bush cover as people require fuel and new places to live (Olo-leader8-
20150417:8). He cited clearing of natural land-cover for building bomas and homes as a 
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major cause of land-cover change. The exact extent of these changes could be confirmed 
using remotely-sensed data but a study on land-cover change in Ololosokwan has not been 
done to date. In a study on land-cover change west of the Serengeti National Park, Estes et al. 
(2012) wrote that land cover changed significantly between 1984 and 2003. The highest rates 
of land-cover change were within 20km of the park boundary and population density 
increases were also highest within the same distance, thereafter decreasing with increasing 
distance from the park. Ololosokwan village land is within 20km of the Serengeti National 
Park boundaries and thus similar patterns to what was observed could be expected. In similar 
findings, Boone et al. (2007) wrote in their study on human caused changes in land-cover that 
there overall greenness in remotely sensed images of the Loliondo division had declined 
between 1982 and 2004. This is only one indicator that there might be significant 
anthropogenic environmental changes occurring in the Loliondo division.  
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Figure 12: A land-cover assessment of the Klein's Camp concession completed by the researcher 
while visiting Klein's Camp. Note that degraded land-cover is concentrated where Maasai cattle are 
most frequently found in the concession. The green dot indicates the location of Klein’s Camp. 
5.3.4.2 Wildlife 
Cattle herds have had a major impact on wildlife in Ololosokwan (Olo-community2-
20150416:34). Some of the major conflicts that occur between the community and other 
stakeholders relate to cattle. As one participant stated, ―what [Maasai] need is a big number 
of cattle‖ (&Beyond-employee2-20150429:31). The growing population of cattle has had an 
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impact on wildlife for two reasons. Firstly wildlife is naturally scared of humans and so the 
growing presence of people and their grazing cattle has had an impact on the amount of 
wildlife living on Ololosokwan village land. One Ololosokwan resident of 30 years, who is 
also an employee of &Beyond, stated that: 
Previously you can't pass here [to Klein’s Camp] on foot because the grass was tall and there 
were animals around; but now every Maasai has got cattle around (&Beyond-employee2-
20150429:6). 
Nomad Africa Adventure Tours once had a mobile camp on the Ololosokwan village land but 
they moved the camp to the Serengeti National Park due to conflict over grazing cattle 
frequently seen in useful wildlife grazing areas (Olo-community3-20150416:21). One of the 
community leaders spoke of changing conditions in the concession and feared that &Beyond 
would vacate their tenancy at the lodge because of decreasing wildlife populations: 
So 3 to 5 years ago the Klein's Camp concession was very unique. There was a number of 
animals, but since the number of the people increased even the concession is becoming a mess. 
That is why you can see people and animals there (Olo-leader7-20150425:1). 
It was acknowledged by 40 of the 41 members of the Ololosokwan community participating 
in this study that there was a problem with people and cattle entering the concession despite 
the agreement between &Beyond and the community. The community leader quoted above 
was not the only participant to notice the problematic nature of this and voice this concern. 
Hunting by the OBC and poachers has also had an impact on the state of wildlife in 
Ololosokwan. One of the major causes of conflict between stakeholders has been hunting. 
The loud noise of a rifle frightens animals and non-consumptive tourism, like game viewing 
and photography, requires tame wildlife. Other hunting issues affecting wildlife are poaching 
(Wato, Wahungu & Okello, 2006), retaliatory killing of predators by local herders (Ikand and 
Packer, 2008), and ritualistic killing of wildlife by Maasai moran, or warriors (Goldman, de 
Pinho & Perry, 2013). Poaching was observed to take place in the Klein‘s Camp concession. 
In April 2015, an elephant was seen to be shot only a few kilometres from Klein‘s Camp. It 
was also said that lions and buffalo have been killed by men of the Ololosokwan community. 
In addition, it was said that the Maasai tradition of young morans killing Lions for social 
status still takes place in Ololoskwan. Hunting and poaching would be an obvious cause of 
shyness in the local populations of these species. Hunting by both the OBC and the Maasai 
can be presumed to have caused shyness among animals. When wildlife is shy it becomes 
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difficult to provide safari patrons with an experience they would want to repeat or 
recommend to others, negatively impacting the potential for wildlife tourism. Where one 
stakeholder group negatively impacts the state of resources or another group‘s ability to 
utilize resources, relations between stakeholders are impacted. The more pervasive social 
aspects of stakeholder relations, such as consideration of other stakeholders‘ interests, are 
thus a critical factor to consider in the examination of this complex socio-ecological 
landscape. 
5.4 Stakeholder Relations 
Stakeholder relations are defined by the ways in which stakeholders interact with other 
stakeholder groups over critical issues related to natural resources. Interactions occur in the 
form of communication, partnerships, and co-operation around resource management and 
sharing. The manner in which stakeholders create or frame power in their interactions with 
other groups is also discussed. These interactions can have both positive and negative impacts 
on stakeholder‘s perceptions of each other. The main interactions occurring between 
stakeholders in Ololosokwan are detailed below. 
5.4.1 Co-operation 
Three relationships where more effective co-operation has been observed are between the 
community and &Beyond, the government and the OBC, and sub-group relations within the 
community. The level of formality in these co-operative relationships ranges from organised 
to ad-hoc: 
 The relationship between the community and &Beyond is strictly organised. They 
have recently been plagued by difficulties in negotiating a fair contract and in the past 
they have been strained by a legal dispute over land ownership (Olo-leader6-
20150422:9). Today this relationship is stated by both sides to be fairly positive (Olo-
community2-20150416:19; &Beyond-employee1-20150427:23) 
 Relations between the government and the OBC have both formal and informal 
components. While the legal system makes certain requirements of the OBC, their 
interactions with government were not limited to this formalised component 
(&Beyond-director-20140818:9). Relations between government and OBC have been 
observed to be generally positive: the government gets significant financial 
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contributions while the OBC gets to manage the Loliondo GCA in a way that 
maximises benefit to their hunting operation18 and 
 Sub-group relations within the community are ad-hoc and thus prone to complexity. 
They are discussed in detail in this chapter. Where the relations are strained is over the 
management of financial resources (Olo-community6-20150419:26), but community 
residents deem these problems to be less significant than the risk that the government 
and the OBC present to the community‘s right to land ownership because in the face 
of this greater risk, the community stands together.  
The most consistent positive results occurred where there were formalised and organised 
arrangements for co-operation. Positive co-operation occurred frequently within the 
community but this group was more prone to variability because of its complexity. This 
section is a presentation of the main factors that have contributed to, and detracted from, the 
potential for effective co-operation between stakeholder groups and sub-groups. These factors 
were derived from the codes relations, adjudication, barriers, co-operation, communication, 
conflict, homogeneity of interests, negative, negotiation, opposition, participation, 
partnerships, positive, social capital, threats to one another, transparency, trust, and use of 
force. A total of 360 quotes were used in the development of this sub-section. 
5.4.1.1 Communication 
While meeting with study participants from different stakeholder groups, I noticed 
communication was a major factor contributing to the state of relations between stakeholders. 
It was often talked about by participants, at times explicitly (Olo-community6-20150419:15) 
but at others implicitly (Olo-community24-20150420:26). Two general assembly meetings 
were attended by the researcher while performing primary research in Ololosokwan. An 
interpreter was present to translate from Maa, the Maasai language, to English. It was 
observed that in a general assembly meeting, all community members can attend and share 
their views with the leaders that negotiate with other stakeholder on the community‘s behalf. 
Despite the ability to participate in general assemblies, 17 of the 24 non-leadership 
community members participating in this study said that they did not feel adequately heard or 
represented by community leaders and that the level of communication within the community 
was poor. One participant also said that local people not on the village council had no power 
to communicate with &Beyond or the Africa Foundation, decreasing the knowledge that 
&Beyond had about expectations and perceptions in the broader community. In other 
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examples of stakeholder communication, community leaders and representatives of tourism 
operations will visit the Loliondo division offices to consult with one another and local 
government officers (the researcher attended one such meeting at the Loliondo division 
centre), or they will visit Buffalo Camp to speak with the managers or owners about their 
concerns.  
5.4.1.2 Barriers to Co-operation 
While gathering data from various stakeholder groups in Ololosokwan it was noted that one 
of the barriers to effective co-operation between the community and foreign tourism 
operators was communication. Community members‘ perception that they could not directly 
contact &Beyond and the Africa Foundation meant that there was a lack of direct 
communication with residents of Ololosokwan. Moreover purposeful miscommunication was 
named by three participants as a barrier to co-operation (Olo-community6-20150419:10). As 
mentioned before, communication with the leadership of the community was said to be 
problematic. Seventeen of the Ololosokwan residents who participated in this study said that 
they did not always believe what leaders told them, or they explicitly stated that they do not 
trust their leaders. One person said that in order for there to be transparent communication, 
―the good thing is to don't do any meetings with few people, a group of few leaders‖ (Olo-
community6-20150419:16). These participants stated that &Beyond should have meetings 
with the whole community rather than only meeting with members of the village council 
because they do not trust the community leaders. 
The same narrative about the community leadership was repeated by an NGO employee 
working in the area. He said that what is said by community leaders must be checked by 
speaking on the same topic to other members of the community: ―They will either support 
what the councillor is saying or speak against‖ (AfricaFoundation-employee1-20150411:40).  
He said that by doing so one can start to gain a clearer understanding of what has actually 
been happening. Some Ololosokwan residents felt that there was not effective representation 
of the community members. One resident spoke of feeling side-lined by the village council: 
―If I have got one of my friends in the leader group then I talk to him then he listens to me‖ 
(Olo-community24-20150420:13). Ineffective representation of community interests has been 
a major barrier to effective co-operation, both within the community and with other 
stakeholder groups. 
While it might be true that a part of the community does not trust their leadership, there are 
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obviously other community members who feel differently. Seven (29.2%) of the community 
participants not in leadership positions said that they were in agreement with the leaders 
(Olo-community24-20150420:19), that the Maasai community is so transparent (Olo-
community1-20150415:9), and that the people trust their leaders as long as the pasture is not 
at risk (Olo-leader6-20150422:14). These were typically young men who were educated and 
personally acquainted with the new mwenyekiti, or village chairperson. The current set of 
leaders was apparently voted in by a majority so if this is correct and there was no adjustment 
of vote numbers, then it would appear that most community members approve of their local 
leadership. By contrast to this logical appraisal, randomly selected participants voiced strong 
disapproval. 
5.4.2 Benefit Sharing 
Benefit sharing from natural resources follows a few main streams in Ololosokwan: Flows of 
money from tourism businesses operating in the area, infrastructure improvement by these 
tourism businesses, and social development. The financial portion of benefit sharing has been 
significant in Ololosokwan: the director of &Beyond told me that they generate upwards of 
US$60,000 annually for the community (&Beyond-director-20140818). Some of this is in the 
form of direct payments to the community trust fund for land rental and guest fees, while 
other non-monetary benefits are paid for by &Beyond such as the doctor at the Ololosokwan 
clinic (Confirmed by the doctor who was working at the clinic). As a brief summary it could 
be said that many residents of Ololosokwan spoke with divided opinions about benefits that 
other stakeholders had shared with the community. Those who were direct recipients of 
benefits only spoke positively: This includes those who were educated as a result of tourism 
related income or those who had been helped by medical staff at the clinic built and funded 
by &Beyond (Olo-community5-20150418; Olo-community7-20150423). Of those who were 
not direct recipients, some spoke positively of the benefits shared by &Beyond because they 
recognised how general amenities like the clinic were useful to them or the community at 
large (Olo-community24-20150420). There were others who were not direct recipients who 
spoke negatively of benefits shared by other stakeholders because they claimed only a select 
portion of the community was benefiting (Olo-community22-20150420:8). More detail about 
benefit sharing, and the impact on stakeholder relations, is mentioned below. 
5.4.2.1 Direct Financial Benefit 
The most significant benefit, and the one that caused the most conflict, was money that has 
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been paid directly to the community by tourism operators and the government as part of their 
benefit sharing of tourism revenue. The largest financial contributor to the Ololosokwan 
community among tourism stakeholders has been &Beyond. The Buffalo Luxury Camp does 
not make any direct payments to the community and the OBC makes irregular development 
aid contributions to the communities in Loliondo. Community members and leaders largely 
spoke positively of contributions from &Beyond: only 4 participants spoke negatively and 
they were typically herders from outlying parts of the community and they understood that 
&Beyond was not involved with the management of community finances.  
5.4.2.2 Employment and its Impact 
One of the benefits emphasised by three community members was employment: They spoke 
positively of the impact that employment at the Klein‘s Camp lodge makes for local people 
(Olo-community3-20150416:19). Some participants said that employment has had other 
effects in the community: They spoke about tourism employment improving quality of life in 
Ololosokwan (Olo-community1-20150415:72). It was pointed out by one middle-aged male 
participant that some of the cement buildings that now exist in Ololosokwan were built by 
employees of &Beyond (Olo-community5-20150418:37). Employment has also changed the 
way that some of the Maasai view money. While some still view cattle as their most 
important asset, a minority has begun to move their assets to the monetary economy: This 
minority is buying and selling cattle in a way that increases their wealth more effectively 
(Olo-community3-20150416:10). Rather than viewing the size of their herd as wealth, they 
choose to build concrete homes, wear western clothes, and have money. Employment is 
impacting the community beyond just a simple flow of money. It is improving quality of life 
and it is changing the way that the younger generation of Maasai people view themselves and 
manage their assets. 
5.4.2.3 Infrastructure Improvement 
The OBC and &Beyond (through the Africa Foundation) have both made significant 
contributions towards infrastructure development in the region. While driving through 
Loliondo it was observed that the OBC was responsible for the drilling of solar-powered 
boreholes in the Loliondo division. The Africa Foundation has supported the construction of 
2 classrooms, the renovation of 6 classrooms and the provision of 40 desks and more than 
100 school books to the Ololosokwan Primary School; a kitchen and a dining hall have also 
been constructed at the school; a 10 room clinic was also built in Ololosokwan, stocked with 
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medical equipment and furniture (Observed in August 2014). The clinic staff is paid by the 
African Foundation, with a resident doctor and nurse who are accommodated in housing 
constructed for this purpose by the Foundation (AfricaFoundation-employee1-20150411:8). 
5.4.2.4 Management of Benefits 
Not everyone sees the benefit of having &Beyond pay money to the community however. 
Complainants were typically community members who were not direct recipients of any 
benefits: 7 of these people participated. As was said by one Ololosokwan resident who is also 
an employee at Klein‘s Camp: ―Some of the people say the company now is for few people, 
not for all people‖ (Olo-community6-20150419:29). When asked if the arrangement with 
&Beyond was good for the community, 4 of the residents shared the opinion that ―very few 
people benefit so it is better for the company to leave so the cows can graze in the 
concession‖ (Olo-community22-20150420:6). Seventeen participants made strong statements 
about the future of &Beyond due to poor management of community funds. They made a 
value judgment between the money paid by &Beyond and the ability to graze in the 
concession, and they chose the grazing because they believed that was what would benefit the 
community the most. One participant stated that the management of monetary benefits has 
been a source of conflict in the Ololosokwan community: 
They have been getting quite a bit of money and now I think the problem is the management of the 
funds (AfricaFoundation-employee1-20150411:20). 
Six of participants said that they felt the money was being used appropriately. Four of those 
people were community leaders. These participants largely said that the money managed in 
trust by the village council was being used for education, health, and legal counsel.  
Despite what was narrated by these participants, the main source of conflict seems to have 
centered on the fact that 19 community members I didn‘t know what the money was being 
spent on. That is 79% of the non-leadership community members and 46% of the entire 
community sample for this case.  Amazingly one of these people was a woman who was at 
that time a member of the village council.  
Another participant remarked about how financial management at the village government 
level has had a clear impact on how residents of Ololosokwan treat the agreement with 
&Beyond: 
The company paid the village but some people, maybe I say they put money in the pocket and then 
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other people don't know the profit from the land for &Beyond. So they must bring their cattle to 
the concession because he don't know profit (AfricaFoundation-employee1-20150411:28). 
Whether or not the village council was improperly using financial benefits could not be 
established, however the lack of communication about these finances has caused conflict over 
resource management. Ineffective management of benefits is not only causing conflict within 
the community, it is also causing conflict between &Beyond and the community.  
5.4.3 The Power Landscape 
The main tool that stakeholders use to create power for themselves is national legislation: 
citizens have a legal obligation to obey the law. Thus a stakeholder can use the law in 
attempting to force other stakeholders into certain behaviours. One example of this is the 
government establishing laws to regulate specific land-use regimes in certain areas. To 
illustrate: the Wildlife Conservation Act of 2009 prohibits cattle grazing in GCAs. However, 
communities in Loliondo have resisted the enforcement of this law despite government 
agencies having used force to enact it (AfricaFoundation-employee1-20150411:52). Top-
down implementation of natural resource law has been a major barrier to successful co-
operation between the government and rural communities. Another example of framing 
power in the legal system is Thomson Safaris in Soitsambu, the community neighbouring 
Ololosokwan. Thomson Safaris claims to own title to 12,000 acres in Loliondo: This title was 
challenged in court by the communities and counter-challenged by Thomson Safaris. As a 
result the Maasai living in that area have a largely negative view of this company (&Beyond-
director-20140818). &Beyond recognised that using the law to frame power can have a 
negative impact on public perception of them; they been cautious in using the law to govern 
their interactions with other stakeholders (&Beyond-director-20140818:19).  
Tourism operators have also framed their power in dealings with Ololosokwan community 
through the use of agreements. In the case of &Beyond, there is a contract with the 
community about the renting and use of 25,000 acres on the community land (Gardner, 
2007)). In the case of Nomad Safaris mobile camp, land was rented in the community for a 
part of the year. There was conflict over these agreements over the years due to the tourism 
operations being disturbed by cattle grazing in designated wildlife areas. After years of not 
being able to resolve the cattle issue, Nomad Safaris stopped operating in Ololosokwan (Olo-
community3-20150416:21).  
Tourism stakeholders have used their financial benefit sharing as a means to wield power 
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over the community in agreements. During the time that the primary research for this study 
was taking place, &Beyond and the community were negotiating the details of a new 
contract. &Beyond used the constant infringement of grazing cattle to bargain with the 
community, saying that they should not have to pay land rental fees when there are cattle 
grazing on the land (Olo-leader13-20150421:19).  
Community members have used the law to frame power in attempting to retain ownership of 
titled village land. The land-use plan ratified by district government is one tool the 
community has used to maintain power over their land (&Beyond-employee2-20150429:25). 
Other ways that the community has used the law to their advantage is by contesting claims of 
land ownership in court (Ndaskoi, 2002). This is where NGO financial support provides 
power for communities. The Ololosokwan community has contested land ownership claims 
made by Tanzania Cattle Products, &Beyond, and the government (Gardner, 2007). The 
Village Land Act of 1999 is a significant contributor to the community having power in 
dealing with other stakeholders in issues of land ownership.  
An idea consistently mentioned by people in Ololosokwan is that a long-term historical 
existence in the area gives them a right to land ownership (Gardner, 2007). While they claim 
that according to the Village Land Act of 1999 they are the legal owners of the village land, 
this has been contested by the Tanzanian government in the past who claim that the land is 
actually a Game Controlled Area and thus government owned. Whatever the legal claims by 
various stakeholders might be, the Maasai also claim to be the rightful owners of the land by 
virtue of their history, not only the land‘s legal status. The Maasai not only claim a form of 
historical ownership by having moved into the area centuries ago, but they also frame power 
in terms of the forced removals they have experienced due to the establishment of protected 
areas since the 1950s until today (Rurai, 2012).  
The Ololosokwan community has used international media to create power in their dealings 
with other stakeholders. The community has used media to share their issues with a wider 
international audience. They have gathered much support using this method. Similarly they 
have used NGOs to publicise their issues and gain power in their dealings with government 
(Ndaskoi, 2002). Rurai (2012) argues that the use of media has been particularly effective in 
the community‘s dealings with the government and the OBC. This avenue of power amounts 
to little though when the government uses force to enact their rule set on community land 
(&Beyond-director-20140818:18; Olo-community3-20150416:25).  
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5.4.3.1 Power in the Community 
Power in the community is vested in the people. The people of a community choose a 24 
person village council to make decisions on their behalf. This council is to engage and 
communicate with the people of their community when making important decisions. 
However, politics in the village are complex and divide the people. Other factors, like poverty 
and the changing face of Maasai culture, have added to the complexity of the modern Maasai 
society. Traditional society is changing: 
In previous times elders would decide who can live here, and why. So now the young man can say 
ah, you are refusing I will just go to police because you are oppressing me (Olo-community1-
20150415:67). 
Community leaders are less inclined to wield autocratic power because doing so would risk 
the position of power they hold. This was not a concern that the traditional leaders had a 
century ago. However leaders in the community today are subject to an election process. 
They can be removed from their positions of power.  
The general narrative among participants was that the village council follows a process that 
encourages democracy: 
If there is a big issue that will affect the community and they will not be able to decide on their 
own, they call a general assembly… in the community and they will discuss (AfricaFoundation-
employee1-20150411:39). 
This oft-repeated narrative of democracy was illusive to find in reality however. One man 
implicitly remarked that democracy was being subverted by poverty and dishonesty (Personal 
communications with resident1 of Ololosokwan community, 12-20 April 2015). He asserted 
that these were decisive factors in the power struggles that exist within the Ololosokwan 
community. He was more willing to speak out on more sensitive political issues than others 
and said that certain leaders used bribery to win votes in the community. If true, this 
demonstrates the influence that poverty can have on local power dynamics. The truthfulness 
of this account could not be verified. 
A different narrative to that which was presented by some community members was 
described by one of the long-standing community leaders. When he was asked why most 
people in the community said they did not know the details of the agreement with &Beyond, 
and they did not know how leadership was managing community finances, he said the 
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following: 
You know these people are not complaining, they are trusting their leaders and the committee. If 
you complain that is why you find the details. If you don’t complain you don't care. What I know of 
Maasai, they trust the leaders. Even if they maybe are going to do something negative, stealing or 
something; but they trust them (Olo-community14-20150423:9). 
Only one community member who was not in a leadership position said that it is not true that 
only leaders benefit from &Beyond (Olo-community7-20150423:24). Despite the fact that 
residents are the ones electing their leaders, some also admitted that the leaders were the ones 
who held much of the power in their community (Olo-leader5-20150421:24; Olo-
community24-20150420:35). I asked one resident if he would be heard by community leaders 
at the general assembly, and he said ―if I have got one of my friends in the leader group then I 
talk to him then he listens to me‖ (Olo-community24-20150420:13). This view was echoed 
by 3 others. These under-resourced herders in the Ololosokwan appeared to be disconnected 
from community leadership who typically had better access to resources. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to: 
 Outline stakeholders relevant to the management of natural resources in the Klein‘s 
Camp concession located on Ololosokwan community land 
 Detail the ownership, access, management, and state of natural resources in the 
concession and 
 Examine the history and current state of stakeholder relations in the management of 
the Klein‘s Camp concession. 
Using data obtained from interviews with participants, as well as secondary sources, the 
complexities of this case were detailed. The observations and narratives that were related in 
this chapter allow for the identification of links between ad-hoc human behavior, stakeholder 
interactions, and natural resource management. Of particular importance were issues of land 
ownership, rules and rule systems, the nature of communication, the manner of benefit 
sharing, and the ways in which stakeholders attempted to wield power over others. Links 
between these topics, and the impact of stakeholder interactions over natural resources, will 
be explored and analysed in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 6: MNEMBA ISLAND MARINE CONSERVATION AREA, 
ZANZIBAR, TANZANIA 
6. Introduction 
The Zanzibar archipelago is a semi-autonomous region of Tanzania about 32 km off the coast 
of East Africa. The two main islands are Unguja in the south and Pemba in the north. 
Historically the archipelago was ruled by Arabians from Oman and was an important hub in 
the 19th century slave trade (Longair, 2016). During this time, Zanzibar also became famous 
for the locally abundant crops of cloves, cinnamon, and other spices (Longair, 2016). In the 
last two decades the economy has been restructured away from spice exports to the service 
industry as it has become an increasingly popular holiday destination (Sharpley & Ussi, 
2014). The number of tourists increased from 162,242 to 376,000 between 2016 and 201728. 
The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar has estimated that by the year 2020, 50% of the 
population will be involved in the tourism industry (https://www.zanzibar.go.tz/in 
dex.php?rgo=tourism). With colourful coral reefs in warm blue water and a seemingly 
endless coast of white sand beaches fringed by coconut palms, tourism to Zanzibar is largely 
dependent on the existence of sensitive natural resources. In this paradisiacal setting, 
livelihoods and tourism are competing over the use of natural resources that are being 
disturbed by poor management and over-use (EcoAfrica, 2005). On the one hand tourism 
relies largely on ‗pristine‘ beaches and reefs; on the other hand livelihoods rely on fishing 
along those reefs. The future of both depends on the long-term persistence of these marine 
resources. 
About 2.1 km off the north-east coast of Unguja, Zanzibar is a small island called Mnemba. 
Mnemba Island is a small landmass with a vegetated coastline of 1.46 km and an area of 0.12 
km2. It is surrounded by a fringing, shallow water coral reef. The Mnemba atoll is an 
important source of tourism revenue for Zanzibar while also being a vital and historical 
fishing ground for rural communities living on the north-eastern coast of Unguja, Zanzibar 
(EcoAfrica, 2005; Gustavsson et al., 2014). Today there is a luxury ecotourism lodge on 
Mnemba Island that is leased from the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar by &Beyond, 
an ecotourism operator running numerous lodges across Tanzania. Government institutions, 
tourism operators, local communities, and NGOs all have interests in the marine resources 
                                                 
28 http://allafrica.com/stories/201704190661.html 
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around Zanzibar. Mnemba Island and the marine resources around it have been a source of 
conflict for the last few decades. Stakeholders interacting over these resources have been 
critical of one another and their relations have mostly been marked by conflict and negative 
perceptions of each other. The history of the Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area 
(MIMCA) is an important story for inclusive conservation in Africa – there are numerous 
stakeholders fighting for their use of a diminishing resource base and there have been 
successes and losses, all within the last 20 years. In this chapter, the case of the MIMCA is 
considered. The most influential data in this case came from the code families benefits, 
community, conservation, government, livelihoods, natural resources, perceptions, power, 
relations, and rules. A total of 98 codes contributed to the development of results across all 
the themes detailed in this chapter. The brief history is visited along with a listing of 
stakeholders and their interests, a review of the natural resources, and a presentation of 
stakeholder interactions over those resources.  
6.1 A History of the Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area 
Mnemba Island was historically uninhabited. Fishermen from the villages of Matemwe, 
Kigomani, Mbuutunde, Pwani Mchangani, and Kiwengwa used Mnemba as a camp from 
which to stage fishing operations that were on the Mnemba atoll or further offshore from the 
Zanzibarian coastline (EcoAfrica, 2005). In 1989, Mnemba Island was leased by the 
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar to a locally based Italian company called Tanzania 
Cattle Products. This company used the island as a resort and built basic infrastructure for 
holidaying corporate staff (&Beyond-employee3-20140822). Along with the lease being 
secured, an agreement was drawn up between Tanzania Cattle Products and the government 
about local access to Mnemba Island and its atoll. This agreement stated that local fishermen 
were prevented from visiting Mnemba Island or being within 200 m of the high tide mark, 
and fishing on certain parts of the surrounding reef was prohibited (&Beyond-employee3-
20140822). The local fishermen told me that they have felt bitter about this prohibition ever 
since (Mbuu-community56-20150502:22). 
Mnemba Island, along with the surrounding reef, currently has legal provisions regarding 
fishing due to its establishment as a Marine Conservation Area in legal notice number 68 of 
2002, published by provision of the Tanzanian Fisheries Act (no.8 of 1988). This 
conservation area was originally created for two reasons: to protect the marine resources of 
Mnemba atoll and to provide an end to the contention between local communities and 
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tourism operators using the atoll (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2010). Protection 
of marine resources has been a critical issue due to the declining health of the overall 
ecosystem, a decline which has resulted from overuse of marine resources (EcoAfrica, 2005). 
Conflict has arisen due to this issue because livelihoods have been put at risk. On the one 
hand, tourism operators have said that they are at risk of losing their livelihood due to the 
high level of subsistence fishing on the atoll (&Beyond sustainability manager, personal 
communication, 21 August 2015). On the other hand, fishermen have wanted to maintain 
access to one of the only fishing areas that continues to be fruitful for them: the Mnemba 
Atoll (Kig-community40-20150313:2).  
There are few alternative livelihoods to fishing (Kig-community40-20150313:26). As such, 
the Mnemba atoll is a significant resource for the communities on the north-eastern coastline 
of Unguja. The idea behind establishing a marine conservation area on the atoll was that it 
would allow the collection of a fee from all tourists visiting the atoll, and this money could be 
used as development support for local communities (&Beyond-employee3-20140822:1). It 
was envisioned that the bulk of the money would provide fishermen with equipment that 
would allow them to fish further offshore as well as develop additional livelihood 
opportunities in the communities affected by restrictions associated with the establishment of 
the marine conservation area (Ex-manager of Mnemba Island lodge, personal 
communication, 24 March 2015). Fishing further offshore is an idea that 24 of the 40 
fishermen spoken to talked about: they said that if they had a motorboat to go fishing in 
deeper offshore waters then they would not need to fish in the shallow near-shore waters that 
are so important for marine tourism (&Beyond-employee2-20150316:33; Matem-leader1-
20150502:26). All of the fishermen spoken with in the coastal communities of north-eastern 
Unguja said that they had no alternative to near-shore fishing in and around tourism hotspots 
(Kig-community40-20150313:26). 
In the first year that the conservation area was operational, &Beyond collected fees from 
tourists visiting the atoll and held those fees in trust. The fees were managed by &Beyond in 
a way that allowed the purchase of fishing equipment (Ex-manager of Mnemba Island lodge, 
personal communication, 24 March 2015). A sum of one million Tanzanian Shillings was 
paid directly to four of the local communities in 2003 and community development projects 
were implemented (Zeppel, 2006). Local fishermen who were asked about the history of 
MIMCA universally told me that they were pleased with the operation because they received 
tangible benefits from conservation and tourism (C-CL-community10-20150323:19).  
131 
 
A year after the conservation area was formed the MIMCA Authority was created by the 
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar as a management body (the MIMCA Authority is 
discussed in more detail later on). The MIMCA Authority is a division of the Department of 
Fisheries and Marine Resources in the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. The MIMCA 
authority deployed rangers with a small motor-boat to Mnemba Island and these rangers have 
been collecting fees from dive tourists visiting the atoll (MCU, 2010). Since the MIMCA 
authority began operating in this way there has been little observable governance of 
conservation and tourism on the atoll and the level of conflict between stakeholder groups has 
escalated. This chapter investigates the reasons for this escalation of conflict. &Beyond has 
attempted to help relations between stakeholders by driving governance of the atoll, but the 
process has been slow due to the complexity of the situation at hand (&Beyond-
management1-20150321:20). These complexities are considered subsequently in this chapter. 
 
Figure 13: Map of central and north Zanzibar showing Mnemba Island, approximation of MIMCA 
boundaries in 2017, and location of relevant settlements 
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6.2 Relevant Stakeholders and their Interests 
6.2.1 Coastal Communities 
There were originally five rural communities that were considered part of the MIMCA. These 
five communities are all on or near the coastline of Zanzibar and they are the ones closest to 
Mnemba Island. These were the communities that most frequently fished on the Mnemba 
atoll and included Matemwe, Mbuutende, Kigomani, Pwani Mchangane and Kiwengwa 
(Private communications with local employee at Mnemba Island lodge, 17 March 2015). 
While the research process was unfolding in the five communities mentioned above, it was 
observed that most of the residents are subsistence-based fishermen or farmers. A young man 
on the beach at Matemwe community told me, ―After finishing school there is not any job so 
you turn to fishing as your life‖ (Matem-community44-20150506:6). Much of the fishing 
occurs on near-shore reefs using small dugout canoes called Ngalawa that can be paddled and 
sailed (EcoAfrica, 2005). The fishermen use any form of equipment they can get, including 
sharpened sticks as spears, spear-guns, hand-made fish traps woven from reeds, nets, hand 
lines and reportedly dynamite on occasion (Kig-community40-20150313:3; Matem-
community51-20150502:24). Other people work as school teachers, run small shops in the 
community, or work in the tourism industry. Some women farm seaweed for sale to local 
NGOs that produce beauty products and companies that export the product to the Far East for 
use in medicines and shampoos29. Seaweed farming was once the third largest industry in 
Zanzibar producing US$ 8 million annually30. Others go out onto the inter-tidal flats at low 
tide to search for octopus, fish, shellfish, and other forms of edible sea-life that they can sell 
at the local market (Msuya, 2012). Most households try their hand at farming in order to feed 
themselves, though the soil in the north-east of Unguja is poor and there is little potential for 
agriculture there. Many households raise chickens and some families have a cow (Personal 
observations in March 2015).  
In rural Zanzibarian communities there are a variety of committees which deal with different 
aspects of daily life. Among these are the village fishermen committee; seaweed farming 
committee; environmental conservation committee; forest committee; and development 
                                                 
29 http://abeautifulperspective.com/2017/07/10/fighting-to-farm-zanzibars-seaweed-growers-face-a-changing-
climate/ 
30
 http://www.africanews.com/2016/04/27/the-bleak-future-of-zanzibar-s-seaweed-industry/ 
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committee to name a few (Gustavsson et al., 2014). Local residents participate in these 
committees and the village leader, or Sheha, is typically present in each of them. These 
committees comprise 15 people who are chosen by village members. Gustavsson et al. (2014) 
noted that the village fishermen‘s committee was developed by the Zanzibarian government 
as a way to establish community-based management of natural marine resources. The 
fishermen‘s committee chooses a representative to participate in management of the MIMCA. 
 
Figure 14: A view of Matemwe from the water (Source: Author) 
6.2.2 Tourism 
6.2.2.1 &Beyond 
As has been stated before in this thesis, &Beyond is a multinational ecotourism company. 
Their stated ethos is ―care of the land, care of the wildlife and care of the people‖ 
(www.andbeyond.com). In line with this ethos &Beyond have employed local Zanzibarian 
staff as much as has been possible.  When the research was conducted, the Mnemba Island 
lodge manager said that 87% of their lodge staff were Zanzibarians. In recognition of the 
importance of other stakeholders‘ contributions, &Beyond also hosts researchers on Mnemba 
Island. While staying on the Island it was observed that the lodge chef bought fish almost 
daily from local fishermen. 
The 33 year renewable lease for Mnemba Island was taken over by &Beyond when they 
bought a series of leases and properties from Tanzanian Cattle Products in the late 1990s. 
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Included in this sale was Klein‘s Camp which &Beyond also leases for a fee. In the case of 
Mnemba Island however the lease fees are paid to the Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar, not to a community like at Klein‘s Camp. The Mnemba Island lease was renewed 
when it was secured by &Beyond. During research at Mnemba Island in March 2015, the ex-
manager was visiting for leisure at the same time. He said that at that time they 
acknowledged that the reef and associated marine resources were in decline due to over-
fishing. In lieu of this, &Beyond sought for the atoll to be proclaimed a marine conservation 
area. The conservation status would allow the government to charge a fee of all tourists 
diving and snorkelling on the reefs and some of this funding was intended to be diverted for 
the support of viable alternative livelihoods and the purchase of offshore fishing equipment in 
local communities (Ex-manager of Mnemba Island lodge, personal communication, 24 March 
2015). This plan was set in motion when the MIMCA was gazetted in 2002. In 2003 the 
MIMCA Authority began management. The situation has been fraught with conflict since. 
The main interest &Beyond has is ensuring that the lodge occupancy remains high. Mnemba 
Island is the flagship property of &Beyond and earns the highest revenues for the company 
(Mnemba Island Lodge manager, personal communication, 15 March 2015). As such they 
aim to ensure that 1) local people gain benefit from, and have positive experiences with, 
conservation and ecotourism and 2) stakeholders work together to ensure resource 
sustainability for multiple uses in the marine conservation area (&Beyond-employee1-
20140822).  
 
Figure 15: View of Mnemba Island from the hill above Muyuni beach on Unguja, Zanzibar (Source: 
https://a.travel-assets.com/) 
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6.2.2.2 Other Tourism Operations 
There are many hotels and other tourism-related business that operate along the north-eastern 
coastline of Zanzibar. Businesses from other areas of Zanzibar also make extensive use of the 
MIMCA, in particular the Mnemba atoll (Boat captain from Matemwe, personal 
communication, 16 March 2015). Many hotels are owned and run by foreigners who settle 
permanently or semi-permanently in Zanzibar (Observed in April 2015). Many, if not all of 
these hotels and lodges, employ local people in catering for tourists. Some of these hotels 
give financial and other benefits to local communities (Matem-community46-20150506). A 
significant number of fishermen participate in tourism during the high season to improve 
their quality of life. This can include working as a formal tour guide, a driver, hotel staff, or 
an informal, non-registered tour guide. Hotels and lodges work with independent tour guides 
and drivers to stimulate local income (Gustavsson et al., 2014).  
These tourism operators have a mix of interests. Some of the foreign tourism operators on 
Unguja are concerned about marine conservation and understand that the future of their 
business is dependent on preserving biodiversity (Tourism worker 1, personal 
communication, 22 March 2015). While some local tourism operators have the same 
concerns and interests, there are also local operators who do not show concern for the 
preservation of biodiversity. On an almost daily basis in March 2015, local tourism operators 
were seen dropping anchors on live coral and fish in areas where their patrons were 
snorkelling. All of the local people spoken to during the research process had the main 
interest of feeding themselves and their families: Their main concern was for their survival on 
a daily basis (Kig-community40-20150313:14). This variety of interests makes for a complex 
set of factors affecting stakeholder relations and resource governance. 
6.2.3 Government 
The government has played a significant part in the development of marine conservation in 
Zanzibar. The most influential government body relating to the study area is the MIMCA 
Authority. There are representatives from various government departments who interact with 
the MIMCA management body. These government stakeholders are discussed below.  
6.2.3.1 MIMCA Authority 
The MIMCA Authority is a semi-autonomous management body organised by the 
Department of Fisheries and Marine Resources in the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar 
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(Gustavsson et al., 2014). The executive committee, comprised of the representatives from 
the respective village fishermen committees, is chaired by the MIMCA manager. The 
manager reports to the Marine Conservation Unit (MCU), a government body that oversees 
the implementation of marine conservation and performs marine research. The tourism fees 
collected by MIMCA rangers at the Mnemba atoll are taken into a government account from 
which money is variously assigned. The MIMCA Authority employs officials known 
colloquially as ‗rangers‘ to collect tourism fees from marine tourists visiting the Mnemba 
atoll. Rangers are selected from local communities by the MIMCA officers and they rotate 
employment at least annually (Private communications with local employee at Mnemba 
Island lodge, 17 March 2015).  
According to the draft general management plan of 2010 the goal of the MIMCA Authority is 
to ―manage the use and harvesting of marine and fisheries resources at ecological [sic] 
sustainable levels, and to manage the development of marine tourism in order to maximize 
economic benefits to the community‖ (MCU, 2010:34). Decision making by management 
officials is supported by the ICZM (Integrated Coastal-Zone Management) steering 
committee, delegated professionals, and support staff working in the conservation area. They 
are informed of concerns in local communities by fisheries officers, of which one is chosen in 
each village by the local leaders (MCU, 2010:50). 
6.2.3.2 Marine Conservation Unit 
The Marine Conservation Unit (MCU) was established in 2005 by the Department of 
Fisheries and Marine Resources in Zanzibar. The unit is given legal status and powers in the 
Fisheries Act (no.7 of 2010) to co-ordinate the management of marine conservation areas in 
Zanzibar. The MCU undertake research to influence government decision making as well as 
the development of regulations and legislation on marine resources. The MCU is responsible 
for the development, management, regulation and implementation of all activities in marine 
controlled areas (McLean et al., 2012). As a unit it is tasked to deal with various stakeholders 
and engage with local communities in marine conservation areas. The primary interest of this 
group is to ensure that marine resources are used sustainably so that high quality services can 
be provided by marine conservation areas (McLean et al., 2012).  
6.2.3.3 ICZM Committee 
The national steering committee for Integrated Coastal-Zone Management (ICZM) was 
formed in 2002. The aim of this committee is to guide district management of all human 
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activity in the coastal zone. In 2009, the Regional Coastal Management Programme of Indian 
Ocean countries, funded by the European Union, helped the ICZM steering committee to 
begin regular operational meetings and to establish district level committees31. These 
meetings were sporadic and &Beyond has sought to help the ICZM committee to hold these 
meetings twice a year by offering the Mnemba Island lodge as a venue for the meetings 
(&Beyond-employee1-20140822). These meetings have resulted in positive discussion but 
local community residents claim that little action has occurred, supposedly due to slow 
bureaucratic operations in the Zanzibarian government (Matemwe residents, personal 
communication, 22 March 2015). This committee has an interest in the MIMCA and 
discusses the declining marine resources in its meetings. Committee discussions are guided in 
large part by research conducted by the Institute of Marine Science (IMS) at the University of 
Dar es Salaam in Stonetown, Zanzibar. The MCU and the IMS are important contributors of 
knowledge to management and decision making in the MIMCA. 
6.2.4 Researchers: Institute of Marine Science 
The University of Dar es Salaam's Institute of Marine Science (IMS) was established in 
197832. Originally focused on fisheries research, the institute performs research on marine 
biology and marine resource development in Tanzania. This research is used to inform marine 
management and policy in Zanzibar so that marine ecosystems can be sustained despite 
increasing stress from climate change and increasing populations. There are also foreign 
researchers who collaborate with the institute in performing research in Zanzibar. The IMS is 
represented on the ICZM steering committee and plays a vital role in providing information 
for ICZM committee decision making.  
6.2.5 Non-Governmental Organisations 
The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar has stated that humanitarian non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are an essential tool in local social and economic development 
(Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2009). The government has stated that they aim to 
work with NGOs to improve quality of life in rural communities in Zanzibar. There are a 
number of NGOs working in Zanzibar among which are the Zanzibar Action Project, Eco and 
Culture Tours, the Makunduchi Project, the Zanzibar Outreach Program, the Africa 
                                                 
31
 www.commissionoceanindien.org 
32 ims.udsm.ac.tz/about-ims/ 
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Foundation, Jamabeco, the Paje Seawee Centre, and MarineCultures to name only a few33. It 
is stated on the webpage cited that these NGOs create opportunities for the development of 
livelihoods that are not dependent on the diminishing marine resource base in order to 
improve the quality of life for people living in Zanzibar. Some NGOs also take an interest in 
the affairs of the MIMCA because conservation action has had a direct impact on people's 
quality of life in the area. While many of these NGOs are run exclusively by foreigners, 
others are run by or in conjunction with locals (NGO employees, personal communication, 10 
March 2015). There are also NGOs such as MCAEE (Matemwe Control of HIV/Aids, 
Environment and Education) that were founded and are run entirely by locals. This NGO 
receives some funding from overseas donors. At that time, MCAEE was focused on 
employing local women to remove litter and waste in the communities (&Beyond-
employee5-20150316).  
One NGO that takes an interest in quality of life is the Africa Foundation, the development 
partner of &Beyond. The patrons of &Beyond are able to make contributions to the 
development of communities living near Mnemba Island through the Africa Foundation. With 
the support of donors, some of whom have been guests at Mnemba Island, the Foundation has 
built classrooms at a local school, provided schooling resources for various schools along the 
MIMCA coastline, drilled boreholes, and funded the establishment of Fish Aggregation 
Devices (FADs). The Foundation works in the community predominantly in an educational 
role, raising awareness on issues of natural resources conservation. 
 
                                                 
33 www.redmonkeylodge.com/projects 
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Figure 16: The researcher, second from right, having a focus group discussion with members of the 
MCAEE NGO (Source: Author) 
6.3 Natural Resources 
The marine resources of the MIMCA are of critical importance to a variety of stakeholders in 
Zanzibar. The reef system around Mnemba Island provides both a means for local fishermen 
to survive as well as stimulation for the local economy. Due to the key position of natural 
resources in local livelihoods and the local economy, stakeholders have been involved in 
conflict over ownership of, and access to, natural resources. As such, the following discussion 
about natural resources focuses on ownership, access, rules about use, actual use practices on 
the ground and the current state of resources in the MIMCA. Conflict regarding these topics 
is discussed throughout. Conflict about these resources is discussed as a common thread 
throughout. Important codes that contributed to this sub-section include natural resources, 
access to, appropriate management structures, change, dependence on, education/awareness 
on, human impact on,  management, overuse, ownership, poaching, and use/harvesting.  
6.3.1 Ownership of Natural Resources 
Ownership has not been a contentious issue in the case of Mnemba Island. This is because the 
ownership of the island is legally clear: the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar owns the 
land. The island, along with the no-go zone around it, is leased from the Department of 
Fisheries and Marine Resources, a division of the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, 
Livestock and Fisheries. Fees are paid directly to government. This ownership is stated in the 
lease agreement and it is understood from the fact that the atoll forms part of a marine 
conservation area. According to the law, the island is state land.  
When people in local communities were asked about ownership of Mnemba Island, there was 
a mixture of responses about ownership of the island. The issue of ownership was framed 
legally and historically. When asked who owns the island the reef around it, some said ―it 
belongs to the community of Matemwe, and all the other communities along this coast‖ (C-
CL-community10-20150323:1) while another said ―we know the owner is the government‖ 
(Kig-community40-20150313:11). Who the owner of Mnemba Island actually is believed to 
be by local people was found to be less important than their consistent concern about the 
benefits from tourism. Only 7 of the participants from communities in the MIMCA said that 
the communities own Mnemba Island. Instead, people more frequently wanted to discuss 
tourism, and the financial opportunities stemming from it, than the legal ownership of 
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resources. Thus it was that some local people chose to frame ownership of the Mnemba Atoll 
using culture and history: it has been one of the only ways for them to claim rightful 
ownership of the benefits stemming from tourism. 
6.3.2 Natural Resource Management 
The MIMCA authority is the legally assigned management body for the conservation area 
(MCU, 2010). This authority was set up in 2002 but participants have stated that there has 
been little in the way of observable management of natural resources in the conservation area. 
Most recently a committee has been organised to help the MIMCA Authority manage 
conservation. It is called the Integrated Coastal Zone Management committee and consists of 
representatives from various departments in government, the IMS, the MCU, researchers at 
the University of Dar es Salaam in Stonetown, &Beyond management, and representatives of 
local communities. Participants expressed mixed opinions about the effectiveness of this 
committee. One tourism operator posed the question: 
So this committee was set up by government and will it actually go anywhere? Well it could have 
been set up as lip service by government so that the World Bank sees they are doing something for 
conservation, etc. But they might actually have woken up. My feeling is that they are conservation 
minded (&Beyond-employee1-20140822:15). 
In addition to the ICZM committee, in 2010 a Draft General Management Plan for the 
conservation area was published by the Marine Consrvation Unit (MCU, 2010). A completed 
plan has not materialised since then. Participants report that despite this draft plan, there 
remains little observable management of the natural marine resources in the MIMCA. One 
employee in the tourism industry said that there is ―a lot of talk and a lot of meetings, but 
nothing is really happening‖ (&Beyond-management1-20150321:31). Over 30 of the 
participants form 5 local fishing communities said they were not aware of the plan and they 
frequently stated that they knew little or nothing about any management. This raises concerns 
about power in the communities, representation of community members, accountability, and 
transparency.  
The lack of visible management has raised concerns about conservation for tourism 
stakeholders. An employee of the tourism industry on the north-east coast of Unguja who 
declined to be recorded said his observation was that most tourism operators felt were unsure 
of the government‘s ability to monitor sensitive parts of the conservation area that were in 
decline (Tourism worker 1, personal communication, 22 March 2015). Employees of 
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&Beyond had ideas about how to improve management of the MIMCA, including higher 
fees, tourism stakeholders being tasked to police resource use, improved monitoring 
(&Beyond-employee1-20140822), and a formalized process for entering the conservation 
area (This was discussed at the ICZM meeting on 22 August 2014). The manager of the 
Mnemba Island lodge likened his experience in Borneo to the circumstances in Zanzibar: 
You could limit people by bringing the fee up. I've always said the $3 is way too low. If it was $50 
a day we could handle it. It will limit the pressure on this reef. Like in SA if you want a shit hot 
game experience you go to a private reserve and you pay. So here you can create the difference… 
where I worked in Borneo you had a limited number of permits and you paid $100 per day and the 
military patrolled it. And they could do that here but the government is so slow (&Beyond-
employee1-20140822:37). 
Other tourism operators were concerned about the lack of government involvement, but some 
did not think that the government was capable of improving the state of management affairs 
in the MIMCA (Tourism worker 1, personal communication, 22 March 2015). The general 
interest among operators in the tourism industry in Zanzibar was the preservation of reef 
systems on the Mnemba Atoll, but there was a lack of consensus about how this could be 
realistically achieved. Opinions varied between a ―fences and fines‖ model and visions of an 
integrated, sustainable, multiple-use system (Tourism worker 1, personal communication, 22 
March 2015). 
Some of the local people had their own ideas about managing the natural resources of the 
MIMCA that they had seen being put in place in other marine conservation areas: 
Like they do at Chwaka bay sometimes they close one place and open another place. So we can 
get an idea from them, some of them they can go out we don't want to see them here but just for 
the old men, they can fish here this year and there next year, and the young people can go out 
(&Beyond-employee2-20150316:33). 
Along with ideas about management of resource access and resources harvesting, 5 of 
tourism workers agreed that without viable alternatives to the current set of livelihoods any 
management scheme was unlikely to succeed. As one participant implied, this denotes the 
importance of a focus on the community and how they use marine resources: 
In five years, it (fish stocks) will be even less than it is today? 
Yes 
Then how can we fix these problems? 
We can fix these problems to the community (Mbuu-community56-20150502:26). 
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6.3.3 Access to Natural Resources 
Natural marine resources occurring in the MIMCA are the primary focus of local subsistence 
livelihoods along the north-eastern coastline of Unguja Island, Zanzibar. It was observed that 
most people living in communities along this coastline engage in marine livelihoods of one 
form or another. Access to natural resources is thus critical to many people‘s survival. While 
there are rules regarding natural resource use, access to resources is not controlled and 
problems have developed relating to the health and status of marine resources. The Mnemba 
Island lodge manager described the situation as a ―free for all‖ and explained that the 
situation would not be sustainable over the long term (&Beyond-management1-
20150321:34). When asked about the possibility of restricting local access to the MIMCA, he 
said: 
That is a terrible idea. It wouldn't work of course because you can't police that whole area but 
you also can't take that resource away from people… These people are extremely poor and they 
are not going to just sit on their hands. It's fight or die (&Beyond-management1-20150321:33). 
All of the study participants recognised that local fishermen have had access to the Mnemba 
Atoll for hundreds of years and that fishing access needs to be maintained, albeit in a 
structured and managed way. Suggestions have been made about managing access but little 
has been achieved operationally (&Beyond-management1-20150321:38). Rules about 
resource access and use have been established, but not many of the fishermen could tell me 
precisely what they are. Despite these rules, daily life continues. As was correctly observed 
by the manager quoted above, the local residents do not just ‗sit on their hands‘: they fish to 
survive. The fishermen could give almost no information about any rules that existed 
regarding marine resource use or rules that the Marine Conservation Unit (MCU) had 
developed for the MIMCA (MCU, 2010). Information about rules relating to natural resource 
access and use had to be found by speaking to employees in the tourism industry and reading 
the Draft General Management Plan of the MIMCA. These rules for natural resource access 
and use are discussed below. 
6.3.3.1 Rules about Natural Resources 
There were no observable rules relating to natural resource use developed by the five key 
communities living within the MIMCA. Members of these communities could not relate any 
rules that had been developed by community members or leaders. As was stated clearly by 
one of the fishermen in an informal community gathering: 
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For this community here there are not any kind of rules making us to stop or be careful when we 
go to the sea (Kig-community40-20150313:2). 
That does not mean that there are no rules at all relating to natural resource use, but most of 
the fishermen from local communities could not state any rule relating to their fishing in the 
MIMCA. One fisherman did admit to hearing about rules for fishing equipment on the radio 
(Kig-community40-20150313:29). Some fishermen did acknowledge that the government 
had developed a rule system for marine resource access and usage but only one of the local 
fishermen was able to relate any rules for resource use in the MIMCA that had been 
developed by government: 
It is not allowed for the fishermen to go fish where the tourists go, where they swim. Also we are 
not allowed to put any trap. There is no trap or fishermen fishing there in the tourists area 
(Matem-leader1-20150502:13). 
Few residents of the local communities acknowledged that the government had developed 
any rules at all. Half of those that did were in leadership positions. It could not be ascertained 
if this was a tactic used by fishermen to avoid rules, but it is possible that the necessity of 
fishing for their survival forces them to ignore any rules that would regulate their natural 
resource use. Fishermen from the local coastal communities surmised that fishing is the only 
way to make money and thus they cannot be bound by regulations on their only income 
generating activity primarily because there are no alternatives: 
Even MIMCA asking many questions about why I am there, why I am doing like this… we do 
whatever we can in the ocean to make money. So there is not any kind of rule (Kig-community40-
20150313:2). 
The rules developed by the Marine Conservation Unit (MCU) in their development of the 
Draft General Management Plan of 2010 were supposedly developed after consultation with 
stakeholders (MCU, 2010). It is thus worth noting that most fishermen could not relate any 
rules relating to resource use. Rules relating to the extraction of living resources specify what 
equipment is prohibited and what types of organisms cannot be killed (types of marine 
species, coral, and Mangrove). They also prohibit the extraction of certain non-living 
resources like sand, salt, and dead coral. There are rules relating to tourism in that docking 
facilities cannot be developed and jet skis, marine curios, and sport fishing are prohibited 
(MCU, 2010).  
Zoning regulations have been proposed by the Marine Conservation Unit after consultation 
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with various stakeholders, but little has been implemented as discussed below (MCU, 2010). 
There are four types of zone: Core, Specified Use, General Use, and Buffer. Only the Core 
and Specified Use zones had actually been assigned. The General Use zone was assigned as 
all other areas that were not assigned to be Core or Specified Use zones. There were no 
observable Buffer zones. Core zones were designated where sensitive resources needed 
protection and monitoring would be used to evaluate future modification of these zones 
(MCU, 2010). As such, all fishing is prohibited in Core zones of the MIMCA and only 
artisanal fishers are allowed in specified use zones. Permits can be issued for sport fishing 
and all local fishermen are supposed to be issued a permit according to the Draft General 
Management Plan (MCU, 2010). Local people were unaware of the need for fishing permits. 
They similarly had no knowledge of the zoning system. There has been a severe lack of 
information sharing from government about fisheries and conservation management. During 
my visits to Mnemba Island in 2014 and 2015, subsistence fishing was observed in core and 
specified use zones. Increasing distance from the island was related to increasing frequently 
of fishing in core zones. Few fishermen operated at the House Reef due to the proximity with 
the island. It could not be ascertained whether or not they did this because of knowledge of 
rules or because &Beyond boat captains would tell fishermen to leave the reef (Mnemba 
Island lodge employee, personal communication, 18 March 2015).  
Rules about natural resource use have largely not been followed. Among the fishermen 
spoken to, no permits were found to have been issued and fishing in prohibited areas has 
reportedly not been monitored. There was little observable compliance enforcement in the 
MIMCA. When it did occur, it was done by &Beyond employees (Mnemba Island lodge 
employee, personal communication, 18 March 2015). This monitoring and enforcement by 
&Beyond has been a source of conflict with some of the local fishermen, roughly two thirds 
of them mentioning it explicitly. The Draft General Management Plan did state that 
―implementation of the management strategies as outlined in this plan will be effective to 
curb illegal activities in the MIMCA only when law enforcement team [sic] are highly visible 
on site‖ (MCU, 2010:54). This visible presence was stated to include regular patrols on land 
and sea. This presence was not observed. The lack of policing prohibited activities has 
negatively impacted tourism stakeholders‘ perceptions of government (&Beyond-
management1-20150321:23). 
The manager of the &Beyond Mnemba Island lodge spoke about the lack of compliance in 
one of the core zones (which he referred to as the special zone): 
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One of the things it says in the fisheries act is that here is supposed to be no fishing, boating or 
mooring [on the House Reef]. Right now there is a lot which will vary in times of year (&Beyond-
management1-20150321:39). 
The main problem that most local fishermen have with rules developed by the government, 
when they were known, and their reason for not complying with these rules is that there are 
no alternatives to some of the prohibited activities (Kig-community40-20150313:26). One 
local working in the tourism industry spoke about the lack of alternative livelihoods: 
They have rules, but they are not strong and they can't stick with those rules because they don't 
have anything to give them. If you stop me to do something, can you show me another way to do 
(&Beyond-employee2-20150316:5). 
He was of the opinion that compliance would only occur when people had alternatives to the 
prohibited activities. Poverty appeared to be the reason that, for example, people took any 
sized octopus they find (NGO-employee8-20150504:25). While I could not find any 
regulations or laws from the government about the minimum size octopus that could be 
extracted, some of the people collecting Octopus said that in the past they would leave small 
octopus on the reef to develop (NGO-employee8-20150504:27). This is no longer the case. 
Poverty is the reason that people use drift nets and purse-seine nets. Without viable 
alternatives, poverty has driven local people to use any means possible to extract marine 
resources and rules have thus not been complied with.  
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Figure 17: Typical catch for a day, at Muyuni beach, Unguja, Zanzibar. These fish are all less than 
20cm in length. The red Lutjanus argentimaculatus are juveniles of the species and the dark Stegastes 
nigricans are sexually mature adults (Source: Author). 
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Figure 18: A seaweed farming plot at Nungwi outside the boundaries of the MIMCA, on the north-
western coast of Unguja, Zanzibar where this practice is more successful (Source: Author) 
6.3.4 State of Natural Resources 
Mnemba Island is surrounded by a ring of hard coral. This coral occurs at a variety of depths 
presenting a diversity of habitats not witnessed in other reef systems around Zanzibar 
(EcoAfrica, 2005). The atoll is an important habitat for a wide variety of marine life (Nangle 
and Sheng, 2010). There is a shallow lagoon within the atoll that varies between tides from 
bare sand at low tide to several meters deep at high tide. The north-eastern coastline of 
Unguja Island, Zanzibar is comparatively devoid of life. The reefs there are no longer vibrant 
as at the Mnemba Atoll and the water is polluted with traces of human waste. 
Many community members acknowledged that there were less fish today than there had been 
even 10 years ago. One of the fishermen thought that this was because of the growing number 
of fishermen and not decreasing fish populations (Kig-community40-20150313:45). He said 
that the catch is significant as a whole but is less significant for individuals because of the 
growing numbers of fishermen. Whatever their belief was about the reasons for decreasing 
yields, almost all the fishermen agreed that the fishing yield was diminishing. All of the 
fishermen who discussed marine resource decline said that they were forced to use the same 
areas for fishing because of a lack of vessels to take them to deeper waters, and this pattern of 
repeated use was leading to over-use: 
One hundred years ago until now, the fishermen are using one place. There is no other place for 
using local tools. If you use one place for every day then the fish become less (Matem-leader1-
20150502:33). 
This pattern was not only seen in the fish populations around the Mnemba Atoll, but also in 
the yield of other edible catches in the MIMCA. A representative of a local NGO called 
MCAEE (Matemwe Control for HIV/AIDS, Education and Environment) said about octopus 
that: 
Many years ago the main people take octopus around the villages, nearly in each area; but now 
they are going far away. You can walk five hours and haven't any one octopus. And the fishermen 
sometimes get fish and sometimes not fish because they are reducing the fish. They number of the 
fish has come down and the population for the fishermen has come up. And many of them when 
they are finished with the water they throw the bottle into the water. Sometimes they are throwing 
the taka-taka into the ocean (&Beyond-employee2-20150316:35). 
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Environmental conditions were not always sanitary. Many people working along the 
shoreline use the beaches of north-eastern Unguja as a latrine. The natural environment was 
perceived to be a sink which could absorb waste. Local NGO workers said that the 
Zanzibarian people throw their taka-taka (litter) anywhere: the ocean, the roadside, or the 
beach. First-hand observation proved that these reports were correct. 
Utilisation practices were sometimes damaging to natural resources in the MIMCA. Similarly 
to Nangle and Sheng (2010), it was observed that parts of the atoll are being damaged by 
poor utilisation practices. These include, but are not limited to anchors damaging the coral, 
tourists and fishermen walking on the coral at low tide, and over-fishing. Through these 
damaging practices, both the tourism industry and local fishermen have been putting pressure 
on the atoll ecology. Ferrol-Schulte, Ferse and Glaser (2014) and Rotarou (2013) argue that 
tourism is a cause of some environmental decline in Zanzibar. Stakeholders who frequently 
use the Mnemba reefs have witnessed that tourism related activities have damaged coral on 
the atoll (&Beyond-employee2-20150316:24). Anchor related coral damage was observed in 
several distinct areas at a popular snorkelling reef. These results align with those of others 
who found that tourism-related activities can damage the environment (Nangle & Sheng, 
2010; Rotarou, 2013).  
Moreover, it is not only tourism that is impacting the ecology of this atoll. Indiscriminate 
fishing and its negative side-effects are also playing a part. It has been reported by 
professional divers who frequent the area that the reef system on the atoll is missing a 
significant population of reef sharks which fulfil a specific predatory function in the 
ecosystem (Communications with professional divers working on Mnemba Atoll, 10-23 
March 2015). These professional divers noted that sightings of reef sharks are fairly 
infrequent, estimated at one in twenty dives. Said divers have also stated that preferential 
fishing of herbivorous fish has led to the increased growth of algae on the reef choking hard 
coral growth (Dive master at Mnemba Island lodge, personal communication, 12 March 
2015). Sea urchins feed on this algae and where they were observed in high numbers 
herbivorous fish were found to be missing, along with most other reef fish species. On certain 
parts of the House Reef on Mnemba Island‘s north-western shore where species in the 
Parrotfish group were missing, an unusually high number of sea urchins were also observed 
confirming the reports of professional divers.  
Another of the environmental impacts of over-utilisation was that in the last four years 
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professional divers have estimated a 10 to 15% decrease in the number of schooling fish seen 
in the waters around Mnemba Island (Dive master at Mnemba Island lodge, personal 
communication, 12 March 2015). Gill nets were observed around the Mnemba Atoll and 
professional divers working in the conservation area reported that they had seen marine life 
as large as turtles caught in the netting. These claims of marine ecosystem decline have been 
corroborated by independent benthic studies of some of the reefs around Mnemba Island 
(Johansen and Kennedy, 2014; LaPlante, 2014). 
6.4 Stakeholder Relations 
Since the inception of the Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area, stakeholders have 
interacted over natural resources by co-operating and sharing the benefits of conservation and 
tourism. The manner and degree of co-operation has changed over time, as have the benefits 
shared between stakeholders. Co-operative arrangements between stakeholders are discussed. 
The way in which power is framed by stakeholders is shown to be linked to stakeholder 
interactions and the level of social capital that exists in stakeholder relations. These links are 
discussed in order to understand drivers of social capital in this case. 
6.4.1 Co-operation 
The development of the Draft General Management Plan (Marine Conservation Unit, 2010) 
for the marine conservation area has been guided by the Fisheries Policy of 2000, the 
Environment Policy of 1992, and the Tourism Policy of 2004. These policies are legal 
mechanisms that provide guidelines for resource management and tourism development in 
Zanzibar. As a whole, they promote collaborative management and the development of local 
rule systems whereby natural resource use in the MIMCA can be sustainably managed. They 
state that community participation is a key tool in the development and implementation of 
these sustainable systems. In the National Environmental Policy for Zanzibar (1992:3), the 
Minister of Water, Construction, Energy, Lands and Environment Salim Hashim Rajab stated 
that government ―must also reach out to the people of Zanzibar, motivating as wide a range of 
people as possible to join the movement towards better environmental management.‖ Due to 
the importance of collaboration in the management of the MIMCA, factors influencing 
collaboration were investigated in this study. Topics that were most important to participants, 
including those not originally appearing in the study, were included in further discussions 
with other participants. The results of this investigation into the nature of collaboration in the 
MIMCA are discussed below. 
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6.4.1.1 Communication 
The Draft General Management Plan states that ―stakeholders should be consulted on a 
regular basis and in a structured fashion to increase the feedback that the MIMCA receives‖ 
(MCU, 2010:61). Despite this mandate, the MIMCA has been plagued by communication 
issues since the managing authority was first organised. One of the most frequently 
mentioned problems that community members raised in our discussions with them was a lack 
of communication from government about benefits arising from tourism to the MIMCA 
(&Beyond-employee1-20140822). Nobody from any stakeholder group was able to say what 
was being done with the fees collected from tourists diving or snorkelling around Mnemba 
Island. A lack of communication is not just a problematic part of relations between 
government and communities: there was little or no communication between any stakeholder 
groups and little communication within stakeholder groups. For example, residents not 
involved in communities within the MIMCA told me that they felt isolated from their leaders, 
and employees in the tourism industry told me that the tourism industry is ―very fragmented 
and disenchanted‖ (Tourism employee 2, personal communication, 21 March 2015). In 
summary, the manager of a lodge said that ―right now there is just no dialogue at all… there 
is no unified voice or communication between stakeholders‖ (&Beyond-management1-
20150321:25). 
The lack of open communication has contributed to a state of passive conflict between 
stakeholders. A tourism operator said that ―conflict comes from lack of knowledge‖ and that 
―without crystal clear communication… people will always be asking questions about how 
and where the money gets spent‖ (Tourism employee 2, personal communication, 21 March 
2015). One employee of a tourist operation said that when he asked the government questions 
about fees collected by MIMCA Authorities from dive and snorkel tourists, certain influential 
people told him to stop (tourism-employee-20140822:8). This lack of open communication 
has contributed to a general feeling of enmity between stakeholders. 
6.4.1.2 Partnerships 
By contrast with that, two of the community members who participated in this study felt side-
lined by hotels operating on the north-eastern coastline of Zanzibar because of a lack of 
support for local entrepreneurs (Matem-community51-20150502:16). Their claim was that 
these hotels did not frequently buy fish and vegetables from the local people. One young man 
told of how he had tried to grow vegetables and sell them to the local hotels but his business 
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had failed because his supply was not as reliable as those farmers from areas with better soil 
and more rainfall (Matem-community51-20150502:16). Gustavsson et al. (2014) point out 
that hotels and lodges often do not operate at the village scale. They buy fish at larger 
markets due to high demand and supply concerns with local fishermen and farmers on the 
north-eastern coast. The produce of local suppliers is not as large or is not as readily available 
as the supply at larger markets in the capital Stonetown. There are some exceptions to this 
trend however, where it was observed that the &Beyond lodge on Mnemba Island buys 
freshly caught fish daily from the fishermen that pass the Mnemba as they return to Unguja 
from deeper waters. 
Very little collaboration between tourism operators and NGOs was observed. The negative 
perceptions that community members have of some foreign tourism operators is that they 
have no concern for local people or their quality of life (Matem-community51-20150502:16). 
The lack of partnership between tourism operators and charitable NGOs likely bolsters this 
negative perception, whereas simple partnerships in which tourism operators encourage their 
patrons to get involved in charitable developments in communities (like the partnership 
between &Beyond and the Africa Foundation) could change these negative perceptions of 
foreign tourism operators.  
 
Figure 19: Cooks from the Mnemba Island lodge weigh local catch outside the lodge kitchen before 
paying the fishermen (Source: Author) 
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6.4.1.3 Accountability 
Some stakeholders have made the claim that the conservation area is ineffective. A foreigner 
working in the tourism industry said the general feeling is that this is due to a lack of 
transparency about the money collected by the MIMCA rangers (Tourism worker 2, personal 
communications, 2 May 2015). In addition, some community members claim there is little 
transparency or accountability in community leaders' financial dealings with hotels and 
NGOs (Matem-community46-20150506). During one of my visits to Kijini village, one of the 
fishermen told me about a sum of five million Tanzanian Shillings that a certain local lodge 
had given to the village as a gift at the end of 2014. He said that these leaders had not been 
held to account about the way in which this money was spent and the local people had not 
seen any benefit from this bestowal. This individual did not seem to know where the money 
was, while others did not know about it at all (Matem-community46-20150506:14). 
In one example that demonstrates a lack of accountability, it was reported by Gustavsson et 
al. (2014:96-97) that one boat, one engine and twelve nets have been given out since the 
inception of the conservation area but since this time no benefits are known to have been 
distributed. According to a well-known boat captain from one of the participating villages, 
this equipment was to be used in a rotational scheme where fishermen were able to share the 
boat and netting (Boat captain from Matemwe, personal communication, 16 March 2015). 
This boat captain also reported that the equipment was taken over by local elites who did not 
share the equipment with other villagers. Not long after the equipment was purchased, the 
MIMCA fee collection scheme was taken over by the independent MIMCA Authority. 
Following the establishing of this authority, the rotation scheme for boat use never happened, 
and additional promised equipment never materialised due to the changing circumstances of 
financial management (Boat captain from Matemwe, personal communication, 16 March 
2015). Due to the perceived lack of benefit sharing, and accountability over management of 
benefits, most stakeholders showed mistrust for foreign business operators, their local 
leaders, and government. Those with the desire to hold authorities to account did not have the 
power to do so.  
6.4.1.4 Barriers to Co-operation 
A worker in the tourism industry said that tourism operators were upset that MIMCA rangers 
did not appear to be policing illegal fishing on the atoll (Tourism worker 1, personal 
communication, 22 March 2015). During visits to the marine conservation area, fishing was 
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observed taking place in restricted areas on the atoll but the rangers did not go out in their 
boat to speak with the fishermen. In similar circumstances, fishermen seen using illegal 
fishing equipment but they were not apprehended by the MIMCA rangers. They were 
however, visited by a local Zanzibarian tourism operator in his boat, and this boat captain told 
the fishermen to leave the area immediately (Boat captain from Matemwe, personal 
communication, 16 March 2015). 
Due to the difficulties that authorities have with policing illegal fishing on the Mnemba atoll, 
some tourism operators trust neither the MIMCA managing authorities nor local government. 
They also told me that because of what they perceived to be an ineffective use of MIMCA 
tourism fees, local communities do not trust government (Personal communications with 
tourism operators, 10-28 March 2015). This lack of trust supposedly leads local fishermen to 
fish indiscriminately on the atoll (&Beyond-employee2-20150316:57).  
A lack of access to technology may have also hindered progress in co-operative management. 
The Draft General Management Plan for the MIMCA states that with regard to the zoning 
areas in the conservation area, ―a system should be developed based on GIS which is linked 
to a website for easily [sic] access to and interaction with by stakeholders‖ (MCU, 2010:60). 
Given the context, this solution to stakeholder participation and information access is flawed 
because there is not enough access to the internet among local people that an online system 
could be warranted. This idea shows that the draft management plan has had a largely top-
down approach to development – residents repeatedly said that they want to engage with 
government face-to-face but it has not happened. Fishermen generally lamented the lack of 
government input into their lives and they typically had problems with the interactions they 
did have. One example is the confiscation of illegal fishing equipment, a practice that is 
perpetuating damaging resource-use practices due to the lack of alternative livelihoods. 
6.4.2 Benefit Sharing 
Benefits from conservation and tourism in the MIMCA occur in two main streams: 
environmental and financial benefits. Financial benefits can be direct or indirect – where the 
former would be payments the latter would be development funding. In the case of 
environmental benefits, conservation management can improve environmental health. 
Additionally, the resulting tourism yields financial income. The main environmental benefit 
of the MIMCA should be improved health of marine ecosystems, but there has been a general 
lack of environmental management conservation area. Due to this lack of management, 
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damaging resource use practices take place and the state of marine resources is in decline. 
While fishing yields could be steady or increasing because of the impact of the conservation 
area, yields have been reported by fishermen to be in decline. The only observable 
environmental benefit occurring because of the marine conservation area has been a decrease 
in the rate of ecosystem decline at the House Reef.  
6.4.2.1 Government 
Financial benefits occurring from tourism can be received from government. Fees from 
tourists visiting the conservation area have been collected by government officials. There has 
been little accountability regarding the use of these funds. The Draft General Management 
Plan discusses some of the financial benefits arising from tourism to the conservation area: 
A fee of US$ 1 per person per day started being charged to tourists visiting MIMCA in 
March/April 2003. This fee has subsequently been increased to US$ 3.... In days during the high 
season between June and March there may be up to 300 people visiting the reef, the preferred 
areas being the House Reef and Kichwani (MCU, 2010:27). 
The fee remained US$3 in 2015. According to the Marine Conservation Unit (2010), there are 
in excess of 50,000 tourists visiting the Mnemba Atoll each year. This amounts to a potential 
income of US$150,000 annually. In the 2016 high season the number of tourists to Zanzibar 
had reportedly tripled in a year28 and this could potentially increase the income for the 
MIMCA authority. This number of people warrants a serious management plan to prevent 
environmental damage and could be used to raise a significant income for local stakeholders.  
There was some speculation by tourism operators about where these fees go or how they are 
used but none of the participants had any information on this topic (Tourism worker 1, 
personal communication, 22 March 2015). All agreed that the lack of transparency and 
accountability from government had caused problems in stakeholder relations (&Beyond-
management1-20150321:25). The Draft General Management Plan was the only source that 
could be found which gave some information about how fees would be managed and used. 
With respect to the fees collected from tourists, the plan states that direct payments would not 
be made but rather financial support would be available for development: 
Seventy percent of the revenue raised is retained for the management activities of MIMCA and 
30% is retained and granted to the local communities to support development programme as a 
form of benefit sharing (MCU, 2010:50-51). 
Despite the statement in this plan, it was reported repeatedly to me by community members 
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that there had been no government support of local development (Kig-community40-
20150313:27). One of the most commonly heard complaints made by local people was that 
there has been no benefit from MIMCA (Mbuu-community56-20150502:22). No distinction 
was made whether or not this statement was about government or private entities. While 2 
leaders in local communities did state that the communities received benefits from the 
MIMCA, they could not precisely say what these benefits were (Matem-leader1-
20150502:27). One oddity in the quote above is that on page 50 of the draft management plan 
it is stated that 30% of funds are reserved for community development, while on page 51 it 
states that the percentage of funds to be made available for community development is still 
being negotiated. Which of these statements is true could not be ascertained from government 
officials, but local people did confirm that the percentage agreed to in 2002 was 30% 
(&Beyond-employee2-20150316:40).  
There was generally a lack of knowledge about funding opportunities for local development 
in communities situated on the coastline of the marine conservation area. One example was 
the government operated Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project 
(MACEMP). In 2005, the MACEMP received US$60 million from the World Bank and 
MIMCA was a beneficiary of this funding (MCU, 2010). This initiative was intended to 1) 
extend the MIMCA boundaries to join other marine conservation areas and form a network 
around Zanzibar and 2) fund sustainable livelihood projects in under-resourced communities, 
among which are the coastal communities in the MIMCA. While some livelihood projects 
reportedly did receive funding around Zanzibar and there were measurable benefits to natural 
resource based livelihoods during project implementation, the overall outcome of this project 
remains unclear (Msuya, 2012; Yussuf, 2013). The MACEMP project and the associated 
US$ 60 million was something that none of the local people had heard about. None of the 
participants in this research reported knowing any people who benefited from this initiative. 
6.4.2.2 Tourism 
With regard to managing the conservation area, an &Beyond director said that sharing 
benefits with local communities is a vital part of their responsibility to engage local 
stakeholders:  
We also don't need to only look at the environmental aspect. We need to look at the social aspect: 
what are the benefits? [There are] whole other aspects as well (&Beyond-employee1-
20140822:16). 
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Benefits have been shared by businesses operating in the tourism industry. These financial 
benefits have been both direct and indirect, channelled through social development. As 
mentioned previously there have been direct financial payments from hotels in the area, such 
as the 5 million shillings paid by a hotel to Kijini village leaders, and there have been local 
development projects funded by hotels or patrons of hotels. In addition to this, &Beyond has 
spent in excess of US$5000 per month purchasing local produce and fish (Zeppel, 2006). It 
was observed that fishermen would stop on Mnemba Island daily when returning from deeper 
waters, selling some of their catch to the lodge kitchen. There are other hotels along this 
coastline that engage in similar practice of procuring local produce.  
There has also been a flow of indirect financial benefits in the form of local social and 
infrastructural development. The Africa Foundation has been able to promote local 
development and gather funding for projects from patrons of the Mnemba Island lodge. From 
the start of operations in 1999 until 2005, the Foundation managed to gather US$40,000 in 
donations for building infrastructure including clinic rooms, classrooms, drilling wells, and 
placing fish aggregation devices in deep water around the Mnemba Atoll (Zeppel, 2006). 
When this research took place, employees of &Beyond and the Africa Foundation 
acknowledged that little funding had been donated recently: The group sustainability 
manager of &Beyond said that he felt the Foundation was not doing enough to help local 
communities (&Beyond sustainability manager, personal communication, 21 August 2015).  
 Figure 20: A view of the MIMCA coastline at Matemwe beach on Unguja, Zanzibar with Mnemba 
Island in the background. The orange-topped boats are owned by tourism operators (Source: Author) 
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6.4.3 The Power Landscape 
Power in Zanzibar is vested in the people, as is the case in Tanzania at large. The community 
is able to choose their leadership by voting for them. This follows the model organised by 
Julius Nyerere that the government, from national to village level, is to be in the service of 
the people34. Despite this ideal, the government and community leadership maintain a balance 
of power that is greater than that of ordinary community members (Kig-community41-
20150506:8). Local government has the mandate to engage with local people, but little 
engagement happens between the government and the public (Kig-community41-
20150506:6; Mbuu-community56-20150502:21). The reasons for this imbalance in power, 
and the impact it has had, are discussed in the following sections on how stakeholders frame 
power in resource management and how power is exerted between and within those 
stakeholder groups in the MIMCA. 
6.4.3.1 Framing Power 
As mentioned previously in this thesis, power frames are an analytical tool used in describing 
the ways in which stakeholders legitimise power in a conflict (Rurai, 2012). These 
evaluations can be used to influence others. Understanding the way that people frame power 
in a conflict situation is an important part in describing the way that stakeholders maintain 
(and exert) power between and within stakeholder groups. Important codes that contributed to 
an understanding of how power has been framed included power, community, government, in 
management, in the community, side-lined, and government, assuming authority. A total of 62 
quotes were useful here. 
All the participants in this study admitted that the balance of power rested with the 
government, at national and local level. National legislation is a guiding influence in the way 
that people talk about natural resource management and use. During a meeting with the 
ICZM committee on 22 August 2014, government officials said that people were not obeying 
the law in using illegal fishing equipment and fishing in protected areas. Local fishermen will 
similarly admit that some of what they do is illegal, but they will simultaneously ask what 
alternatives there are (Kig-community43-20150506:27). Those who would speak against 
illegal fishing do so in the name of the law while local people question how they can survive 
without breaking the law. The most obvious framing of power occurs with the law. It exists to 
                                                 
34 http://www.tamisemi.go.tz/menu_data/About_us/Our_History/History-of-Local-Government-In-Tanzania.pdf 
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control resource access and use so that resources can be managed sustainably. Despite this the 
law has not been used as a successful frame of power. Inadequate compliance enforcement 
and a lack of development intervention have resulted in a blatant disregard for environmental 
law in Zanzibar.  
The tourism industry has little power to affect resource use using the law. An incident 
involving &Beyond on the Mnemba Atoll demonstrates the power vested in fishermen 
because of their poverty and their drive to survive: 
Some dive boats rocked up here and asked for help in getting rid of two big fishing boats that were 
using big nets over the reef, and there were divers down there. They were telling us to go get them 
(the nets) up but we just had to say ―we're not the police‖ and it created a huge tension on the reef 
(&Beyond-employee1-20140822:11). 
Tourism stakeholders used the law as a reference in attempting to get &Beyond to remove 
illegal fishing nets from the atoll, but representatives of &Beyond recognised the complexity 
of this situation and chose to refrain from removing the fishermen‘s livelihood from them 
(&Beyond-employee1-20140822). Firstly, &Beyond is attempting to bring about change 
without conflict and secondly, they had recognised that ―people would not just sit on their 
hands‖ (&Beyond-management1-20150321:33) if they were to remove the netting. Stated 
more explicitly, such an intervention in local marine-based livelihoods could increase the 
level of conflict between stakeholders.  
As demonstrated in this case, the human instinct to survive is far greater than the desire to 
operate within established legal principles. One employee in the tourism industry said that for 
local people, ―its fight or die‖ (&Beyond-management1-20150321:33). Many of the 
fishermen that participated in this study said that they had no alternative to using illegal 
fishing equipment. They eat and sell whatever they can catch. The need to survive was by far 
the most important framing of power in this case. It was an over-riding factor that dominated 
much of the conversation that was had with local people. If faced with the law, the common 
rejoinder was that survival is more important. In the meeting ICZM, other stakeholder groups 
had no solution for this except acknowledging that it is a problematic situation. 
Fishermen from the MIMCA coastline also assert their right to the region and its resources 
through virtue of their generational existence in the area. Local people claim their right to be 
in the marine conservation area because they have always been there, long before the 
conservation came to exist. It is because of this power that they have, which is power based 
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on their traditional existence, that the MIMCA draft management plan was devised with 
sustainable use in mind (MCU, 2010). It is because of this power frame that tourism 
stakeholders admit that those resources cannot be taken away from people (&Beyond-
employee1-20140822:14). Similar to the power of survival, traditional existence has been 
used as a way to frame power and influence stakeholder interactions. 
The influence of culture is also an important frame of power that exists implicitly. One 
example of the pervasive influence of culture was shared by a young man near the fish 
market in Kigomani: he said that people from his generation have been trying to get involved 
in politics but because ―they are young they don't get to talk as much or participate in the 
[community] meetings‖ (Matem-community46-20150506:17). It is not overtly spoken of, but 
I observed the impact of culture in the interactions that people have with their elected leaders. 
The traditional societal structure in Zanzibar has been influenced by African and Arabian 
culture. Historically there were leaders that were given rule by birth-right or were chosen by 
those that received it by birth-right; there were also leaders that fought for rulership over 
others (Longair, 2016). It is because of a history of bloodshed and conquest that these leaders 
were given reverence by the people. People respect their leaders because it is part of their 
culture to do so (Matem-community46-20150506). This power frame is used by those in 
leadership to belittle the power had by other community members. This framing of power is 
admitted implicitly by the people in their subjugating themselves to the authority of local 
leaders. This was exemplified in the case of the 5 million shillings paid to community leaders 
by a local hotel in Kijini village. The local people could demand transparency about such 
funding, but they choose not to challenge leaders because 1) it would disturb the regular order 
and 2) the leaders are perceived to have greater power. This power is framed in the traditional 
and implicit assumption that leaders are powerful people.  
6.4.3.2 Power in the Communities 
The political community structure in the community is based on Julius Nyerere‘s policy of 
village government34. Each community is to elect a chairperson to lead and a committee with 
which that chair must confer. As was just mentioned, the people of Zanzibar have a 
traditional respect for leaders that is a result of their history. As such, the leadership of a 
community have fairly autocratic power to influence others community members. It was 
almost unanimously agreed by residents that community leadership was the most powerful 
group at the local level. One employee in the tourism industry said: 
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I think in local communities, the Shehias are the most influential people, but the power of 
financial need is [greater] (&Beyond-management1-20150321:27). 
While community leadership has power to influence decision making at the local level, it was 
observed that they have little power to influence natural resource use. As such, management 
of the marine environment has been largely ineffectual. One fisherman claimed that those 
tasked with resource management have made no effort to implement any plans that have been 
spoken of or devised (Kig-community41-20150506:6). The reasoning for this is embedded in 
the complexities of politics at the community level. As mentioned above, part of this is due to 
the power of financial need. There are no legal mechanisms that can be used to control the 
resource usage of people who are 1) driven by poverty and 2) have no alternative to 
harvesting from a diminishing natural resource base. The Mnemba Island lodge manager said 
that community leaders are powerless to implement natural resource management plans in the 
face of overwhelming financial need in their communities (&Beyond-management1-
20150321:27). When asked if there were rules, community leaders admitted that there were, 
but also added that people were largely not keeping those rules (Matem-leader1-
20150502:13). All of the participants of this study said that the overwhelming issue was that 
there were no alternatives to illegal fishing: 
If government can bring support to make our lives to be well its fine, but they are not doing that 
because they promised us they will bring boat for fishing, but until now we did not see anything 
(Kig-community40-20150313:30). 
There is the expectation among many community members that if the government wants to 
close certain parts of the Mnemba Atoll for fishing, then it is responsible to provide 
alternatives. They cite the fact that the government has not done this as justification for their 
non-compliance with rules governing natural resource use (Kig-leader2-20150323:21). 
The members of the communities who were not involved in leadership shared opinions of 
local level leaders: the conservation area was not effective and they could not give up their 
spears or nets because they had no alternative (Kig-community40-20150313:30). Some 
community members also added that they felt side-lined by community leadership (Kig-
community40-20150313:16). One resident not involved in community leadership said that 
leaders were not interested in engaging with members of their community: 
Is there no chance to speak to village leaders about these issues? 
No they are not interested. The leaders just choose their friends to benefit. Every day it's the same 
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faces. In any village meeting maybe it is the same 3 people who can participate (Kig-
community41-20150506:8). 
Some of the community members clearly feel that they are not being heard by those chosen to 
represent them (Kig-community40-20150313:17). This is another reason that people are not 
choosing to participate in more sustainable resource harvesting or conservation: 
I believe that this project it is belonging to the community there. So it is only us who is feeling 
pain for that project. If it belongs to us we will look after it properly, but because we don't own it 
we do not feel commitment to that place (Kig-community40-20150313:17). 
While this statement explicitly uses the concept of ownership, it must be remembered that 
English is not the first language in this study area. The implicit usage of the ownership 
concept in this quote relates to management: ordinary community members have not been 
involved in the management process (Mbuu-community56-20150502:19). While this is partly 
due to the power that government has to decide who participates in MIMCA management, 
community leaders also explicitly stated that they were in part responsible for choosing who 
represents the fishermen in the community to the MIMCA authority (Kig-leader2-
20150323:14). This raises questions around the nature of community representation in 
MIMCA decision making. 
Appropriate information dissemination techniques and consultations will be adopted to sensitize 
stakeholders to regulations and ensure that all groups have proper opportunities to give feedback 
on issues of concern to them (MCU, 2010:52). 
The official narrative of decision making in natural resource management is one of co-
operation. Despite this, actual examples of appropriate community representation in the 
MIMCA were difficult to find. Community members said that they were unhappy with the 
way in which they are represented to the MIMCA Authorities (Kig-community40-
20150313:17). They said that one person is chosen from the communities by the village 
fisheries committees each year, and that this person had the responsibility of sitting in 
meetings with the MIMCA management body and the ICZM. Two fishermen said that they 
did not know if that person was fulfilling their responsibilities (Kig-leader2-20150323:21). 
They reported to me that they felt they were not represented appropriately (Kig-
community40-20150313:16). 
According to the Draft General Management Plan (MCU, 2010), management of the MIMCA 
should give consideration to the Village Conservation Committee, a committee that none of 
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the participants mentioned during the course of this research. Participants regularly 
mentioned the Village Fishing Committee, but according to the MCU (2010) this committee 
has been replaced by the Village Conservation Committee. The community members 
appeared to be incorrectly informed. Furthermore, none of the community members seemed 
to know of any management plans: Neither those working in the tourism industry nor 
subsistence fishermen. Some knew of a form of this plan but claimed that democracy did not 
exist – that the Sheha personally chose an individual from the village to attend the MIMCA 
executive committee meetings (Kig-community41-20150506:8). They spoke quite 
passionately about feeling side-lined (Matem-leader1-20150502:24). Several of the fishermen 
from the north-eastern shoreline of Zanzibar were not sure what the acronym ―MIMCA‖ 
actually meant (some called it Menai after the Menai Bay Marine Conservation Area on the 
south-western cost of Unguja) but they felt it was being used a means to try exclude them 
from certain fishing areas (Matem-community44-20150506:12; Mbuu-community56-
20150502:29). One professed to have never heard of such a thing at all (Kig-community41-
20150506:6). 
The issue of representation has clearly impacted the way that people perceive their leaders 
and those involved in the conservation area. One participant, a resident in Matemwe 
community, said ―We have leaders. We have a leader for the government, for the sheha, or 
councillor, or representative, therefore we are sending our opinion for them and then they 
have to discuss with government. But they don't do that‖ (NGO-employee8-20150504:23). In 
the formation of the MIMCA management authority, affected villages told me that they were 
largely not consulted and that they are not currently sufficiently involved in the management 
of the MIMCA (Residents of villages in MIMCA, personal communication, 2-28 March 
2015). The narrative of participation and co-operation was not found in the management of 
the MIMCA – it was found to be a top-down management approach opposed by locals. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the management of the Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area in 
Zanzibar, Tanzania. It related the main findings in this case and as a chapter in this thesis the 
aims were to: 
 List relevant stakeholders, their role in the MIMCA, and their interests in the 
conservation area‘s resources 
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 Examine issues relating to natural resources in the marine conservation area, 
including ownership, rules and their impact on stakeholder behaviour, management, 
resource use practices, and the state of marine resources and 
 Examine the history and current state of stakeholder relations relevant to the 
management of the MIMCA. 
The data obtained from interviews with representatives of various stakeholder groups was 
used to detail the complexities of stakeholder relations over natural resource management in 
the MIMCA. The information related by participants in this case allow for a consideration of 
the impact that human behaviour and stakeholder relations have on co-operative natural 
resource management. Of particular concern was access to resources, the nature of co-
operation, communication, partnerships, accountability to other stakeholders, the sharing of 
benefits, and the framing of power in stakeholder interactions. This data will be used in the 
next chapter in an analysis stakeholder interactions and the impact that social factors have on 
natural resources and their management. 
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CHAPTER 7: PHINDA GAME RESERVE, KWAZULU-NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA 
7. Introduction 
This chapter studies the case of &Beyond‘s Phinda Game Reserve in KwaZulu-Natal, South 
Africa, the first protected area the company operated in. This case is included in less detail 
than the two Tanzanian cases and is a comparative one, providing data with which to contrast 
the broader patterns discovered in the former two cases. This reserve is adjacent to the 
Isimangaliso Wetland Park, a world heritage site on the east coast of South Africa‘s 
KwaZulu-Natal province. It is a unique case in that it provides some data on positive relations 
in co-operative natural resource management, specifically co-operative in terms of tourism 
and conservation. It is unique among the 3 cases in this study in that all of the stakeholders 
are co-operating to varying degrees and are mostly pleased with the arrangements. This 
chapter will thus serve as a repository of data to compare and contrast with the two Tanzanian 
cases examined in this thesis, cases in which stakeholder co-operation has been less 
successful than the stakeholders at Phinda Game Reserve. This case was included as a 
comparative work because of the successes that have occurred in co-operative governance. 
Not as much detail was included during the primary data gathering phase of this case, but 
rather the broader concepts relating to success and failure were investigated.  
Phinda Game Reserve is a modern example of self-funding conservation: needing large 
capital investment to be established, it relies largely on foreign tourism to be maintained and 
repay those investors. The Munyawana Conservancy is a privately owned wildlife 
conservancy in the KwaZulu Natal province of South Africa. It consists of about 28,000 
hectares of Lowveld Bushveld, Mountain Bushveld and Sand Forest. There is one perennial 
river, the Mzinene River, which flows from west to east from the Lebombo Mountains. 
Multiple dams have been built in the conservancy to hold perennial water for the abundant 
wildlife. There are multiple land owners in the conservancy and it is continuing to grow in 
size by dropping fences with neighbouring game reserves. The part of the conservancy that 
has been considered in this study is the Phinda Game Reserve, commonly referred to as 
Phinda in short. The Phinda Game Reserve is a popular safari tourism destination within the 
greater Munyawana Conservancy. Phinda Game Reserve is one of the major parts of the 
Munyawana Conservancy and it is the only part relevant to this study because it was only 
&Beyond that was affected by the 2005 land claims. It was &Beyond that forged the 
agreement with the communities. Due to this reason, the greater Munyawana Conservancy is 
not being considered in this case and as such &Beyond was the only stakeholder in 
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Munyawana that took part in this study. 
Phinda provides noteworthy data on both wildlife conservation and community engagement. 
The land is owned by &Beyond and two rural communities neighbouring the reserve and co-
operative relations are generally positive. Being one of the more successful examples of co-
operative conservation and ecotourism, it is worth considering the history of Phinda, the 
historical and current state of stakeholder relations, the challenges experienced, and the 
successes enjoyed. It did not include all of the case families that were influential in the 
previous two case chapters – code families that were influential in the development of this 
chapter include benefits, community, conservation, livelihoods, natural resources, power, and 
relations. A total of 67 codes were influential in the development of novel information in this 
chapter. It was through these codes that important results emerged within the main themes of 
this case.  
7.1 History of Phinda Game Reserve 
In the late 1980s 7,500 hectares of cattle ranching land was purchased from multiple farmers 
between the state owned Mkuze Game Reserve and the Sodwana State Forest Reserve in the 
KwaZulu Natal province of South Africa (Buchanan, 1999). In 1991 a further 6,000 hectares 
were added to the 7,500 hectare amalgamation of farming properties. Neighbouring land was 
purchased over the next few years and by the year 2000 the reserve consisted of 17,000 
hectares of prime wildlife habitat. The name Phinda is a Zulu word which means ―the return‖ 
in English36. The establishment of Phinda Game Reserve involved the one of largest wildlife 
restocking exercises ever undertaken on private land in South Africa. About 1,500 head of 
game were brought into the reserve, including the increasingly endangered Cheetah and 
Black Rhino which have since thrived (Buchanan, 1999). The wildlife at Phinda is a frequent 
subject of various research projects and &Beyond has hosted many researchers since its 
establishment. Four different lodges have been built in Phinda including Forest, Mountain, 
Rock, and Vlei Lodges.  
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Figure 21: Map of South Africa showing location of Phinda Game Reserve (Source: Author) 
 
Figure 22: Map of Phinda Game Reserve and surroundings (Modified from 
http://gamelodgekwazulunatal.com/) 
Having reintroduced wildlife by 1993, and being in the process of building four safari lodges, 
&Beyond recognized at this early stage of operations that another key part in managing the 
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reserve sustainably was forging a connection with neighboring rural communities (Buchanan, 
1999). The key term that was used by Les Carlisle, Conservation Director at &Beyond, was 
working ‗with the community‘37. &Beyond aimed to operate with this ethos from the start by 
marking the Phinda boundary with the help of the local community leaders.35 With respect to 
&Beyond‘s strategic vision for Phinda, the founder, Dave Varty, wrote that: 
Phinda was born out of a belief that the beauty of Maputaland was worth saving from the spiral of 
destruction into which it has been drawn. Its first target was to repair habitat damaged by almost 
a century of cattle farming, to return the wildlife which had once roamed the Maputaland plain, 
and to build luxury, world-class destinations for visitors without whom there would not be a 
viable plan. The second task was to reconnect the rural communities with the land by giving 
people the opportunity to participate at every level in sustainable conservation development by 
providing employment, training and the infrastructure for small business development.36 
It was due to this strategic vision that the Community Development Fund (CDF) was 
established for the sake of the communities living around Phinda Game Reserve. This Fund 
was created to accumulate and store financial donations for community development projects. 
In 1993 KwaGiba High School (Figure 23) was built in Mnqobokazi because of financial 
support from the CDF37. The Fund became the basis for the Africa Foundation which is a 
non-profit organisation that is the development partner of &Beyond38. Through the 
subsequent years and with the financial support of guests of Phinda and other development 
support partners, the Africa Foundation has built its resources to be able to support 
development in the five neighbouring communities living around Phinda Game Reserve 
(AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120). 
                                                 
35 http://africafoundation.org.za/celebrating-25-years/ 
36 http://www.eyesonafrica.net/south-african-safari/phinda-rock.htm 
37 http://africafoundation.org.za/celebrating-25-years/ 
38 http://africafoundation.org.za/who-we-are/ 
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Figure 23: KwaGiba High School built in 1993 with funding from the Community Development 
Foundation (Source:http://africafoundation.org.za/celebrating-25-years/)) 
In 2005, two land claim cases were registered in the South African Land Claims Court that 
involved a total of about 21,000 hectares of land within Phinda Game Reserve43. The Land 
Claims court was established in 1996 by virtue of the Land Restitution Act (no.22 of 1994). It 
exists to deal with the nationally endorsed land restitution process that aims to redress victims 
of racially motivated land dispossession by restoring land ownership rights to people who 
were forcibly removed during Apartheid-era evictions. Initially &Beyond wanted to oppose 
the land claim but the Chief Executive Steve Fitzgerald said: 
I realised it was stupid because we had already spent so much time building good relations with 
the community. The chiefs were very clear that they were not looking for financial compensation 
because that was not going to sustain them in the long run.39 
                                                 
39
https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/communities-win-farms-back-but-what-can-they-do-next-718583 
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The Mnqobokazi and Makasa communities claims were settled in 2007 when an agreement 
was reached between &Beyond and the two communities. The ownership for a total of about 
10,000 hectares was given to the two communities and in return &Beyond was allowed to 
continue operating on that land under certain conditions that were laid out in the agreement 
between &Beyond and the two communities43. The details of this agreement, along with its 
ramifications, are discussed subsequently in this chapter.  
This landmark agreement between &Beyond and the two communities, Mnqobokazi and 
Makasa, demonstrated a working model for land restitution in South Africa. Ultimately it has 
proven to be a solution in which representatives of all stakeholder groups say that their 
interests are being satisfied (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120; Phinda-management1-
20141121; Mak-leader2-20141121). Development has been further enabled in local 
communities and biodiversity conservation has continued. Looking at this case it would 
appear that conservation and development priorities can be achieved concurrently. Thus in a 
time when co-operative natural resource management was being labelled as an overall failure 
by scholars, this case should be seen as useful in providing data on co-operative tourism and 
conservation management. Reasons for this will be demonstrated throughout this chapter. The 
chapter presents a brief analysis of the key factors that have contributed to the development 
of the largely positive outcomes and compares these with outcomes of the previous two cases 
to highlight some of the reasons for more successful co-operation.  
7.2 Stakeholders 
The set of stakeholders in the case of Phinda Game Reserve is quite different to the other two 
cases considered in this thesis. The main reason for this is the legal status of land ownership 
in Tanzania and South Africa. The land and resources considered in the Tanzanian cases of 
this thesis are owned by either the government or the local community. By contrast, most 
land in South Africa is privately owned and Phinda Game Reserve is no exception. The 
difference between this case and the other two Tanzanian cases it that the land in Phinda is 
privately owned as opposed to the publicly owned land and resources in the Tanzanian cases. 
Another major difference between these cases is that protected areas are fenced in South 
Africa whereas in Tanzania they are not. This private ownership of land and wildlife, and the 
fencing of resources, reduces the number of stakeholders. In the case of Phinda Game 
Reserve, there are only three owners of land and wildlife: &Beyond, the Mnqobokazi 
Community Trust, and the Makasa Community Trust. A fourth stakeholder is included, the 
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Africa Foundation, because it is the means by which &Beyond contributes to development in 
the local communities living around Phinda. 
7.2.1 Local Communities 
There are a total of five communities that the African Foundation works with around Phinda 
Game Reserve (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120). Of these five, only two are relevant 
to resource management decisions. The two communities that own part of the land in Phinda 
Game Reserve, Mnqobokazi and Makasa, are the two key stakeholder groups among the 
neighbouring local communities. As mentioned, the other three communities that &Beyond 
helps with development funding are not land owners in the reserve. They are thus not key 
stakeholders in resource management decisions, but &Beyond does consider them to be 
stakeholders in local conservation because of the impact they can have on the Phinda 
ecosystem at a landscape scale. The three non-ownership communities are Nibela, KwaJobe, 
and KwaNgwenya. Throughout the rest of this chapter the phrases communities, local 
communities, and neighbouring communities will be used to represent all five of the 
communities mentioned above. They will be differentiated either by their names or by their 
ownership of land within Phinda. The residents of these communities situated around Phinda 
Game Reserve will be referred to as local people.  
The most commonly observed livelihoods in the communities around Phinda are based on 
natural resources. During the research process at Phinda, it was observed that most people 
living in these communities are subsistence farmers and they rely on the naturally occurring 
resources that are found around the reserve. Wood for fire and poles, natural fruits, and 
grasses for thatching have become an important source of revenue for the poor female headed 
households living under the effect of HIV (Dahlberg, 2005). Many households keep at least 
one head of cattle and some goats. Some rely in part on government support: social grants are 
given to young women and the elderly who have children (AfricaFoundation-employee2-
20141120). The social grant system is something that does not exist in Tanzania. These 
communities have access to a financial resource, and an alternative system of sustenance, that 
is not available to Tanzanians and it is worth considering that these communities are affected 
by the grant system.  
According to the census data (available from www.statssa.gov.za) the rural population in five 
relevant communities around Phinda Game Reserve was about 25,000 in 2011. It increased 
from about 43 people/km2 to about 53 people/km2 between 1991 and 2007. According to a 
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study on unemployment in South Africa, rural unemployment in KwaZulu-Natal was 45% in 
2003 (Kingdon & Knight, 2005). There are few employment opportunities in the 
communities around Phinda Game Reserve and income in existing employment opportunities 
in the sugar-cane farming industry offer about minimum wage income; research suggests 
some men in rural South Africa will rather engage in subsistence farming than work long 
hours for little pay with low job security (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2012). 
In the communities neighbouring Phinda, a variety of people representing each stakeholder 
group were spoken to; that included community leaders, community members, and local 
employees of &Beyond. All of the participants spoke English at least moderately well, but 
most were fluent. Their main interest they have in their land in Phinda Game Reserve is to 
ensure that their land is used sustainably (Mnq-leader3-20141121). The operative word is 
main because not everybody in the communities agrees that the best use of this land is for 
wildlife conservation and ecotourism: there are those who think the land should be occupied 
and grazed by cattle (Phinda-employee2-20141122; Mnq-leader3-20141121). Participants in 
this case said that this was the minority of the population though. The consensus was that 
most residents agree with the current land-use agreement with &Beyond and they simply 
want the community to benefit from the wildlife (Mak-leader1-20141121; Mak-leader2-
20141121). 
7.2.2 &Beyond 
&Beyond is a luxury tourism company operating across southern and east Africa, India and 
South America. Their ethos by which they operate is ―care of the land, care of the wildlife 
and care of the people‖ (http://www.andbeyond.com). In line with this ethos, most of the staff 
at the lodges in Phinda Game Reserve are from the local communities living around the 
reserve. &Beyond has shown an interest in communities living around their reserves from the 
start of business operation37. They believe that this interest, paired with proactive 
involvement, will improve the perceptions that local people have of conservation and tourism 
(AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120). &Beyond attempts to manage interactions with 
other stakeholders in a way that can demonstrate positive ways to deal with a diverse array of 
interests and issues.35 Phinda Game Reserve was the initial project of &Beyond and it has 
become their best example of co-operation with local communities. The main interests that 
&Beyond have in Phinda Game Reserve are that: 
 Phinda can continue to operate as a protected area for wildlife 
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 Their ecotourism business can continue generating income and 
 The communities living around Phinda can benefit from the presence of the wildlife 
being conserved in the game reserve through the income generated and donations of 
patrons. 
7.2.3 The Africa Foundation 
The Africa Foundation has been suitably introduced previously in this thesis. It is the 
development partner of &Beyond operating around Phinda Game Reserve40. The Foundation 
has been responsible for funding significant infrastructural and social development in the 
community (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120). Their interests are to improve relations 
between the community and &Beyond as well as to improve local peoples‘ perceptions of 
conservation (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120). They achieve this by engaging in 
development projects that improve quality of life in neighbouring communities. The local 
manager of the Foundation said that he takes patrons of the reserve into the communities 
around Phinda Game Reserve and shows them some of the already completed projects. He 
will discuss the portfolio of prioritised projects needing funding and invite the patrons to 
donate financial support to one of these projects (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120). 
There are also non-profit organisations in the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom which are involved in fund raising activities and seeking funds from development 
donors41. 
7.3 Stakeholder Relations 
Stakeholder interaction is the critical part of this case that needs to be examined in order to be 
beneficial for practitioners working in other contexts. The history of stakeholder interaction 
has been briefly reviewed, but this will be discussed in more detail below. More recent 
interactions between stakeholders will also be discussed. Representatives from each of the 
three stakeholder groups were asked about stakeholder interactions over resource ownership, 
use, and management. While a discussion guide was used to keep discussions on certain 
topics, the participants of this study were allowed to focus on the topics that were most 
important to them. This was done to allow the data to be prioritized according to what the 
actual stakeholders thought to be most important in their relations with other stakeholders. 
                                                 
40 www.africafoundation.org.za 
41 https://africafoundation.org/?region=NA&redirect=%2Fhomepage 
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While most aspects of the relationship are positive, and the focus of this chapter is to examine 
why, there are also those who do not agree with the agreement that exists between &Beyond 
and the communities. This is reviewed below. Some of the most important topics that were 
repeatedly mentioned were communication, partnerships, accountability, and benefit sharing. 
Issues of power and representation were also mentioned by community leaders who had been 
affected by these within the community stakeholder group, and these issues are also discussed 
below. 
7.3.1 Co-operation 
Co-operation with local stakeholders was one of the founding principles for &Beyond. One 
of the founders, Dave Varty, said he realised that maintaining a sustainable operation in the 
future would be dependent on their co-operation with neighbouring rural communities36. This 
sentiment is largely shared by residents of the local communities around Phinda. A trustee of 
the Mnqobokazi Community Trust42 who is well known in that community said that: 
At the end of the day we need one another to look after each other (Mnq-leader3-20141121:60). 
Co-operation between local communities and stakeholders whose main interest is in 
conservation is an ideal that still guides the operations of &Beyond and the Africa Foundation 
today. When asked about some of the reasons for &Beyond‘s successful co-operation with 
local communities, a representative of the Africa Foundation at Phinda Game Reserve said: 
Interests were clearly mapped out when Phinda started. The key part of that success was 
consultation and the consultation not just with anybody else, but… consulting with the chief. And 
not even coming [with] expectations, because you might not be able to meet those expectations, 
but to say: Here we are, this is what we are doing… we need your inputs (AfricaFoundation-
employee2-2014112032). 
In the initial stages of creating the reserve, &Beyond‘s approach was proactive and inclusive. 
They made contact with local communities and did so through the channels of leadership that 
showed respect to the local society and customs. They asked for help from the local 
communities and did so with the idea of working together. These factors were repeatedly 
mentioned, both implicitly and explicitly, as being deterministic of local people‘s perceptions 
of &Beyond (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120; Phinda-employee3-20141122; Mak-
                                                 
42 The financial trust that had been set up for the Mnqobokazi community to receive land rental payments from 
&Beyond after the change of land ownership relating to the land claim in 2007 
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leader2-20141121). Not only is co-operation an important feature in determining the outcome 
of conservation efforts in populated rural areas, but the manner of co-operation is also 
seemingly critical (Phinda-employee1-20141122; Mak-leader2-20141121). Successful co-
operation in this case was also based on structured partnerships and the significance of this is 
also examined below. The sub-headings presented here emerged from the analysis of the 
codes relations: barriers, co-operation, communication, conflict, negative, negotiation, 
opposition, partnerships, positive, social capital, solutions, threats to one another, 
transparency, and trust.  
7.3.1.1 Communication 
Some participants attributed good co-operation between stakeholders to communication. 
When asked about the positive relationship between &Beyond and the local communities, a 
prominent member of the Mnqobokazi community and a trustee in the Mnqobokazi 
Community Trust, said that it is in part due to the frequent discussions:  
If there is something we do not understand I call on the board [of trustees]: I don't understand 
what is happening here – can you explain to me? Okay it’s fine I am happy, or I am not happy and 
how can we change it? Actually it's active engagement to both parties‖ (Mnq-leader3-20141121). 
Three other participants from all three of the main stakeholder groups spoke of the 
importance of being proactive. The Conservation Manager at Phinda said that in order to 
have and maintain positive working relations, it is essential to ―have good communication 
channels. If there are issues we pick up the phone and we talk about it. If there's a problem 
we talk about it and try and solve it‖ (Phinda-employee3-20141122). The Regional 
Operations Manager at the Africa Foundation spoke energetically about the importance of 
proactive communication. He said that proactive communication had led other stakeholders 
to being responsive in a positive manner: 
You need to be proactive. Go to them even before they say it. Update them on what is happening. 
Quarterly, sit with them. If there is a change in management, go there. Even if you are not doing 
anything, keep them [posted]…. What you do to them they will do to you…. But you know it all 
starts from us (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120:69). 
It is not only &Beyond or the Africa Foundation that has been proactive in communicating 
with other stakeholders. The community has shown initiative in being communicative. A 
representative of the Africa Foundation said that ―the good part of it is even if they are not 
satisfied they will call us and we will sit down, say we are not happy here‖ 
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(AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120:30). With respect to the land rental agreement that 
was formed after the land claim in 2007, it should be noted that community leaders in the 
Makasa and Mnqobokazi communities communicated with &Beyond during the land claim 
process and this communication changed the perception that &Beyond had of the land claim. 
Whereas &Beyond had at first had a certain perception about being forced off the land, 
community leaders from both communities expressed their interest in entering a partnership 
with &Beyond35. Proactive communication prevented misunderstandings and helped the 
stakeholders to negotiate a partnership that satisfied community development goals by using 
conservation and the resultant ecotourism as a sustainable base. 
The Regional Operations Manager for the Africa Foundation at Phinda emphasised that while 
communication is an essential tool it is only a means to an end, with that end being 
transparency of information (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120). He attributed the 
positive working relations to the ―transparent wall‖ that exists between &Beyond and the 
communities living around Phinda. He said that ―of course we know Phinda is running a 
business, we cannot disclose details, but the fact of the matter is: What are your main 
intentions?‖ (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120:34). The wall illustrates the fact that 
these stakeholder groups are distinct entities with their own management structures; the 
community is not involved in &Beyond‘s business and equally &Beyond does not get 
involved in community affairs. This wall is transparent though, representing how each of the 
stakeholder groups must make their intentions and interests clear to other stakeholders. 
Communication resulting in transparency has contributed to these successful partnerships. 
7.3.1.2 Partnerships 
Representatives of &Beyond, the communities and the Africa Foundation agreed that 
partnerships were a vital part of their co-operative natural resource management arrangement. 
Having established that partnerships are an important aspect of co-operative natural resource 
management, the purpose of this section is to examine aspects of stakeholder interactions that 
contribute to the outcome of partnerships. 
Impact of Individuals 
The individuals that are chosen to represent stakeholder groups to other stakeholders have a 
direct impact on the way in which those stakeholders interact. When asked about the role that 
individual relationships play in shaping stakeholder interactions, a member of the Phinda 
management team said that ―a lot of it is relationship and personality driven, but I suppose 
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it‘s no different to any other corporation where you've got people dealing with relationships‖ 
(Phinda-employee3-20141122:30). The two community trusts were identified by one of the 
trustees as a critical part of the relationship between the two ownership communities and 
&Beyond (Mnq-leader3-20141121). He said that the governance actions of the individuals on 
the board of trustees have had an impact on the perception that the community members have 
of &Beyond, Phinda, and ultimately conservation: 
If we as the trust are not doing justice to these communities, it will affect the relationship between 
Mnqobokazi and Phinda, because if our members are not happy about us, they won't trust 
anything we do with Phinda (Mnq-leader3-20141121:51). 
When asked about the impact that individuals can have on good governance, this member of 
the board of trustees identified an important characteristic that trustees needed to have in 
order to make the trust successful: 
If I am not selfish that I want everything to come to my hand, to my pocket – that is why they 
killing some of the good feelings from the community – if this community have entrusted me, I 
must make sure I deliver to them…I think if we identified the right people to the right positions we 
wouldn't have these toyi-toyi and strikes (Mnq-leader3-20141121:52). 
His opinion was that successful partnerships were dependent on people who were genuinely 
motivated by achieving the greater good for the stakeholders they represented. An &Beyond 
and an Africa Foundation employee both mentioned Isaac Tembe, the first person to work 
with the Africa Foundation at Phinda. Both participants said that he was instrumental in 
forming positive relations between &Beyond and the local communities. The significance 
that these two participants attributed to Isaac Tembe shows the importance of relationships in 
governance. 
Approach to Working with Other Stakeholders 
One participant, who had previously served in leadership positions in the Mnqobokazi 
community, said that her positive perception of &Beyond and the Africa Foundation was due 
to their approach in working with local people: 
What I liked about them is that when they come to the community they don't just say we are here 
as Phinda, or the Africa Foundation, to do this for you; but they involved us. We were part and 
parcel of everything. Preparations, organisations, and when there were constructions we were 
involved as a community. By so doing I was empowered (Mak-leader1-20141121:36). 
This was reflected in a discussion had with a representative of the Africa Foundation. He 
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stated that when working with community members they will ask questions about 
development requests they get from the community. This is to help the community members 
prioritise development projects that the Foundation works to gather funding for: 
Any time I get a request I go and sit down with the community or that particular structure and try 
to get, is this a need or is this just a wish-list; where does this come from; how much of an impact 
it's going to have if this project is funded (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120:3). 
Acknowledging Limitations 
One of the important aspects impacting working relations mentioned by the assistant 
conservation manager of Phinda Game Reserve was that stakeholders need to be realistic in 
what they can achieve together: 
That's how you earn the trust. Bring them on board. Make them see. Being them in. They mustn't 
just say, ah you guys are making lots of money. They must see the challenges you have (Phinda-
management1-20141121:18). 
One of the participants who had been a leader in the Makasa community said that local 
people needed to be patient with &Beyond and the Africa Foundation because they are doing 
what they can to address needs in the community (Mak-leader2-20141121). She had a 
positive perception of these stakeholders because they had related their limitations to her and 
she felt that they were doing the best they could. The idea that partnerships improve when 
limitations are communicated and people are perceived to be doing their best was reinforced 
by a community leader in Mnqobokazi who said of the work done by the Africa Foundation: 
I am not saying it is enough, to all the community members I am not sure, but to my understanding 
they are doing their best (Mak-leader2-20141121:16). 
Utilising Public Resources 
Partnerships can also extend the capabilities of stakeholders. One of the important 
partnerships has been between &Beyond and government. The government has helped 
&Beyond to provide employment to the local communities through various programs. The 
conservation manager at Phinda Game Reserve said: 
There are a couple of government initiatives here…. We have an initiative here called Working for 
Wildlife, which is done by the Department of Environmental Affairs through SANParks. They 
subsidize quite a number of guards here, field rangers. There are about 40. We get herbicide 
assistance from the Department of Agriculture…. We are busy talking with government about 
other extended works programs like Working on Fire. We are busy talking to the Department of 
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Tourism to try and get grants for training for young school leavers to get skills in the lodges 
(Phinda-employee3-20141122:4). 
By utilising the financial resources that the South African government is willing to contribute 
to conservation and local development, &Beyond has been able to secure employment for 
local people who might not have otherwise had such opportunities.  
One thing that should be noted is that the South African economy is stronger than the 
Tanzanian economy and as such there is more funding available for public works programs 
that employ rural people, like ―Working for Water‖. There is also no social grant system in 
Tanzania: rural people do not have access to direct financial aid from their government like 
there is in South Africa. However international sources of funding for community 
development do exist and they can be sought out by stakeholders as a source of aid for local 
people. 
Features of the Phinda Agreement 
&Beyond and the local communities around Phinda Game Reserve have shown that they are 
willing and able to co-operate by forming a partnership. Their partnership was proactive in 
that it was arranged before legal intervention was necessary, though the land claim cases 
certainly were an initiator for this partnership. The partnership is based on mutual land 
ownership in the Phinda Game Reserve. The Mnqobokazi and Makasa communities have 
structured their partnership with &Beyond through an agreement about commercial use of 
community-owned land in Phinda. This agreement has been formalised in a written contract 
and was finalised in 2007 bringing an early end to the land claim process that each of those 
communities engaged in43. In order to be concise, the mains points of the agreement have 
been paraphrased from a presentation made by &Beyond to the Department of Tourism in 
South Africa43; they are listed below: 
 Title deed would be transferred to a trust operating on behalf of community 
members44 
                                                 
43https://www.tourism.gov.za/CurrentProjects/PastProjects/Local%20Government%20Tourism%20Conference  
%202015/Documents/A%20Model%20for%20Community%20Benification%20and%20Job%20Creation%2
0Phinda.pdf 
44 Infrastructure is currently on the land belonging to &Beyond, however the communities do plan on building 
their own infrastructure in the future. 
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 Ownership of wildlife not included 
 There would be no occupation of the land and 
 &Beyond to have a lease for 36 years 
 A Development Fund would be established into which &Beyond would pay SAR9 
million and the South African government would pay SAR40 million 
 Two trust funds would be opened, one for each community, into which &Beyond 
would pay a total of SAR23 million with roughly half going to each community trust 
 A monthly rental would be paid to each trust respectively, approximately 
SAR150,000 monthly for each trust 
 Preferential employment to be given to community members 
 Skills development to take place 
 Conservation and infrastructure management to be undertaken by &Beyond and 
 Trustees to be taught skills regarding, and given assistance with, managing funds. 
This agreement has been adhered to by both parties, with both parties exceeding expectations 
in some ways. An example of this is that &Beyond gave the boards of these community trusts 
assistance in managing finances with &Beyond‘s internal accounting staff. These sorts of 
gestures from &Beyond improved community member‘s perceptions of &Beyond and led to 
a positive response from the community (Mak-leader2-20141121). The Africa Foundation 
pointed out that this agreement has been a trust building mechanism: 
Part of Phinda was given back to these 2 communities; but these 2 communities, because of the 
relationship that we have had, the trust that we have built, knowing that these are our neighbours, 
they said let's form a working partnership (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120:73).  
The agreement formed the basis of a partnership where actions could be evaluated and 
stakeholders could be held accountable for their responsibilities in the agreement. While 
partnerships are an essential part of forming positive working relations, accountability in 
responsibilities is equally important if those partnerships are to be sustainable. 
7.3.1.3 Accountability 
A trustee of the Mnqobokazi community trust said that accountability was a vital part of 
successful co-operation between stakeholders (Mnq-leader3-20141121). Each of the 
stakeholders has certain responsibilities to fulfil with respect to the agreement and they are 
accountable for fulfilling them. Whether or not they are able to be held accountable by other 
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stakeholders can have an important impact on the outcome of a co-operative natural resource 
management relationship. In this thesis, accountability for communal finances earned from 
Phinda Game Reserve was not followed up in detail, but perceptions of this accountability 
were questioned. Further research could expand on the matter of resource governance 
accountability and its impact on the behaviour of the community stakeholder group. 
Individuals play an important role in the way that stakeholder groups hold each other 
accountable, both between and within stakeholder groups. Whereas some individuals will 
work honestly and be willing to hold themselves to account for their management of financial 
assets, there is the risk that an individual with a strong personality, or one who has some form 
of social power in local society, can manage assets poorly and shirk the responsibility of 
being held accountable (Mnq-leader3-20141121). This was pointed out by an observer who is 
external to the communities. He said that the Mnqobokazi trust was led by an individual who 
was a stronger leader, making it more autonomous than the trust in the Makasa community: 
In some sense the [Makasa] community, their inKosi has a lot more involvement in the running 
and affairs of the trust… The [Mnqobokazi] trust is much more autonomous. They keep the inKosi 
in the loop, you know abreast of decisions, but they largely do their own thing. Jay...is much more 
of a stronger leader than the other chairman (Phinda-employee3-20141122:14). 
Thankfully in the case of the Mnqobokazi and Makasa communities, the boards running the 
two community trusts have remained transparent and their management has been successful 
due to training that ensured skills development (Phinda-employee3-20141122). However, in a 
case where those tasked with managing assets are not honest or do not have the correct skill 
set, they could potentially avoid being held accountable if they had the power to do so. This 
would ultimately have a negative impact on the working relations that exist between 
stakeholders.  
One of the defining characteristics of the land-use agreement between the Makasa and 
Mnqobokazi communities and &Beyond was written into the formal agreement they co-
signed. In the agreement it was stated that 1) the two community trusts would be accountable 
to the community members and that 2) they would be trained in the process by which they 
would account for their management of the trusts. Due to the help and training from advisors 
and accountants external to the boards serving for those trusts, the people managing the trust 
funds were more easily able to hold themselves to account to the beneficiaries and trustees 
(Phinda-employee3-20141122; Mnq-leader3-20141121). In a sense, &Beyond used their 
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power in negotiating the land-ownership transfer to ensure that those tasked with managing 
assets for the communities would be held accountable. 
Holding other stakeholders to account for the fulfilling of their responsibilities relies partly 
on the power landscape. When stakeholder groups are able to exert power over other 
stakeholders then there is a higher chance that they will be accountable to each other. For 
example, the community is able to revoke their agreement with &Beyond and so the Africa 
Foundation volunteers information about the work that they do – they are held accountable by 
community leaders because of the power that community leaders have due to their ownership 
of land in Phinda. In some cases though, like with the board of trustees managing the 
Mnqobokazi Community Trust, people who are in positions of power can feel that it is their 
duty to hold themselves accountable to the relevant stakeholders (Mnq-leader3-20141121).  
7.3.1.4 Opposition to Co-operation 
Not everybody in the Makasa and Mnqobokazi communities agrees with the partnership with 
&Beyond (Phinda-employee2-20141122; Phinda-employee1-20141122). There have been 
some objections within the communities. These objections come from a number of sources, 
but what was said is that they are most commonly from people who do not directly benefit 
from &Beyond and the ecotourism land use in Phinda Game Reserve (Mnq-leader3-
20141121). They might be people who applied for a bursary but failed the application 
process. A trustee of the Mnqobokazi Community Trust said: 
Sometimes they ask for the bursary even if they are not accepted to tertiary institutions. They just 
want money. So if Phinda is wanting some evidence then they start to complain (Mak-leader2-
20141121:13). 
A local school principal said that people‘s perceptions of &Beyond are easily influenced by 
their access to benefits. With respect to the impact that the bursary application process can 
have on local perceptions of Phinda she said: 
You will find that the child fails the interview; that person will not say ―how can you develop my 
child that he or she can pass the interview?‖ But they will say, ―Ah, Phinda is not good because 
the child has failed the interview‖ (Mak-leader1-20141121:32). 
Opposition towards the current land-use agreement and partnership between &Beyond and 
the Makasa and Mnqobokazi communities was related to the level of benefits received. Even 
if the benefit distribution process was fair, being denied access to direct benefits can have a 
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negative impact on perceptions of Phinda, &Beyond, and/or the Africa Foundation. 
Conversely, receiving a direct benefit typically has a positive impact on the beneficiaries‘ 
perceptions of Phinda, &Beyond, and the Africa Foundation (Phinda-employee2-20141122). 
One participant of a staff training program at Phinda said that her parents had a poor 
perception of &Beyond and Phinda Game Reserve before she entered the training program: 
I didn't like Phinda because I wasn't here before…. My father said oh no Phinda is bad, and some 
families can say Phinda took our place and they have done nothing for us…. My family are very 
happy because it is just me [working] (Phinda-employee2-20141122:14). 
She said that the perception her family has of Phinda has changed because of her employment 
at Phinda. She is the only income earner in her household and her income has had a positive 
impact on her family.  
A resident of the Makasa community said that the older generation in his community 
typically approved of &Beyond because they remembered what life was like before &Beyond 
began assisting local development by securing funding. He said that most opposition came 
from the younger people who could not perceive the significance of &Beyond‘s assistance to 
the community: 
Mostly the younger generation disagrees. But mostly those older people they know the history 
between the community and Phinda. But those other people who are born free they don't know 
Phinda, where it's from so they don't understand very well (Phinda-employee1-20141122:20). 
He also said that they are not vocal about their negative perceptions of Phinda Game Reserve, 
that they are typically under the age of 25 and have finished school but mostly not received a 
tertiary level education. They apparently felt marginalised by the dearth of local people 
holding management positions at Phinda Game Reserve and the lack of advancement 
opportunities for local people within the Phinda employment hierarchy. Management 
representatives of Phinda responded to this by saying that they largely chose suitably 
qualified people for employment positions, but did give opportunity for advancement to some 
select individuals who showed promise. This seemed to be a cause of contention with the 
younger age group in the communities. Ownership of resources was more important to the 
younger people than the older generations who were more concerned with direct benefit. 
Despite some pockets of opposition to the current land-use of community-owned land in 
Phinda Game Reserve, all of the participants agreed that the majority of the communities 
does approve of &Beyond operating on community land. As one participant said: 
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It is a work in progress; you can never get everybody on board equally but [we are] slowly getting 
there (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120:27). 
7.3.2 Benefit Sharing 
The sharing of benefits has been a critical part of the successful co-operation between 
stakeholders at Phinda Game Reserve. As has been stated before in this thesis, benefit sharing 
is the action of giving a portion of the advantages and profits derived from conservation and 
tourism to the historical or rightful owners of the land/resources being used. Land ownership 
has given the Makasa and Mnqobokazi communities a definite advantage for development in 
comparison to other neighboring communities: these two communities own land in the 
reserve, allowing them to negotiate the terms of their agreement with &Beyond as well as 
accrue financial assets due to their partnership they formed with &Beyond.  
A significant part of the benefits shared with the Makasa (also called Mduku) and 
Mnqobokazi communities is financial. This is because of the partnership they formed with 
&Beyond due to their land ownership. One of the issues that caused tension among local 
people was the direct financial benefits received by what are termed direct beneficiaries in 
these two land-owning communities. A member of the board of the Mnqobokazi Community 
Trust explained that the Deed of Trust document specifies that those who were directly 
dispossessed of land in Phinda Game Reserve are direct beneficiaries and they receive more 
benefit than residents in the community who were not historically dispossessed of land: 
We are working according to the Deed of Trust. That's our guidelines. The deed of trust is talking 
about the direct beneficiaries; there are people who were directly dispossessed from that area, not 
all of these community members here.… Each and every year, we give the direct beneficiaries 
some money.… That is a direct benefit that is not obtained by the whole community (Mnq-leader3-
20141121:24). 
This community trust board member further reasoned that local unrest was a sign that some 
of the community members did not seem to understand or agree with the direct beneficiary 
policy. He implied that certain people could enjoy a specific set of benefits due to their 
families‘ historical dispossession of land: 
The non-direct beneficiaries… used to fight in the community, trying to get equal things, whereas 
the guidelines of the constitution or the policy do not allow that. That is why you see people 
marching all over sometimes. When you listen to them and their story you will find this was not 
necessary for them to toyi-toyi because they wanted something that is not meant for them (Mnq-
leader3-20141121:26). 
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He specifically said that direct beneficiaries were ―descendants of the people that were 
dispossessed of this land. There were one or two really old beneficiaries that have since 
passed away. The vast majority were direct descendants; they were daughters or sons of those 
people that were dispossessed of this land prior to 1917.‖ Some local people who were not 
dispossessed were unhappy that they did not receive this financial benefit but there have been 
other ways in which they benefit from conservation and tourism. The trustee said that while 
there are not direct financial benefits for everyone in the community, the programs sponsored 
by the trust and the Africa Foundation serve to benefit the whole community if they choose to 
take advantage of them: 
If we are giving bursaries, we don't say we will not give you because you are not from the 
beneficiaries’ household. We are giving everybody. If we are building halls, everybody has to use 
those halls equally. As we put in the electricity here, it was not just for people who were direct 
beneficiaries. It was put across the community (Mnq-leader3-20141121). 
Another reason that some of the communities receive more benefits from conservation and 
ecotourism was due to the location of the community in relation to the game reserve. When 
asked if benefits where shared equally among all the five communities neighboring Phinda 
Game Reserve, a representative of the Africa Foundation said: 
It's not quite…. We have done more in Mduku/Makasa. One of the advantages is that it is the 
closest…. When they come here they normally come here for a holiday. You wouldn't like to keep 
them more than what they are here for. So you find people get to know Mduku/Makasa more than 
others (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120:48). 
While the Africa Foundation can take guests of Phinda Game Reserve further afield, their 
apprehension at taking guests on long drives for an activity other than wildlife viewing gives 
an advantage to the closest communities. 
One of the opportunities provided equally to residents of all five communities around Phinda 
is employment at the reserve. In order to develop skills in local communities that can be 
useful to the operations of Phinda Game Reserve, &Beyond operates the Star in Training 
Program. The graduates of this training program are then able to apply for advertised 
positions at Phinda or other wildlife tourism businesses around South Africa. The Operations 
Manager of the Africa Foundation explained the program: 
There is another program we had some time back called Star in Training, where we look at young 
people less than 30 years. Those people who might not have been able to go to university and we 
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take them on for training, six months training; provide them with a stipend for R800, a place to 
sleep, they get food, but they get trained in all different departments: housekeeping, the kitchen, 
and all that. After they finish 6 months they gain a certificate. They haven't paid anything. Instead 
they are getting even some stipend, accommodation, and food. When they go out some of them get 
employed here if there are positions because positions are always limited, but if they are not they 
get out with that certificate (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120:71). 
This program forms part of &Beyond‘s strategy to maximise the flow of benefits to 
neighbouring communities. From the beginning of Phinda Game Reserve, &Beyond has 
sought ways in which they can maximize the flow of benefits to the communities. A total of 
SAR7 million was spent on the building of Phinda Forest Lodge, of which SAR3.2 million 
was channeled into the local economy in the form of construction materials and worker‘s 
wages (Bushell and Eagles, 2007). The construction of lodges at Phinda Game Reserve 
employed 110 people. This, and the subsequent employment of about 300 people to staff the 
&Beyond lodges, has provided economic support for about 10% of the rural people living in 
the neighboring communities around Phinda Game Reserve (Zeppel, 2006). The Africa 
Foundation has provided numerous other benefits to the communities living around Phinda. 
The list of benefits that the Africa Foundation has provided to the neighbouring communities 
is extensive. While a list of benefits provided specifically for communities around Phinda 
Game Reserve could not be sourced, a list of development activities that the Africa 
Foundation has been involved in across 6 countries in Africa is a useful resource because 
many of the activities listed have taken place around Phinda. The list has been paraphrased 
directly from the &Beyond website45 and is as follows: 
 Raised SAR100 million for community development 
 Facilitated the development of 80 schools through the construction of more than 175 
classrooms, upgrading and renovating 18 pre-schools, building two administration 
blocks, four libraries and three media centres, thus improving academic facilities for 
approximately 10,000 children per annum 
 Enabled the construction of 12 school kitchens to strengthen access to government 
support for school nutrition programmes 
 Provided Conservations Lessons for more than 500 teachers and 7,000 school children 
 Granted scholarships to 285 aspiring community leaders 
                                                 
45 http://blogs.andbeyond.com/karen_richards/the-story-of-beyond/ 
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 Enabled the construction of, and supported, four clinics in remote rural areas, one of 
which, the Makasa Clinic outside Phinda Game Reserve, is open 24 hours a day and 
serves over 11,000 people in the region 
 Facilitated the construction of 113 EnviroLoos at schools and community-based 
institutions 
 Implemented access to water for more than 56,000 people at community institutions 
and schools 
 Helped provide more than 3,600 Hippo Water Rollers (most people in rural southern 
Africa have to carry water to their homes in a bucket or drum from a communal water 
source – water rollers are round containers that are pushed with a handle and do not 
have to be carried enabling people to carry more water) 
 Established the ―DevCentre‖ project to provide access to technology 
 Established a ―Skills and Health Centre‖ to provide training and access to positive 
living 
 Supported five centres for orphaned and vulnerable children, two of which are in 
communities around Phinda Game Reserve 
 Aided the establishment of 13 food gardens to promote food security and nutrition 
 Facilitated the installation of electricity at schools and community-based institutions 
and 
 Established a Community-Business Linkage Programme that promotes self-reliance 
for local small-scale farmers by addressing matters of food security, increasing 
income potential and fostering business relations with the neighbouring lodges. 
This pattern of sharing the benefits of conservation and ecotourism has had a largely, though 
not entirely, positive impact on the perceptions that community members have of &Beyond 
and Phinda Game Reserve. This impact on perceptions has served as a basis for the current 
state of working relations that exists between stakeholders. Some of the ways that benefit 
sharing impacts perceptions and working relations are examined below. 
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Figure 24: Makasa/Mduku clinic built with funding from the Africa Foundation (Source: 
www.africafoundation.org.za) 
7.3.2.1 Impact on Perceptions 
During the week-long research visit to the communities around Phinda, participants from all 
stakeholder groups said that the sharing of financial and development benefits with 
neighbouring communities has had a largely positive impact on local perceptions of Phinda, 
conservation, and &Beyond (Mak-leader1-20141121; Mak-leader2-20141121). Local 
residents that I met with consistently said that &Beyond had helped improve the quality of 
life in their communities. The only instances of negative talk about &Beyond was when a 
participant of the Star in Training program said that she and her family had previously had a 
negative perception of &Beyond, but that after she had begun participating in the training 
program their perception had changed entirely to being positive (Phinda-employee2-
20141122). 
A significant reason for the positive perceptions that people had of &Beyond was due to 
sourcing local people for employment at Phinda Game Reserve (Mak-leader1-20141121:24). 
This had been one of the terms of the agreement that the communities entered into with 
&Beyond. Fulfilling this part of the agreement has had a remarkable impact on local 
perceptions of &Beyond, Phinda, and conservation. A representative of the African 
Foundation spoke of the way that preferential employment opportunities for local people had 
affected working relations: 
One of the key things is job creation at Phinda and having to prioritise the people coming from 
these 5 communities. That has changed a lot of their mind set. It has built or emphasised a lot of 
trust. They have seen one family who doesn't have one person who is working but down the line 5 
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years, the person working at Phinda has built a house or providing for the family on a monthly 
basis and all that (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120:78). 
While local perceptions were positively affected by local development that the Africa 
Foundation and &Beyond had funded, the most influential factor was a direct monetary flow 
(Mak-leader1-20141121). This was similarly the case in the two Tanzanian cases in this 
thesis: communities wanted direct payments (Olo-community2-20150416:30; &Beyond-
employee2-20150316:40). Individuals who received money because of the presence of 
Phinda Game Reserve typically had the most positive perceptions. This included direct 
beneficiaries, participants in training programmes, those receiving a bursary, those employed 
in some capacity within the reserve, and family members of the aforementioned.  
Those with negative perceptions typically did not receive direct financial benefits and had not 
been affected by any of the development projects initiated by &Beyond and the Africa 
Foundation, i.e. they had not received a bursary, not been chosen for hospitality training, or 
was not a family member of somebody who had benefited from the aforementioned (Phinda-
employee1-20141122). When asked why some people spoke negatively of &Beyond, a 
representative of the Africa Foundation said that it was because of: 
Unequal distribution of resources, or projects, as we were talking about. They will say, ―Why are 
you doing this? You have been doing that in the same school.‖ And some will say, ―We think you 
love that community more than us because you spend a lot of time there‖ (AfricaFoundation-
employee2-20141120:65). 
The potential for the unequal distribution of resources to negatively impact stakeholder 
relations was recognised by 4 of the participants. A counsellor at the Makasa community 
clinic said that in order for a co-operative arrangement to be successful between communities 
and a private wildlife tourism business, the community members should all have some form 
of benefit (Mak-leader2-20141121). While he recognised that there were direct beneficiaries 
who benefitted more than others due to the direct payments, he said that community-wide 
development programs should not favour particular people: 
They must try to help the community equally. There must be no community members who can 
benefit better than others. If there are job opportunities, they can rotate the community members 
so that each community members can benefit. If they are willing to donate a building or structure 
in the community they can identify the places that are far from them, like those who are living far 
in the bushes, but they must also give them assistance (Mak-leader2-20141121:28). 
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Due to the power landscape that exists between and within stakeholder groups, unequal 
distribution of benefits is not always within the control of those providing the benefits 
(Phinda-employee3-20141122). However, as has been illustrated there are certain tools that 
stakeholder can use to ensure that there is equitable distribution of benefits. The power that 
stakeholders have, the way it is manifested, and the way it impacts stakeholder relations are 
discussed in more detail below. 
7.3.3 The Power Landscape 
The distribution of power among stakeholder has had a critical impact on the way in which 
they have interacted with one another. This case is unique among the three that are considered 
in this thesis because of: 
 Private ownership of land and wildlife resources by multiple stakeholders including 
rural communities and a private tourism enterprise 
 High value benefit sharing 
 The use of a community trust that is distinct from community leadership structures 
and 
 The power that community members were given by the national Land Claims Court.  
These two factors have empowered the communities around Phinda Game Reserve. Power is 
thus framed firstly in terms of the law and secondly in terms of the agreement between the 
communities and &Beyond. This order is important because of the significance of the power 
provided by these frames. The law provides for private ownership of land and wildlife. This 
enabled the Makasa and Mnqobokazi communities to open a land claim case in which they 
asserted their historical right to ownership of the land in Phinda Game Reserve. In addition, 
&Beyond runs a successful ecotourism business and this has given them power to negotiate a 
land-use agreement with the local communities. This agreement gives power to &Beyond to 
continue running their business while the local communities are empowered to receive 
increased access to financial benefits accruing from conservation and ecotourism.  
Ownership and a feeling of empowerment was mentioned by three local residents as being 
important factors in helping improve local perceptions of conservation and Phinda Game 
Reserve (Mak-leader2-20141121). &Beyond has actively sought to engender a feeling of 
ownership through the work the Africa Foundation has been doing. The Conservation 
Manager at Phinda Game Reserve said that while the outcome of the two communities‘ land 
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claim cases had certainly increased the general feeling of ownership in the Makasa and 
Mnqobokazi communities, the feeling of ownership has originally come about because of ―a 
lot of the work that [the Foundation] does, and what we do as well is to try and promote the 
positive link between the reserve and the wildlife, and I guess the tourism, and the 
development of the community. School, education, health, small business, which is their 
focus [at the Africa Foundation]‖ (Phinda-employee3-20141122:10). The feeling of 
ownership has enabled trust and a sustainable working relationship between stakeholder 
groups.  
Actual ownership of land and resources has done more than feelings of ownership. The 
shared ownership of land in Phinda has given the community members power to negotiate 
their access to financial profits accruing from the conservation and ecotourism that takes 
place in the reserve. If the community members chose to, they could revoke &Beyond‘s 
access to their land in Phinda or even revert to grazing on the land. In doing so however, they 
would lose access to the benefits they receive from &Beyond‘s successful ecotourism 
business. Similarly &Beyond could stop sharing the benefits of conservation and tourism 
with the communities, but in doing so they would lose access to much of the land in the 
reserve. It is this balance of power that allows the stakeholder groups to make a significant 
offering to each other. 
Despite this, it is more than a matter of power that supports the existence of this co-operative 
arrangement. For example, &Beyond would not stop sharing benefits with local communities 
around Phinda Game Reserve because their business ethos obliges them to share. The 
stakeholders have certain interests and in making these interests clear to one another, they are 
able to build trust. The importance of trust, and its relation to power, are discussed more in 
the following chapter, a cross-case analysis of the three cases considered in this thesis. 
7.3.3.1 Power in the Community 
The local manager of the Africa Foundation is a Zulu man and he described the nuances of 
the local society (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120). Power within the community is 
vested largely in the traditional leadership structures which are headed up by the Chief. The 
community structure is based on traditional Zulu tribal society. The Chief, or iNkosi, receives 
his title by birth-right. The iNkosi then chooses his Headmen, or iziNduna, from among the 
community. These iziNduna represent the community to the iNkosi. They are tasked with 
engaging community members on critical issues and then reporting back to the iNkosi. When 
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outsiders come into the community, whether to live, graze their cattle, get involved in 
community development, or perform any task that might impact the community, they should 
present themselves to the iNkosi to ask his permission beforehand. The iNkosi of the 
community has significant power. 
Historically the common farming practice has been to come together as a community to work 
in communal crop fields (KwaJobe community leader, private communication, 6 December 
2012). A simple drive through the rural communities adjacent to Phinda is enough to see that 
people are increasingly choosing to rather cultivate small patches of maize and other foods on 
their own around their homes, an area of land that was traditionally set aside solely for human 
habitation and cattle grazing. A leader of the KwaJobe community said that not as many of 
the communal fields had been used recently as were used in the past (KwaJobe community 
leader, private communication, 6 December 2012). He indicated that people living in the area 
were not working as hard as they had in years gone by, his suggestion being that money 
received in the form of grants from the South African government leads residents to choose to 
rather grow small crops near to their homes as they are no longer dependent on communal 
agricultural activities. 
The changes mentioned above indicate that the traditional structure remains but people are no 
longer as dependent on the community as they are on their own work and the social grants 
provided by the South African government. These alternatives empower people to improve 
their quality of life on their own. It also signifies subtle changes in local society bode well for 
conservation: While it is no longer as simple as getting the buy-in of community leadership 
structures, it also gives stakeholders access to the greater community where they can get 
wider support. Most importantly, the support of the greater community has been a critical 
factor in maintaining a stable relationship between stakeholders. 
This change in local society brings with it new issues about representation. Whereas 
historically Zulu society considered the inKosi to be the most significant decision maker in a 
community, and this is still largely the case, modern Zulu society and changes to community 
structure engendered in South African law have assigned some power to the non-leadership 
members of communities around Phinda Game Reserve, power that is inherently available to 
the public in democratic systems. This is why some of the residents in these communities 
were not entirely satisfied with the representation that their leaders provided for them. It is 
also why &Beyond or the Africa Foundation should allow for more direct engagement with 
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the community members. 
When asked about the type of governance that was needed to ensure positive working 
relations between the local communities and &Beyond, a resident of Mnqobokazi said: 
The community [leaders] must not be greedy. They must not think about themselves. They must 
think about the people they are representing. As I am talking to you now it is you and me. There 
are none of the community members that are here but all what I am saying is affecting them. So 
the decisions I am taking today, it will affect the next person that is out there. So if I am working 
transparently and honestly, and representing fairly, it will help them and even they will see the 
difference and they will support you (Mnq-leader3-20141121:54). 
He said that governance which served to benefit all community members rather than an elite 
few was the most likely to result in successful working relations, both within and between 
stakeholder groups. Power impacts accountability and accountability impacts stakeholder 
relations. Power distribution in the community is thus a vital factor to consider when studying 
stakeholder relations. 
7.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined social aspects relating to the co-operative natural resource 
management arrangement that exists between &Beyond and local communities around 
Phinda Game Reserve in South Africa. In this chapter, the main findings of a series of 
discussions and interviews were presented. As a chapter in this thesis, the aim was to: 
 List relevant stakeholders, their role in the Phinda Game Reserve, and their interests 
in the resources of the reserve 
 Examine issues relating to the current set of stakeholder relations: 
o Relate important factors affecting the history and current state of co-operation 
between stakeholders 
o Relate the history and current state of benefit sharing between stakeholders 
and 
o Detail the frames of power that shape stakeholder interactions. 
The data that was related was obtained from key informants who provided detailed 
information in in-depth discussions. These informants represented all of the critical 
stakeholders. The data allowed for an examination of the impact that human behaviour has on 
the formation of working relations between stakeholders. Matter which were of particular 
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concern included the nature of communication, the nature of partnerships that exist between 
stakeholders, the use of accountability as a governance tool, sources of opposition to 
partnerships, the impact of benefits on working relations, and the impact of power frames on 
the sustainability of working relations. This data will be used for a comparative analysis in 
the next chapter. It will serve as a successful example of community-based conservation and 
a basis of comparison for the other two cases which have been less successful.  
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CHAPTER 8: WHEN CO-OPERATION WORKS: A COMPARISON OF THREE 
CASES  
8. Introduction 
The previous three chapters dealt with each of the cases in this study: Klein‘s Camp and the 
Ololosokwan community conservancy in the Ngorongoro district of Tanzania; the Mnemba 
Island Marine Conservation Area (MIMCA) on the north-eastern coastline of Unguja, 
Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous archipelago state off the coast of mainland Tanzania in east 
Africa; Phinda Game Reserve, a part of the greater Munyawana Game Reserve in KwaZulu-
Natal province of South Africa. These last three chapters analysed the qualitative data 
obtained in each case to find patterns of association between stakeholder co-operation and 
natural resource governance. Consistencies between participant accounts were revealed in the 
thematic coding of each case dataset. In each of the three cases, consistencies in participant 
accounts showed that co-operation between stakeholders can have a significant impact on the 
sustainable sharing of natural resources. The highlighted consistencies, along with the 
relevant inconsistences that enabled verification of participant accounts, revealed events that 
needed to be analysed in a broader multi-case framework. The findings are discussed as 
results are revealed and compared between cases.  
The aim of this chapter is to discover the extent to which these three cases are similar or 
different to each other46. The similarities and differences will be considered using event 
matching in which events between cases have been matched into sets of factors that influence 
stakeholder relations and ultimately co-operative governance. Sets of factors are presented 
under headings for important topics. The three main topics presented in this chapter (Factors 
affecting stakeholder relations; Conflict; and Trust) represent the main themes of this study 
that have evolved as threads which were found to be consistent in each of the previous three 
chapters. The threads presented here under the main themes emerged as consistent discussion 
points for participants and were found among the commonly occurring codes such as 
benefits: fairness in allocation, impact on behaviour, impact on perceptions, and lack of; 
livelihoods: alternative, and cattle; natural resources: education/awareness on, human impact 
on, management, and ownership; power: in the community, to influence; rules; and relations: 
communication, conflict, leadership, positive, transparency, and trust.  
                                                 
46 The three cases will hereafter be referred to as Klein‘s, Mnemba, and Phinda 
195 
 
As stated, these themes were affected by specific sets of factors; this chapter examines the 
consistency with which specific factors affected patterns of events across the three cases. The 
association of these events, and the reasons that they are important to this study on co-
operative natural resource governance, are discussed below. The chapter following this one 
will conclude this thesis by seeking wider applications for the data and abstracting these 
themes to make recommendations for co-operative governance in settings where private 
ecotourism businesses are able to partner with communities. 
8.1 Factors Affecting Stakeholder Relations 
Stakeholder relationships form the basis of a co-operative strategy in natural resource 
governance. This research found that good working relationships between stakeholders 
typically result in more effective co-operation between stakeholders. These working relations 
can be affected by a variety of factors relating to resources and resource management. In this 
section of the chapter, the results of an associative analysis (in which sets of events were 
matched between the three cases) are presented in order to detect events that are patterned or 
related. Factors affecting relations and co-operative governance were revealed by coding and 
a form of inductive qualitative analysis where the coded data was refined and classified into 
groups. Unfortunately even a summary of the results of this descriptive analysis would be too 
large to include in this thesis due to the sheer volume of data. The main factors or themes 
were similar between cases though there was slight variation due to the semi-structured 
nature of participation in this exploratory study. They were typically the themes that 
participants focused on the most in discussions and the ones that participants rated as the 
most influential on stakeholder relations and the effectiveness of co-operative resource 
governance. The similarities between cases, and the relevant differences, are pointed out 
below. 
8.1.1 Benefits 
Benefit sharing between stakeholders relying on common-pool resources was a factor that 
influenced the nature of co-operation between stakeholders. As described in Chapter 2, 
benefit sharing is a process in which fair trade-offs are made between costs and benefits 
across multiple stakeholder groups (Swemmer et al., 2015). The sharing of benefits between 
stakeholders is important for the sustainability of conservation and tourism because in cases 
where stakeholders feel included and empowered they are more likely to co-operate (Suich, 
2013). Overall, the participants of this study were in agreement that benefits for local 
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people47 were an important part of improving the sustainable use of shared resources. There 
was not one study participant who said that benefits shared with local people were not 
important. 
Like other studies that investigate benefit sharing, this research demonstrated that effective 
benefit sharing occurs when benefit sharing positively affects the state of relations between 
sharing stakeholders (Suich, 2013; Richerzhagen, 2011; Nkhata & Breen, 2010). Similar to 
Suich (2013), this study finds that this can occur when the benefits shared are perceived as 
relevant or important by receiving stakeholders; but when stakeholders present a threat to the 
interests of other stakeholder groups, benefit sharing effectiveness is diminished. This thesis 
shows that where stakeholder interests threaten the interests of other groups, the potential for 
benefit sharing to have a positive impact on relations is decreased; where there is little or no 
positive impact, benefit sharing can be said to be ineffective.  
This study found, like Suich (2013), that the state of co-operation between stakeholders was 
linked to the effectiveness with which tourism operators shared benefits. At Phinda, &Beyond 
has benefit sharing has been empowering, negotiated and inclusive, mechanisms are in place 
to effectively address grievances of other stakeholders, and the results show: their relations 
with local communities are positive. At Klein‘s, &Beyond has performed similarly well and 
relations with the local community are largely positive though there is room for 
improvement. At Mnemba, neither &Beyond nor the other tourism stakeholders were 
capitalising well on the opportunity to share the benefit of conservation and tourism and they 
are not acutely aware of other stakeholders‘ needs or interests. As such, relations between 
tourism/conservation stakeholders and the community members have been poor. In essence, 
stakeholder relations were better, and co-operation was more likely to occur, when benefits 
were shared effectively (Suich, 2013; Richerzhagen, 2011). 
The opportunity to share benefits is an important reason why conservation and tourism 
should remain viable: Despite the fact that in some cases opportunities to share benefits are 
not always used by tourism and conservation stakeholders, the opportunity to share benefits 
and have an impact at the community and individual level remains present. Where 
opportunities are capitalised on, the impact can be significant: Aylward and Lutz. (2003) 
demonstrated that communities around Phinda Game Reserve have benefited from tourism to 
                                                 
47 Those living in or around a protected area who had at one time used the resources which are now protected 
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the area. This study finds similar circumstances in the cases of Klein‘s and Mnemba Island. 
Other than tourism these communities have little economic stimulation due to a lack of 
commercial agriculture and industry. It should be remembered that while natural resources 
are being used for subsistence livelihoods, rapidly increasing populations make the long-term 
sustainability of this less likely over time. Unchecked harvesting of natural resources can 
cause ecosystem collapse (e.g. intensive agriculture and mariculture). As such, growing 
populations mean that sustainable alternatives must be found if these ecosystems are to exist 
for the benefit of generations to come. Conservation, and the resultant tourism, can possibly 
provide sustainable alternatives to subsistence livelihoods (Holmes, 2015). 
Table 5: Summary of common benefit sharing categories across three cases 
Category  
Ololosokwan 
Conservancy Mnemba Island MCA 
Phinda Game 
Reserve 
Fees 
 
Land lease fee is paid by 
&Beyond to the 
community 
 
Land rental paid to 
community trust fund 
 
 
Guest fees are paid to the 
community by the 
Wildlife Division 
  
Land 
Ownership 
 
 
Land owned by local 
community 
 
Two thirds of land owned 
by local communities 
Procurement 
 
Lodge buys locally 
grown vegetables where 
possible 
Lodge buys locally caught fish 
daily 
Lodge building employed 
local people and used 
local materials 
    
Lodges buy local produce 
where available 
Community 
Development 
 
 
Africa Foundation 
partners with &Beyond 
guests for community 
development 
Africa Foundation partners with 
&Beyond guests for community 
development 
Africa Foundation 
partners with &Beyond 
guests for community 
development 
 
 
  
Hospitality training for 
selected high school 
graduates 
Employment 
 
Preferential employment 
of Ololosokwan residents 
Preferential employment of 
Zanzibarians 
Preferential employment 
of residents from 
neighbouring 
communities 
Financial 
Management 
 
 
Financial income from 
tourism managed by 
village council 
Financial income from tourism 
gathered and managed by 
government - benefits often 
withheld 
Fees managed by 
Community Trust - 
management assistance 
from &Beyond 
    
Community Development 
Fund (CDF) established 
by &Beyond 
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8.1.1.1 Opportunities with High-End Tourism 
High-end tourism provides opportunities for benefit sharing that might not be available to 
budget destinations. It is different to the greater tourism industry in that it attracts wealthier 
guests. &Beyond is a high-end tourism operator that attracts wealthier guests; these guests 
have donated funding for the Africa Foundation to aid development in local communities. In 
the Klein‘s and Mnemba cases, there is also enough income from lodge guests for &Beyond 
to pay a lease fee for the land the lodges are built on. At Phinda, &Beyond was able to make a 
capital pay-out to the two communities that opened a land claim in the Land Reform Court of 
South Africa over Phinda Game Reserve. In his book The Full Circle (2007), David Varty48 
explains that this is less to do with financial profit than it is to do with the business model and 
the financial standing of the guests that a tourism business attracts.  
David Varty was a pioneer in the neoliberalisation of conservation in Africa (Varty, 2007). 
He, along with the help of others, established Phinda Game Reserve. As was explained in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis, the process required considerable financial investment which Varty 
and his partners procured internationally. Despite this investment, the business was not 
profitable in the early years due to high operating costs and low occupancy. Funding for 
benefit sharing in the form of community development came from donors due to high 
financial liability of the business. This model proved to be successful and continues to be 
used by &Beyond and the Africa Foundation today. It is a model for benefit sharing that has 
been applied in other scenarios (Duffy, 2008; Honey, 2008; Beeton, 2006). The guests are an 
important financial resource to community development through donations. This model can 
work at high-end destinations, or perhaps destinations that have a high volume of guests, but 
might not be applicable to destinations which are for those on a budget and/or have low 
tourist volumes. It might not also apply to government owned protected areas like national 
parks which have different forms of governance and income. 
A similar scenario exists at Klein‘s Camp in the Ololosokwan conservancy: in this case 
benefit sharing is factored into the cost of guest accommodation. This method has been used 
successfully in other areas like the Anjajavy Resort in Madagascar (Duffy, 2008). As in other 
cases, guests provide donor funding for community development. At Klein‘s, &Beyond pays 
an additional land lease fee directly to the community for renting the conservancy. This land 
                                                 
48 One of the founders of &Beyond, or Conservation Corporation Africa (CCA) as it was then called 
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lease fee is factored into the cost of accommodation and so it does not affect capital flow in 
&Beyond finances, but it does affect what the guests pay per night. In order to pay this lease 
for the Ololosokwan conservancy in 2018, if occupancy49 is 100% annually (which it is not) 
then &Beyond will pay US$7.85c per guest per night. With a drop in occupancy comes an 
exponential increase in the amount that must be paid per guest per night, as high as 
US$78.50c if occupancy were a mere 10% annually. For budget tourism destinations that do 
not attract wealthy guests, or for new destinations that might have low occupancy for some 
time, this model of factoring financial benefit sharing into the cost of guest fees might not be 
viable to the same degree that &Beyond contributes at Klein‘s Camp. 
8.1.1.2 Management of Benefits 
This study demonstrated that a lack of accountability in benefit management impacted the 
effectiveness of benefit sharing. Where benefits were not managed transparently, community 
stakeholders typically had poor perceptions of conservation and tourism stakeholders, and co-
operation was poor or non-existent. This was the same as Nkhata and Breen‘s (2010) findings 
in a co-operative resource management scheme in Zambia: non-transparency on the 
distribution of revenue and non-transfer of management powers to local communities reduced 
the effectiveness of the co-operative arrangement. Along with findings from Nkhata and 
Breen (2010), Nkhata et al. (2012), and Dzingirai and Breen (2005), this study has 
demonstrated that government stakeholders typically exhibit low accountability, particularly 
at the level of national government. It was also found that devolving governance powers to 
community level increased community stakeholders‘ willingness to co-operate. In the three 
cases of this study it should be noted that: 
 The South African government was not at all involved in the sharing of benefits at 
Phinda Game Reserve because the land is privately owned; it is worthwhile noting 
that in this case benefits were managed the most effectively of all three cases 
 There was partial involvement from the Tanzanian national government in the 
Ololosokwan wildlife conservancy at Klein‘s: The Wildlife Division collected fees 
from &Beyond for each guest that stayed at the Klein‘s Camp lodge. Sixty-five 
percent of those fees were then paid to the village council because the tourists were 
                                                 
49 Occupancy is the ratio of occupied beds per night to the number of beds available; 100% occupancy annually 
means that all beds are occupied every night of the year. 
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accommodated on village land. The village council then had authority over the use of 
those funds in the community. This differs from cases where government has full 
control like the Mnemba case or the Zambian case described by Nkhata and Breen 
(2010): where government has full control over financial income from tourism, 
benefit sharing has typically been less effective and 
 The Tanzanian government had full power over financial income from tourism in the 
MIMCA: While in the Draft General Management Plan (MCU, 2010) for the MIMCA 
it was stated that 70% of tourism income would be reserved by the authority for 
community development, communities along the MIMCA coastline reported that they 
had received no financial income or other benefit from tourism to the Marine 
Conservation Area (MCA). In other similar cases across Africa, full government 
control over financial income from tourism has led to poor outcomes for co-operative 
natural resource management (Burgoyne, Kelso & Mearns, 2017; Nkhata et al., 
2012). 
The similarity between the two Tanzanian cases is government involvement in benefit 
management. In both cases there are issues with accountability and transparency, negatively 
affecting perceptions of conservation and tourism. This lack of accountability caused conflict 
between stakeholders over the management of financial income from tourism. This conflict 
had ramifications for the effectiveness of working relations and the sustainability of resource 
use in or around the two Tanzanian protected areas considered.  
In cases where governing actors cannot be held accountable for the management of benefits, 
co-operation between stakeholders will likely be negatively affected. By contrast, the two 
communities neighbouring Phinda Game Reserve that had received financial benefit from 
tourism managed these finances with an elected board that was independent of community 
leadership. They were held accountable by community leaders and the community at large for 
their management of what was recognised as being an asset of the community. This case 
suggests that where accountability and transparency exist, co-operation is likely to as well. 
For benefit sharing to be effective, the management of benefits should provide equitable 
opportunities for all members of the receiving stakeholder group (Suich, 2013). For example 
in the communities around Phinda, when community members recognised leaders as being 
partial towards specific community members in benefit sharing, for example in choosing 
people for employment opportunities in community funded developments, the aggrieved 
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community members spoke with community leaders and the issue was resolved amicably 
(Mak-leader2-20141121). Two key factors affecting the effectiveness of benefit sharing in 
this example were that information was freely available through transparent management and 
that conflicts over benefit management could be resolved. These two factors were linked to 
the largely positive community perceptions of benefits that &Beyond shared with 
communities around Phinda. 
Another significant difference was that in the communities around Phinda Game Reserve, 
&Beyond had helped to establish a financial management framework, a framework that 
required accountability and transparency. They were not able to help establish (or did not 
think of establishing) such a framework for the communities living near Klein‘s or Mnemba 
Island. The Phinda case differed from the Klein‘s case because in the Ololosokwan 
community, management of finances was ultimately at the behest of the village council (Olo-
leader6-20150422). It also differed from the MIMCA where there was no reported or 
observable framework for the management of income from tourism. These cases highlight the 
importance of good financial governance over public funds, fairness in the allocation of those 
funds, and a means to resolve conflict over fund management. Where management was 
transparent benefits could be shared effectively, but where benefit management was not 
transparent sharing was less effective. In similar circumstances, Nkhata et al. (2012) 
described cases where there was no working framework that created transparency in the 
management of financial income from tourism; this study suggests that in cases where there 
is no effectively implemented framework, financial management typically leads to 
marginalisation of stakeholder groups that lack power to influence management. 
8.1.1.3 Perceived Importance of Benefits 
In this study, benefits had varying effects on local peoples‘ perceptions of other stakeholders, 
conservation, and tourism depending on the perceived importance of those benefits. Benefits 
can be shared in a number of ways and some stakeholder groups (typically rural 
communities) receive shared benefits from those with power to administer those benefits (in 
this study typically government, whether centralised or local-level). As Swemmer et al. 
(2015) pointed out, if the benefits shared are perceived as important by those receiving they 
will be more likely to have a positive impact on receivers‘ perceptions of conservation and 
tourism; the converse is also true in that benefits viewed as not being significant will likely 
have no impact on perceptions, or the impact might be negative. This is why engaging with 
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receiving stakeholders about their interests is so important: it can have a serious impact on 
co-operation and working relations between those stakeholders (Swemmer et al., 2015). 
Benefit sharing is more effective when the benefits shared are perceived as important by 
those receiving them. 
Benefits that were viewed by local people as being most important had the longest lasting 
impact. In the case of Phinda, this was ownership of the land and a substantial financial 
contribution in the form of a community development fund. In the cases of the Klein‘s Camp 
and Mnemba Island MCA, this related to the management of financial income from tourism; 
in the former case it was land rental payments by &Beyond and in the latter case it was fees 
paid by tourists visiting the MCA. These were the most frequently discussed issues with the 
most significant impact on perceptions. In summary, if benefit sharing is to be effective then 
stakeholders with power over resources should engage other stakeholders about their interests 
(Swemmer et al., 2015). In order to do this there must be good governance where 
stakeholders are transparent, do not use their power to unfairly exert their will, and 
communicate openly and frequently. 
8.1.2 Governance 
The actions of governing actors had an impact on the perceptions of local people that I spoke 
with in the three cases of this study. This was the case with centralized government, such as 
TANAPA, the Wildlife Division in the Ololosokwan conservancy and the MIMCA 
management authority in Zanzibar, and with local community-level government, such as the 
village council in Ololosokwan as well as the Sheha’s and fishermen‘s committees in 
Zanzibar. Where governance of resources was not transparent, was not inclusive, and where 
leadership was thought by local people to be dishonest, working relations between 
stakeholder groups were typically strained. 
8.1.2.1 Accountability and Transparency 
Participants from tourism and community stakeholder groups spoke about the important roles 
of accountability and transparency in effective governance. This study provides evidence to 
rebut Larson and Soto‘s (2008) and Ribot‘s (1999) idea that elected local governments are 
more likely to downwardly accountable than unelected local authorities like chiefs or 
unelected user committees. The three cases in study demonstrated that elected local 
governments can show an equal lack of accountability compared to unelected authorities. 
This lack of accountability negatively impacted perceptions and relationships leaving 
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constituents feeling helpless. 
In all three cases, residents of communities who were not in leadership positions had little or 
no power to enforce accountability of those who were responsible for managing income from 
tourism. In the two Tanzanian cases, those responsible for managing tourism income were 
largely not holding themselves accountable to community members. As a result, local 
perceptions of those managing the funds were mixed but strongly biased to the negative in 
both cases. This result matches other similar case studies (Khatun et al., 2015; Agrawal & 
Ribot, 1999). In the case of the MIMCA, the financial manager was the MIMCA Authority 
and in the case Klein‘s this was the village council. In the two communities neighboring 
Phinda Game Reserve that received financial benefits, Makasa and Mnqobokazi, the fund 
managers were separate to community leadership and accountable to the community at large 
for fund management. In this case, conflict over the management of funds accruing from 
tourism and conservation was significantly lower than in the other two cases in this study. 
One of the important findings about management of communal finances was that the 
development of a financial management framework by a separate private stakeholder 
improved governance. Moreover it is important to note that this framework was developed 
with assistance from another stakeholder which wielded influence due to financial benefit 
sharing. When &Beyond gave SAR23 million to the Makasa and Mnqobokazi communities 
for the establishment of two respective community trust funds in 2007, &Beyond specified 
that: 
 The trusts should be managed by entities separate from community leadership 
 They would be audited by external accountants 
 The trustees would receive training on trust management and 
 They would be held accountable to the community on fund management and use at 
annual community meetings. 
While &Beyond helped the trustees with accounting in the first few years of their 
management of the two funds, this role has decreased over time leaving the trustees with 
experience and a structure for management and accountability (Phinda-employee3-
20141122). By contrast when &Beyond established the MIMCA fund by gathering tourist 
visitation fees in the MCA, &Beyond was initially responsible for gathering and managing 
those funds. The plan was to transition to a sustainable community governance structure. This 
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situation quickly changed when the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar established the 
MIMCA Authority and took over gathering and management of those funds. Although 
&Beyond had participated in the establishment of the MCA, they were not able to help the 
MIMCA Authority establish a financial management framework in the way they did with the 
two communities at Phinda Game Reserve. There is no observable management framework, 
no horizontal or downward accountability, and no transparency; the level of conflict is 
concurrently high. 
Similarly in the Ololosokwan community, &Beyond did not help to establish a framework for 
the management of community income from &Beyond. A managing body already existed in 
the form of the village council, but they do always not operate according to their spending 
mandate. There is no specific framework. As such accountability has varied over time. 
Similar to a case study of participatory forest management in Tanzania (Khatun et al., 2015), 
when financial management was more transparent, conflict was simultaneously low across all 
three cases; conversely when transparency was low conflict increased. A financial 
management framework which requires accountability and transparency is obviously 
preferable. One of the arguments of this thesis is that tourism stakeholders that have influence 
over community stakeholders due to financial benefit sharing can help improve local people‘s 
perceptions of conservation and tourism by helping communities develop independent 
governance structures that require accountability and transparency. Through this they could 
achieve long-term stability in working relations. 
8.1.2.2 Representation 
Another recurring topic among participants from the communities living in each case was 
representation of constituents by leadership. Fraser (2009) recognises representation as one of 
the three critical dimensions of justice. This study reinforces the notion that representation of 
stakeholder group constituents is a critical part of equitable resource governance. Problems 
with representation were evident in varying degrees in all three cases. Local people from 
communities in all three cases stated that their elected leadership did not always take note of 
what the community members had to say; this irked community members who participated in 
this research (Olo-community24-20150420; Mak-leader1-20141121). It was recognised by 
these participants that elected leaders were in a position of greater power and so they did not 
openly challenge poor representation of their interests (Olo-community23-20150420; Mak-
leader1-20141121). Representation had an impact on working relations within stakeholder 
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groups and also affected perceptions and relations between stakeholder groups. Poor 
representation, in both the Mnemba and Klein‘s cases, was linked to negative perceptions of 
community level leadership and conservation stakeholders (Olo-community8-20150427; Olo-
community24-20150420).  
Representation directly affected trust. Low levels of trust in elected community leadership 
and MIMCA Authorities was frequently mentioned by fishermen living in the MIMCA 
(&Beyond-employee6-20150316; Matem-community46-20150506). Their low levels of trust 
resulted from poor representation of their interests, at local government level and to other 
stakeholders, and low levels of accountability in lieu of poor representation. They had no 
access to information and felt that their interests were not being expressed to other 
stakeholders by the elected leadership. Similar to findings by other researchers (Larson and 
Soto, 2008; Lebel et al., 2006), this study demonstrates that in order for there to be more 
sustainable governance of resources, individuals charged with governance need to be good 
representatives of stakeholder interests particularly in communities where the stakeholder 
group is complex and non-homogeneous. This follows the pattern of stakeholder interaction 
at Phinda Game Reserve: representatives communicate openly with all stakeholder groups 
about their constituents‘ interests and are then held accountable to their constituents in what 
they have achieved (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120). Good governance requires 
good representation of the varied interests among community members: in the instances 
where community members felt better represented, such as in the Makasa and Mnqobokazi 
communities of the Phinda case, they had better perceptions of other stakeholders. Effective 
representation was associated with better co-operation between stakeholder groups in the 
sustainable management of natural resources. 
8.1.2.3 Communication 
Quality communication between stakeholders is critical to effective resource governance. 
Flintan (2001) found that community resource management programmes in Namibia which 
were not performing according to expectations typically had difficulties with communication 
between stakeholders. Evidence from this thesis suggests the amount and quality50 of 
communication within and between stakeholder groups has an impact on the quality of 
                                                 
50 Higher quality communication means that relevant information is shared and stakeholders feel well informed. 
Low quality communication lacks information and leaves stakeholders feeling uninformed. 
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stakeholder co-operation. Community members in Makasa and Mnqobokazi communities 
outside Phinda Game Reserve had a positive perception of relations with &Beyond and the 
Africa Foundation because of frequent communication of relevant information (Mak-leader1-
20141121). At Klein‘s, residents of the Ololosokwan community who felt communications 
were not frequent enough had poorer perceptions of &Beyond (Olo-community1-20150415). 
In the case of the Mnemba Island MCA, poor communication with communities was linked 
to ineffective and unsustainable resource management. Where communication was poor or 
infrequent, there were also typically problems with accountability and transparency resulting 
in poor co-operation; where stakeholders communicated effectively and frequently with each 
other, and representatives with their constituents, there was a higher level of accountability 
and transparency allowing co-operation to occur. 
Less effective communication within stakeholder groups had a direct impact on the state of 
working relations with other stakeholder groups. Gruber (2010) states that communication is 
one of the adaptive leadership skills that is necessary for representatives and leaders of 
stakeholder groups that interact over natural resource use and management. In Ololosokwan 
near Klein‘s Camp, residents said that the village council did not communicate effectively 
with them about the contract with &Beyond or financial income from &Beyond and the 
Wildlife Division. This had a negative impact on perceptions of, and relations with, &Beyond 
because it influenced residents to take their cattle to graze in the conservancy without 
discretion (Olo-community16-20150420). In both the Klein‘s and Mnemba cases, poor 
communication between community leaders and community members was linked to negative 
perceptions of conservation, negative working relations between stakeholder groups, and 
poor adherence to resource management schemes. While it has been demonstrated that 
communication alone does not necessarily cause a change in stakeholder behavior (Watson et 
al., 2015), this study shows that effective communication within stakeholder groups is a 
necessary precursor to co-operation. 
It was explicitly stated by participants from multiple stakeholder groups in all cases that 
communication could be used as a means to improve working relations between stakeholders 
(Olo-community2-20150416; Kig-community19-20150313; Phinda-management2-2014112 
1). They also mentioned that the manner of communication was significant in improving 
perceptions between stakeholders, e.g. asking for help as opposed to imposing agendas. The 
following examples illustrate the connection between effective communication and positive 
working relations:  
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 Community members and leaders from the Phinda case said that communication with 
&Beyond was frequent and they were pleased with this – leaders felt they could 
contact &Beyond at any time and get a response (Mak-leader2-20141121) 
 Leaders in the Ololosokwan community near Klein‘s were pleased with the level of 
communication with &Beyond, except the average resident did not feel the same way. 
It was said by at least one Ololosokwan resident that only leaders could speak with 
&Beyond representatives, hence the lack of consensus about the conservancy across 
the community (Olo-community24-20150420) 
 In the Klein‘s case, communication between Buffalo Camp and the community was 
infrequent and was more often about negative issues; with the OBC there was little or 
no communication. Relations with these two operators and the community were poor 
 In the Mnemba case communication between stakeholders in the MIMCA was 
infrequent and relations were poor (&Beyond-management1-20150321) and 
 In both the Klein‘s and Mnemba cases, the Tanzanian government communicated 
infrequently with other stakeholders and it was one-sided – it was said by some that 
they could not initiate successful contact with government representatives (Mbuu-
community53-20150502; Matem-leader1-20150502).  
The same pattern was found in all three cases: frequency of communication; reciprocity in 
initiating contact; and quality of communication (or information sharing) were factors linked 
to the state of working relations. These were important factors in explaining positive working 
relations and effective co-operation between stakeholder groups 
8.1.3 Natural Resources 
In all three cases, local people had a high dependence on natural resources for their 
livelihoods. In the two Tanzanian cases, those resources were under threat from over-use due 
to growing populations (Bartels, 2014; Johansen and Kennedy, 2014; LaPlante, 2014). While 
the number of cattle in Ololosokwan fluctuated year on year, the increasing human 
population meant that the number of cattle would correspondingly increase because breeding 
cattle is the main livelihood. The number of fishermen was increasing in the MIMCA due to 
the human population outgrowing the economy – a lack of formal employment meant that 
fishing has been one of the only livelihoods available to the growing local population. In the 
communities around Phinda Game Reserve, people were vulnerable to climate variations like 
drought and households reported being without water frequently (Phinda-employee2-
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20141122). In summary, people engaged in natural resource based livelihoods were 
vulnerable to changes in the natural resource base. In each of these cases, there has been 
conflict over natural resource use which has been influenced by these vulnerabilities. A study 
on conflict in Loliondo by Rurai (2012) showed similar findings: The limited ability of 
natural resources to support subsistence livelihoods and a lack of alternatives to natural-
resource based livelihoods were factors that have played a pivotal role in conflict. This 
knowledge warranted an evaluation of the impact that the state and management of natural 
resources had on stakeholder relations in each case. 
8.1.3.1 State of Resources 
In all three cases natural resources around the protected areas were undergoing change due to 
over-use and the resultant degradation of ecosystem processes. Natural resources both within 
and around the protected areas were under threat due to increasing demands from subsistence 
harvesting and agricultural activity, though in the case of Phinda Game Reserve resources 
within the reserve were under significantly less threat relatively speaking due to access 
restriction. In addition, the state of natural resources in and around the three protected areas 
had an impact on the state of stakeholders‘ relations: greater rates of resource degradation 
were typically associated with more conflict and poorer relations.  
One might argue that the conservancy reduces community access to grazing land, having a 
direct impact on the state of resources and the level of conflict between stakeholders. While 
the presence of the conservancy in the Klein‘s case does have an impact on population 
density in the Ololosokwan community, even if the conservancy were to be removed the issue 
of overpopulation would become relevant again in future years as the population continues to 
increase. This point was recognised by the local herdsmen (Olo-community10-20150423). 
Thus the issue of resource overuse is something worth resolving now and does not warrant 
the removal of the conservancy. 
The situation in the Mnemba Island MCA is similar to Ololosokwan: local people need 
alternatives to natural resource dependence to ensure sustainability. This is because existing 
resources are being subjected to increasing levels of subsistence use by the growing numbers 
of local fishermen. There are currently few alternatives available and financial income from 
tourism to the MCA has not been used effectively to generate widespread access to 
alternative livelihoods. The fishermen explicitly said that the lack of alternatives drove them 
to go fishing in the MCA despite the decreasing fishing yields. A lack of benefit sharing in 
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both Tanzanian cases has also contributed to resource decline and in the Mnemba case has 
created a scenario that resembles Hardin‘s (1968) Tragedy of the Commons. 
The availability of alternative livelihoods could decrease the potential anthropogenic threat 
posed to natural resources. In the Klein‘s case local people reported that the younger 
generation was beginning to earn money in ways that were not related to breeding cattle: 
trading food and household goods, transport using motorbikes, processing grain, building 
houses, and more (Olo-leader8-20150417). However in the MIMCA, local people reported 
that there were no alternatives to fishing. They used the same equipment that had been 
available for the last few decades and visited the same fishing spots that had been used for 
what has possibly been centuries (&Beyond-employee5-20150316). In the Mnemba and 
Klein‘s cases where there was no fencing like around Phinda, the overuse of natural resources 
around protected areas was linked to the threat of decline inside the protected areas. Hence 
biodiversity, and the dependent tourism industry, would be at risk.  
While it is difficult to compare the rate of resource decline in the two Tanzanian cases, the 
threat of ecosystem collapse around Mnemba Island is most likely the highest of the three 
cases due to overuse (EcoAfrica, 2005). Moreover stakeholder relations in this case were the 
poorest. In Ololosokwan village at Klein‘s, the threat of an ecosystem collapse occurring on 
community land outside the conservancy is mitigated by an increasing set of alternative 
livelihoods and a flow of benefit from conservation and tourism in the conservancy. Another 
point was made by an employee of &Beyond at Klein‘s Camp who was also a long time 
resident of the Ololosokwan community. He said that the main difficulty in improving natural 
resource management in Ololosokwan is less to do with a lack of alternative livelihoods than 
it is to do with the cultural dedication of the Maasai to their cattle (&Beyond-employee2-
20150429). Culture certainly plays a role in the Klein‘s case and it is playing a role in 
determining the future of conservation and tourism in the Ololosokwan conservancy. Overall, 
natural resources in and around protected areas were under threat in both Tanzanian cases and 
these were the cases with the least co-operation occurring between stakeholders. 
8.1.3.2 Management 
Difficulties in the management of natural resources were linked to both stakeholder 
relationships as well as the relationships within stakeholder groups. The relationships that 
existed between stakeholders, and the nature of their co-operation or lack thereof, had a major 
impact on the use and management of those resources. Typically where people from local 
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communities felt they did not receive their fair benefit from conservation and tourism, they 
showed little thought for the management of natural resources. In Klein‘s case, a portion of 
the community felt that they were not receiving their fair share of benefit. Thus they took 
their cattle to graze on the conservancy. This scenario was more extreme at Mnemba Island 
where most of the local population felt they did not receive their fair share of benefits and 
they said that this drove them to fish inside the MCA without concern for sustainability. This 
was different in the Phinda case however, where not only did most of the local people feel 
fairly dealt with but they also had no direct access to biodiversity or control over 
management decisions inside the game reserve – the reserve is fenced. 
The defining of roles in natural resource management in the Phinda case51 has played an 
important part in reducing the level of conflict occurring between &Beyond and the local 
communities around the reserve. &Beyond manages the reserve for their own benefit and the 
benefit of the community. When asking the biodiversity manager at Phinda Game Reserve if 
there was conflict over natural resources in the reserve he pointed out that unlike Tanzania 
where there are no fences, Phinda is fenced and the issue of resource management and use 
has been settled (Phinda-management2-20141121). This is a similar scenario to the 
Ololosokwan conservancy where issues relating to resource management and use have been 
settled but poor access control subsequent to role definition has led to conflict over these 
issues – some people feel they should be allowed to graze in the conservancy during dry 
season, while &Beyond feel it is not fair that people are frequently bringing cattle into the 
fringes of the conservancy near the lodge. Similarly in the Mnemba case, issues relating to 
resource management in the MCA were apparently settled in the Draft General Management 
Plan (MCU, 2010), but a lack of observable implementation has created conflict. In all three 
cases definition and fulfilment of stakeholder roles contributed to more effective governance. 
Child (2003) stated that the key to smooth operations in Zimbabwe‘s famed CAMPFIRE 
programme was clear definition of roles and expectations. Fabricius and Collins (2007) 
propose that well-defined roles and responsibilities are a key part of co-operative governance 
strategy. This study provides evidence for this idea, adding that role definition alone is not 
enough when there is no accountability for fulfilment of responsibilities. 
In all three cases, governance of land around protected areas lacked a working framework. 
This, along with increasing populations, has likely been responsible for an increasing 
                                                 
51 Biodiversity management inside the reserve done by &Beyond, outside the reserve by community government 
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intensity of subsistence land-use within or on the immediate boundary of the two Tanzanian 
protected areas in this study. In the Klein‘s case, the governance of resources around the 
conservancy was at community level whereas in the Mnemba case a separate central 
government authority was responsible for governance. In the Mnemba case in particular, a 
lack of observable governance of marine resources in the MCA caused not only decline in the 
state of natural resources leaving coastal communities vulnerable, but it has also caused 
serious conflict between stakeholders. These cases demonstrate that government (whether 
local or central) was less effective at governance than private entities whose community (e.g. 
Makasa and Mnqobokazi at Phinda) or business (e.g. &Beyond) depends on effective long-
term management of natural resources.  
Natural resource management can be difficult where there is low awareness about decreasing 
resource levels. Almost every one of the participating Morran in Ololosokwan said that 
during the rainy years there was enough grazing for all the cattle in the community. While the 
younger generation stated that soil erosion was a problem, they did not mention land 
degradation due to changing land-cover, soil compaction, or decreasing soil fertility. While 
the younger generation thought it was best to reduce the number of cattle in order to reduce 
pressure on the environment, there was little recognition of the fact that higher quality breeds 
consume more forage leading to a similar set of problems around decreasing graze quality 
(Olo-leader8-20150417). There was a similar lack of recognition about decreasing marine 
resource abundance in the communities along the MIMCA coastline in Zanzibar. According 
to Lockwood et al. (2010) this lack of awareness shows that communication between 
stakeholders is poor. This study supports this argument: The Phinda case provides evidence to 
suggest that where information about resource management is communicated to improve 
environmental awareness, resource users are willing to adjust their behaviour provided they 
trust the information bearers. In the Klein‘s case certain community members recognised that 
there have been issues with their patterns of natural resource use but also state they do not 
have the knowledge, skills or resources to effect community-wide change. A lack of 
stakeholder communication stunts possible change effected by increased awareness. 
In both the Mnemba and Klein‘s cases, a lack of awareness about resource decline had an 
impact on management of resources. Resource users were not aware that the resources upon 
which they depend could one day be entirely expended, thus they did not manage their use 
effectively. A paucity of alternatives along with persistent poverty were also partly 
responsible for this lack of self-management in resource usage and greater awareness might 
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not be able to change behaviour while these two problems remain. In the Mnemba case a lack 
of benefit sharing provided no incentive for people to manage their marine resource use. The 
lack of self-management and communal management had a direct impact on the state of 
stakeholder relationships. Co-operative management of resources based on a framework in 
which there are norms and enforceable rules is a vital part of developing positive working 
relationships between stakeholders. 
8.1.4 Power 
8.1.4.1 Framing Power 
Similar to findings by Castro and Nielson (2003), this study found that the ways in which 
stakeholders use power to influence their interactions with each other has a direct impact on 
the outcome of co-operation for natural resource management. In the previous three chapters 
there was discussion of how power was framed by stakeholders. In all three cases the law was 
one of the main means of framing power at the local level. In both Tanzania and South Africa 
the law enables vertical governance in communities, a process through which higher levels of 
the community hierarchy are able to dictate in a top-down manner and the lower levels of the 
community hierarchy are expected to comply. This contrasts with a horizontal decision 
making process where consensus is required among negotiating parties. While the community 
members in all three cases are able to share ideas with their local leaders during community 
meetings, residents of all the communities participating in this study spoke of having little or 
no influence in the decisions made by the chairperson or chief of their community (Mak-
leader1-20141121; Matem-community47-20150502; Olo-community24-20150420). As was 
found in Zimbabwe (Harrison et al., 2015), decentralized natural resource management in 
Tanzania can create a differential power distribution that lacks inclusiveness. 
In Tanzania, power to manage resources above soil on community land is in the hands of 
community level government. While community leaders should consult their constituents 
(and in Maasai culture this is required), community leaders are enabled to make the final 
decisions. As argued by Harrison et al. (2015), a decentralised system which gives decision 
making authority to community government allows for the co-opting of benefits by powerful 
figures. This decentralized vertical governance system is framed by the law of Tanzania. A 
similar vertical system also exists in South Africa. The community level government has 
significantly more power than ordinary community members because national and traditional 
law puts power over community resource management in the hands of a tribal chief. While 
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the chief will at times consider the input of the people he governs, a local Zulu man told me 
the final decision all comes ―down to the chief‖ (AfricaFoundation-employee2-
20141120:13). Thus for there to be equity in governance systems, the governing authorities 
would need to be responsive to their constituents. 
It would appear that the balance of power to make decisions over resources that communities 
depend on resides with the government, whether at community or national level. While 
power is theoretically in the hands of community residents because residents are able to elect 
their leaders, representation and responsiveness were not always sufficient to make this ideal 
a reality. Additionally, it was apparent that poor representation and poor responsiveness from 
elected leaders were not challenged by constituents because of 1) the vertical governance 
structure placing power in the upper hierarchy as well as 2) the perception among ordinary 
community members that they were essentially powerless (Matem-community49-20150502; 
Olo-community24-20150420). 
Community leaders assigned the power to govern, and those that align closely with them, 
were the people who wielded the most influence over the management of natural resources, 
tourism, conservation, and the benefits arising from these. The cause of this was the 
governance structures created by legal frameworks and traditional law. These frameworks 
played a significant part in framing the power landscape and stakeholder interactions. Just as 
Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012) argued, this study finds that the issue of resource 
ownership and how it is framed have been highly influential factors that have defined the way 
that stakeholders interact with each other over natural resource management and benefit 
sharing. 
8.1.4.2 Power Over Land and Resources 
The ownership of land and biodiversity was one of the most significant contributors to 
conflict in this research. It gave power to stakeholders in various ways. In the three cases 
studied in this research, the resources being contested were land and biodiversity, including 
flora and fauna. The legal frameworks of South Africa and Tanzania enable non-government 
ownership of land. In South Africa the Game Theft Act of 1991 enables private ownership of 
biodiversity including wildlife, while in Tanzania the Village Land Act of 1999 enables 
communities to register as villages and communally own the land on which they live. This is 
relevant because of the following:  
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 Marine resources along the coastline of Zanzibar do not fall within the scope of 
village land and so are managed by the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar; 
residents of coastal communities in Zanzibar acknowledged that the government owns 
the resources and they have no power over their management (Kig-community40-
20150313). The government is not required by law to share any benefit accruing from 
tourism to public protected areas because there is no legal framework for the 
communal ownership of marine and coastal resources. Local people did, however, 
consistently state that their historical dependence on those resources should allow 
them access to the benefits of tourism that uses those resources (Kig-leader2-
20150323). While the government acknowledged that argument in the MIMCA Draft 
General Management Plan (MCU, 2010), their behaviour has not been aligned with 
this acknowledgement due to the lack of observable benefit sharing 
 In Ololosokwan the land has been registered as village land under the Village Land 
Act of 1999 and as such is the communal property of the people living in 
Ololosokwan, to be administered by them through their elected village council. The 
government therefore has no control over land-use within Ololosokwan boundaries. 
Their power over land is low, but their control over wildlife is greater due to the 
Wildlife Act of 1974 which makes the Wildlife Division of the Tanzanian government 
responsible for wildlife management. As such they are able to collect fees from 
tourism operations relating to wildlife but their control over land-use decisions, such 
as entering an agreement with a foreign tourism operation to rent village land, has 
been limited. Ownership of village land gave the community power to negotiate a 
lease and benefit sharing with &Beyond and 
 The Land Restitution Act of 1994 in South Africa gave the communities of 
Mnqobokazi and Makasa power to claim ownership of land within Phinda Game 
Reserve. &Beyond settled this claim and this land ownership gave the communities 
power to negotiate benefit sharing between &Beyond and the communities around 
Phinda. The ability &Beyond has to generate financial income from that land in 
Phinda game them power to negotiate with the communities. 
While the contract between &Beyond and the Ololosokwan community does not have a legal 
foundation and it can be cancelled by either party at any time, it is useful for framing power 
because it results in significant financial contributions to the community. Without this 
contract the community would have much less in the way of development funds. By contrast, 
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the land title owned by Buffalo Camp does have a legal foundation and trespassers can be 
ordered off the land. This title is a source of conflict though, with community members 
saying the land was not acquired through due legal process. These agreements are both used 
to create power – one by financial means and the other by legal means. &Beyond has been 
the more powerful stakeholder as a result of the means they use to frame power: financial 
gain is a powerful motivator for under-resourced people and has been shown to impact 
perceptions (García-Amado, Pérez & García, 2013).  
The nature of land ownership and use has had an impact on the level of power that 
stakeholders have. Like this study, Harrison et al. (2015) found that land/resource ownership 
and user rights were one of the key conditions associated with successful CBNRM practice in 
Zimbabwe. Similar to numerous other studies conducted in Tanzania (Downie, Dearden & 
King 2018; Bluwstein, 2017; Bluwstein, Moyo & Kicheleri, 2016; Green & Adams, 2014), 
this study suggests that decentralised authority (or private ownership) over land and resources 
in Tanzania can create a differential power landscape which allows stakeholders to negotiate 
for terms of co-operation that meet their interests. As with Harrison et al. (2015), this thesis 
argues that decentralisation can be a poor long-term solution where authorities to whom 
power has been decentralised are not accountable. By contrast devolution that gives 
communities legal rights over resources and provides mechanisms for all constituents to 
participate will likely yield more positive long-term results. 
8.1.4.3 Financial Power 
In all three cases, financial resources have been both contested and used as a tool to influence 
other stakeholders. This is similar to another recent study in Tanzania where foreign tourism 
investors were said to be using money to influence the decision making of community 
stakeholders (Bluwstein, 2017). In the Mnemba Island MCA, money has been contested by 
communities and government: the financial income from tourism to the MCA has been a 
cause of conflict for over a decade. One participant, a young fisherman from Kigomani, said 
that the MIMCA authority had used this financial income (which would be substantial 
compared to average personal income in Zanzibar) to influence the decisions of community-
level politicians and those involved in resource governance at this level (Kig-community41-
20150506). Similarly in the Klein‘s case, an Ololosokwan resident mentioned the use of food 
to influence residents of the community (see Chapter 5). While this is not money, it is equally 
powerful in a community where food is not always easily obtainable. Similar to findings by 
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Bluwstein (2017), this study demonstrates that money and other associated benefits are 
powerful motivators for those who are under-resourced and they can be used as a tool to 
influence decision making, both within and between stakeholder groups. 
An analysis of the impact had by legal frameworks controlling the ownership of land and 
biodiversity is important because it can help stakeholders in these cases, or other cases 
around the world, to analyse the legal frameworks they operate within and determine how to 
operate in a way that would benefit stakeholder groups in a fair manner, thus reducing 
conflict and increasing the likelihood of sustainable resource use. In some cases a basic 
analysis would also be able to show where legal frameworks give too much power to one 
particular group, or where there is not enough of a framework to structure sustainable long-
term working relations that would mitigate conflict and ensure fairness. In this study, legal 
frameworks did give certain stakeholder more power than others – where this power was not 
used in a way that benefited groups equitably, there was conflict. 
8.2 Conflict 
Conflict has been a major thread running through all of the observed and reported historical 
behaviours that stakeholders have exhibited in their interactions with one another. In some 
instances, conflict has been caused by stakeholder behaviour while in other instances conflict 
has impacted stakeholders‘ interactions with each other. The study of conflict, how it is 
caused, and how it impacts stakeholder behaviour is an important part of understanding the 
impact that conflict has on co-operative natural resource management and how the impacts of 
conflict can be mitigated. 
8.2.1 Causes of Conflict 
Some of the causes of conflict that were common between all three cases were ownership of 
resources, resource management, management of benefits and benefit sharing, resource 
access, and resource use. As with results from Bluwstein, Moyo and Kicheleri (2016), 
conflicts were more likely to occur where control over resources was more centralised, even 
in cases where power was placed in community level government. This demonstrates that 
decentralising control is not enough; it is also necessary to devolve power by providing 
mechanisms for effective participation (Harrison et al., 2015). With an increasing devolution 
of control and power away from a centralised authority (to allow for effective participation 
for all stakeholder group constituents), correspondingly less conflict occurred. Details about 
the level of conflict and the stakeholders involved in this conflict are listed in the table below.  
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The two factors that were significantly different between cases were conflict over ownership 
of resources and conflict due to NGOs. In the Klein‘s case resource ownership was a 
significant cause of conflict between government and the community, whereas in the other 
cases it was largely uncontested at the time of the research process due to legal frameworks 
that defined land and resource ownership. In addition NGOs caused conflict between the 
government and the communities in Loliondo because they largely sought to benefit the 
interests of communities and this approach has conflicted with government interests 
(&Beyond-director-20140818). The reasons that the listed factors caused conflicts in each of 
the three cases were different and they were discussed in detail in each of the three case 
chapters. What is most important to understand when comparing cases is that conflicts of 
interest across these factors and contrasting beliefs about what is fair have both fuelled the 
conflicts that exist today. 
Table 6: Summary of common causes of conflict across three cases 
 
Ololosokwan 
 
Mnemba Island 
 
Phinda
†
 
Cause of 
Conflict 
Level of 
conflict§ 
Stakeholder 
groups* Level of conflict 
Stakeholder 
groups* 
Level of 
conflict 
Ownership of 
resources 
Significant com/gov None 
 
None 
currently, 
but history 
Management of 
resources 
Slight com/tou Significant com/gov None 
Benefits from 
tourism 
Significant Within com Significant com/gov Minimal 
Resource access Significant com/tou Significant com/tou Minimal 
Illegal resource 
use 
Significant com/tou Significant com/tou Minimal 
NGOs Slight com/gov None 
 
None 
*com=community; gov=national government; tou=foreign tourism operations 
†
Stakeholder groups involved in conflict were restricted to only &Beyond and local communities, 
thus this column is not included for this case 
§The level significant means outright conflict where stakeholders openly contest each other‘s 
rights to resources through speech and action, and there is little order; slight conflict is verbal, 
where stakeholders do not overtly challenge the status quo but rather choose to speak poorly of 
other stakeholder groups while maintaining order to some degree; minimal means that where 
conflict does occur it is quickly dealt with through effective communication. 
8.2.2 Conflict of Stakeholder Interests 
Conflict over the resources in Ololosokwan took place between various groups and sub-
groups. There was inter- and intra-stakeholder conflict. Intra-stakeholder conflict was most 
prominent in the community. In other stakeholder groups this was less important because 
those groups were typically internally homogenous in their interests, for example foreign 
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tourism businesses like &Beyond or government entities such as the MIMCA Authority. An 
exception was tourism stakeholders in Zanzibar who did not agree with the hands-off 
approach &Beyond took on enforcing rules relating to the MIMCA. Inter-stakeholder conflict 
was most prominent between non-consumptive and consumptive resource users. Some of the 
varying resource use practices have been conflicting with each other, with a lack of co-
operation resulting in overuse and a decreased quality of available resources. Conflicting 
resource use needs, as well as the decreasing condition of natural resources, were observed to 
be major causes of conflict. This highlights the pivotal role of different resource use practices 
in stakeholder conflict.  
The varying contested resource use practices also relate to the broader contested issues of 
resource ownership and access. The main reason that these issues were contested was that 
decreased quality of natural resources leads to a decreased yield of benefits for each 
stakeholder group. Each stakeholder group seeks the highest quality of resources to satisfy 
their interests, but this is compromised by the activities and interests of other stakeholders. As 
a source of conflict, all of this can be summarised concisely: conflict of stakeholder interests. 
In this study it was noted that a conflict of stakeholder interests typically occurred when there 
were not enough resources for all stakeholders and when the resource-use interests of one 
stakeholder group were compromised by the interests of another. Where resource and land-
ownership were well defined, like in the case of Phinda, conflicting resource use practices 
could be negotiated in order to meet multiple interests. Where ownership was not secure 
however, like at Mnemba, then negotiation between private entities could not occur and 
interests were not being met, driving conflict. Resource ownership is critical for co-operation. 
This thesis proposes that conflict is driven by the level of threat that stakeholders pose to each 
other‘s interests, and that the level of threat correspondingly decreases the effectiveness of 
co-operation. Yasmi, Schanz and Salim (2006) similarly suggested that conflict arises when 
there is incompatibility between stakeholder goals, and this incompatibility then causes one 
stakeholder to feel compromised by the actions of another. One of the leaders in the 
Ololosokwan community at Klein‘s described the state of a relationship between stakeholders 
as being related to the threat that stakeholders present to one another‘s interests. He said that: 
The relationship depends on the threat of the relationship. If there is a threat coming from any of 
those to the community we will not want them here (Olo-leader6-20150422).  
Speaking of his community, Ololosokwan, this person highlighted an important factor that 
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applies to other stakeholder groups: Several of the stakeholder groups pose significant threats 
to one another‘s resource use practices and this affects their relationships. These threats 
include: 
 Overpopulation of cattle poses a risk to wildlife tourism in Ololosokwan 
 Hunting in Loliondo poses a risk to photographic wildlife tourism and Maasai 
pastoralism in Ololosokwan, a village within Loliondo 
 The Wildlife Division of the Tanzanian government has sought to obtain ownership of 
registered village land in Loliondo, threatening communal ownership rights and 
 Fishing and ineffective tourism management in the Mnemba Island MCA are a threat 
to the future of both biodiversity on Mnemba Atoll and tourism to the atoll. 
Some of these threats have been discussed by stakeholders, without resolution. With the 
community and tourism operations, problems with resource consumption by local people in 
important tourism areas have not been resolved. It was observed that one stakeholder used 
benefit sharing in an attempt to mitigate the threat they pose to other groups. The OBC has 
built solar powered borehole water pumps in an attempt to ease strained relations with 
communities in Loliondo. This is an example of one stakeholder showing concern for another 
stakeholder‘s interests. Despite this attempt to show concern for other group‘s interests, 
conflict continues in the Klein‘s case because a successful resolution for integrating multiple 
resource use practices would be enormously complex and require more than simple gestures 
of generosity like building solar powered boreholes. Moreover, the boreholes were viewed 
sceptically by local people because the level of threat this stakeholder posed was high. 
Conflict will likely continue to occur until this threat no longer exists or is no longer 
important to local people due to access to, and interest in, other livelihoods. 
8.3 Trust 
The level of trust between stakeholders is impacted by all of the previously discussed 
variables involved in stakeholder relations: Governance of resources, benefit sharing, and use 
of power to control decision making. In the cases of Klein‘s and Mnemba, community leaders 
and government authorities were not holding themselves accountable to the public for the 
management of natural and financial resources; as a result trust was low. Stakeholders have 
asked questions but these questions have gone unanswered. This lack of interest in being 
accountable and transparent has led to a general lack of trust between stakeholders. Nyirenda 
et al. (2010) present similar findings from CBNRM projects in the Luangwa Valley in 
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Zambia. One fisherman living along the Mnemba Island MCA coastline said that ―if you 
want to help the community, it is a bad idea to go through the community leaders‖ (Personal 
communications with Matemwe resident, May 2, 2015). This sentiment of mistrust was 
expressed by numerous other community members. One participant spoke with an analogy 
about the impact that a lack of benefit sharing has on trust:  
If you give me the ground to build a big house, the land is mine to build the house and every year I 
can give you money; But then I don’t give you money. What will you think? It is rubbish 
(&Beyond-employee5-20150316).  
Due to the poor working relations that exist between stakeholders, and the lack of trust that is 
the result of these relations, community members living in the Mnemba Island MCA largely 
think that the conservation area ―is rubbish.‖ When attending an open meeting at the 
Mbuutende community, a gathering of 49 community members of various ages was asked if 
it would be a good idea to scrap the conservation area: all 49 agreed it was a good idea. A 
lack of trust in other stakeholders has led these people to believe that they are better off 
without conservation.  
By contrast in the case of Phinda Game Reserve, the community leaders and community trust 
fund managers do hold themselves accountable to the community for the management of 
benefits; as a result, trust is high. Thus is can be said that trust can be developed through 
positive actions in working relations, but these positive actions between stakeholders have 
largely been lacking in the two Tanzanian cases. Where they have been present on an ad hoc 
basis though, such as benefit sharing in the Ololosokwan community, trust levels have 
increased accordingly. Trust is thus able to develop when stakeholders deal fairly with each 
other and follow through on their agreements (Nyirenda et al., 2010). Participants from the 
case at Phinda Game Reserve were all in agreement that trust is one of the most important 
factors allowing effective co-operation (AfricaFoundation-employee2-20141120; Phinda-
management2-20141121; Mnq-leader3-20141121).  
The study of trust, its development and effects, has been extensive in various other disciplines 
but has received little focus in natural resource governance literature (Shackleton et al., 2010; 
Marshall, 2008; Kwon and Suh, 2006; Li, 2005; Pope, 2004). Where it has occurred, much of 
the literature investigating trust has been situated in social capital studies (Nyirenda et al., 
2010). Social capital studies emphasize the role of commitment in making trust an influential 
social factor. Trust has been shown to be vital for effective co-operation (Lockwood et al., 
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2010; Prell, Hubacek and Reed, 2009). Similar to the aforementioned research, this thesis 
posits trust as being a key part of co-operative natural resource governance. In this section, 
factors that impact the level of trust between stakeholders are examined. 
8.3.1 Factors Affecting Trust 
8.3.1.1 Honesty 
Participants from all three cases said that honesty was important to them. Community 
members in the two Tanzanian cases complained about what they felt was a lack of honesty 
from government, both at community and national levels. This directly affected their trust of 
the community leaders and the national government. Community members in Ololosokwan 
spoke explicitly about not trusting the members of the village council because they feel that 
they are not being told the truth: 
I can go to our chairman in the village to ask how many money they never say the true thing… We 
don't trust leaders (Olo-community24-20150420:36). 
An employee of an NGO based in Arusha, one that had worked in the Ololosokwan 
community for over a decade, said that in order to get a correct understanding of the political 
process in the community one must speak to multiple individuals and triangulate what is 
being said because people elected to positions of community leadership would speak with a 
biased point of view: 
I'm telling you to speak to him because I know he knows the way it is required to be. But that does 
not necessarily mean that is what has been happening. Then you speak to those who are neutral 
and you will get the problem. They will either support what the counselor is saying or speak 
against (NGO-employee1-20150411). 
There are various factors that might cause this and these have been discussed previously in 
this thesis, but what is important to note is that stakeholders in the two cases where conflict is 
significant (Klein‘s and Mnemba Island) do not feel that other stakeholders are being honest 
with them, particularly those endowed with governance powers or financial benefit. 
Lockwood et al. (2010) argued that in order for co-operation to occur effectively, governing 
actors need to be honest with their constituents and with other stakeholders. This study shows 
that when constituents and stakeholders felt that they were being told correct information, 
they would be more inclined to trust governing actors and interact with them. 
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8.3.1.2 Transparency 
Transparency was related to honesty. Transparency occurs when stakeholders freely share 
information with each other relating to their interests and governing actors clarify decision-
making processes to others (Lockwood et al., 2010). This roughly equates with freedom of 
access to information relevant to stakeholder interests. Residents of local communities around 
the three protected areas in question felt more trust for their community level government 
when they received information about income from tourism in the community, such as was 
the case in the communities adjacent to Phinda Game Reserve. Where this was not the case, 
such as in the Mnemba Island case, local peoples‘ trust for government was less. Similarly in 
Ololosokwan near Klein‘s Camp, trust levels fluctuated according to the level of 
transparency. With some participants, repeated changes in the level of trust made their overall 
sentiment increasingly negative. What was interesting to note in the Klein‘s case was that 
transparency was slow to build positive perceptions of other stakeholders, but a lack of 
transparency could quickly degrade perceptions. Positive perceptions, and trust, take time and 
consistency in behaviour to develop. 
Trust can be increased when stakeholders are transparent about their interests to other 
stakeholders. An employee of the Africa Foundation at Phinda Game Reserve said that it is 
important to explain your intentions to other stakeholders. This was demonstrated at Klein‘s 
Camp: local perceptions were reversed, and in the long-run trust was built, because early on 
in the relationship &Beyond made their intentions clear to the Ololosokwan community 
neighbouring Klein‘s Camp. They agreed to speak directly to, and negotiate with, the 
community and not go through the national government to secure their lease of the land at 
Klein‘s Camp. They also agreed to revoke the title in order to empower the village and 
followed through on this commitment. They made it clear that their intention was to empower 
the community and provide benefit from tourism so that conservation could be made 
sustainable. This created an environment where trust could develop. Not explaining 
intentions to other stakeholders when beginning a working relationship can lead to 
misunderstanding and a lack of trust.  
8.3.1.3 Keeping Commitments 
As noted previously, trust takes time to develop and it develops after consistent patterns of 
behaviour (Pretty, 2003). An important part of being consistent is keeping commitments. In 
the Klein‘s case, trust increased when commitments were kept; when commitments were not 
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kept (for example bringing cattle into the conservancy), trust was reduced. In the Mnemba 
case, when the Zanzibarian government has not kept its commitment to share financial 
benefits from tourism with local communities in the MIMCA trust has been drastically 
reduced. Trust can only develop when stakeholders honour their commitments to others. A 
similar point has been demonstrated in social capital literature, that trust is dependent on 
commitment (McDougall & Banjade, 2015). This link can be problematic when expectations 
exceed what stakeholders can or have said they will do: in this study and a case from Zambia 
(Nyirenda et al., 2010), trust decayed when community members‘ expectations were not met. 
What has been shown in this thesis is that where expectations are unrealistic they can be 
adjusted through effective communication that reaches all stakeholder group constituents. 
In addition it was important for stakeholders to clarify the timeframes in which commitments 
will be met. One of the participating women in the Mnqobokazi community outside Phinda 
Game Reserve said that part of the reason the community trusts &Beyond is because they do 
what they say they will do. She said that in 2001 the perceptions of &Beyond in the 
community had become so negative that a large group of residents spoke with local 
community leaders about trying to remove &Beyond from Phinda. She said that the residents 
felt that &Beyond did not do enough for them. Her response was simple:  
The challenge was that people thought that if we need something it must be addressed now, now, 
now. And as the teacher I was supposed to give them a lecture, to tell them to be patient. To know 
that Phinda don't have much money. They go and fund raise so that they can be able to address 
our needs. So for them, they have to wait and see. They have to give them time (Mak-leader1-
20141121). 
The community had to learn to have patience in allowing &Beyond time to keep their 
commitments. Ultimately the biggest change in local perceptions occurred when &Beyond 
gave part of the land in Phinda Game Reserve to the communities and entered a management 
contract with them, but an understanding that fund raising for community development takes 
time, and remaining committed to development, has been a contributing factor in the long-
term maintenance of positive perceptions. In this case, following through on the largest and 
most lasting commitment had the largest impact on perceptions. 
8.3.1.4 Use of Force and the Law 
Another important factor affecting trust in this study was the use of the law in dealing with 
stakeholder conflict. Using the law to settle stakeholder conflict in a way that does not benefit 
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all parties fairly reduced trust and co-operation. The use of force has occurred multiple times 
over the years in the Klein‘s case where the national government has sought to evict Maasai 
people from their land due to conflict over land-use and ownership in the Loliondo Game 
Controlled Area. The conflict resulting in these evictions has revolved around the lease of 
hunting rights to the OBC in the Loliondo Game Controlled Area. As such they forcefully 
evicted Maasai people in 2009 and 201752. This has caused the Maasai of Ololosokwan to 
have a complete lack of trust in the intentions of the OBC as well as regional and national 
government. 
Using the law to negotiate or gain power over other stakeholder groups reduced trust. In the 
Loliondo Game Controlled Area in Tanzania, it is useful to compare the behaviour of three 
different tourism operators in dealing with land ownership conflict in Loliondo: &Beyond, 
Tanzania Cattle Products, and Thomson Safaris. As was detailed in Chapter 5, when Tanzania 
Cattle Products acquired the rights to land in what is today Ololosokwan village land, they 
were not initially honest about their intentions; because of this the community did not trust 
Tanzania Cattle Products. When &Beyond bought the supposed lease, the community did not 
initially trust &Beyond either. The level of trust began to increase however after &Beyond 
decided, due to outside pressure, to give the land rights to the Ololosokwan community and 
enter a lease agreement. Thereafter trust could increase because perceptions improved. A 
similar scenario occurred with Thomson Safaris who fought the land claim of the Soit-Sambu 
community in court – interestingly their relations are very poor. 
Using the law to retain ownership or rights over land was a strategy not used by &Beyond but 
used by other companies, and it has variously impacted relations between tourism 
stakeholders and the Maasai community enormously. Trust is lost when stakeholders attempt 
to use force in having their interests prioritised over the interests of other groups; trust can be 
won when stakeholders deal with one another in a way that allows for the interests of 
multiple resource user groups to be met. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The co-operation of stakeholders for effective natural resource management is an important 
part of ensuring that multiple resource use practices can be accommodated in an ecosystem. 
Effective management is especially important in situations where a stakeholder group has few 
                                                 
52 http://www.conservation-watch.org/2017/08/16/violent-evictions-of-maasai-underway-in-loliondo-tanzania-
to-make-way-for-otterlo-business-corporations-hunting-concession/ 
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or no alternatives to subsistence natural resource use. This is largely the circumstance in all 
three cases considered in this study: rural communities largely rely on natural resources for 
their survival and without access to these resources, or without their continued existence, 
rural people would suffer. This study has found that co-operation between stakeholders is 
required for effective and sustainable management of resources to occur. Where co-operation 
was lacking, resources were typically under threat. This link has been claimed in the literature 
and this thesis provides evidence to support this claim (Nyirenda et al., 2010; Bodin & Crona, 
2008; Stratford & Davidson, 2002). Declining resources under threat in turn increased rural 
peoples‘ vulnerability to negative changes in the resource base, creating a feed-back loop that 
led to ecosystem degradation at various scales. 
The findings of this study support the notion that conservation, protected areas, and tourism 
are important to rural development in at least these three cases and potentially in Southern 
and East Africa in general. Other research supports this idea (Snyman, 2014; Aylward & Lutz, 
2003). In all three cases, conservation was chosen by local people as a land-use practice in 
return for the promise of financial and development benefits from tourism. Across the three 
cases, the promise of benefit sharing has been fulfilled to varying degrees. The degree to 
which benefit sharing has been effective was linked to the degree of successful co-operation. 
Moreover in all three cases, conservation and tourism have benefited community stakeholders 
at some point – enough to show that benefit sharing is both possible and useful in achieving a 
sustainable balance of multiple resource use practices. This is evident in the Phinda case 
where effective benefit sharing has improved the state of co-operation between stakeholders. 
By contrast what the Mnemba case demonstrates is that when benefit sharing stops, so does 
co-operation; thereafter the natural resource base is negatively affected.  
What is also made clear in this study is that without conservation, tourism, and effective 
sharing of the benefits, rural people are worse off. It was observed that without effective 
benefit sharing, people do not co-operate in resource management as there is no communal 
benefit; thus they essentially have less access to resources because every resource user is 
pitted against each other in order to gain maximal benefit as an individual (Hardin, 1968). 
However when benefits are distributed to community stakeholders by those that have power 
over the benefits, then opportunities arise to help rural people work together and work with 
other stakeholders in managing their resources more sustainably. In a time when rural 
populations in Africa are growing, conservation and tourism could be used as at least one tool 
to help rural people avoid the looming crises of diminishing space and resource availability. 
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This chapter focused on the cross-case analysis of factors affecting co-operative natural 
resource governance in the three cases detailed in chapters 5 to 7. With positive stakeholder 
relations being a primary basis for effective co-operative governance of natural resources, the 
factors affecting stakeholder relations were compared between the three cases. The common 
factors were analysed by matching sets of events across cases and using both explicit and 
implicit reasoning to explain patterns of events. This process was described in Chapter 4. The 
main factors that appeared to be influencing stakeholder relationships included: 
 Benefits and the effectiveness with which benefits were shared 
 Governance, including accountability and transparency in governance; the creation 
and enforcement of rules in natural resource management/use; and representation of 
resource users in governance; communication; inclusiveness for all stakeholder sub-
groups 
 Natural resources, including the state of resources, access to resources, and 
management of resources 
 Power to influence stakeholder interactions and behaviours, including how this power 
was framed, how it was used, and how it influenced stakeholders‘ relationships 
 Conflict over resources and resource access 
 Trust, its development, and its effect on co-operation. 
In each of the three cases, these factors either created causes for conflict or avenues for co-
operation. The different reasons for conflict or co-operation in the three cases were compared 
and contrasted across cases so that more general reasoning could be applied for explaining 
patterns of events. Based on these generalised explanations an abstracted set of principles 
guiding co-operative partnerships is formulated and discussed in the following chapter. 
Conflict was analysed with discussion about the common causes of conflict. Trust and the 
factors affecting its development were discussed in detail, along with examples from the three 
cases being used to illustrate. This analysis and discussion of results across three cases has 
served to illustrate sets of behaviours that detract from, or build towards, maximal 
effectiveness of co-operation in the governance of natural resources that have multiple (and at 
times conflicting) users. The following chapter will discuss these sets of behaviour at a higher 
level of abstraction with the aim of both making recommendations for co-operative 
governance as well as contributing to the field of co-operative natural resource governance. 
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CHAPTER 9: COLLECTIVE PRINCIPLES, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
CONCLUSION 
9. Introduction 
Good working relations are an essential consideration for people-oriented conservation. Co-
operation between stakeholders both affects and is affected by the natural resources that 
stakeholders are interacting over. There has not been much commentary to date on the social 
side of co-operative natural resource governance – it is a difficult topic to capture the essence 
of in rigorous academic study because of the highly contextual nature of social networks. 
Driven by the need for a contextual understanding of co-operative natural resource 
governance in ecotourism settings in Africa, as well as a paucity of literature on the social 
factors that make this governance work, this thesis sought to investigate these factors using 
three case studies where conflicting resource uses affected governance sustainability and 
conservation in southern and east Africa. While most of these factors already appear in the 
literature, they have not as yet been considered in a singular work, likely due to the 
complexity of combining such diverse threads in analysis (Shackleton et al., 2010; Agrawal, 
2002). The study was exploratory in nature, thus requiring a heavily qualitative approach. 
Without this, important contextual data would be lost and hence explanatory analysis of 
patterns across the data set would be futile.  
Co-operative governance in ecotourism is a complex topic that is heavily affected by 
contextual factors. As such, the factors that affect effective and sustainable governance in 
people-oriented conservation will differ significantly from place to place. As such, the study 
makes no attempt to yield a generalizable set of principles that will be useful across culture 
and contexts. However, it does is add evidence to the debate on the efficacy of considering 
institutional factors without the comparative social factors that influence governance (Cox, 
Arnold & Tomás, 2010). The reason for not producing a set of general co-operative 
governance design principles is that they receive plenty of debate already, besides which a 
contextual qualitative analysis of three cases does nothing more than to show that that as an 
analytical and evaluation approach it is insufficient to solve the problems of people-oriented 
conservation. This thesis simply aimed to investigate the social factors impacting co-
operative natural resource governance in specific ecotourism contexts with the idea that 1) at 
least these stakeholders will be helped by the practical considerations of this study and 2) 
there might be an improved general understanding of some the social factors that belie 
effective co-operation in people-oriented conservation. Having identified and characterised 
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stakeholders (Objectives 1 & 2), investigated benefit sharing and stakeholder engagement 
(Objectives 3 & 4), this chapter continues with the 5th objective (begun in Chapter 5) by 
moving toward a broader analytical commentary on the key principles driving governance 
effectiveness. Based on the understanding gained, recommendations are suggested for 
possible courses of action relating to the stakeholders in each of the three cases considered. 
9.1 Effective Co-operative Governance 
Each of the three cases considered in this study represented a scenario in which natural 
resources were being contested by multiple stakeholder groups with varied interests. In all 
three cases there was a protected area used for conservation, and an ecotourism company 
used this protected area for their tourism business. There were varying levels of conflict 
across all three cases, the reasons for conflict differing due to context specific factors. This 
conflict, and the factors causing it, had an impact on the state of co-operation between 
stakeholders, and ultimately the state of protected natural resources in each of the three cases. 
This study set out to investigate the impact of conflict over natural resources on the co-
operative management of those contested resources. It was found that while a complex set of 
factors influenced the state of co-operative relations between stakeholders, what drove 
stakeholder conflict and hampered co-operation was the level of threat that each stakeholder 
posed to the other‘s interests. Where there was no co-operation, stakeholders sought to meet 
their own interests whether or not their activities threatened the interests of other 
stakeholders. This free-for-all, as one participant of this research called it, is reminiscent of 
Hardin‘s (1968) Tragedy of the Commons. Some of what Hardin suggested in his game theory 
scenario played out predictably in the three cases studied for this research, but as Cox, Arnold 
and Tomás (2010) point out, resource users can be self-organising non-rational decision 
makers and the outcomes of each case were not as predictably simple as Hardin suggests.  
This section of the chapter demonstrates how the research process met the aim of this study to 
investigate the social factors affecting outcomes of stakeholder interactions in co-operative 
natural resource governance. It also answers the question of the research problem: how do 
social factors influence stakeholder interactions and socio-environmental outcomes of co-
operative natural resource management? Hereunder is a consideration of the factors that 
contribute to more effective and sustainable co-operative natural resource governance in 
scenarios where there are competing interests.  
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9.1.1 Factors Impacting Co-operative Governance 
Much of the conflict that occurred between stakeholders in this research was conflict over 
benefits from conservation and tourism. What each stakeholder group ultimately wanted was 
for their interests to be met. When the interests of one group conflict with those of other 
stakeholder groups, stakeholders should work together in negotiating a compromise that 
minimises costs and maximises benefits for each group. Negotiating and managing a scenario 
in which all stakeholders benefit appropriately (also referred to as a win-win) requires a 
variety of governance mechanisms to be effective (De la Torre-Castro; 2012). Where these 
mechanisms are not in place, or where they are implemented poorly, then a win-win is not 
likely to occur. Despite the rhetoric regarding people-oriented conservation, in many cases 
the costs of conservation have largely been borne by the most under-resourced communities 
and individuals while they have not received a proportionate share of the benefits (Mariki, 
2016; West, Igoe & Brockington, 2006; Schmidt-Soltau, 2004). In this thesis, as well as other 
studies (Kideghsho, Røskaft & Kaltenborn, 2007; Gillingham & Lee, 1999), it was found that 
this disproportionate sharing of costs and benefits contributes to a lack of interest in, or even 
resentment for, conservation. Poor perceptions of conservation due to inequitable cost/benefit 
sharing decreased the likelihood that a sustainable co-operative working arrangement would 
be able to occur. 
In order to increase the likelihood of a co-operative natural resource governance arrangement 
lasting in the long-term, working relations between stakeholders need to be operable. If this is 
to occur, stakeholders must be open to co-operation and willing to make trade-offs. When 
these factors are not simultaneously present among all stakeholders then the capacity for co-
operation will be diminished from the start. However, when conditions allow for the 
beginning of co-operation between stakeholders, there are still various factors which need to 
be considered and managed in the African context, factors which have not been considered in 
the literature as a singular argument. This thesis presents a series of factors which, when 
taken together, represent a consideration of the human side of co-operative people-oriented 
natural resource governance. The series of factors presented in this thesis provides a frame for 
understanding how to better enact the rights of those who have been historically marginalised 
(Shackleton et al., 2010). 
In this research, conflict occurred in cases where there was uneven distribution of power and 
this power was used to empower certain individuals or groups while marginalising others. In 
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these cases, resource access and use rights of certain people were infringed upon while others 
received more than their fair share of resources and benefits. In concert with Rurai‘s (2012) 
findings in the greater Loliondo division around Ololosokwan, the biggest contributors to 
stakeholder conflict in this research were governance of resources, their use, their 
conservation, and the costs and benefits resulting from trading consumptive use for 
conservation and tourism. Even conflict over land and resource ownership was ultimately 
focused on the sharing of costs and benefits resulting from conservation. Stakeholders used 
land as a form of power, to negotiate less compromise on their interests and more benefit. 
Stakeholder conflict over governance was largely due to concerns about resource access. 
Where resources were not immediately available due to conservation and tourism, people 
wanted to receive benefit from this thereby still having access to resources, albeit indirect 
access. When uneven power enabled certain actors to increase their share of benefit, thereby 
diminishing others‘, conflict occurred. The results suggest that effective governance, and 
successful co-operation, therefore entails governing actors using their power to give voice to 
the constituents of the group they represent. Giving a voice to group constituents means 
suitable representation of varied group interests, thereby providing all the members of a 
complex stakeholder group (like a community) with a channel through which they can 
communicate with other stakeholders (Brosius, Tsing & Zerner, 1998).  
Most conflict linked to differences in the power that each stakeholder was able to exert over 
resource management decision making (Rurai, 2012). In both South Africa and Tanzania, 
legal frameworks were set up to enable good governance at the community level. In both 
countries the community elects representatives to communicate their concerns with other 
stakeholders as well as higher levels of government. Unfortunately in all three cases, 
community members provided anecdotal evidence to suggest that some of these positions 
have been monopolised by powerful individuals. In all three cases those who were not family 
or friends of these powerful individuals (or if their opinion differed significantly with that of 
the elected governance actors) felt that they were side-lined. Overall, community members 
reported not having power to hold governance actors to account and this, combined with a 
lack of transparency, decreased their interest in conservation or sustainable resource 
management (Bennet & Dearden, 2014). Co-operation will be more likely to occur if 
mechanisms are in place to give constituents of stakeholder groups power to hold their 
representatives and leaders to account. Using a democratic electoral process alone is not 
enough. There needs to be a process in place whereby elected individuals can be removed 
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from their positions and replaced should the community at large deem it necessary. 
This work suggests, like LaChapelle and McCool (2005), that ownership of resources gives 
stakeholder groups, like communities, power to negotiate with other groups. The Klein‘s case 
in Tanzania is a good case to illustrate the importance of land ownership in empowering 
communities to negotiate with governing stakeholders. The Phinda case in South Africa 
provides further evidence for this because the land is privately owned and it has empowered 
the local communities to negotiate their share of benefits and costs relating to conservation. 
The Mnemba case contrasts in a way that shows why private or communal land ownership is 
important. Ownership of land was an important factor contributing to co-operation that 
resulted in justice for the resource access rights of communities. Where communities owned 
land, people were more likely to buy-in to the concept of conservation and tourism because 
they could manage the benefits (Schmitt, 2010); thus where community members feel they 
received benefit from conservation and tourism, this thesis suggests like Salafsky et al. 
(2002) that there will be more self-management of resource use.  
Communication was an essential determinant of successful co-operation, just as Murphree 
(1999) suggested. Whens stakeholders communicate effectively they share information with 
other stakeholders which is relevant to their interests and the interests of other stakeholder 
groups. By doing this stakeholders are able to know each other‘s interests and negotiate 
accordingly. Without knowing other stakeholders‘ interests there can be misunderstandings, 
stakeholders may feel threatened by other groups or individuals, and thus conflict is likely to 
occur. Similarly communication needs to occur effectively within stakeholder groups for it to 
be effective between groups. Communication between stakeholders took place in most cases 
but was not effective until all constituents were able to participate directly or through 
representation of their interests by elected officials. Participation in resource governance can 
occur indirectly through good communication between elected authorities and stakeholder 
group members like local community residents (Bodin & Prell, 2011). Thus communication 
can be a major enabler of co-operation. Poor communication within and between stakeholder 
groups was associated with a lack of transparency and poor representation, factors that 
inhibited co-operation. 
In this research, ineffective representation by local level government resulted in a poor level 
of co-operation between stakeholders (Lockwood et al., 2010). In the two Tanzanian cases, 
public actors oversaw the governance of resources. This included local level community 
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government as well as higher-level government bodies like the MIMCA Authority and the 
Wildlife Division. These public actors were largely not accountable for their management of 
resources. There was no other stakeholder that had the power to hold them to account for 
their management decisions. Where there was no way to enforce accountability, governing 
actors typically took advantage of their positions of power to enable themselves at the 
expense of others. Even in circumstances where there was no evidence to suggest that 
benefits were being unfairly co-opted by governance actors like community government or 
conservation authorities, this research shows, like Oyono (2004) suggested, that poor 
representation of community members and poor distribution of benefits irked community 
members and left them feeling marginalised. When governing actors in communities were not 
held accountable they typically did not represent community constituents well, resulting in 
intra-community conflict. Intra-group conflict had a negative impact on stakeholder co-
operation and the state of natural resources. As was found by Lockwood et al. (2010), this 
work shows that accountability, representation of community interests to other stakeholders, 
and benefit distribution that left constituents feeling satisfied were three vital factors 
contributing to effective co-operative governance. 
In the Tanzanian cases where there were no fences separating protected areas and rural 
communities, it was found that a higher level of buy-in to conservation in the communities 
neighbouring protected areas was associated with a greater level of adherence to resource 
management and access rules (Kideghasho, Røskaft & Kaltenborn, 2007). Successful co-
operation, between communities and conservation related stakeholders, was in large part 
impacted by the level of buy-in to conservation by communities. In the case where buy-in 
from community members was the highest, community members also made policed resource 
access and use to a limited extent by reporting poachers illicitly entering the protected area. 
Community members bought-in to the conservation and tourism concept because of their 
communal ownership of the land that empowered them to negotiate a high level of 
infrastructural, social, and financial benefit from tourism. Where communities had no 
ownership of land they had little power over resources, little power to negotiate with 
governing actors, and received little benefit from tourism to protected areas (LaChapelle & 
McCool, 2005). These factors in turn resulted in subsistence resource users engaging in 
damaging resource use practices, causing conflict with other stakeholders and decreasing the 
likelihood of co-operation.  
What should be emphasized is that in cases where communities are given the power and 
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responsibility to govern without being given training and a framework for governance, co-
operation was ineffective or did not occur. This was a major finding for this thesis that is not 
emphasised elsewhere. In the case of Phinda, training was provided, a framework was 
enacted, and the result was positive co-operative governance. The training not only provided 
information on the management of community income from tourism, but it also educated 
those tasked with governing about the importance of equity and justice in resource 
governance. The framework provided a platform for those tasked with governing to be 
accountable to, and transparent with, the community. Each year governing actors are required 
to present information and plan for the coming financial year at a meeting that all community 
members are encouraged to attend and participate in. While those chosen to govern 
community tourism income in the Phinda case were elected in a long-term capacity, ideally a 
board constitution would specify there be at least one short-term member of the governing 
board who would be voted in annually by community members. The voting process and final 
ballot should be made transparent in such a way that cheating could not occur. This short-
term board member would serve a maximum specified term (e.g. two years) as a type of 
‗watchdog‘ board member. This could increase the power of the community to enforce 
accountability and transparency, also reducing the ability of board members to unjustly 
capture benefits.  
In the case of the Mnqobokazi community outside Phinda, it was fortuitous that 1) a local 
champion was elected to govern the community income from tourism and he holds himself 
accountable because of his personal commitment to being transparent, and 2) the chief 
requires this financial manager to be accountable to the whole community. It was found, 
Sutton and Rudd (2014), that local champions are an important part of starting and even 
maintaining co-operation. However whether there are local champions or not, in most cases 
governing actors would benefit from working within a framework that enables them to be 
effective representatives as well as accountable and transparent – if they choose not to be 
such the community should have power to replace the relevant individuals. 
The biggest lesson learned from this research process was that in order for co-operative 
governance to occur, the majority of constituents of stakeholder groups need to feel that they 
are getting fair access to resources and that their access to resources is not being negatively 
impacted by another group‘s access (Lockie, 2013; Fabricius et al., 2013; Nemarundwe, 
2003). When individuals feel that their interests are at risk (this typically involved impeded 
access without alternatives, or resource integrity being damaged by poor use or overuse), then 
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they were more likely to behave in a way that negatively impacted other stakeholder 
relationships, thus reducing the likelihood of effective co-operation. The ideal circumstances 
would entail a system which enables stakeholders to negotiate and work for their interests to 
be met in a way that minimises the amount that each group needs to compromise. Community 
members must be able to participate in governance, governing actors must be transparent, and 
those chosen to represent community members need to be held to account for their actions. 
The factors presented in this study can contribute to such a scenario and can be used as 
guidelines for the improvement of stakeholder relations: 
 Stakeholders that are open to communicating, co-operating, and are willing to 
negotiate trade-offs 
 A legal system that gives power to communities so they can negotiate with other 
stakeholder groups (e.g. private or communal land ownership) 
 Adequate representation of all stakeholder constituents 
 A framework for sharing benefits equitably between constituents of complex 
stakeholder groups like a community 
o Those managing benefits need to be held to account; stakeholders need to have 
power to hold governing actors to account so that they can bring about justice 
 Resource access that is fair 
o Communities need to have access to resources for harvesting and/or have 
alternatives to resource harvesting which they are satisfied with when 
harvesting is partly or entirely restricted 
o Governing actors need to effect policing of resource use practices so that 
stakeholders are not negatively impacted by individual or group resource use 
and 
o Constituents must have power to enforce accountability and transparency from 
their representatives and leaders, as well as have the power to replace corrupt 
or inefficient individuals. 
This list of guidelines can be used to help practitioners to structure stakeholder relations and 
resource sharing agreements that will more likely be sustainable in the long-term. Ultimately, 
people simply wanted to be treated fairly. They wanted their rightful share of resource access, 
either directly or through other benefits. Trust was an indicator of fair treatment. It was one of 
the most important factors influencing co-operative natural resource governance in this study 
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(Jones et al., 2012; Grafton, 2005; Pretty, 2003). Trust entails believing another individual or 
group because they are honest, transparent, follow through with their commitments, and do 
not actively threaten the interests of other stakeholders. Where there were poor levels of trust 
between stakeholders e.g. in the Ololosokwan case, or where community members did not 
trust their representatives and leaders e.g. in the Mnemba case, there were typically other 
problems relating to stakeholder relations and the resource governance system. Trust was an 
effective indicator of the state of stakeholder relations and co-operative governance. Similarly 
the state of natural resources within the protected areas considered was indicative of the state 
of relations between stakeholders. Thus in order for natural systems to remain in a state of 
healthy and sustainable use, stakeholders need to co-operate to share benefits in a way that 
leaves the majority of stakeholders (and constituents within stakeholder groups) feeling 
satisfied. 
9.1.2 Developing Partnerships 
The basis of co-operative governance is the formation of working partnerships between 
stakeholders. As Plummer and FitzGibbon (2004:64) stated, a partnership intuitively refers to 
―a shared undertaking by more than one party.‖ Brinkerhoff (2002:21) further states that a 
partnership is a dynamic relationship among diverse actors between whom there is equal 
participation, mutual respect, and transparency. In order for co-operation to occur, 
stakeholders must be open to forming partnerships with other stakeholders. This research 
identified certain factors that can affect the outcome of diverse stakeholders co-operating in a 
shared undertaking. These factors affected the outcomes of working relations between 
stakeholders in the three cases considered in this study; as such they are included here as 
possibilities for further research and consideration for practitioners who are designing and/or 
contributing to co-operative natural resource governance arrangements. 
In order for a partnership to begin developing wherein co-operation can occur, at least one 
stakeholder group needs to be proactive. At some point one stakeholder needs to approach 
other stakeholders and begin discussing interests. In all three cases, the proactive effort to 
form partnerships with other stakeholders proved important: &Beyond developed a strong 
partnership with the Ololosokwan community neighbouring Klein‘s Camp in Tanzania, they 
developed strong partnerships with the communities neighbouring Phinda Game Reserve in 
South Africa, and they are in the process of developing a partnership with the governing 
actors of the Mnemba Island MCA in Zanzibar, Tanzania.  If there is no proactive start from 
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one stakeholder then circumstances can indefinitely continue as they are. Moreover at the 
start of a partnership stakeholders should ask for input rather than being prescriptive – this 
improved perceptions among stakeholders. 
There is an idea that one‘s willingness to be influenced increases influence on others. This is 
critical in the development of a partnership. If a stakeholder is not willing to be influenced, 
then negotiating is futile and relations will likely stagnate. In the case mentioned above with 
the Ololosokwan community and Buffalo Luxury Camp, if Buffalo Camp shows willingness 
to engage with the community on the issue of benefit sharing then they can in turn negotiate 
the terms upon which they share benefits and other issues, like the issue of cows grazing near 
the camp. As a further example of this, when &Beyond bought the infrastructure at Klein‘s 
Camp they initially did not engage with the community. When the community then used the 
law as a means to gain power over &Beyond and influence their business by taking the 
Klein‘s Camp land title deed to court, &Beyond realised that speaking directly to 
communities, and revoking their claim on land ownership, would show concern for 
community interests as well as a willingness to negotiate. Their willingness to be influenced 
by the community has made the community open to being influenced by &Beyond. This 
move by &Beyond was the start of a partnership that has been fruitful for both parties. 
When dealing with complex non-homogeneous stakeholder groups like communities, 
speaking to representatives like elected community leaders can be problematic. In the two 
Tanzanian cases, residents of communities living adjacent to the protected areas said that 
community leaders did not represent the residents well to government and other stakeholders. 
These participants suggested that rather than speaking to the elected leaders of their 
communities, tourism stakeholders should rather deal with the local people directly. Thus 
where representation is poor, a possible work around is to deal directly with community 
members. While going through the proper hierarchy when interacting with communities is 
important, requesting an open meeting with the whole community would not be out of order 
because open community meetings are part of Tanzanian custom. This way of bypassing poor 
representation, by getting information about interests directly from stakeholder group 
constituents, would be necessary in cases where governing actors inhibit the development of 
partnerships due to ineffectiveness or dishonesty.  
For partnerships to be enduring, trust needs to be developed (Pretty & Smith, 2004). Much of 
what was mentioned above for improving general co-operation is also applicable to 
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partnership development. As mentioned in this thesis, trust develops when stakeholders are 
honest with each other about their intentions, about what they can accomplish, what they are 
willing to do, and when they end up following through on their commitments. Trust 
development is aided by stakeholders being fair with one another. When stakeholders are fair 
to each other in their negotiations and in their resource use practices, trust is strengthened. 
When this occurs consistently over long periods of time, trust can become enduring when 
supported by effective and frequent communication. Enduring partnerships also entail 
transparency. Stakeholders must be transparent in representing themselves to other 
stakeholders. There must be transparency of interests at the start of forming working 
relations. Mutual recognition of interests is vital to any scenario where co-operative 
governance is necessary (Lockwood et al., 2009). Working partnerships that are the basis for 
co-operative governance must be formed with mutual respect for alternative or competing 
interests. In such circumstances, natural resource governance is more likely to be sustainable. 
9.1.3 Assumptions 
This research makes certain assumptions about the circumstances that exist in co-operative 
governance scenarios. These assumptions are critical in assessing scenarios where co-
operative governance could potentially be of use. When they are not in place then the 
likelihood of sustainable co-operative governance will decrease and ways need to be found to 
work around the inhibiting factors. The main assumptions that form a basis for this thesis‘ 
characterisation of effective co-operative governance are: 
 Legal frameworks are in place that can enable democratic governance of common-
pool resources and private or community ownership of land 
 Stakeholder groups want to resolve interests and work together – they must be willing 
to negotiate and compromise 
 Stakeholder groups are willing to be transparent with one another and governance 
actors are willing to be transparent with, and accountable to, stakeholders; when 
transparency is low, trust is low and co-operation is unlikely 
 Government is willing to decentralise and devolve governing power; where 
governance power was decentralised, powerful individuals at the community level 
were able to co-opt governance processes to create more benefit for themselves 
 Alternative livelihoods can be created where natural resource dependence is high; 
where there are no alternatives to high-levels of subsistence natural resource use, and 
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populations are increasing, there is serious risk to the ability of ecosystems to provide 
goods and services to stakeholders in the long-term 
 There is financial opportunity to create alternative livelihoods – where there is not 
possible from tourism income alone, this needs to be created by patrons providing 
donations or aid organisations funding development projects; the bottom line is that 
conservation costs and in cases where it inhibits resource access, alternatives need to 
be provided if there is to be any buy-in to conservation among affected stakeholders 
 Stakeholder champions (for non-homogenous groups) are present; this means that 
people who are elected to positions of power should be committed to holding 
themselves accountable for their governance practices, and it is especially relevant in 
groups like historically marginalised communities that are not entirely committed to 
co-operation with conservation related stakeholders. Without committed individuals 
who are able to influence others in their own group, it can be difficult to bring about 
changes in group opinion and behaviour. 
These assumptions are not entirely limiting, meaning that there will be ways to work around 
some of them. Certain of these assumptions can potentially be entirely limiting however, for 
example where groups do not want to resolve their conflicting interests and work together 
there is little hope for a sustainable resolution. But with other factors there are ways to avoid 
or mitigate their limiting influence, for example when government is not willing to 
decentralise or devolve governing power then stakeholders who are willing to co-operate can 
form a working partnership that does not involve the unyielding stakeholders.  
Achieving positive outcomes would be less likely where governing actors are unyielding. An 
example of this is the Mnemba Island MCA: the government is unwilling to increase the level 
of governance participation among affected communities and they are unwilling to be 
transparent on sensitive issues such as the management of financial income from tourism. 
Despite this there is a potential work around. In this scenario it would be helpful if tourism 
stakeholders were willing to work around government‘s unyielding nature and provide 
benefit to the communities through alternative means like the Africa Foundation. Additionally 
stakeholders that the government are willing to engage with can try to gently influence 
government decision making with the hope that in the future they might be willing to 
negotiate and co-operate. This could be difficult to realistically achieve but it is possible in 
certain circumstances (see the recommendations below for the Mnemba Island Marine 
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Conservation Area in Tanzania). These assumptions could be used to direct future research in 
a way that provides meaningful contributions to effecting sustainable co-operative natural 
resource governance in scenarios where it seems unlikely to occur. 
9.2 Recommendations 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the factors affecting stakeholder co-operation in 
natural resource governance, with particular reference to ecotourism in concession type 
protected areas. The three cases in this study had a variety of imperfections in working 
arrangements. This is to be expected and the analysis and comparison of these three cases has 
yielded some useful information that can positively impact the outcomes of stakeholder co-
operation. Recommendations are made for each case based on the abstracted principles 
presented earlier in this chapter. These recommendations focus on general systemic issues 
rather than individual issues raised by participants. Any of these suggestions could be 
incorporated in order to improve the state and sustainability of co-operative governance. No 
references are provided in this section because the real-world and theoretical underpinnings 
of the recommendations have been sufficiently discussed throughout this thesis. 
9.2.1 Klein’s Camp and the Ololosokwan Conservancy, Loliondo, Tanzania 
The main problems creating barriers to better co-operation between stakeholders are conflict 
over access to grazing, awareness about resource over-use, a lack of land-use planning, poor 
rule adherence at the local level, difficulties accessing alternative livelihoods, low benefit 
sharing transparency and financial accountability, and poor representation of community 
members by the village council. Recommendations are presented for each of these issues. 
While there were major issues that the community had with regional and national 
government, the land is owned by the village and so the government is less relevant to the 
issue of sustainable resource sharing between non-consumptive tourism and local subsistence 
resource use. Moreover the Tanzanian government has presented itself as a largely unyielding 
entity in some respects and so recommendations are aimed at the other main stakeholders 
whose relations are critical to the long-term sustainability of natural resource use: &Beyond 
and the Ololosokwan community.  
Access to grazing land for Maasai cattle on the Ololosokwan conservancy land is an issue 
that has put &Beyond and the community members at odds with one another. This conflict 
could be mitigated by &Beyond negotiating access to grazing land within the concession in 
certain seasons, for certain numbers of animals dependent on grazing conditions, and at a 
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reduced rate of payment per acre. In the long-term the solution would be to reduce the size of 
local herds of cattle, but in the short-term a more realistic option would be to negotiate 
limited access to the conservancy for grazing.  
The management of natural resources has been a contentious issue. Rules relating to land-use 
planning that were negotiated within the community and with &Beyond have not been 
strictly adhered to, causing conflict between the community and tourism stakeholders like 
&Beyond, Buffalo Luxury Camp, and in the past Nomad Safaris. There has been an 
increasing number of cattle incursions into the conservancy. The solution that &Beyond was 
working towards included a higher fine for herdsmen bringing their cattle onto conservancy 
land, as well as a community fine to create social pressure for those wanting to intrude onto 
conservancy land with their cattle. &Beyond could also negotiate for the community to fine 
community members living within a certain distance of the conservancy for more than 6 
months, or more than 1 month after the rainy season had begun, or a limit to be placed on the 
number of cattle that could be housed in temporary bomas within a certain distance of 
conservancy boundaries. This strict form of resource access control is arguably a ‗fences and 
fines‘ approach but it has yielded positive results by replacing direct resource access with 
extensive benefit sharing at the community and household level. While most of these benefits 
do not directly replace the grazing that is lost to the conservancy, such as healthcare or 
education, it was understood by residents that they were essentially trading grazing for these 
benefits. The level of satisfaction with this arrangement varied among community members. 
Cattle management will be one of the most important ways to resolve conflict over grazing 
resource access going forward. &Beyond can help the community initiate improved cattle 
management by empowering younger herd owners to buy, fatten, breed, and sell their herds 
according to the rainy seasons. One of the local complaints about selling cattle frequently was 
the distance to the nearest slaughterhouse: herders either had to take their cattle to Arusha, a 
large town in northern Tanzania or across the border to Kenya. The Africa Foundation could 
fund the establishment of a business to transport cattle by truck to the slaughterhouse in 
Arusha. There also needs to be an increased level of awareness and education about the 
benefits and difficulties associated with farming other breeds of cattle. Management of other 
breeds has been reportedly difficult and management of a smaller but higher yielding 
commercial herd has been beyond the reach of most local cattle owners, but the Africa 
Foundation could help with that. 
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One of the important factors that was largely lacking in Ololosokwan was general 
understanding about carrying capacity of cattle on grazing land. Many of the herders stated 
that the land was being over-grazed in their opinion, but they did not speak about the idea of 
carrying capacity in any form. A widely suggested solution to the increasing numbers of 
cattle was for the village council to limit the number of cattle per household, but there was no 
scientific reasoning behind the suggested number of 80 head of cattle per household. The 
Africa Foundation could help get members of the community trained to use freely available 
remote sensing imagery and open-source software to monitor grazing land quality each year, 
as well as on-ground monitoring for grazing yield per hectare. Alternatively they could help 
the community to organise this service rendered by a consultancy. This would help generate 
scientific understanding among residents about carrying capacity and land degradation. 
The reasoning behind these recommendations is that the population will continue to grow and 
so if &Beyond is committed to conservation and indigenous people like the Maasai, then they 
should get involved in transforming the local economy to secure the future of conservation 
(and thus their business), thereby also improving local quality of life in the long-term without 
negatively impacting biodiversity. Local champions can be helped in demonstrating the 
benefits of alternatives and a money-based economy in the community. They also need to 
explain to younger people that there is a decreasing amount of land so they need to diversify 
their livelihoods. The Africa Foundation needs to become more involved in suggesting 
livelihoods related to cattle or other livelihoods that are not natural resource based. Younger 
people in Ololosokwan were typically more interested in money than large herds of cattle. 
The Foundation could help them access livelihoods that decrease the cattle population.  
Communication needs to be encouraged between the community and &Beyond or the Africa 
Foundation. Poor representation and an inability to approach &Beyond were issues that local 
people mentioned. &Beyond or the foundation could bypass the problem of poor 
representation by the village council by speaking directly with community members in an 
open meeting. They could also perform occasional opinion polls using the services of a 
bipartisan Maasai (most likely to be an individual from outside of Ololosokwan). This would 
be to find out local perceptions, the varied interests of members of the community, discover 
issues that the village council does not raise, and ask for suggestions to improve relations or 
solve issues. &Beyond could also set up a way for community members to engage with them 
directly, providing a possible route for escalation of issues to a higher level like Klein‘s Camp 
management. This could be done by the Africa Foundation and would increase their 
242 
 
awareness of expectations and barriers to co-operation within the community. 
Some of the community members suggested that they would like &Beyond to help increase 
the level of transparency around financial income from tourism in the community. This could 
be achieved by &Beyond revealing their payments with community members in an open 
meeting in the community. Others though it a good idea for &Beyond to suggest appointing a 
separate committee to manage the community income from tourism, or even a committee that 
would monitor the financial management. Despite this interest, it is most likely too late for 
&Beyond to try establishing a benefit sharing framework to encourage transparency. They 
should use their financial influence to create opportunities for transparency in other ways. 
Ideally tourism stakeholders would negotiate for financial transparency from the village 
council but powerful individuals could then block the renewing of a contract with &Beyond 
making way for another tourism company to use the conservancy, one that would be 
disinterested in transparency.  
9.2.2 Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area, Zanzibar, Tanzania 
The main issues in the Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area that are leading to the 
current state of unsustainable resource use and lack of co-operation were found to be the 
unyielding nature of government authorities, an almost complete lack of benefit sharing 
between government conservation authorities and the communities, and a lack of alternative 
livelihoods to relieve pressure on marine biodiversity from the increasing intensity of 
subsistence resource use. 
One thing that the lodge management at &Beyond Mnemba Island Lodge have been working 
on is helping the Zanzibarian government authorities move to action, as well as influencing 
decision making of these government authorities like the MIMCA Authority or the Integrated 
Coastal-Zone Management Committee. The MIMCA Authority seems to be under-resourced 
in both finances and human resources, and thus unable to complete many of the basic 
management actions that have been set out in the Draft General Management Plan (MCU, 
2010). In order to avoid complete stagnation of conservation and biodiversity management in 
the MCA, &Beyond could harness the weight of the local Zanzibarian tourism industry along 
with all tourism operators to drive management action in the MCA despite the lack of 
government resources. The hope would be that government will become more responsive to 
the needs of other stakeholders over time, but failing this at least the tourism industry can 
work with the Zanzibarian government to accomplish basic management actions like policing 
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subsistence resource harvesting in core conservation zones or improving awareness about 
protecting sensitive marine resources. 
To increase the likelihood of governance co-operation on the Mnemba Atoll, &Beyond could 
take more a of a leadership role in the Zanzibarian dive tourism industry. As the Mnemba 
Island Lodge manager stated, there is no unified voice in this industry. There is thus an 
opportunity to create one and become an enabling force in lobbying government for change. 
This would also enable &Beyond and the Africa Foundation to partner with other tourism 
enterprises to raise funds for development. Many of the other tourism operations might not be 
luxury destinations attracting wealthy guests but a high volume of small donations can gather 
significance quickly. This might entail electronic payments for donations or giving cash to 
registered operators who are willing to pass on funds to a multi-party management board 
through a transparent process of fund collection. At this stage, it is unlikely that the 
philanthropic potential of tourism to Zanzibar is realised. &Beyond could help the dive 
tourism industry to achieve this through donor financing strategies for local social and 
infrastructural development opportunities. 
One of the key parts of the &Beyond ethos is ‗Care of the People‘. Part of their commitment 
to this would be realised in continuing to assist researchers working on the Mnemba Atoll. 
Continual monitoring is important if data is to be available for raising awareness and 
knowing the state of ecosystems on the atoll. It is not only for the sake of &Beyond business 
but also for the future of local people living along the MIMCA coastline. Research can 
provide information that can be shared through education and awareness initiatives, 
improving the level of understanding that local people have of the importance that resource 
management and sustainable use plays in their future. 
The Africa Foundation could play a more significant role in the MIMCA. The Foundation, 
and other NGOs, can serve to bypass issues stemming from government non-transparency by 
sharing benefits directly with communities. These benefits can include improving access to 
deep water fishing equipment and alternative livelihoods, funding community development 
and social improvement. They could also provide awareness as to who the MIMCA Authority 
is, who &Beyond and the Africa Foundation are, and what their roles and responsibilities are 
in the MCA. This could be the start to improving perceptions of &Beyond (and other 
participating tourism operators) and the development of co-operative relations. The 
Foundation could also partner with local NGOs and local champions in communities on 
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MCA coastline53 in order to educate people about damaging resource use practices. It could 
also find international funding for alternative livelihood projects through NGOs; establish 
simple forms of mariculture like mussel farming; establish artificial reefs with the help of 
international scientists; establish fish aggregation devices; and rather than giving offshore 
fishing equipment like boats to the community or to individuals, the Foundation could help 
create an NGO which owns and manages the use of the donated equipment with a small 
rental paid per trip that is proportional to the catch. This last suggestion would also be helpful 
in monitoring by-catch and overall yields. 
In this case, if the government were to yield on their position to not release information on 
financial management of MIMCA income, or if they were to be willing to partner with 
communities or tourism operators in managing the MCA, this would be one of the greatest 
ways to bring about change. Much of the conflict stems from the lack of transparency about 
management of financial income and the lack of benefit flow to the communities. Failing this, 
the tourism industry could by-pass the pitfalls associated with government inaction in the 
ways described above. 
9.2.3 Phinda Game Reserve, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 
The main problems that were creating barriers to greater co-operation between &Beyond and 
the communities around Phinda Game Reserve were a lack of involvement of the younger 
generation in conservation management and the business side of tourism to Phinda, a lack of 
skills development for middle and upper management positions in the Phinda employment 
hierarchy, and a lack of awareness about perceptions and issues at household level in local 
communities.  
One of the things that became apparent after speaking to some of the younger employees and 
trainees at &Beyond lodges in the Phinda Game Reserve was that their opinions were 
important for the future of biodiversity as well as &Beyond‘s business in Phinda Game 
Reserve. There should be more involvement of the younger generation in the management of 
conservation and tourism in Phinda Game Reserve. This age set typically had a greater 
proportion of people who had poor perceptions of &Beyond, specifically because of their 
lack of involvement. The older generation was more concerned with benefits, but the younger 
                                                 
53 For example MCAEE (Matemwe Control of HIV/Aids, Environment and Education) or the Mnemba 
Conservation Club. 
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generation has the vision of running a community-owned business on their portion of the 
lodge land in the future so that all profits go to the community. In order to make the 
transition, higher positions in of employment in Phinda need to be filled by competent local 
people who have been prepared for the job. Thus &Beyond could improve the state of 
relations now, and also secure the state of relations in the future when younger generations 
take leadership positions, by working with the younger people in local communities and 
training them for positions within the &Beyond employment hierarchy at Phinda. The 
younger generation can provide income for their families and change perceptions of 
conservation across the community, creating lasting change because of their future placement 
in positions of influence in these communities. 
In addition &Beyond should undertake opinion polls to learn more about the interests and 
concerns of residents across the communities living adjacent to Phinda. They can also help 
with minor issues where possible (like provision of wildlife meat to community gatherings). 
This would give greater voice to any individuals or groups who get marginalised. 
The Africa Foundation should begin to monitor the deployment and impact of their 
community development projects. At this stage this is not something that they are doing 
effectively and so they are able to learn little from their engagement processes with the 
communities. By monitoring deployment and impact of projects they could improve the way 
in which these projects operate and improve the way in which the Foundation works with the 
communities. The Foundation is a critical stakeholder that can create positive perceptions of 
conservation and improve co-operation with &Beyond. These recommendations would help 
to connect &Beyond with the community at large and the younger generation, rather than 
maintaining the current state of relations that exist with the older leaders in the communities. 
If they do not act now to work with the younger generation and connect with the community 
directly, they might find that when this younger generation attains positions of influence in 
the communities their co-operation with the communities is not as secure as it is today. 
9.3 Efficacy and Contribution of this Research 
Many of the results from this study that add evidence to, or differ from, recent research have 
already been discussed, but this section presents a series of contributions that this thesis 
makes to co-operative natural resource governance literature at a higher conceptual level. 
While this research does present a set of abstracted principles affecting co-operative 
governance by using a comparison of three case studies, it does present a set of guidelines 
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that can improve co-operative natural resource governance and makes specific 
recommendations for each of the cases considered. Other similarly placed practitioners could 
learn from these. This thesis is dissimilar from typical design principle work in that it has 
focused on social aspects of governance. Most of the research that analyses factors 
contributing to successful outcomes in co-operative common-pool resource governance 
focuses on an abstracted set of institutional principles which can be difficult to apply in 
varying contexts (Cox, Arnold & Tomás, 2010; Ostrom, 1990). These principles do not take 
into consideration the historically and socially embedded factors that affect governance actors 
and the networks they operate in (Cox, Arnold & Tomás, 2010:38). This thesis takes an 
approach that resembles Young‘s (2002) diagnostic approach wherein political ecology 
becomes a useful data gathering and analytical framework. While it is recognised that the 
design principles provide a set of conditions that generally occur in sustainable common-pool 
resource governance (Agrawal, 2002), this thesis shows that they are not enough by 
presenting a set of socially embedded factors that has directly affected co-operative 
governance. 
Similar to what Dressler et al. (2010) argued, this thesis finds that a market-based approach 
to co-operative resource governance typically provides more tangible benefits to local people 
than the alternative. It is argued in this thesis that private ecotourism investors have 
significant potential to positively impact resource use and management in what might 
otherwise be areas of marginal interest to conservation and tourism. Through the use of 
tourism markets, they also have power to influence poor perceptions of biodiversity 
conservation thereby increasing local buy-in to conservation initiatives, improving the 
likelihood that sustainable resource use can occur where there are multiple conflicting 
resource use interests (Schmitt, 2010). Bardhan (2000) suggested that co-operation was 
linked to market connections, both non-consumptive and consumptive markets. This study 
demonstrates these connections and stresses the importance of stakeholders meeting their 
interests for resource access to accrue financial gain and/or an improved quality of life. This 
thesis does find evidence to support Dressler et al. (2010) and Bardhan‘s (2000) idea that 
market connections are linked to co-operation, but in this research it was found that the 
availability of markets for consumptive resource users did not always disrupt non-
consumptive resource users. This differs from findings of Cinner and McClanahan (2006). In 
the case of Mnemba there were fewer of the higher trophic level marine species due to 
selective overuse, but at Ololosokwan in the Klein‘s case the lack of available markets led to 
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resource overuse due to herders‘ inability to sell their cattle. Markets serve different functions 
in different contexts. Their efficacy in relation to livelihoods and biodiversity conservation 
for tourism should be considered. 
Crona and Hubacek (2010) stated that ―selecting stakeholders from different organizations 
and sectors is simply not enough. Neither is it enough to simply find those stakeholders who 
represent different stakes. Instead, practitioners need to come to grips with the fact that 
individuals are embedded in social ties, and that it is these ties that are constraining and 
influencing peoples‘ perceptions about management practices… Examination of social 
networks, i.e., the patterned relations linking actors together, be they formal or informal, 
offers many new insights relevant for natural resource governance.‖ This study not only 
investigated the social ties, but it also incorporated the arguments presented by Saunders 
(2014) and Agrawal and Gibson (1999) which state that communities are complex, non-
homogeneous groups whose norms and interests need to be considered in a fuzzy manner so 
that ad-hoc social networks can be considered in intra- and inter-stakeholder analysis. 
Shackleton et al. (2010) indicated that much of the current research on community-based 
natural resource management (of which the community-based wildlife management cases in 
this research are a form) ignores the relative power relations within stakeholder groups such 
as communities. This study focuses on a finer scale at the local level examining ―who gains, 
who loses and why, and what mechanisms can be developed… to promote greater rights, 
security of such rights, equity and justice‖ (Shackleton et al., 2010:2). The approach this 
thesis takes contributes to a conceptual move away from simply handing over responsibilities 
to communities towards greater recognition of the difficulties that occur in dealing with 
socially complex stakeholder groups (Agrawal et al., 2002). This thesis presents an argument 
which proposes that such a recognition should precipitate a more intricate and sensitive 
handling of community engagement in conservation and ecotourism rather than a simple and 
straightforward devolution of power merely because stakeholders have the right to this 
power. The nature of power is important: stakeholders should seek authentic and negotiated 
power as opposed to management structures that are imposed and not inclusive. 
Crona and Hubacek (2010) wrote that ―much work remains before we will fully understand 
how relations among actors, and the structuring of these relations, affect natural resource 
governance outcomes.‖ This thesis contributes to our understanding of how stakeholder 
relations affect co-operative natural resource governance outcomes, with particular reference 
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to ecotourism occurring in common-pool ecosystems that are available for use by subsistence 
consumptive resource users. The study investigated how three socio-environmental problems 
were socially constructed and demonstrated that co-operation which results in positive 
outcomes can be difficult to achieve due to the number of factors affecting stakeholder 
relations during the governance process.  
Future research could focus on a specific series of topics that would help practitioners 
implementing people-oriented conservation initiatives (specifically co-operative governance 
in the context of private ecotourism partnerships) and help stakeholders better understand 
how to work so that they can co-operate. There is also a suggestion in the list below for future 
research to work within a typology that would make the majority of individual case studies 
more comparable, enabling greater comparison of case studies that are currently not 
comparable due to the contextual nature of qualitative research. The list below comprises a 
set of suggestions for future research that would build on the knowledge gained by this 
research: 
 The impact of different legal frameworks on democratic governance of resources at 
community level 
 The structure and implementation of mechanisms that enforce accountability and 
transparency in the management of shared and/or contested resources, with particular 
interest in financial income from tourism  
 The potential for alternative livelihoods to reduce natural resource dependence and 
how to increase their uptake in communities 
 The use of socio-economic development initiatives as a tool for improving the 
sustainability and efficacy of conservation 
 The impact of market availability for resources relating to ecosystems and 
stakeholders involved in co-operative governance 
 Cases where tourism does not generate large amounts of profit that can be shared as a 
benefit with local communities – how to work around this or create other benefits 
from conservation and tourism 
 The role of local champions in creating behaviour change in stakeholder groups that 
are contesting resource use or access with other stakeholders 
 Long-term monitoring of the impact of community perceptions on the outcomes of 
conservation, either in qualitative case format or quantitative analysis of many cases 
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 The state of biodiversity health in and around privately leased protected areas like the 
ones included in this study would provide interesting information for analysis on the 
impact that social relations between stakeholders have on the environment, as well as 
be a good way to monitor resource use and warn of potential ecosystem collapse 
 The nature of mechanisms that enable decentralised governance of natural resources 
to be inclusive and effective, as opposed to allowing the marginalisation of 
community members who are not in (or near to those who are in) positions of power 
and 
 The more widespread use in research of a typology that classifies people-oriented 
conservation according to common characteristics, like the framework devised by 
Plummer, Kulczycki and Stacey (2006). 
9.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the contextual social factors that affected co-
operative natural resource governance in three different ecotourism cases. In this regard the 
work set about characterising stakeholders so that questions could be asked about their 
interactions over shared resources and conflicting interests. Benefit sharing and the power 
landscape that stakeholders worked in were two of the most influential factors that affected 
the outcomes of co-operative governance. These outcomes were measured against the goals 
that were set by stakeholders and the factors were investigated as they arose throughout the 
adaptive participatory research process. The analytical process was arguably biased by the 
researcher‘s subjective assessment but care was taken at every stage of the process to let the 
results emerge on their own, the researcher merely being a catalyst aiding their revelation 
from the murky waters that are people-oriented conservation, community-based natural 
resource management, and co-operative conservation.  
What this study emphasises is that social factors are at the core of multi-party resource 
governance. If we cannot understand them, we will likely not succeed in conserving 
biodiversity in our increasingly populated world. In relation to the third, fourth, and fifth 
objectives for this study it should be noted that while some of the results presented here may 
seem to be common sense, it is certainly not common practice. As such it was thought to be a 
useful study in bringing focus onto the most important part of co-operative natural resource 
governance and conservation: the human part. A significant portion of research that exists 
today searches for absolutist answers that can be quantified and abstracted so that predictable 
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outcomes can be reproduced without end; but the thing about humans is that we are not 
predictable. The feelings of the human heart cannot be quantified – but they can, at times, be 
understood. It is the search for this understanding that motivated this thesis. Partnerships and 
social relations built on mutual respect of interests and trust of others are the foundation of 
co-operation; without them co-operation does not thrive. With them, who knows what is 
possible and the answer to many of life‘s great and wicked problems might be achievable if 
we are able to work together. Here‘s to hoping we can. 
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Appendix A – Discussion guide used during primary data gathering 
Who are the stakeholders in this protected area? 
Who has claims to the resources in this protected area?  
What are the resources that are important to these stakeholders? 
What are stakeholders concerns about natural resources in the protected area? 
Resource use 
Are any natural resources from within the protected area used for local community livelihoods? 
Are there any benefits that the community receives from living adjacent to a protected area? 
What are these benefits? 
Who receives them? Who decides who receives them? 
Are the benefits received affected by the community power hierarchy? 
Who owns the land that the protected area is on? 
How has this land ownership changed in the past? 
What natural resources do local community members use on their land next to the protected area? 
How have community resource-use habits changed over the last two decades? 
What are the common livelihoods in this community? 
Are natural resources illegally utilised inside this protected area? 
Do communities living around the protected area use illegal methods of harvesting? 
If so why? 
Is there over-utilisation of resources inside the protected area? Around the protected area? 
Which resources and why are they over-utilised? 
How has the availability of resources changed over the last two decades? 
What were the changes in the diversity of resources? 
What were the changes in the distribution of resources? 
What are the roles of stakeholders?  
What responsibilities do you have in the management of resources in this protected area?  
What are the responsibilities of other stakeholders? 
Are they fulfilling their responsibilities? 
What roles could stakeholders expand to fill? 
Have you ever seen stakeholders fulfilling the roles of other stakeholders? How? 
What is required of stakeholders for the successful management of: 
This protected area? 
Natural resources? 
Decision making process 
What is the process for making management decisions in this protected area? 
Who designed this process? Who manages it? Is it effective? 
Which stakeholders are involved in making decisions? 
What is the best way for stakeholders to get involved in decision making? 
How do stakeholders assert themselves in the decision making process? 
Who is responsible for making resource management decisions in the space around the protected area? 
Are decision-making processes transparent?  
If not, what can be done to encourage transparency? 
How can decision making build ownership and commitment? 
Influence of stakeholders 
Who is involved in making decisions? 
Who is influential in decision making and in what ways? 
Do these stakeholders use their power to overwhelm other stakeholders or undermine their 
participation? How? 
Rank stakeholders according to the influence they have on decisions made 
Who has the power to make final decisions?  
Are they using this power in a way that benefits all stakeholders equally, or do some benefit more than 
others? 
Impact on stakeholders 
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Who is most dependent on the resources at stake?  
Is it for livelihoods or economic gains?  
Are there alternatives to these forms of dependence? 
Rank stakeholders from most to least impacted upon by resource management decisions in the 
protected area 
In what ways will they be affected? 
Importance for success 
Who has been involved in decision making historically? What has this led to? 
Who has not been involved but should have been? 
Who has been side-lined and in what ways? 
What are the risks of not engaging a particular stakeholder? 
Who will obstruct decisions if not involved?  
Who could in any way obstruct decisions? 
Stakeholder engagement 
Which stakeholders need to communicate about resource management? 
Why do they need to communicate? 
Are they communicating in this way already? 
How can they engage in the best way? 
Investigate axes of tension 
Which stakeholders are in greatest opposition to each other and which stakeholders show the greatest 
level of co-operation? 
Which stakeholder groups‘ goals are being threatened? By whom and in what ways? 
How are conservation targets threatened? 
How are local community livelihoods threatened? 
What issues do stakeholders contend over? 
What resources do stakeholders contend over? 
What has been the result of contentions in the past? What is their state if they are on-going? 
How can collaboration be enabled between contending stakeholders? 
What are the barriers preventing better collaboration between stakeholders? 
What are stakeholder perceptions of the protected area? 
What are stakeholder expectations of the protected area? 
How do stakeholders show their support or disapproval for the protected area and the way it is run?  
What are stakeholders‘ ideals for the protected area? 
Population 
How has the local population (human and cattle) changed over the last two decades 
Are there problems that have come about in resource use and management because of population 
changes? If so what? 
Stakeholder Knowledge 
In what ways are natural resources important to you? 
What do these concepts mean to you? 
Sustainability 
Community-based conservation 
Please explain the social hierarchy in this community (for local community key informants) 
What are the levels of power/social recognition? 
How do people attain a certain level of recognition? 
How many people occupy each of these levels of recognition? What is the average age and sex 
in each level? 
What is the process for making community-wide decisions in the community? Who is 
involved and what is their ranking in the community hierarchy? 
What forms of local environmental knowledge exist in this community? 
How does this knowledge come to exist?  
How does it get widely known? 
How does it become generally accepted? 
How open are people to new knowledge, from local and non-local sources? 
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Appendix B – Final list of codes and code families from the data analysis process 
1 Benefits Beneficiaries Lack of 
Fairness in allocation List 
Impact on behaviour Management of 
Impact on perceptions  
2 Community Accountability to the Population 
Adaptation Quality of life 
Change Representation in negotiation and planning 
Expectations Role in resource management/conservation 
External aid Social indicators 
History of dispossession Understanding of arrangements 
Politics Wealth 
3 Concepts CBC Sustainability 
Climate WMA 
4 Conservation Interest in Related behaviour 
5 Government Assuming authority Mistrust of 
Corridor Partnerships 
Difficulty in working with Responsibilities 
Lack of action Stakeholder engagement 
6 Livelihoods Alternative Cattle 
Business Cattle, concession 
Crops Cattle, income/use 
Marine Cattle, management 
Nomadism Cattle, market 
Tourism Cattle, population 
Women Cattle, pride 
7 Natural resources Access to Land-use plan 
Appropriate management 
structures Management 
Change Overuse 
Dependence on Ownership 
Education/awareness on Poaching 
Human impact on Traditional harvesting 
Land law Use/harvesting 
8 Perception of community of NGO 
of conservation of protected area 
of government of tourism operators 
9 Power Community in the community 
Government Side-lined 
in management to influence 
10 Relations Adjudication Model 
Barriers Negative 
Co-operation Negotiation 
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Communication Opposition 
Conflict Participation 
Consultation Partnerships 
Contracts Positive 
Corruption Social capital 
Decision making Solutions 
Formality of co-operation threats to one another 
Homogeneity of interests Transparency 
Interests Trust 
Leadership Use of force 
11 Rules Locally devised norms Restrictions on harvesting 
Locally devised rules Sanctions on rule breakers 
12 Stakeholders &Beyond NGO 
Africa Foundation OBC 
Maasai Patrol 
MIMCA Phinda 
 
